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11 Introduction
B
etween 1950 and 1985, the number of divorces per 10,000 married couples per annum in the
Netherlands rose from 30 to 99 (CBS 2001). The overall increase in divorce rates throughout the
past few decades is related to changes in society such as women’s increasing economic
independence and changing norms and values. This study investigates some specific social and cultural
causes of divorce: spouse selection and mixed marriage in particular. In this introductory chapter, I will
begin by subsequently discussing mixed marriage, divorce and the relationship between them. The
meaning of these phenomena, their societal and scientific history and relevance and research findings
will be discussed within this discourse. Next, the research questions of the present study will be derived.
This will be followed by a brief overview of the theories and the data to be used to answer the research
questions. The actual answers will follow in five empirical papers forming Chapters 2 to 6. The
organization of these chapters will conclude this introductory chapter.
1.1 Mixed marriage
The main focus of this study is on the relationship between socially mixed marriage and divorce.
There are several terms in use for the phenomenon of mixed marriage. If spouses resemble each
other, we speak of a homogamous marriage. A couple in which husband and wife differ is called
heterogamous. Other words for non-mixed marriage are homogamy, endogamy, in-marriage or
assortative marriage; other words for mixed marriage are heterogamy, exogamy, out-marriage or
mixed marriage.1
1.1.1 Mixed marriage and its relevance to society
The expression ‘mixed marriage’ in society is mainly associated with religion and sometimes with
ethnicity. Nevertheless, there are more social characteristics which constitute dividing lines. This
implies that marriages can be mixed with regard to all these social characteristics. This book will
deal with mixed marriage regarding age, education, social status, religion, ethnicity and social
status of origin. I will now discuss the relevance of these types of heterogamy.
Due to secularization, there is a large group of people not affiliated to any religion. The people
who are affiliated are mainly Christian, although immigration throughout the past few decades
has increased the number of affiliates to other religions, like Islam or Hinduism. The Christian
group itself can be divided into several denominations. The main dichotomization of this would be
between Catholics and Protestants. The Protestants mainly consist of two Calvinist mainstreams,
the Dutch reformed (in Dutch: ‘Nederlands hervormd’) and Re-reformed (in Dutch: ‘gereformeerd’,
mostly the more conservative groups, which evolved out of several church schisms). An old Dutch
expression says: “Twee geloven op één kussen, daar slaapt de duivel tussen” which may be translated
into: “When two faiths share one pillow, the devil sleeps in-between”. This expression refers to
Catholic/Protestant mixed marriages. It took until 1971 before an official mutual recognition
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between the Catholic church and several Protestant churches of mixed marriages came about.
Opinions have modernized, but some reservations towards mixed marriages can still be
noticed. Surprisingly, religious heterogamy still attracts attention, even in Dutch society, which is
highly secularized. This is illustrated by public interest in the Royal Family. In 1998, Prince
Maurits, a nephew of Queen Beatrix and Dutch Reformed according to the tradition of the Royal
Family, married the Catholic Marilène van den Broek. This union caused considerable
consternation amongst the more traditionally minded of both denominations.2 The commotion
was not as profound as in 1964, when the marriage between the present queen’s sister, Princess
Irene with the Catholic French-Spanish Hugo Carlos was preceded by the princess’s secret
conversion to Catholicism. Mixed marriages in the Royal Family have again become a hot item in
the Netherlands since Crown Prince Willem-Alexander announced his engagement to Máxima
Zorreguieta, an Argentinean Catholic. The ethnic part as such does not seem to be the main part of
the commotion, although it caused much ado years earlier, when Prince Willem-Alexander’s
mother, Queen Beatrix, married a German, Claus Von Amsberg. By marrying a German, Queen
Beatrix was following in her mother and grandmother’s footsteps. Royal families are often very
international and in fact, Prince Willem-Alexander is a second generation allochthonous in the
sense of the wide definition of Statistics Netherlands: one of his parents was born abroad; as a
matter of fact, three of his grandparents were born abroad. In the case of Zorreguieta, the main
cause of the commotion lies in the fact that her father was a minister in the junta regime of Videla
in Argentina, during which many people were tortured and killed or disappeared without ever
having been found.
Up to now, two types of mixed marriage have been mentioned: with respect to religion and
with respect to ethnicity. Even though the term ‘mixed marriage’ often makes people think of
religion and ethnicity, other types are also of social relevance. The aforementioned public interest
in the Royal Family reminds us of other types of mixed marriage. According to old fairy tales, a
(handsome) prince always marries a (pretty) princess, yet in more recent royal marriages, the
princes have married commoners without a trace of blue blood. This study does not investigate
mixed marriage regarding nobility, but will examine other characteristics of descent. Husband and
wife may be mixed by stemming from a different economic or cultural background. They may
come from a rich or a poor family, or from a culturally more or less sophisticated family. This
notion manifests itself in society in the form of questions such as: “What does his (or her) father
do for a living?” Apparently, people are interested in the profession of their girlfriend’s or
boyfriend’s parents. It gives a good impression of his or her social background. This question often
comes from the parents as well, who would like their children to have the best future possible.
This wish extends to a desire that their children marry someone from an advantageous social
background.
The characteristics mentioned up till now are those inherited from the parents: parental social
status, ethnicity and religion. Although religion is one’s own choice, in most instances, it is
something that one has been brought up with. Most cases in the Netherlands of a person not
following his or her parental religion refer to people who have left the church. Since society has
become more meritocratic, one’s own social characteristics have become more relevant as a quick
indicator of one’s (social) position in society. That is why I will study mixed marriages with respect
to social characteristics which come about by one’s own achievement. These characteristics are
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age, level of education and social status of the spouses themselves. In this way, we make a
distinction between inherited characteristics of ascription and meritocratic characteristics of own
achievement.
Thus, instead of looking at parental profession, people also pay attention to their future
spouse’s own profession and education. These characteristics indicate where a person stands
when it comes to money, culture and future perspectives. If someone marries a spouse with a
higher social position or education – or one from a high status background for that matter – this
can be interpreted as a success. This, however, implies that the spouse in question marries
someone with a lower social position. From this point of view, the person with the lowest social
position might be looked upon as a sponge. Age can be added to this list of characteristics. It is
considered ‘normal’ if spouses are of about equal age or if the husband is somewhat older. An
older man with a young woman may derogatorily be called an old rake, whereas an older woman
with a young man is even more uncommon.
The description above implicitly considers the level of homogamy or heterogamy as an outcome of
the spouse selection process. Depending on how suitable a spouse one has chosen, the level of
social heterogamy will be higher or lower. When reasoning from spouse similarity, many people
will think of personality characteristics on which spouses can differ or resemble. Heterogamy
regarding these mainly psychological personality characteristics will not be a part of the analyses
in the present study. Preferences which have to do with the spouse selection process are
correlated with the social characteristics studied here. These social characteristics, interesting by
themselves, may also be seen as an indicator for a whole array of personality and life style
characteristics.
1.1.2 Mixed marriage, mobility research and the openness of society
This study fits in a historical sequence of sociological research in which sociological questions
related to social inequality and social cohesion or integration come together.3 The starting point is
that inequality does not need to be constant within society or within persons in a society. People
can be upwardly or downwardly mobile. Therefore, a branch in this historical sequence in
sociological research is labelled mobility research. A society can be considered more open as more
people have access to other positions than their previous one. Developments in this field of
research have been very rapid throughout the past few decades and have been guided both by the
subject of study and by methodological progress (Ganzeboom, Treiman & Ultee 1991).
In Figure 1.1, the left upper cell indicates research into intergenerational social mobility.
This has been methodologically split into two groups. The first is indicated by keywords such as
social class and mobility tables. A very well-known class scheme has been developed by Erikson,
Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1982; Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992). Models of analyses are built
around cross tabulations of fathers’ and sons’ occupational positions (for a basic overview, see
Hout 1983), in which odds ratios of intergenerational positional changes play a central role.
Mobility tables have been widely used and compared cross-nationally (Ganzeboom, Luijkx &
Treiman 1989). Formally, the class indications’ measurement level is nominal, but in practice they
are treated as discretely ordinal, since researchers speak of going up and going down the social
scale. Therefore, the second methodological group in the upper left cell in Figure 1.1 is based on
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continuous scales. Socio-economic indices of statuses of occupations have been developed and
used already since Blau and Duncan (1967). Later, distinctions between dimensions were added
(e.g. De Graaf & Kalmijn 1995). Also the prestige in society was measured (Van Tulder 1962;
Treiman 1977; Ultee & Sixma 1984).
Figure 1.1 Mobility research, heterogamy and divorce
Intergenerational mobility of occupation
– social class (EGP), mobility tables, odds
ratios, nominal/discrete measurement,
‘upward’ & ‘downward’. (Erikson,
Goldthorpe, Ganzeboom, Treiman)
– status, prestige, continuous scales (ISEI),
path models besides mobility tables.
(Blau, Duncan, De Graaf, Kalmijn, Van
Tulder, Treiman, Ultee)
– development of loglinear models,
multivariate.
Marriage patterns
– classes (see above). (Hout, Jones, Ultee,
Luijkx, Smits)
– status (see above). (Blau, Duncan,
Warren)
– development of loglinear models,
multivariate ; extension to e.g.:
– level of education;
– religion.
(Kalmijn, Hendrickx, Uunk)
Divorce patterns
– Given the marriage patterns, what are the
divorce risks? Integration of discrete and
continuous measurement (references in
text)
– Full integration of many types of
homogamy. (this study)
In the left lower cell of Figure 1.1, a similar distinction between class and status is made for the
investigation of marriage patterns. It was recognized early on that marriage patterns have a lot to
say about mobility and the openness of society. From the view of mobility, the reasoning would be
like this: if someone is socially mobile when he or she moves to a higher or lower position than his
or her father, then he or she is also mobile when marrying someone in a different position.
Obviously, the economic position of one’s spouse has consequences for one’s own economic
position. Analogously, marriage has social and cultural consequences. People will mingle in the
social circles of their spouse. If moving to another position than the one held by one’s father
indicates a flow between groups and, therefore, some sort of openness between those groups,
then moving to another position by marrying someone in another position indicates the same sort
of openness.
In fact, some status mobility researchers went into status homogamy research (Blau &
Duncan 1967; Warren 1966). Researchers treating social class as categorical entities applied their
models to homogamy (Hout 1982; Jones 1987; Ultee & Luijkx 1990; Smits 1996). This went along
with a further development in mobility research, mentioned in Figure 1.1, in which loglinear
models were further developed. An integration took place in which the cross tabulation format
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could be integrated with multivariate analyses in this field of research and in which several
characteristics besides status or class, like education and religion, could be studied (Kalmijn
1991b, Hendrickx 1994, Uunk 1996). In this way, the openness of society can be studied in many
social aspects. After all, openness is about integration and accessibility between social groups and
this can refer to any social characteristic.
1.2 Divorce
The number of divorces in the Netherlands has risen considerably in the last few decades. In 1950,
30 divorces per 10,000 married women occurred, whereas in 1985, there were 99 divorces per
10,000 married women. In subsequent years, the level of divorce stabilized or even decreased
slightly (Tas 1989).4 Predictions indicate that about one third of existing marriages will end in
divorce (Van Praag 1997).
The increase in the risk of divorce in the 1970s and 1980s can also be seen by following the
survival chances of marriage cohorts. Of all marriages contracted in the Netherlands in 1976, 6.6
percent had divorced after five years, 14.0 percent after ten years, 18.4 percent after fifteen years
and 22.3 percent after twenty years. For marriages which started in 1981, 9.5 percent had
divorced after five years, 16.1 after ten and 21.0 percent after fifteen years (CBS 1997a).
1.2.1 Divorce: some implications for society
The strong increase in divorce risks is generally explained by changes in society such as women’s
increased economic independence and changing norms and values (e.g. Janssen, Poortman, De
Graaf & Kalmijn 1998). The growing independence of women is illustrated by the number of
women who have paid jobs. In the situation of a traditional division of labour, the wife takes care
of the household without investing in her career, whereas the husband has the opportunity to
invest in his career. Economic theory (Becker 1981) has stressed the advantages of specialization
in marital relationships. These advantages are the reason for more stable marriages among
couples with a traditional division of labour. A more feminist perspective points to the fact that
the result of this division of labour is that the wife is financially dependent on her husband and
has fewer chances on the labour market after a divorce. In less traditional households, the wife
has a paid job or the potential to earn a living. This makes divorce more accessible to her (Cherlin
1979, 1981, Hannan, Tuma & Groeneveld 1977; Spitze & South 1985), even though the possibly
accompanying double income may reduce financial problems and, therefore, marital instability
(Cutright 1971). The relationship between female labour force participation and divorce is also
studied the other way around: the risk of divorce promotes the wife to work in order to be able to
make a living on her own if necessary (Diekmann 1994).
Changing norms and values can be seen in an increasing level of acceptance in Western
countries towards divorce as a solution for marital problems (Dumon & Kooy 1983; Kooy 1977;
Thornton 1995). This increasing level of acceptance of divorce is part of a more general increase in
the permissiveness and acceptance of other than traditional living arrangements (SCP 1996). This
includes the increasingly less negative way in which people in society think about phenomena
such as extramarital cohabitation, staying single, family planning and self-chosen childlessness,
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homosexual relationships and divorce.5 It is clear that we are dealing with a coherent system of
opinions regarding family matters.
Norms and values are related to religion. In Christianity, historically the most influential
religion in the Netherlands, reservations and restraint towards divorce were or are common. This
is based on Jesus’s teachings, according to Matthew (19, 3-9) and Marc (10, 2-12):
“God said, ‘[...] a man will leave his father and mother and unite with his wife, and the two
will become one.’ [...] No human being must separate, then, what God has joined together.
[...] Any man who divorces his wife for any cause other than her unfaithfulness, commits
adultery if he marries some other woman.” (GNB 1994: Gospel according to Matthew).
In the Netherlands, there are some differences between denominations. In most Dutch Calvinist
Protestant mainstreams (Dutch Reformed church, in Dutch: Nederlands hervormde kerk), divorce is
possible, but frowned upon. In the official Roman Catholic church, divorce as such is unknown:
under certain special conditions marriages can be annulled. Obviously, people in the Netherlands
do not rely on their church for either a legal divorce or a civil marriage. I will go into legal changes
with respect to divorce later. Not all church members follow official church policy. This depends
on the level of secularization. It is to be noted that levels or moments of occurrence of
secularization are not equal between denominations, also in relation to divorce (Dumon & Kooy
1983).
Changes in public opinion with respect to divorce run parallel to trends of
individualization and secularization (Lesthaeghe & Van de Kaa 1986). The clearest indicator of this
is the percentage of church members. Census data show that in 1971, 24 percent of the population
did not belong to any church. Subsequent estimations of trends based on surveys show that in
1975, about 26 percent of the adult population was not a member of any church. In 1980, this was
29 percent, in 1985, 31 percent and in 1990, 38 percent (Becker & Vink 1994). Survey questions in
two steps – first asking: “Do you consider yourself a church member,” then, if yes: “Which church
are you a member of?” – yield higher percentages of non-church members but reveal a similar
trend towards secularization. The percentage of non-church members then runs from 42 in 1975
to 50 in 1980, 52 in 1985 and 57 in 1991 (ibid.).
Changes in Dutch divorce law reveal how reluctance to accept divorce in the past was
replaced by more permissive attitudes. The first Civil Law of the Netherlands after Napoleon in
1838 only allowed divorce on serious grounds, like adultery, long term abandonment or a criminal
sentence to long term imprisonment. No-fault divorce based on mutual consent was not allowed.
However, a verdict of the Netherlands High Court in 1883 sustained a guilty plea or
non-appearance of the defending spouse as a valid proof of adultery. This led to the practice of
mutual consent divorce under the guise of a pretended adultery of one of the spouses, a practice
also known as ‘the big lie’. Officially, a legal increase of permissiveness only came about in 1971.
This present law allows divorce if both spouses agree upon a ‘durable disruption’ (in Dutch:
duurzame ontwrichting) of the marriage provided that the custody of the children and the division
of the property are arranged. This change in law was followed by a considerable increase in
divorce figures in 1972 and 1973. After that, however, the annual increase in divorce rates
returned to the previous level (Van Poppel & De Beer 1991). In the short period after the new law
was passed, a backlog of legal divorces for people who had already separated took place.
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Therefore, the law did not cause the rising divorce rate, but merely reflected changes in society.6
1.2.2 Dutch research into divorce
In the Netherlands, sociological research into divorce has been less extensive and systematic than
in some other countries, such as the United States.7 There are a few exceptions to this rule. The
best-known large-scale study into divorce in the Netherlands was done by the family sociologist
Kooy (1969). He investigated marital success in the 1960s, using a survey which was nationally
representative for the Dutch population. This ‘marital success’ referred to the level to which the
spouses are happy with the relationship and to intentions or disagreements within the
relationship. In this way, Kooy conducted cross-sectional research in which marital satisfaction is
taken as an indicator for the stability of a marriage. In 1983, Kooy (1984) again conducted a similar
research for Libelle, a popular magazine, once more indicating the topic’s relevance to society. The
few other, demographic studies into the social causes of divorce include Klijzing (1992), Manting
(1993, 1994).
That sociological research into divorce in the Netherlands has, for a long time, lagged
behind that in the United States, may be related to the relatively low, though increasing, divorce
risks in the Netherlands (CBS 1976, 1996).
Another possible reason for the lack of systematic research into the causes and
consequences of divorce is that research questions into divorce have, for a long time, been
considered as implicitly defending the traditional family (Dronkers 1997). In the 1970s and 1980s,
the period of increasing diversity in living arrangements other than the traditional family,
researchers tried to stress the equality of alternative individual choices. Analysis of social
determinants of divorce could easily be considered politically incorrect. In this way, political
correctness, under the guise of research free of ethics, does not guarantee that this research will
be free of norms and values. On the contrary, the norm of acceptance of more modern living
arrangements adopted by researchers, led to the avoidance of investigating divorce. In this line of
reasoning, the decision to avoid research into certain subjects related to divorce is actually based
upon ethics.
The lack of systematic research into the social causes of divorce is noteworthy. It is not
only remarkable because of its social relevance, but from a social science point of view. After all,
questions about the formation of primary relationships constitute an important part of the
cohesion question in the social sciences. This means that questions about the dissolution of those
relationships are important as well.
1.3 Mixed marriage and divorce
I would now like to relate mixed marriage and divorce to each other.
1.3.1 Societal relevance and scientific relevance related
As I have already mentioned, questions about the dissolution of primary relationships, in addition
to questions regarding their formation, constitute an important part of the cohesion question in
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the social sciences. Possibly because of its high societal relevance, early research into divorce
sometimes took a therapeutic direction. Examples of this therapeutic attitude can be found even
for the specific topic of this present research, mixed marriage and divorce. In 1949, Judson T.
Landis published an article about the comparison of divorce risks among religiously homogamous
and religiously mixed couples. Unfortunately, the couples under research were a selective sample
of the parents of the students following Landis’s lectures on sociology of the family who answered
some questions about their parents. The article states:
“The teacher of courses treating modern marriage becomes a counselor on many types of
courtship problems whether or not he wishes to counsel. In Michigan we are often asked for
help from students contemplating mixed marriages. They want to know what their chances
are for success in such a marriage.”
The last sentence in this quote is exactly the core question posed by research into the
consequences of mixed marriage with respect to the risk of divorce. The fact that people are
asking about it, already indicates its societal relevance. The use of the word ‘counsellor’, however,
seems to suggest that the task of a social scientific researcher is intertwined with that of a
personal counsellor. It may be obvious that counselling requires different skills than conducting
social scientific research and the other way around, but undoubtedly, knowledge arising from
social scientific research may be a helpful tool to specific kinds of counselling. Of course,
systematic research into the matter of interest would be necessary in that case.
1.3.2 Heterogamy and divorce, mobility research and the openness of society
When investigating the relationship between spouse selection characteristics – with the main
focus on heterogamy – and divorce risk, we are taking the next step in the sequence of mobility
research followed in subsection 1.1.3. This step is taken in Figure 1.1 by going from the left lower
cell to the right lower cell. If marriage patterns are indicators of mobility and of the openness of
society, then it is worthwhile to see the other end. Rising divorce levels make it interesting to see
whether it is especially those ‘open-society’ mixed marriages which are prone to divorce. If so, this
sheds new light upon the image of the openness of society. The type of analysis done on this side
of Figure 1.1 is different from the previous because the sorting – in this case the mating of spouses
– has already taken place. The starting point is formed by the marriages as they come into
existence and the fate they undergo as they progress.
I will now discuss this step in research from the left lower cell to the right lower cell. First,
I would like to point out that Figure 1.1 is only meant to give an indication of how this research is
embedded in mobility research. Many more directions taken by sociological research could be
logically added as a dimension to this scheme. We can think of research into the mechanisms of
and resources in social reproduction (Blau & Duncan 1967; De Graaf 1987; Niehof 1997),
intergenerational and spousal influences on voting behaviour (Need 1997), comparative mobility
research, labour market positions and unemployment in couples (Bernasco 1994), poverty, being
single or divorced and exclusion (Paugam 1993; Paugam, Zoyem & Charbonnel 1993). Uunk (1996)
presented an extended scheme of the history of research into homogamy in his dissertation.
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As mentioned above, the level of occurrence of mixed marriage is an indicator for the extent to
which members of different groups in society mingle or stay separated. In other words, the level
of heterogamy in a society is an indicator for the openness of that society. For that reason,
research has been carried out to assess the level of homogamy. In the Netherlands, generally,
husband and wife resemble each other fairly strongly, that is to say they are fairly homogamous,
with respect to social characteristics. This has been investigated for level of education, age, social
background and religion (Hendrickx 1994, 1998; Hendrickx, Lammers & Ultee 1991; Hendrickx,
Schreuder & Ultee 1994; Hendrickx, Uunk & Smits 1995; De Hoog 1982; Smits 1996; Smits, Ultee &
Lammers 1999; Uunk 1996).
The level of heterogamy does not necessarily remain constant over the years, as shown
regarding the Netherlands by Hendrickx (1994), Smits (1996) and Uunk (1996). The change in the
level of heterogamy will be regarded as a change in the openness of society. However, we can get
an extended view on the openness of society by examining how long these mixed marriages last.
This ‘other side of the coin’ is another indicator for the openness of society: to what extent do
mixed marriages end in divorce compared to homogamous marriages? Thus, by answering
questions concerning the relationship between heterogamy and divorce, this research contributes
to the general sociological field of the openness of society. Rising divorce rates make this
extension into the consequences of heterogamy for divorce both interesting and possible to
investigate.
In the United States and some other countries, the relationship between heterogamy and
divorce has been studied for several decades. Nevertheless, this research was not very systematic
and only took one or a few heterogamy characteristics into account per study. All the pieces of the
puzzle together shed a light on the influence of many types of mixed marriage on the risk of
divorce. Age differences between spouses increase divorce risks (Bumpass & Sweet 1972).
Marriages in which spouses have different levels of education, too, have a higher risk of divorce
(Bumpass & Sweet 1972; Tzeng 1992; Wagner 1993), even though it is not always present when
controlled for heterogamy with respect to job characteristics (Tzeng & Mare 1995). Ethnically
mixed marriages are less stable than ethnically homogamous marriages (Jones 1994, 1996; Roloff
1998), even though an American research shows that racially mixed marriages do not need to be
less stable than racially homogamous ones, depending on age at marriage and marriage number
(Cuningham 1990). Being mixed with respect to religion leads to less satisfaction and higher levels
of divorce compared to couples who share the same religion (Burchinal & Chancellor 1963;
Bumpass & Sweet 1972; Heaton 1984; Lehrer & Chiswick 1993). The question whether
Catholic/Protestant mixed marriages have higher divorce risks have interested American
researchers for a long time, even before surveys among proper samples were available (Bell 1938,
Weeks 1943, Landis 1949). American intermarriage between Protestants and Catholics increased
dramatically in the 20th century, while intermarriage between different educational groups has
decreased (Kalmijn 1991a, b, Mare 1991). This seems to indicate an increase in the strength of
educational boundaries and a decrease in the strength of religious boundaries. Nevertheless, with
respect to divorce risks, effects of educational differences are small when compared to heterogamy
effects of age and religion (Bumpass & Sweet 1972). Job status heterogamy is found to have a
positive effect on divorce (Philliber & Hiller 1983), contrary to heterogamy with respect to income
(Tzeng & Mare 1995). Sometimes, effects of heterogamy go in a specific direction, namely of a
higher divorce risk in the case of a better situated wife. Divorce risks increase if a wife has a
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higher level of education than her husband (Wagner 1993) or if the traditional division of labour is
broken and the wife works more than the husband (Tzeng 1992; Tzeng & Mare 1995).
In the Netherlands, the relationship between mixed marriage and divorce has not been
investigated systematically in large scale surveys. For the Netherlands, there are a few bivariate
statistical notes and a study which show that marriages have a higher risk of divorce if they are
mixed with respect to ethnicity (Van der Heijdt 1996; Harmsen 1998), church affiliation or age (CBS
1958; Dumon & Kooy 1983). Besides the fact that not many characteristics are taken into account,
another drawback of these studies is that, although data are available in most instances, the
comparison of homogamous and mixed categories is not made in the proper way. This is especially
prevalent with respect to church affiliation, where both denominational and heterogamy effects
are present, so that they can intertwine and become invisible. Suppose that we would like to
know whether Catholics married to Protestants have a higher risk of divorce because of their
marriage being mixed. We should compare their divorce risk to Catholics and Protestants, leaving
out non-church members. The latter can be expected to have a higher divorce risk because of their
non-church membership. The relationship between heterogamy and divorce will be obscured if we
fail to take this into account.
There is more to be studied in the relationship between mixed marriage and divorce. The level of
mixed marriage can be seen as a result of the spouse selection process. When people search for a
suitable spouse, they may search for a long time or they may find the one they want to share their
lives with quickly. A long search period may result in waiting until a more mature age, by dating
more candidates or by observing a candidate spouse for a longer period of time before being sure
to have found the Mr. or Ms. Right. This sounds like a conscious and thorough calculation, but
obviously, this process is much more subtle and partly unconscious. However, selecting a spouse
is a task that may take time in order to find the perfect match.
If the spouses suit each other well, this means that their characteristics are sufficiently
compatible. With regard to social characteristics, this means that they have corresponding social
characteristics. The outcome of the spouse selection process may also turn out to be an ‘imperfect’
match. I will go into indicators of the intensity of the search behaviour itself. How long did the
spouses search and how well did they look for their match? Research has indicated that the
younger the couple is at the time of marriage, the higher the risk of divorce (Becker, Landes &
Michael 1977; Manting 1994; Wagner 1993). The same goes for interruption of searching for a
spouse because of a sudden decision to marry due to an unintended premarital pregnancy
(Morgan & Rindfuss 1985). In theory section 1.5, I will go into this matter further.
1.4 Research questions
Up to now, I have explored the field of research and discussed some previous research on spouse
selection, mixed marriage and divorce. The present study aims at systematically extending the
previous research in this field. In this section, I will present the main research questions which are
to be answered in the empirical Chapters 2 to 6. In my research questions, I will begin by
examining the main topic, mixed marriage and divorce, and end with other aspects of spouse
selection. First of all, I aim to present a picture as complete as possible of the impact of mixed
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marriage on divorce risks, systematically taking as many aspects as possible into account. To these
ends, I will combine many social characteristics on which spouses may be homogamous or
heterogamous. This implies a combination of characteristics which were previously studied
separately or not at all. The accompanying descriptive research question reads:
1 Does heterogamy with respect to (1) age, (2) level of education, (3) social status, (4)
religion, (5) ethnicity, and (6) social origin, have an influence on the risk of divorce
in the Netherlands? And which types of heterogamy have the largest impact?
This combination of several types of heterogamy is necessary to take into account that some
characteristics may be related. Of course, it is interesting to look at the divorce risk of a couple
who is mixed with respect to education, for instance, without looking at possible other social
differences, but not taking the relationship between social characteristics into account could give
an incomplete image. For example, people who have a higher education went to school for a
longer period of time. Those people will generally marry at a later age (Smeenk 1998). If those
people meet each other more often in school, age at marriage and homogamy with respect to age
can be expected to be correlated with educational homogamy. Another example has to do with the
level of education and social origin. If it is true that the level of education constitutes a criterion
on which spouses select each other and at the same time the level of education is related to one’s
social origin, then social origin homogamy arises automatically alongside educational homogamy
(Blau & Duncan 1967; Warren 1966). To assess levels of homogamy of these kinds simultaneously,
sophisticated loglinear dual trait models have been used (Kalmijn 1991c; Uunk 1996). Similarly,
dual trait models have been applied to simultaneously assess religious and educational homogamy
(Hendrickx 1994). The level of religious homogamy is affected by the level of education of the
spouses and the level of educational homogamy is affected by the religious denominations of the
spouses.
In order to gain insight into the real impact of different forms of heterogamy on divorce, I
will simultaneously investigate the effects of these different forms. Once the influences of several
forms of heterogamy on the risk of divorce have been determined, the question remains as to
what causes the influence. This question is an explanatory question:
2 How can the relationship between heterogamy and divorce be explained?
For this explanation, I will look at what existing literature has to say about heterogamy and
divorce. The literature demonstrates that homogamy is advantageous for marriage. These
advantages of homogamy imply the disadvantages of heterogamy for marriage. I will demonstrate
this in the theory section and show that these disadvantages are embedded both within the
couples themselves and within the social environment in which they live.
Besides giving descriptions and explanations, I also intend to discuss trends. As mentioned earlier,
society has changed in many respects relevant to the research topic. I stressed the changes
towards more acceptance with respect to divorce and the trends in levels of mixed marriage and
the openness of society. All these changes have taken place within the past few decades. It would,
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therefore, be naive to assume that the relationship between heterogamy and divorce is destined to
be stable. This leads to my macro-trend research question:
3 Which trends can be discerned in the past few decades with respect to the
relationship between heterogamy and divorce?
The first type of change in society which is important with respect to this research question is a
trend towards individualization and secularization and, alongside, a shift in norms and values
(SCP 1994). The second type of change is related to the first. Society has shifted from being one in
which positions can be acquired based on one’s social origin towards one in which one achieves
positions on one’s own merits (Blau & Duncan 1967). This latter change has been applied to
account for rising or stable levels of educational homogamy alongside declining levels of
homogamy regarding social origin (Forsé & Chauvel 1995, Uunk 1996). If this is so important for
homogamy, then it is important for evaluating the impact of heterogamy on the risk of divorce.
The third research question into macro-changes brings me to the question of micro-
changes: changes in the life course. Things can change within marriages. In this respect, two types
of changes are of interest: firstly the influence of heterogamy levels on the risk of divorce and
secondly the heterogamy levels themselves. The former change follows the macro-trend question.
If the importance of mixed marriage for the risk of divorce can change over time, it can also
change over the course of marriage, even when taking the macro-level changes into account. Why
should the impact of mixed marriage on divorce stay the same during marriage? Maybe people
become increasingly tired of their differing spouse during marriage. Or, on the contrary, spouses
become more accustomed to each other’s social differences.
Or maybe they adapt in another way – and this brings me to the second possible micro-
level change: spouses can adapt by moving towards each other, for instance when the lower
educated one attains additional degrees of education, or when one spouse in a religiously mixed
couples converts to the religion of the other. Obviously, these personal changes can go in the
opposite direction of alienation, of socially growing apart, as well. So, overall there are two sub-
questions in the research question into changes in the life course:
4a Does the impact of mixed marriage on the risk of divorce change over the course
of marriage and in which direction?
4b What happens to the risk of divorce when heterogamy changes during marriage
in either direction?
The questions above are descriptive, explanatory, trend and life course questions on the impact of
mixed marriage on the risk of divorce. Six types of heterogamy are taken into consideration. I have
already indicated the importance of taking all types of heterogamy into account simultaneously.
This implies that the main characteristics of the individual spouses – age, education, social status,
religion, ethnicity and social origin – are taken into account. These, too, will influence the risk of
divorce. There are even more social characteristics related to spouse selection which have to be
considered. Did the spouses look well enough when selecting a spouse or did they marry in a
hurry or under social pressure? Above, these characteristics have been treated implicitly in
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relation to how heterogamy occurs. Now, I will focus explicitly on spouse selection. Therefore, the
last research questions extend on to the previous ones by looking into the intensity of search
behaviour, such as a short search period or a hastily ended search period. Question 5 is
descriptive, question 6 is explanatory.
5 Does the intensity with which persons look for a spouse before deciding to marry
influence the risk of divorce?
6 If yes, can this relationship be explained by mixed marriage?
1.5 Theory
Let me now go into the main theoretical ideas which are relevant to the present research of
spouse selection, heterogamy and divorce. In Chapters 2 to 6, I will draw from these ideas and
hypotheses will be derived from them to be tested. The results will yield the conclusions by which
the research questions can be answered.
1.5.1 Heterogamy and divorce: main considerations
I have already noted that previous research indicates that homogamy with respect to several
social characteristics occurs regularly and is more common than heterogamy. Why, then, does
homogamy occur so frequently? Several reasons can be given, which I will share under the
keywords of personal preferences, preferences of the social environment and opportunity. I will
now examine these reasons and demonstrate that they constitute arguments as to why
heterogamy will lead to a higher risk of divorce.
I would first like to go into personal preference as a cause of social homogamy. Some
people may state that specific types of social differences are not relevant to them when choosing a
spouse. They refer to an old expression saying: “Love is blind”. In this case, we are talking about
people who are, consciously or unconsciously, blind to specific social dividing lines. An even more
extreme reasoning is that people who choose a spouse who socially differs from them are not
blind. On the contrary, they have deliberately and consciously chosen these differences, like in the
old proverb: “Opposites attract”. However, it can generally be expected that most people will look
for someone with whom they have things in common. That is why another proverb seems to have
much more power: “Birds of a feather flock together”. Plainly speaking, people choose a person
with similar social characteristics simply because they want to, because they like them more,
because they share the same characteristics. This does not only pertain to the social characteristics
which are under investigation here, but to many more personal characteristics. The idea is that
people look for someone who has similar likes and tastes, and this ensures social homogamy. Life
tends to be easier when both spouses have the same preferences, expectations and opinions about
the organization of daily life, lifestyle, the organization of the relationship, the division of labour
and having and raising children. In this way, spouses have the same interests and a common room
for discourse. With respect to social characteristics, spousal preferences would translate into
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preferring a spouse who is as similar in status as possible (Kerckhoff & Davis 1962; DiMaggio &
More 1985). There is, nevertheless, a competing theory, but leading to the same result of
homogamous marriage patterns. It is argued that people prefer to marry someone with a status as
high as possible (Elder 1969; Mare 1991). High-status candidates will get the first proposals and
high-status proposers will be accepted first, which implies that the least attractive will be left for
each other.
The second reason for the wide existence of homogamy is found in the preferences of the
social environment. Candidate spouses have preferences, but so do their parents and other family
and friends. If the husband and the wife have equal characteristics, there will be more
resemblances between their respective friends and relatives. This means that people within the
social networks of both spouses are more able to get along with each other. If the relationship
with the in-laws and with mutual friends is good, they will be more willing to support the
marriage. This can be extended to the period before the marriage, when the candidate spouses are
dating. In this way, the preferences of the social environment play an important role in the mate
selection process.
A third explanation for a strong resemblance between marriage partners is related to the
second explanation in the sense that it is related to the environment. But this third reason has
nothing to do with preferences but can be found in opportunity. Possible marriage partners often
meet in school, at work, when going out or at a friend’s place. That is why they will relatively
often get in contact with people sharing their social characteristics (Kalmijn 1998; Smeenk 1998).
A theory of heterogamous divorce can be derived by going back to the first two causes of
homogamy. These causes were related to preferences: preferences of spouses and preferences of
their social environment. The chances of finding someone of one’s liking and of one’s social
environment’s liking are higher if that someone has matching social characteristics, such as age,
level of education, social status position, religious and ethnic background and social status of
origin.
According to these theoretical considerations, a pattern evolves which relates social
homogamy, personality, expectations, taste and a good interpersonal interaction between spouses
mutually and between spouses and in-law families. Spouses who are similar will probably get
along with each other better than spouses who do not resemble each other. Likewise, the odds
will be that the families, friends and acquaintances of both spouses will be more alike and that
they will be able to get along much better with each other and with those spouses. This implies
that they will give greater support to the marriage, including in bad times, and that the step
towards divorce is less easily taken than in mixed marriages. However, if a marriage is mixed, the
interaction with the social environment may be worse and those people may have more
reservations towards the marriage and the couple. When troubles arise, there is a higher chance
that parents and friends may say something like: “I warned you. Maybe you should think about
divorce”. They may try to make their son or daughter turn against his or her spouse. Of course, it
does not need to be so explicit. A lack of support may manifest itself in a more subtle way, for
example by a repetitive lack of attention and advice or by giving more attention to another son or
daughter and his or her spouse who are not heterogamously married. The way in which I describe
it here suggests that these considerations are always made consciously and deliberately, but of
course that does not need to be the case.
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All the above leads to the expectation that mixed marriages are less stable. However, one
may object that heterogamous couples have thought through all possible disadvantages before
marriage and have come to the conclusion that their love is strong enough to withstand those
disadvantages. According to this objection, mixed marriages, even though they are less likely to
occur, are a special selection of stable marriages. Furthermore, these people, for the very reason
that they get involved in mixed networks, may take all the effort to get along with those different
people in the mixed networks (Blau & Schwartz 1984). Their attitude would be more tolerant, and
conflict and disagreement as a result of social differences with, for example, the in-law family,
would be avoided.
People might be able to get over different preferences and a lack of support by the social
environment in the beginning of a relationship or during the honeymoon period. Nevertheless, the
expectation here is that the lack of a common social background will bring about a higher divorce
risk when the marriage reaches later stages, like after child birth, a characteristic that has to be
taken into account. Besides, even though the marriage partners may be willing to overcome
differences and accept the in-law family and respective friends as they are, those family and
friends may not be willing to do so in return. The support for the marriage will then be low. This is
beyond the control of the married couple. Thus, it can be expected that mixed marriages, on
average, have a higher risk of divorce.
This does not mean that the assimilation process of getting along in the case of a mixed
marriage, as just described, does not work at all. A Dutch study shows that evading the
differences promotes acceptance (Hondius 1999). Unfortunately, such studies use in-depth
interviewing among still existing mixed relationships only. In this way, divorced and non-divorced
couples cannot be compared and no inferences can be made about the influence of mixed
marriage on divorce.
1.5.2 Heterogamy and divorce: additional considerations
The outlines of a theory have now been developed which generally predicts more stability for
homogamous marriages and, reversely, a higher probability of divorce for marriages mixed with
respect to social characteristics. The theory identifies the main causes for this relationship
between mixed marriage and divorce, namely differences in tastes and preferences and, therefore,
disagreements between spouses on the one hand and the lack of support by the social
environment on the other. This is my theoretical starting point. However, differences can be large
or small and go in different directions, society is changing and ‘social characteristics’ is a wide
concept. As indicated earlier, I will look at differences between spouses with respect to age, level
of education, social status, religion, ethnicity and social origin. Taking all this into account, I will
need some extensions and additional suppositions and considerations to the theory which I can
use in the next chapters in order to derive specific hypotheses.
1.5.2.1 Division of labour and the direction of differences
The main theory predicting higher divorce rates for mixed marriages was based on the advantages
of homogamous marriage. Nonetheless, theories exist which under certain conditions imply that
not homogamy but heterogamy is more advantageous for a marriage. For this, I will turn to the
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economic theory (Becker 1981; Becker, Landes & Michael 1977) which predicts more stable
marriages if the spouses are specialized in the tasks they perform in the household. This means
that there is a clear division of labour in which one spouse, traditionally the husband, has a paid
job, while the other spouse, in this case the wife, is responsible for housework tasks. This implies
that the husband is more successful as his career is running more prosperously. He has to invest
in his career, his economic status or, in economic terms, in his human capital. More experience
and, therefore, an older age, and a higher education will contribute to his success. In the extreme
case of this type of division of labour, investment in human capital is not important for the wife.
Because she is taking care of the house and the children, she gets less or no opportunity at all to
further invest in her human capital by building up experience. In this way, the social status of the
wife is less important to begin with and a gap between the job status of her and her husband is
likely. This social status heterogamy will only grow, because she is not gaining any more
experience, while her husband is. And more indirectly, heterogamy with respect to correlated
characteristics, such as level of education and age, will be promoted by this division of labour.
In this line of reasoning, the term heterogamy is used. In the traditional case of division of
labour, it is the husband who has the highest social status and level of education and who is the
oldest. This leads to looking at directions in which heterogamy goes. From the perspective of each
spouse, he or she can marry upward or downward, which is analogous to being upwardly or
downwardly mobile. The terms hypergamy and hypogamy8 are used for these perspectives of
heterogamy.
When talking about the ‘traditional’ division of labour, the word ‘traditional’ seems to
point at a situation which is originally considered as ‘standard’, ‘normal’. It refers to a value
judgement. Certain combinations, like in this case the fact that it is the husband who is older and
in a higher position in society, are by some considered as more acceptable than the combination
the other way around. This is related to norms and values, and to common practice. For example,
marriages in which the wife is older than the husband are less frequently found than marriages in
which the husband is the oldest (Mare 1991; Smeenk & Ultee 1997). Furthermore, women
themselves prefer a husband who is a bit older, not only for reasons of custom (preferences in the
social environment), but also because it is practical and because women reach maturity at a
younger age (own preferences) (Vossen 1999). All this can be used for a further elaboration of the
notion that heterogamy is related to divorce because of individual preferences, taste and
satisfactory communication between spouses and because of what is expected by people in the
social environment. The underlying idea is that the more common a match is, the more stable the
marriage will be.
1.5.2.2 Macro trends: secularization, individualization, meritocratization
Just above, I mentioned expectations and traditionality and the fact that the word ‘traditional’
seems to point at a situation which is originally considered as ‘standard’ or ‘normal’. However, the
word ‘traditional’ first and foremost refers to something which came into practice in the past and
survived over time. This brings me to the changes which have actually taken place in society.
These will have to be taken into account in the research of heterogamy and divorce.
Some of the main changes in society have already been dealt with in the beginning of this
chapter, when mentioning this research’s societal relevance. As a matter of fact, the increase of
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divorce is one of the changes and it is embedded in a greater array of social changes. This greater
array of changes include secularization. Figures above illustrated the vast increase in the number
of non-church members in the Netherlands over the past decades.
People are less involved with church. Even for people who still consider themselves as
church members, religion has become less salient and less important as a moral guideline (Wilson
1967). Thus, along with secularization, there is more individual thinking: secularization goes
together with individualization. This individualization entails that a growing number of people no
longer consider marriage to be the only way to security in life, because they have become more
individualistic. Instead, they look for love, affection and self-fulfilment in a marriage. This implies
that a growing number of people do not see marriage as necessarily lasting for life. They will be
more willing to break up if a relationship is working out badly or does not yield what they expect
from it. Furthermore, individualization reveals itself in opinions about a number of issues which
portray general norms and values. Permissiveness is increasing with respect to extramarital
cohabitation, staying single, family planning and self chosen childlessness, homosexual
relationships and divorce. This can be extended to marriage outside social dividing lines. We can
expect people to be less bound to the social groups to which they belong. Social barriers are
becoming fainter. This means that marrying outside social boundaries of religious, ethnic and
other social categories is becoming more common. People are less shocked by or opposed to such
marriages. 
Another theory about macro changes which will be used stems from research into
intergenerational social mobility and was predominantly used in that field. Despite this, it was
promptly applied to mixed marriage as well (Blau & Duncan 1967; Kalmijn 1991a, b). Society has
been changing from one in which positions are ascribed by inherited background characteristics
towards a more meritocratic one in which own achievement is more decisive. When applied to the
study of the occupational structure, this means that someone inherits the status of his or her
occupational position to a decreasing degree from his or her father’s position and achieves this
status to an increasing degree on his or her own merits, such as the level of education and own
experience. This can also be applied to marriage markets. The relevance lies in the fact that I am
studying several heterogamy characteristics, some of which are more related to parental
inheritance, while others can be attributed to own merits. Research has indicated that an
individual achievement characteristic like the level of education has gained in importance when
choosing a spouse in comparison to characteristics ascribed by origin such as parental social
status, religion and ethnicity (Kalmijn 1991a, b; Hendrickx 1994, 1998). When linking heterogamy
to the risk of divorce, we can use the theory about ascription and achievement to predict the
relative importance and trends as to different types of mixed marriage.
1.5.2.3 Life course developments: growing acceptance, accumulated irritations
Changes can also occur within a marriage. Basically, one of two things can happen with regard to
mixed marriage and divorce; either differences are overcome and things work out right or they do
not. The question is whether it is possible to generally predict what will happen. I will apply two
opposing theories about changing divorce risks over the course of marriage: the theory of growing
acceptance and the theory of accumulated irritations (Trussell, Rodriguez & Vaughan 1992).
The theory of growing acceptance generally predicts a decrease of the risk of divorce over
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the course of marriage. Psychologically, this can be supported by stating that the longer a husband
and a wife have been together, the more they have grown accustomed to each other’s personal
characteristics. Otherwise, they would already have divorced. Economical theory supports a
decreasing risk of divorce during marriage by stating that the longer a couple has been together,
the more investments they have made in the marriage. They have a lot of common property, such
as a house, and children. Divorce would only create more problems. The theory of accumulated
irritations, however, proposes the opposite expectation for divorce over the course of marriage.
The reasoning is that spouses in general know about many of the personality traits of their
partners at the moment they marry and they are willing to adapt. As time goes by they may find
out that this is not as easy as they thought. They will get more and more fed up with their
spouses’ irritating behaviour and finally decide to divorce after all.
These theories focus on divorce risks over the course of a marriage. Nevertheless, they are
more suitable to be applied to the relationship between mixed marriage and divorce over the
course of the marriage. This goes mainly for the theory of growing acceptance. This can be
accomplished by taking the theoretical notion into account which predicts that mixed marriages
have a higher risk of divorce because of differences in taste and opinions between spouses and
because of a lack of support for the marriage by the respective parents, friends and acquaintances.
If this is true, then the influence of heterogamy on divorce will diminish during marriage, because
still existing marriages apparently proved that they were able to handle this and that the couples
learned to accept each other.
1.5.3 Search behaviour
The final general research questions posed in this introductory chapter were about the influence
of the intensity of the search for a spouse on the risk of divorce. These questions were actually
raised partly because the relationship between mixed marriage and divorce seems to provide a
possible explanation for the relationship between the intensity of search behaviour and divorce.
Relevant to this respect is the notion earlier in this chapter that social heterogamy can be
considered as an outcome of the spouse selection process.
The general expectation is that if someone did not search long or hard enough for a
suitable marriage partner, the probability of a ‘wrong’ choice is higher. This means that he or she
ends up with an incompatible spouse (Becker, Landes & Michael 1977). This inferior level of
compatibility, in turn, may show up in spousal differences with respect to their personalities and
their social characteristics, leading to increased marital instability. Although one may find a
spouse with corresponding ideas, opinions, behaviour and expectations but deviating social
characteristics, the chances are high that if someone is looking for a spouse with a similar taste
and the same preferences, he or she will find a person who also has similar social characteristics.
It is exactly these social characteristics about which I have been talking up to this point: age, level
of education, social status, religious affiliation, ethnic background and social origin.
There are several aspects to the intensity of the search behaviour for a spouse. Firstly, we
can think of maturity. This is directly related to the age at marriage. On average, younger people
can be expected to make more impulsive and impetuous choices. Additionally, at a relatively
young age, people are still psychologically developing. After a few years of marriage, these people
might realize that they have ended up with someone who is completely different from their initial
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expectations.
A second aspect of the intensity of the search behaviour is simply the length of time that
spouses know each other before they decide to marry. This aspect is related to the previous one,
because it deals with knowing whom one marries. One may expect that candidate spouses know
each other better after they have observed each other for a longer period of time. This is expected
to decrease the chances of an insufficient match. Knowing each other may refer to either the
period before forming one household or the period between the start of cohabitation and
marriage. The former refers to the period of courtship or dating, whereas the latter refers to the
practice of cohabitation before marriage, the occurrence of which has increased tremendously in
the past few decades. Both the duration of courtship and cohabitation before marriage can be seen
as an extension of the period of searching for a spouse. Cohabitation in this respect can be seen as
a test marriage, from which the more stable are expected to survive and eventuate in more stable
marriages (Klijzing 1992). Nevertheless, much international research has demonstrated that
couples who live together before they marry have higher risks of divorce. This is generally
attributed to the fact that premarital cohabitation constitutes a reflection of less adherence to
traditional norms and values concerning marriage and the family.
The final aspect of the intensity of spouse selection is considered with a premature
decision based on pressure from the social environment: premarital pregnancy. Couples who
decide to marry because the wife got pregnant unintendedly, ceased their search for a suitable
spouse early. In the case of such a so-called shotgun marriage the chances are higher that a
premature choice regarding the spouse has been made. This implies that the probability is higher
that the spouses will turn out to be less suitable for each other, which increases the risk of
divorce.
1.6 Data sources
In this study, two different data sets will be used for the analyses in which the hypotheses to be
derived from the above theoretical considerations will be tested. One of the data sets stems from
official registrations, the other from a sample survey.
1.6.1 Marriage and divorce registrations
The first data source stems from records registered by Statistics Netherlands (CBS), which I
analysed on site. This information was supplied by every Dutch municipality and it includes every
marriage and divorce registered in these municipalities between 1974 and 1994. No records are
electronically available from before this period. After this period, data are not gathered in this way
anymore, but information of persons is obtained from the municipal basic administration
(Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie, GBA). This information is not available for external across-time
analysis. I have records on all marriages contracted and dissolved in the Netherlands during the
period 1974-1994. It is a unique opportunity for me to match and analyse these data that cover the
whole research population and that have never before been used for such a purpose.
The municipalities filled in information on registration forms about characteristics at the
time of the marriage ceremony. Of the 1,928,463 marriages which were registered in the period
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1974-1994 (21 years), information is available about the municipality of registration, the date of
marriage, the dates of birth, the previous marital statuses, the church affiliations (until 1991) and
the nationalities of both spouses. Within the same period, 1974-1994, 581,040 divorces were
registered. However, many of these divorces concern marriages contracted before 1974. These
divorce registrations contain information about the municipality in which the couples married,
the date of divorce, the date of marriage and the year of birth of both spouses.
Thanks to the information supplied by the divorce files, it is possible to know whether any
one of the marriages contracted in the Netherlands ended in divorce before the end of 1994.
Nevertheless, as the files do not contain a unique file number, they had to be matched using a
combination of characteristics available in both sets of files. The way in which this was
accomplished and exactly which information was used will be shown in Chapters 2 and 3.
The use of these data has two advantages. Because this information stems from official
registrations, it does not suffer from a possible lack of reliability of retrospective questions.
Furthermore, I have real population information instead of a sample and I am not dependent on
statistical significance. It is also possible to study relatively small groups. The use of these data has
drawbacks as well. The number of characteristics for which the influence of heterogamy can be
detected is limited. Spouses can be compared with respect to their ages, religious affiliations,
nationalities and their previous marital statuses, but other social characteristics on the basis of
which the spouses possibly select each other, such as level of education and social origin, are left
out of the picture.
1.6.2 Divorce in the Netherlands: SIN 1998
Because of the shortcomings of the registration data, as just mentioned, I also used survey data.
These stem from the SIN98 data set (Kalmijn, De Graaf & Uunk 1999). This data set was especially
designed for this particular and several other research projects and it contains sufficient
information about the two spouses in both intact and divorced relationships.
The interviews were carried out in autumn 1998 and winter 1998/1999. Within a sample of
municipalities in the Netherlands, representative with respect to region and degree of
urbanization, three sub-samples were taken: one from married people in their first marriages, one
from divorced people who were then single, and one from divorced people who remarried. The age
limit in all these strata was set from 30 to 75 years. In order to have a sufficient number of
divorced and remarried people in the sample, the second and third strata were over-represented.
Of the people in the sample, 78.9 percent could be reached. Subsequently, 57.7 percent of these
completed the survey, which was administered by interviewers using a paper questionnaire (PAPI,
paper-and-pencil-interviewing). This brings the response rate to 45.6 percent. Because of the
sensitivity of the subject and the over-sample of divorced people, this percentage is certainly not
bad. In total, the survey was completed among 2,346 individuals: 551 respondents (23 percent)
were in their first marriages and 1,795 (77 percent) had been divorced.
The survey included questions about the respondents’ life histories, their (past and/or
present) marriages and their working careers among other things. For the research in the present
study, we included questions about both spouses’ social characteristics, their courtship period,
disagreements between spouses and acceptance of the relationship by the social environment. The
design was such that extended information about the marital relationship and the spouse became
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available for one marriage, that is the present marriage for married people in their first marriage
and the past marriage for those who had been divorced. If a person had been divorced more than
once, the longest lasting relationship was taken.
The use of this data set makes it possible to extend the study of mixed marriage to other
types of social heterogamy which are not available in the official marriage and divorce
registrations. These types of heterogamy concern heterogamy with respect to level of education,
social origin and social destination. The way in which all this information could be used, will be
shown in Chapters 4 and 5. The way in which the information on characteristics with respect to
the intensity of spouse selection were used, will be shown in Chapter 6. Analyses on these data
can be extended to unmarried unions of cohabitation, which are obviously missing in official
marriage registrations.
The data sets used in this study are complementary. The advantages of the one are the
shortcomings of the other.
1.7 Organization of this book
All the theoretical considerations which I dealt with in section 1.5 will be used in the subsequent
chapters to derive hypotheses. These will be tested by using the data sets introduced in section
1.6. This will yield the answers to the research questions posed in section 1.4.
In Chapter 2, the use of the official marriage and divorce records in the study of the
relationship between heterogamy and divorce will be introduced. In that chapter, a partial answer
can be given to research question 1 by using information on the whole population. The
relationship between heterogamy and divorce will be studied for four types of heterogamy,
namely with respect to age, religion, nationality and previous marital status.
Chapter 3 will expand upon Chapter 2 by making a distinction in marriage durations and
marital cohorts. In other words, Chapter 3 adds dynamics to Chapter 2. For a limited number of
types of heterogamy, the results from registration data will give an answer to research questions
3 and 4a.
The other research questions need more detailed information to be answered. For this, I
will use the survey data of SIN98. In this way, Chapter 4 will extend on Chapter 2 by adding more
characteristics of heterogamy and by adding theoretical explanatory characteristics. The results in
Chapter 4 can, therefore, be used to answer research questions 1 and 2.
Chapter 5 dynamically expands upon Chapter 4 just like Chapter 3 dynamically expands
upon Chapter 2. Changes in the impact of six types of social heterogamy on divorce will be
studied. These changes are concerned with trends over time as well as changes over the course of
a marriage. So, Chapter 5 will result in answers to research questions 3 and 4.
Chapter 6, then, will introduce information about the intensity of search behaviour in
spouse selection. In this way, the remaining research questions 5 and 6 can be answered.
The results and answers found in Chapters 2 to 6 will be brought together in Chapter 7.
That chapter will contain a synthesis of the whole study and a conclusion to this book.
A complete image of the relationships studied in this research is visualized in a simplified
way in Figure 1.2. In this figure, the key characteristics are positioned as well as the relationships
between them. The bold arrows indicate the main relationships under investigation: from search
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1. Often, the terms ‘endogamy’, ‘exogamy’, ‘in-marriage’ and ‘out-marriage’ are reserved to indicate the
breakout of the social status position of origin, of the parents. In that case, it is used for mixed marriage with
regard to a characteristic such as parental social class, but not with regard to own social position or age, for
instance (cf. Hansen 1995). For reasons of clarity, I will use the terms ‘homogamy’ and ‘heterogamy’ or ‘mixed
marriage’ in this book for any type of social difference between spouses. If applicable, the type of difference
will be specifically indicated. The equivalents for mixed marriage and assortative marriage are from Greek
origin: åjãs (homos), equal; qbols (heteros), different, other; kalk (endon), inside; ut (exo), outside;
d^jt (gameo), marry. Inventing a Greek-based equivalent for higher divorce risks among mixed marriages as
the counterpart of heterogamy would lead to the term heterapostasy, from qbols (heteros), different, other;
mlpq|pflk (apostasion), divorcement.
2. Most of the commotion was related to the fact that both Protestants and Catholics participated in the
Eucharist, including the previous queen, Princess Juliana, the mother of the present queen.
3. For an overview of sociological main questions, see Ultee, Arts and Flap (1992).
QUALITY OR
INTENSITY
OF SEARCH
BEHAVIOUR
- age at marriage
or cohabitation
- duration of
courtship
- marriage (or
cohabitation)
because of
unintended
pregnancy
(shotgun wedding)
- premarital
cohabitation
HETEROGAMY
with respect to
- age
- educational level
- social status
- religious affiliation
- ethnicity
- social origin
(controlling main
characteristics)
EXPLANATORY
- spousal differences
of opinion
- lack of support by
social environment
presence
of children
RISK OF
DIVORCE
behaviour to the risk of divorce and from heterogamy to the risk of divorce. The other arrows are
relationships which are controlled. Dynamics over time and over the course of marriage still need
to be added to this picture.
Figure 1.2 The relationships studied in this research
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4. At the end of the 1980s, the yearly divorce figure showed a slight decrease to 81 per 10,000. In 1994, the
official figure jumped to 102, to conclude the century at a level of 95. The rise in figures until the mid 1980s is
particularly important. The rise in the mid 1990s may be at least partly attributed to a different measurement:
from Dutch court divorces until 1994 towards registered divorces of couples of whom at least one spouse is
registered in a Dutch municipal basic administration since 1994.
5. Except for an increasing acceptance of non-traditional living arrangements, an increase of the occurrence of
some of them can be noted. A serious pluralization of living arrangements is not likely to have taken place on
the level of society as a whole, since the main shift can be found in an increase of one person households at the
expense of the proportion of married couples with children. Only within relatively small subgroups of extra-
familiar non-single household living arrangements has some pluralization taken place (see for example
Wagner & Franzmann 2000).
6. For an international comparison of legal dissolution, see Castles and Flood (1991).
7. ‘Research into divorce’ as such is a wide concept. Even cross-cultural comparisons of divorce patterns have
been made (Goode 1962, 1993). In this study, as already stated, I am focussing on specific socio-cultural causes
of divorce.
8. These terms are derived from the Greek words ¿mo, (hyper), for up, above, and ¿mã, (hypo), for down,
beneath.
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2 Heterogamy and divorce within ten years.
A descriptive analysis of Dutch register data 1974-1994.1
D
o marriages in which, at the time of marriage, partners do not resemble each other with respect
to age, religion, nationality and former marital status, have higher probabilities of divorce than
marriages in which partners have the same characteristics? To answer this question, I employed
marriage and divorce registration data as collected by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). These data enabled me
to assess all new marriages conducted between 1974 and 1984, to see whether they had ended in divorce
before 1994. The analysis of this data set shows that several forms of heterogamy affect the divorce risk.
Couples in which spouses differ in age (especially if the wife is older than her husband), couples in which
husband and wife have different religions, and couples with different nationalities have higher divorce
risks than homogamous couples. The more uncommon a combination, the higher the risk of divorce.
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will look at Dutch society at the end of the 20th century and determine the extent
to which social differences between spouses (heterogamy) at the time of marriage affect the
probability that a marriage will end in divorce. I will demonstrate how I used data registered by
Statistics Netherlands (CBS) on every marriage taken from the population registers of all Dutch
municipalities in the period from 1974 until 1984 and on every divorce registered from 1974 until
1994. By means of these data, I investigated whether a higher degree of differences between
spouses (the level of heterogamy) leads to a higher chance of divorce compared to marriages in
which husband and wife resemble each other (homogamous marriages). This is the first time that
records of these marriage and divorce files were matched. The registration data of Statistics
Netherlands give information about four kinds of heterogamy: differences with respect to age,
religion, nationality and previous marital status (never been married, divorced or widowhood).
A lot of research on the occurrence of homogamy has been carried out in the Netherlands.
Generally, husband and wife appear to resemble each other strongly with respect to level of
education, age, social origin and religion (Hendrickx 1994, 1998; Hendrickx, Lammers & Ultee
1991, Hendrickx, Schreuder & Ultee 1994; Hendrickx, Uunk & Smits 1995; De Hoog 1982; Smits
1996, 1999; Uunk 1996; Uunk & Kalmijn 1996). The most prominent explanation for homogamy
assumes that behind the choice for a spouse with equal social characteristics, there is a hidden
preference for a spouse with a corresponding taste. Life is much more agreeable when one’s
partner in life has similar ideas about the division of labour2, about having and raising children,
about the organization of the relationship and about lifestyle. By choosing a spouse with similar
characteristics, one creates a common room of discourse and shared interests in life. A second
explanation for homogamy refers to the support given to the relationship by the social
environment. If a husband and a wife have equal social characteristics, then their respective
family members and mutual friends will also bear a closer resemblance to each other. They will
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get along with each other and with the married couple better, and therefore give more support to
the marriage and the choice of spouse. Next, one may have wishes, but needs the opportunity to
have them fulfilled. Therefore, a third explanation for a strong resemblance of marital partners
can be found in the opportunity structure. People meet each other in school, at work, when going
out or at a friend’s place and because of this, come into contact with people who have similar
social characteristics relatively often (Kalmijn 1998; Smeenk 1998).
Why, then, do heterogamous marriages exist? There are at least five causes for this, some
of which are mirrored to the three reasons above for the existence of homogamy. Firstly, some
people may think that social dividing lines are irrelevant when selecting a partner: “Love is
(socially) blind”. Secondly – and this argument is closely related to the first argument of
irrelevance – social dividing lines are not completely synonymous with preferences. It is possible
to find a spouse with similar tastes and expectations who does not belong to the same social
group. The third possible reason for the existence of heterogamous marriages is that people
sometimes do not take enough time to find their match. People who marry young can easily end
up in a marriage with a spouse who later turns out to be less compatible than expected. Fourthly,
the opportunity structure can play a role when heterogamous marriages come about (Becker,
Landes & Michael 1977). This is related to availability. Heterogamous marriages can arises
automatically when one is unable to find a spouse with similar social characteristics, but persists
in wanting to get married. Anyway, it is not easy to find a marriage partner who is equal in every
conceivable respect. Fifthly, it is possible that heterogamy comes about because it is useful in
some respect. This applies to the division of labour within the household in particular. According
to the economic theories of Becker, a specialized division of labour within the household is
favourable for a marriage: one spouse does the housekeeping, the other is the breadwinner. The
result is some kind of exchange. This brings about heterogamy with respect to the position on the
labour market and the investment in human capital (Becker 1981; Becker, Landes & Michael 1977).
This is also important with respect to a difference in age. After all, men, who are mostly the
breadwinners when the division of labour is specialized, have a better position if they already
have some experience and, therefore, are a bit older. Although the resulting heterogamy may be
efficient with respect to the division of labour, it can result in marital conflict as a result of
cultural differences.
If it is true that homogamy enhances the possibility of finding a spouse with similar tastes
and preferences, and ensures that one will experience more support from the social network, then
it can be expected that homogamous marriages will be more stable and long lasting than
heterogamous marriages.
However, not much is known on this topic in relation to the Netherlands. There are a few
bivariate statistical notes and a study which show that mixed marriages have a higher risk of
divorce with respect to ethnicity (Van der Heijdt 1996; Harmsen 1998), church affiliation and age
(CBS 1958; Dumon & Kooy 1983). The drawback of these studies is that, though data are available
in most instances, the comparison of homogamous and mixed categories is not made in the proper
way. I will go into this matter later on. Furthermore, these studies, using official registrations of
divorces, do not directly match marriages and divorces but relate the occurrence of divorce of
certain categories to the occurrence of marriage within the same categories a specific number of
years earlier. Multiple characteristics of spouses on the wedding day are unknown. Therefore,
complete multivariate analyses are not possible.
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More research has been carried out in the United States and a few other countries. The
studies in concern, both bivariate and multivariate, show more or less positive effects of
heterogamy on the risk of divorce (e.g. Bumpass & Sweet 1972; Burchinal & Chancellor 1963;
Heaton 1984; Jones 1994, 1996; Wagner 1993). These studies use either retrospective life-course
data or occasionally panel data. The effects of differences in church affiliation are mostly small.
Stronger are the effects of age differences and, not under investigation in this chapter, differences
in the level of education (Kalmijn 1991a 1991b; Tzeng 1992; Wagner 1993).
It is not so strange that, for the Netherlands and for most other countries, so little is known about
the effects of heterogamy on divorce. To establish the influence of heterogamy on divorce,
information is needed about relevant characteristics of both partners in both existing marriages
and marriages that have ended in divorce. This makes high demands on the data that are needed
and in existing population surveys in the Netherlands, the required information is either
insufficient or absent. Sometimes, an alternative research design is used in which one does not
look at de facto divorces but at other measurements of instability of marriages, such as the
perceptive quality of the marriage and the subjectively estimated probability of divorce by the
spouses themselves (Kooy 1969, 1984; Booth & White 1980; Booth, Johnson & Edwards 1983;
Janssen, Poortman, De Graaf & Kalmijn 1998). Such research has indeed shown that some forms of
heterogamy, especially with respect to level of education and social origin, lead to more unstable
marriages. However, the research design followed is far from ideal. Even though perceptive
instability of a marriage is related to the probability of divorce, it cannot be equated to an actual
divorce. After all, marital problems are often overcome and some people prefer being unhappily
married to being divorced. Furthermore, a large data set is needed to find enough cases of more
unusual combinations of, for instance, ethnicity.
For this chapter, registered data were used to study the influence of heterogamy on
divorce. Every year, the Dutch municipalities had provided Statistics Netherlands with registration
cards containing information about every marriage and divorce that they had entered into their
registers.3 On the basis of these registration cards, it was possible to follow every marriage
contracted in the Netherlands between 1974 and 1994. This allowed me to check every marriage
to see whether it ended in divorce for as long as the data were available, that is, until 1994. This
means that, for the selection of marriage years 1974-1984, ten years is the minimal duration for
which I could follow all these marriages. The municipalities also had to provide Statistics
Netherlands with a few characteristics concerning both spouses. Based on this information, I
could establish whether the marriages are homogamous or heterogamous with regard to four
aspects: age, religion, nationality and previous marital status.
My method has two major advantages. The first one is that this research does not concern
a sample but data about all marriages and divorces registered in the Netherlands between 1974
and 1994. In this period, 1,928,463 marriages and 581,040 divorces took place (a large part of the
divorces concerning marriages which started before 1974). With these data, marital dissolution of
small groups can also be observed. The second advantage is that in this prospective research
design, I do not depend on possibly less reliable, retrospective data. My research design has some
drawbacks as well. The number of characteristics for which the influence of heterogamy can be
detected is limited. Spouses can be compared with respect to their ages, religious affiliations,
nationalities and their previous marital statuses, but other social characteristics on the bases of
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which the spouses possibly select each other, such as level of education and social origin, are out
of the picture. Furthermore, the data solely refer to officially married persons in the Netherlands.
Separations of persons living in unmarried cohabitation are not included. This has to be kept in
mind, even though it is not a big problem, since most serious cohabitations eventually lead to a
marriage in the Netherlands. Of women aged 20-24 who started cohabitation without marriage
between 1975 and 1979, within 8 years, 67 percent were married, 22 percent were separated and
only 11 percent were still cohabiting without being married. For the women aged 20-24 who
started cohabitation between 1980 and 1984, these figures after 8 years are: 63 percent married,
19 percent separated and 18 percent still cohabiting (De Graaf & Steenhof 1999, pp. 26, 28).
In this chapter, I set out to answer the question whether mixed marriages indeed have a higher
probability of divorce within ten years, the duration for which I can follow a reasonable selection
of marriage years. In the next paragraph, I will theoretically answer this question by presenting
hypotheses. After that, I will describe the data from the marriage registers that I used. This will be
followed by the analyses. The concluding paragraph will complete this chapter.
2.2 The influence of heterogamy on divorce: hypotheses
I have already noted that homogamy can have two advantages leading to a successful marriage.
Spouses who resemble each other in social respect share ideas about how to organize their lives
and will probably get on better than less similar spouses. Also, there will be a higher chance that
both spouses’ family members, friends and acquaintances are better able to get along, which also
makes life more pleasurable. These considerations can be made consciously and explicitly when
selecting a partner for marriage, but obviously, this is not necessary. Shared preferences and
support from one’s social network give rise to the expectation that a homogamous marriage will
be more stable than a heterogamous one.
To this reasoning, one could object that persons choosing for a heterogamous marriage
may have decided, again explicitly or not, that the disadvantages of a heterogamous marriage do
not outweigh their love or that they find their preferences to be compatible. This line of reasoning
suggests that it is true that people who do not resemble each other have a reduced probability to
marry each other, but that the selective group who still does so constitutes stable marriages.
Besides, it is probable that people who end up in heterogeneous networks of different social
backgrounds because of their heterogamous marriage, will make every effort to get along with
people of these different backgrounds. They will adopt a tolerant attitude and avoid
disagreements or conflict as a result of social contrasts (Blau & Schwartz 1984; Hondius 1999).
In the beginning of the relationship and during the honeymoon, one might easily be able to
forget about differences in preferences and a lack of support by family and friends. Nevertheless, it
can be expected that once a heterogamous couple is married, a lack of shared culture and interests
will lead to a higher risk of divorce. An additional argument reasons that not only heterogamous
couples fit less well because of cultural differences, but that those differences stemming from
different backgrounds are the reason that the spouses are less able to gain sufficient information
about each other. Another issue is that, even though the marriage partners may be willing to
overcome differences and accept the in-law family and respective friends as they are, if those
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family and friends are not willing to do so in return, they will not support the marriage. A
relatively small crisis during the marriage is less likely to be resolved.
In short, I expect that heterogamous marriages have a higher risk of divorce than
homogamous marriages. I call this the heterogamy hypothesis.
What do I mean by differences in divorce rates between heterogamous and homogamous
marriages? In other words: how should the hypothesis be tested? At first sight, one could think
that the average probability of divorce of all homogamous marriages should be compared to the
average probability of divorce of all heterogamous marriages. This is not the correct way to
proceed, though, because there are quite some differences within the group of homogamous
marriages, just as there are within the group of heterogamous marriages. Homogamous marriages
between two non-church members have a higher risk of divorce than homogamous marriages
between two Re-reformed (gereformeerden) and it would be misleading to take these risks together.
In the same way it is misleading to combine, for example, heterogamous marriages between a
non-church member and a Catholic spouse and heterogamous marriages between a Re-reformed
and a Dutch Reformed spouse. To detect whether heterogamous marriages between non-church
member husbands and Catholic wives have a higher probability of divorce, their probability of
divorce should be compared to the probability of divorce of two homogamous groups only:
homogamous non-church member marriages and homogamous Catholic marriages. If the
probability of the heterogamous couples is in between, then an adaptation is taking place which
does not constitute a heterogamy effect per se. In this way, I can take possible adaptation into
account (cf. Jones 1994, 1996).
The above reasoning implies that different categories of the characteristics under research
are expected to have different divorce risks. In fact, this reflects the main effects of those
characteristics themselves. Let me hypothesize about these effects in short here. I have already
expressed the expectation that non-church members will have higher divorce risks than church
members. However, we may also expect differences amongst church members. The strictest
church members in the Netherlands can be found among Re-reformed groups. Therefore, I would
expect the Re-reformed to have the lowest divorce risks. With respect to age, I hypothesize that
couples marrying at young age have higher divorce risks than couples marrying at a more mature
age, as has been found earlier (Bumpass & Sweet 1972). Mostly, this effect is attributed to a short-
duration, low-quality search for a suitable spouse (Becker, Landes & Michael 1977), which will be
studied more deeply in Chapter 6. With respect to marital status, I expect that persons who
remarry carry a burden of their past marriage in the form of memories and maybe even physical
‘remnants’, like children. This may cause tension in a subsequent marriage. That is why I predict a
higher divorce risk in a second or later marriage. This effect can be expected to be stronger for
divorcees than for widows and widowers, since the memories of divorcees will, on average, be
more negative than those of widowed people. I have no specific expectations about the main
effects of nationality on divorce.
In general, my testing procedure is as follows. I compare the risk of divorce of
heterogamous marriages with the risk of two appropriate types of homogamous marriages.
Firstly, these are the homogamous marriages in which both partners have the same characteristic
as the wife in question and, secondly, these are the homogamous marriages in which both
spouses have the same characteristic as the husband in question. This can be clarified by Table
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2.1. On the shaded main diagonal, fictitious probabilities of divorce are depicted for homogamous
non-church member marriages, homogamous Catholic marriages, homogamous Dutch Reformed
marriages and homogamous Re-reformed marriages. The cells outside the main diagonal, A to L,
represent heterogamous marriages. To investigate whether a marriage between a non-church
member husband and Catholic wife (combination A) has a higher probability of divorce than
homogamous marriages, the probability of the heterogamous marriage is compared to the
probability of homogamous non-church member marriages and homogamous Catholic marriages,
which in this case is 10 percent and 6 percent. If A is between 6 percent and 10 percent,
heterogamous marriages apparently adapt to the norms and customs with respect to divorce in
the two religious groups. According to the heterogamy hypothesis, however, it is expected that A
will be larger than both 10 percent and 6 percent, so, that A will, for example, be 12 percent. In
the same way, the heterogamy hypothesis predicts that the divorce risk of a Catholic/Dutch
Reformed marriage will be greater than 6 percent, etcetera.
Table 2.1 Example on fictitious divorce risks by religion of husband and wife
wife:
husband: none Catholic Dutch Reformed Re-reformed
none 10 % A B C
Catholic D 6 % E F
Dutch Reformed G H 5 % I
Re-reformed J K L 4 %
This general heterogamy hypothesis relates to all four types of heterogamy mentioned. I can
formulate a supplementary hypothesis about the influence of age heterogamy. Marriages in which
the wife is older than her husband occur less frequently than marriages in which the husband is
the oldest (Mare 1991; Smeenk & Ultee 1997). Apart from task specialization mentioned above, one
of the reasons for this is that marriages in which the wife is older are less easily accepted than
marriages in which the husband is older. This refers to traditional norms that the man is the boss.
This traditional superiority becomes ‘endangered’ if the wife is older because her relatively higher
age will give her a bigger say. That is why it can be expected that, if the wife is older than her
husband, the probability of divorce is higher than in the case of the same difference in age in the
other direction. This is called the asymmetry hypothesis or hypergamy hypothesis with respect to age
heterogamy. This hypothesis predicts that marriages which are heterogamous with respect to age
are extra inclined towards divorce if the wife is older than her husband. Asymmetry here refers to
the fact that in a squared table with rows and columns for husbands and wives, the mirror cells
do not display the same divorce risk according to this hypothesis. Hypergamy refers to someone
marrying a spouse in a higher or better position, as hyper is the Greek synonym for the Latin super.
In this chapter, I will use the term asymmetry hypothesis. For heterogamy with respect to church
affiliation, nationality and previous marital status, the asymmetry hypothesis is not obvious and
will not be postulated.
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2.3 Registration data
2.3.1 Official marriage and divorce registrations
In order to test the hypotheses, I made use of data which are registered by Statistics Netherlands
(CBS). This is information supplied by all Dutch municipalities of every marriage and divorce
registered in these municipalities between 1974 and 1994. No records are electronically available
before this period. After this period, data were not gathered in this way anymore, but information
of persons was taken from the municipal basic administration (Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie,
GBA). This organization made it impossible to match the information necessary for the present
investigation for the period after 1994. For the 1974-1994 period, I had records on every marriage
contracted and dissolved in the Netherlands. The municipalities filled in information about
characteristics at the time of the marriage ceremony on registration forms. Therefore, this
information does not suffer from a possible lack of reliability inherent in retrospective questions.
Table 2.2 gives an overview of the number of registered marriages and divorces in all available
files and in the files used in this chapter.
Table 2.2 Registered marriages and divorces
Marriages Divorces
Registered 1974-1994 1,928,463 581,040
Key not unique 59,851 9,868
Marriage before1974 (not applicable) 297,169
Contracted abroad (not applicable) 101
Marriage not present in marriage files 46,384
Totally available 1,868,612 227,518
Selecting marriages between 1974-1984 of which both
spouses younger than 50 years on the wedding day.
931,198 158,620
Of the 1,928,463 marriages registered in the period 1974-1994 (21 full years), information was
available about the municipality of registration, the date of marriage, the municipality in which
the partners lived and the one in which they were going to live, the dates of birth, the previous
marital statuses, church affiliations (until 1991) and nationalities of both spouses. To be able to
analyse the influence of as many of these characteristics as possible on the risk of divorce and to
follow all marriages for at least ten years, I decided to employ the data on marriages contracted in
the years 1974-1984 (11 full years). These could be tracked in the divorce files until 1994.
In the same period 1974-1994, 581,040 divorces were registered. These registrations
contain information about the municipality in which the couples married, the date of divorce, the
date of marriage, the year of birth of both spouses, church affiliation of both spouses, the
occupation of the husband (for a very restricted period) and the number of children in the
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marriage. The occupation of the husband and the number of children at the time of divorce cannot
be used to predict which marriages will end in divorce, because this information was not available
for couples who did not divorce. It is necessary to compare divorced and non-divorced couples in
order to compute divorce risks. The most important information supplied by the divorce files is
that it became known of every marriage contracted in the Netherlands, whether or not it had
ended in divorce before the end of 1994. The exact date of divorce was also available, so I knew
how long the marriage had lasted.
In order to find out whether a couple who married between 1974 and 1984 divorced
between the start of their marriage and 1994, I looked for all marriages in the divorce files. Seeing
that no direct link is possible, for example based on file identification numbers, I used a
combination of characteristics available in both the marriage files and the divorce files. The
combination of the municipality of the marriage, the (exact) date of marriage and the year of birth
of both spouses yielded an (almost) unique key to make the match of both files. The information
about the municipality of marriage had to be used with care, because registers regularly go to
other municipalities as a result of the abolition and creation of municipalities. Therefore, I recoded
all municipalities to the situation on 1 January 1996. If the full dates of birth of both spouses had
been recorded in the divorce files, the key would have been completely unique, but unfortunately,
only the years of birth were recorded. Now, there are some marriages and divorces with an equal
key. These marriages cannot be used and as a result of that, 3 percent of the marriages registered
between 1974 and 1994 were dropped. I assume that this did not affect my results.
I wanted to be able to follow all marriages for ten years. Therefore, I restricted myself to
the marriages contracted between 1974 and 1984, which is about half of the marriages observed
in all the files together. Next, I had to account for distortion of the results caused by death. The
registration data do not show whether a marriage ended because one of the partners deceased. To
restrict the risk of falsely assuming that these marriages were still at risk of divorce, I only
analysed those marriages in which both spouses were younger than 50 years of age at the
beginning of the marriage.4 By selecting the marital years 1974 to 1984 and the couples who
married before the age of 50, having valid values on all relevant variables (there were three
couples with missing values), 931,198 marriages remained to be analysed.
A large part of the 581,040 divorces registered in the Netherlands during the 1974-1994
period were also dropped from my analyses. The most important reason for this is that many
divorces concerned marriages contracted before 1974. A relatively large number of 46,384 divorces
(8 percent of all divorces in the file) which according to registration concerned marriages
contracted between 1974 and 1994 could not be traced in the marriage files. Partly, these could be
marriages from abroad which happened to end up in these statistics. Besides, one has to realize
that data entry errors also crop up in official statistics. The data from the years that I analysed
were noted down in the municipal administration, copied on forms by hand, and then sent to
Statistics Netherlands to be processed. A third possibility, which seems unlikely because this is
against policy, is that parts of certain municipal administrations went to another municipality
than expected after those municipalities had been abolished. However, the administration of an
abolished municipality always goes to the municipality to which most inhabitants of the abolished
municipality are assigned. This is exactly how I recoded the municipalities. It seems unlikely that a
marriage and the divorce of the same marriage were assigned to different municipalities in my
procedure. However, it is technically impossible to test this.
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2.3.2 Operationalization
All characteristics of husband and wife were taken from the marriage registration data and refer
to the time of marriage. I divided both the husband’s and wife’s ages into seven categories:
younger than 20, 20 to 25, 25 to 30, 30 to 35, 35 to 40, 40 to 45 and 45 to 50 years. Dividing age
into five year intervals allowed me to present accessible cross tabulations of both spouses’ age. Of
course, categories are based on arbitrary borders. Two people can differ 4 years and be in the
same age category whilst others differ a month and belong to different age groups. Nevertheless,
on average people in one age group are more homogeneous, whereas age differences increase
when category cells in the frequency table are further apart.
Several denominations can be discerned in respect of church affiliation. Seven categories
were available throughout the period under investigation: no church affiliation, Roman Catholic,
Dutch Reformed, Re-reformed, otherwise Protestant, Jewish, other/unknown. In this way, the
three main religious denominations in the Netherlands and some smaller ones were discernable.
There was no available information in the period of research about religions like Islam and
Hinduism, which have grown strongly in numbers throughout the past few decades. However,
they still constitute a small minority. It is obvious that whether or not one is religious has a strong
impact on marital stability (Booth, Johnson, Branaman & Sica 1995), but differences between
denominations can also be found by distinguishing different denominations. More important for
this research is that we can see differences between several homogamous and mixed couples from
all these denominations.
I divided the nationality of husband and wife in six categories. Besides people from the
Netherlands, I made a category for people from similar neighbouring countries, broadly defined,
representing Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and France. The third category
constituted people from Southern Europe, defined as Portugal, Spain, Italy, the former Yugoslavia
and Greece. These are the European countries that are a bit further away than the neighbouring
countries, mainly with a Catholic or Orthodox background, and that supplied an early wave of
labour immigrants in the 1960s. Two later groups of labour immigrants, from Turkey and from
Morocco, were discerned. These countries have a Muslim background but are quite different from
each other. Turkey is a more secular country, whilst Morocco is one of the Arabic countries. The
other countries constitute a miscellaneous category.5
Finally, the previous marital status of both spouses was divided into three categories:
never married before, widowed and divorced. In this way, I could see whether past marriage
history and heterogamy in this respect affects the risk of divorce.
A drawback of the Dutch registration data is that church affiliation is not always registered
accurately. Many have turned their backs on religion (even before marriage) without reporting this
to the municipal registration. The first result of this is that the effects of church membership may
be underestimated. Divorce risks of persons registered as church members can be discerned less
well from risks of non-church members, because some of the people registered as a church
member have in fact become non-church members. Therefore, differences between church
members and non-church members could be larger than the data suggest. The 1971 census and
subsequent surveys in the 1970s and 1980s indicate that in the period under investigation, about
25 to 30 percent of the population was not a church member (Becker & Vink 1994). This
corresponds to the number of non-church members in the marriage files. Two step survey
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questions, in which it is firstly asked whether a person counts himself or herself as a church
member and, if yes, of which denomination, normally yield higher numbers of secularized persons
(ibidem). The registrations have probably become less accurate over time and limiting the use of
marriage records until 1984 reduces distortions in the analyses. Furthermore, most marrying
couples are of a younger age than the average population and, therefore, may be expected to be
more secularized. A second and for my analysis more interesting consequence is that heterogamy
effects may sometimes be distorted. On the one hand, the heterogamy effect may be
underestimated, because the distinction in the probabilities of divorce between homogamous and
mixed marriages become smaller in the data set. On the other hand, heterogamy effects could also
be overestimated, for example when looking at divorce risks of heterogamous marriages of two
church members from different denominations. This overestimation comes into effect if church
leavers who are not registered as such are particularly common amongst the heterogamous
couples. This problem is less serious for mixed marriages between church members and non-
church members. After all, it is unlikely that the risk of divorce will rise above that of a non-church
member because one partner leaves the church.
Another disadvantage of the use of these registration data is that it is unknown whether a
marriage has been dissolved abroad. The expectation is that this will not affect the results with
respect to heterogamy of age, religion and marital status. I have to be more careful in the case of
heterogamy of nationality. Foreigners marrying in the Netherlands will return to their home
country relatively often. I do not know to what extent this will influence my results. Obviously, I
will underestimate the divorce rates of homogamous foreigners, but I do not know to what extent
this will bias the heterogamy effects.
2.4 Analyses
2.4.1 Regression model
I have investigated the relationship between four types of heterogamy and the risk of a marriage
ending in divorce within ten years on the basis of the official registration data. To present the
results more clearly, I have refrained from analysing the influence of heterogamy on the exact
duration of marriage. Besides reasons of clarity, this has practical reasons: due to the enormous
data set and the fact that all analytical work had to be carried out on site at Statistics Netherlands
(CBS) because of safety and privacy regulations, it was not possible to do analyses of the exact
duration. Instead, I investigated divorce risks within ten years of marriage. This is a reasonable
duration which is above the mode and a bit below the average duration at which couples divorce
(CBS 1997a). This duration allows me to follow 11 marriage cohort years, 1974-1984.
In the description of the analysis, I will not only look at the observed divorce risks after ten
years of marriage for every combination of age, church affiliation, nationality and previous marital
status of husband and wife, but at the corrected divorce risks in particular. These corrected divorce
risks are predictions based on a regression model, in which the influence of the four types of
heterogamy are analysed simultaneously and in which I also statistically control for the year of
marriage (for every year separately), for the degree of urbanization of the municipality in which
the marriage took place (based on the size of the population in five categories according to the
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municipal division of 1 January 1996) and for the province in which the marriage took place
(according to the division in twelve provinces as on 1 January 1996). This correction allows me to
determine the net contribution of heterogamy. After all, the characteristics under investigation
are correlated. For example, a remarrying widow or widower will be older than a spouse who was
never married before and couples of which both spouses are Dutch Reformed will probably also
have Dutch nationality. The observed and the corrected divorce risks will therefore differ from
each other. I have made use of logistic regression analyses in which the dependent variable is the
odds that a marriage has ended in divorce within ten years – which is the probability it has ended
versus the probability it has not. The regression equation looks like:
p
p
x x x
x x
x x
i j k
l m
n o
year i year i age j age j religion k religion k
nationality l nationality l marital status m marital status m
urbanization n urbanisation n province o province o
( )
[ * ] [ * ] [ * ]
[ * ] [ * ]
[ * ] [ * ]
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . .
1
0
1975
1984
1
48
1
48
1
35
1
8
1
4
1
11
−
= + ∑ + ∑ + ∑ +
∑ + ∑ +
∑ + ∑
= = =
= =
= =
β β β β
β β
β β
 
In this equation, p stands for the probability of divorce within ten years of marriage, _’s are
regression coefficients, x’s are variables. The content of the variables and their coefficients are
indicated: year is the marriage year, age is the age category combination of both spouses, religion
the combination of both spouses’ religions, nationality the combination of both spouses’
nationality, marital status the combination of both spouses’ previous marital status, urbanization
the degree of urbanization of the municipality where the marriage took place, province the
province in which that municipality is situated. All these were entered in the logistic regression
analysis as sets of dichotomous variables (dummies), of which one was omitted in the estimation.
Deviation contrasts were used, so that the imaginary average occurring categories formed the
reference in the analysis.
With the multivariate regression coefficients, I computed the predicted risk of divorce of
every combination. This will be referred to as corrected probability of divorce in all tables to be
presented. Since deviation contrasts are used, the reference category to which all corrected
probabilities are projected is the average married couple in the Netherlands in the time period
covered.
In Tables 3 to 6, both the observed and corrected relationships between the four different
forms of heterogamy and the risk of divorce after ten years are presented. Furthermore, the
relative and absolute frequencies of all categories are shown. As a result of correlations between
the variables in the analysis, the observed and corrected risks of divorce sometimes differ to quite
some extent. When discussing the results, I will give particular attention to the corrected risks of
divorce computed on the basis of multivariate logistic regression analysis, because they give a
better image of the influence of heterogamy on the risk of divorce. In all tables, cells with
probabilities of divorce based on less than 100 marriages are left empty. These marriages occur so
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infrequently – on average less than 10 times a year – that their divorce percentage offers no
relevant information.
2.4.2 Age heterogamy
Table 2.3 goes into the frequencies and effects of age heterogamy. The frequencies show that the
largest age group by far is a husband and a wife both between 20 and 25 years of age. Other
relatively young homogamous categories are large too, but so are relatively young couples with a
little age difference of 5 years on average. In total, a little more than half (52 percent) of the
couples can be found in mixed categories.
The probabilities of divorce are given both as observed probabilities, without controlling
other characteristics, and as corrected probabilities, in which the other characteristics in the
model, as discussed above, are taken into account. The first number in the first panel of Table 2.3,
for example, indicates that 23.1 percent of the couples in which both husband and wife are
younger than 20 years on the wedding day will divorce within ten years of marriage. However, if
these couples would be distributed across categories of year of marriage, religion, nationality,
marital status, degree of urbanization and province as the average married couple, then the
percentage of this age group which divorces within ten years would be 31.7. This can be seen in
the corresponding cell in the second panel of the table containing corrected probabilities. These
young couples are, for example, less likely to be remarrying divorcees, which reduces their
observed divorce risk.
The numbers in Table 2.3 show the influence of age at marriage itself. This can be seen
directly from the corrected probabilities of divorce for the homogamous couples on the main
diagonal of the second panel of the table. On this main diagonal, we find the risks of divorce of
couples in which husband and wife belong to the same age category. The older the spouses at the
time of the marriage, the smaller their probability of divorce appears to be in the first ten years of
marriage, corrected for the other characteristics in the analysis. This is as predicted. Marrying at
an extremely young age brings about an especially increased probability of divorce. If both
spouses are younger than 20 years old, the corrected probability of divorce within ten years is
more than 30 percent. The probability of divorce for each age category within age categories of
the other spouse displays a strong effect of age. The effect of age at marriage on the probability of
divorce is usually explained by the intensity with which one has searched for a spouse (Becker,
Landes & Michael 1977; Janssen et al. 1998; Manting 1993; South & Spitze 1986; Tzeng & Mare
1995). If the spouses are older when they marry each other, the probability is higher that they
have searched longer and better for a suitable partner.
It is interesting to note that there are quite large differences between the observed and the
corrected probabilities of divorce in Table 2.3. Higher divorce rates among the young and lower
divorce rates among the older are obscured in the observed figures, because they are not
controlled for previous marital status. Among older marrying people, there are more divorced and
widowed persons who marry for the second or later time, while among younger people, there are
relatively more persons marrying for the first time. This contamination of divorce risks in different
age groups caused by differences in previous marital status is filtered out in the corrected
probabilities of divorce.
What do the figures in Table 2.3 tell us about the heterogamy hypothesis? This hypothesis
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Table 2.3 Observed and corrected probabilities of divorce within ten years of marriage (percentage)
and relative and absolute frequencies, by age of husband and wife on the wedding day,
marriages 1974-1984
Observed probabilities of divorce
wife:
husband: <20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50
<20 23.1 22.1 34.2
20-25 16.5 9.4 13.0 25.6 38.0 41.6
25-30 19.0 9.9 10.3 16.3 27.0 38.9 38.0
30-35 25.4 16.6 13.9 14.9 20.2 26.8 29.7
35-40 30.5 23.3 18.1 16.9 17.9 20.0 26.5
40-45 28.4 27.4 20.1 17.7 17.3 17.2 20.4
45-50 26.2 18.3 16.6 16.0 15.8 15.1
Corrected probabilities of divorce
wife:
husband: <20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50
<20 31.7 27.2 27.4
20-25 22.8 13.6 13.0 15.0 18.4 15.5
25-30 22.7 12.6 9.9 9.9 12.6 15.9 13.4
30-35 22.5 13.8 9.7 8.1 8.8 10.8 10.8
35-40 24.0 14.5 9.3 7.7 7.6 7.8 10.4
40-45 24.3 15.3 8.9 7.1 6.8 6.8 7.7
45-50 13.5 7.4 6.2 5.9 6.0 5.7
Relative (overall) frequencies
wife:
husband: <20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 total
<20 1.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0
20-25 10.6 34.6 2.9 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 48.4
25-30 2.5 19.9 8.7 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 32.7
30-35 0.3 2.8 3.7 1.9 0.5 0.1 0.0 9.4
35-40 0.1 0.6 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 3.9
40-45 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.1 2.2
45-50 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.4
total 15.0 58.8 16.9 5.5 2.3 1.1 0.5 100.0
% homogamous: 47.8
% mixed: 52.2
Absolute frequencies
wife:
husband: <20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 total
<20 13,040 5,214 325 65 18 6 5 18,673
20-25 99,012 321,799 26,708 2,577 532 149 62 450,839
25-30 23,133 185,661 80,804 12,051 2,230 494 163 304,536
30-35 3,011 26,463 34,289 17,918 4,517 1,140 303 87,641
35-40 715 6,004 10,433 10,654 6,253 1,914 555 36,528
40-45 204 1,851 3,655 4,989 5,017 3,223 1,064 20,003
45-50 94 664 1,566 2,455 2,957 3,064 2,178 12,978
total 139,209 547,656 157,780 50,709 21,524 9,990 4,330 931,198
Source: Marriage and divorce files, Statistics Netherlands (CBS), own calculations. Empty cells: n < 100. Cells for
corrected probabilities of divorce which constitute a heterogamy effect are in bold. Total N = 931,198.
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predicts higher divorce risks for mixed couples compared to homogamous couples. More than half
(21) of the 36 heterogamous combinations in the table show probabilities between the probability
on the main diagonal in the corresponding row and the probability on the main diagonal in the
corresponding column. For example, the corrected divorce risk for a marriage between a husband
aged between 20 and 25 years at the time of the marriage and a wife who was under 20 (22.8
percent) is between the corrected divorce risk of couples in which both spouses were younger
than 20 years on the wedding day (31.7 percent) and the corrected divorce risk of two spouses
both between 20 and 25 years old (13.6 percent). In these 21 cases, there is no heterogamy effect.
In the other 15 heterogamous combinations, in bold print in the table, the divorce risk is not
within the boundaries set by the corresponding cells in the main diagonal. Instead, all of them are
higher. If the divorce risks of these 15 combinations are related to those of homogamous couples
within the age category of the husband and to those of homogamous couples within the age
category of the wife, then heterogamy appears to lead to higher divorce risks.
This means that the age heterogamy effect is found in a considerable number of situations,
namely in 42 percent of the heterogamous cells with at least 100 observations. Large age
differences in particular, lead to a higher risk of divorce. One may object that this implies that in
58 percent of cells, the heterogamy hypothesis is not corroborated. However, if no heterogamy
effect were present at all, then all heterogamous categories should have divorce risks between
those of homogamous couples in the category of the husband and those of homogamous couples
in the category of the wife. And if not, then a few higher risks should be counterbalanced by a few
lower risks. This is not the case: 42 percent is higher, 58 percent is in between. Therefore, I can say
that overall there is a clear age heterogamy effect and it is possible to be more specific by
indicating for each combination whether this is the case or not.
The cells indicating a heterogamy effect have a divorce risk within ten years which is on
average 2.2 percentage points higher than the maximum divorce risk if no heterogamy effect were
present. Because the average divorce rate within ten years in the model is 12.7 percent for the
whole population, a 2.2 percentage point increase is reasonably large. The cells in which the
heterogamy effects occur, however, refer to relatively rare categories as can be seen from the
frequencies, the lower two panels in Table 2.3. We may get an idea of the macro-level implications
of the heterogamy effect found here by assigning people to categories on the basis of a completely
open or a completely closed society and maintain the predicted divorce rates for all categories. If
society were completely closed, persons would only marry a spouse in the same age group. If we
assign persons like this and predicted divorce rates would stay the same, the overall divorce rate
would be 12.6 percent.6 Distributing people across the table by chance implies a completely open
society in which age does not act as a selection criterion for a spouse at all. This is a model of
statistical independence, in social mobility research also referred to as model of perfect mobility
(Hout 1983). Applying this open society model yields an overall divorce rate of 14.7. This indicates
that there is indeed an effect of heterogamy on the macro-level divorce risk. I have to add, of
course, that these imaginary percentages only illustrate the effects of heterogamy on macro-level
divorce figures and they imply a ceteris paribus assumption. This means that if society were really
completely open or closed with respect to marriage patters, it would very likely show different
divorce patterns as well and levels of divorce in each cell would be different from now.
The asymmetry hypothesis predicts a higher risk of divorce if the wife is older than her
husband compared to a marriage in which the husband is older than his wife. Just now, we
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observed that 15 heterogamous age combinations have a higher risk of divorce than could be
expected if no heterogamy effect were present. A close inspection of these 15 age combinations
shows that only three of them appear to refer to combinations in which the husband is older
(below the main diagonal), while the other 12 refer to combinations in which the wife is the oldest
(above the main diagonal). This can be expected on the basis of the asymmetry hypothesis.
We can go deeper and look at divorce risks of marriages which are each other’s mirror
image in the main diagonal. Comparing the corrected divorce risk of couples in which the wife is
between 20 and 25 years old and the husband is younger than 20 on the wedding day (27.2
percent) with the corrected divorce risk of couples in which the ages are the other way around
(22.8 percent), shows that the risk of divorce is higher when the wife is the oldest. If this
comparison is made for all 16 mirror images present in the table, then the risk of divorce is indeed
higher if the wife is older than her husband with no exception. All this corroborates the asymmetry
hypothesis. Marriages in which the wife is older than her husband are more exceptional and
apparently this has a detrimental effect on marital stability.
2.4.3 Religious heterogamy
In Table 2.4, the frequency and the risk of divorce are given by the church affiliations of the
husband and the wife. The frequency table shows the relative size of the religious groups. It also
shows that most people marry within their own group. The percentage of inmarriage among
couples is 67 percent. This still means that about one third of the couples is religiously mixed.
The net, corrected, effect of church affiliation on divorce becomes clear on the main
diagonal of the second panel in Table 2.4. Conforming to predictions, homogamous marriages
between non-church members have by far the highest risk of divorce: according to the corrected
figure (second panel), 15.6 percent get divorced within ten years. Among the religious
denominations, we find the highest risk of divorce for the category of ‘other religions’ (14.1
percent), ‘other Protestants’ (12.1 percent) and Jews (10.8 percent). The divorce risks are the lowest
for the three main church denominations. Among them, the homogamous Catholics have the
highest risk of divorce (10.1 percent within ten years), followed by the Dutch Reformed (8.0
percent). The lowest probability on divorce overall can be found among the homogamous Re-
reformed, being 5.4 percent. I expected couples to have a low risk of divorce if they are from
denominations with a stern conception of the admissibility of divorce. The fact that the Re-
reformed have such a low divorce risk is in accordance with this expectation. Catholics, however,
could be expected to have a lower risk as well. The relatively high level found here is less strange
when one considers that Dutch Catholics showed a higher level of permissiveness in relation to
alternative norms and values in this period, despite the church’s official position (cf. Dumon &
Kooy 1983, p. 111; Becker & Vink 1994). I already noted that we are dealing with registered church
affiliation, which does not necessarily give an accurate picture of actual religious conviction or
involvement with the church. A number of people who are registered as a church member are, in
fact, no longer a church member and probably behave more like a non-church member, including
when it comes to divorce. Thus, the effect of church affiliation on the risk of divorce will be even
higher than these figures suggest.
Is the risk of divorce higher for heterogamous marriages? In 18 out of the 35 heterogamous
combinations, the risk of divorce is between that of homogamous couples with the church
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Table 2.4 Observed and corrected probabilities of divorce within ten years of marriage (percentage)
and relative and absolute frequencies, by registered church affiliation of husband and wife
on the wedding day, marriages 1974-1984
Observed probabilities of divorce
wife:
husband: none Catholic
Dutch
Reformed
Re-
reformed
other
Protestant Jewish other
none 18.6 16.9 13.6 13.2 18.0 32.4 14.1
Catholic 18.3 9.7 12.0 12.4 18.8 26.3 26.8
Dutch Ref. 14.5 12.4 6.7 7.3 13.2 17.2
Re-ref. 14.0 12.0 6.7 4.5 11.7 13.2
other Prot. 17.7 14.0 11.2 10.0 11.7 17.7
Jewish 34.4 27.6 23.1 16.9
other 37.5 30.6 22.7 18.6 22.2 17.0
Corrected probabilities of divorce
wife:
husband: none Catholic
Dutch
Reformed
Re-
reformed
other
Protestant Jewish other
none 15.6 14.3 13.1 12.6 13.6 15.7 16.0
Catholic 15.1 10.1 12.1 12.2 14.1 12.2 16.9
Dutch Ref. 13.2 12.3 8.0 8.5 12.2 13.1
Re-ref. 13.0 11.7 7.8 5.4 9.9 10.6
other Prot. 15.3 11.6 10.9 10.5 12.1 13.0
Jewish 18.8 15.7 13.1 10.8
other 19.9 17.3 14.9 13.7 14.1 14.1
Relative (overall) frequencies
wife:
husband: none Catholic
Dutch
Reformed
Re-
reformed
other
Protestant Jewish other total
none 17.4 4.6 2.9 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.4 26.6
Catholic 3.8 33.0 3.4 0.9 0.2 0.0 0.4 41.7
Dutch Ref. 2.4 3.6 9.7 1.9 0.1 0.0 0.3 17.9
Re-ref. 0.8 0.9 1.9 5.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 9.2
oth. Prot. 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7
Jewish 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
other 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.2 3.8
total 25.0 42.9 18.4 9.5 0.8 0.1 3.4 100.0
% homogamous: 67.9
% mixed: 32.1
Absolute frequencies
wife:
husband: none Catholic
Dutch
Reformed
Re-
reformed
other
Protestant Jewish other total
none 162,221 42,680 27,401 9,756 1,875 204 3,594 247,731
Catholic 34,956 307,713 31,575 8,485 1,949 133 3,905 388,716
Dutch Ref. 22,230 33,071 89,836 17,734 1,310 65 2,401 166,647
Re-ref. 7,327 8,527 17,791 50,531 472 27 961 85,636
oth. Prot. 1,285 1,774 1,286 468 1,081 3 170 6,067
Jewish 337 196 130 60 12 278 23 1,036
other 4,742 5,661 2,904 1,260 257 17 20,524 35,365
total 233,098 399,622 170,923 88,294 6,956 727 31,578 931,198
Source: Marriage and divorce files, Statistics Netherlands (CBS), own calculations. Empty cells: n < 100. Cells for
corrected probabilities of divorce which constitute a heterogamy effect are in bold. Total N = 931,198.
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affiliation of the wife and that of homogamous couples with the church affiliation of the husband.
In the other 17 combinations, heterogamous marriages have a higher divorce risk. These include
all but one of the possible mixed combinations between members of the three main confessional
groups in the Netherlands (Catholics, Dutch Reformed and Re-reformed). Apparently, marriages
suffer when spouses do not share the same religious orientation.
It is also interesting to observe whether the church affiliation of the wife is more or less
important than the affiliation of the husband. The idea behind this is that religious affairs within a
marriage or a family are predominantly the field of the wife. Her attitude, therefore, can be
expected to be more decisive for the religious attitude within the household than the attitude of
the husband (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi 1975; Felling, Peters & Schreuder 1991).7 The corrected
probability for a Catholic wife with a non-church member husband to get divorced within ten
years is 14.3 percent. For homogamous non-church members, the probability is 15.6 percent and
for homogamous Catholics 10.1 percent. In this case, the probability is closest to the religious
group of the husband. Looking at all 35 heterogamous combinations in Table 2.4, we find 18
combinations in which the norms within the husband’s and 17 combinations in which the norms
within the wife’s religious group appear to be more decisive. Therefore, the norms with respect to
divorce within the religious affiliation of the wife are not generally decisive.
Something else catches my eyes when I take a closer look at the influence of religious
heterogamy on divorce. The divorce risks for marriages between a church member and a non-
church member are, in general, closer to the divorce risk of homogamous non-church member
marriages than to the divorce risk of homogamous marriages in the group of church members
concerned. There is only one exception to this, namely other Protestant wives with non-church
member husbands. The fact that the divorce risks of mixed marriages between a church member
and a non-church member are closer to the divorce risks of non-church members is partly caused
by the fact that the divorce risk for mixed couples is often higher than the risk for homogamous
couples, and among the homogamous, non-church members have the highest divorce risk.
Nevertheless, this finding can also indicate that church members who marry non-church members
attach less value to the norms with respect to divorce within their religion. As noted before, we
have to take into account that the church member/non-church member mixed marriages are
relatively often marriages between two people who are, in fact, two non-church members because
the person registered as a church member has, in fact, left his or her faith. Of course, this is also in
accordance with the observation that church members who marry non-church members attach
less value to their religion.
To summarize effects with respect to religious heterogamy on divorce, I state that almost
half (49 percent) of the extra-diagonal cells constitute a heterogamy effect which raises the divorce
risk within ten years with an average of 2.0 percentage points compared to the maximum possible
divorce risk if no heterogamy effect were present. As the average modelled risk amounts to 12.7
percent, this effect should not be underestimated. However, many cells in which the heterogamy
effects occur are relatively small in size, as can be seen in the lower two panels of Table 2.4, and
the net contribution of religious heterogamy to the overall divorce rate on the macro level is
smaller. As before, I can illustrate this by computing the risks of divorce in a completely open and
in a completely closed society, based on the corrected divorce risks displayed in Table 2.4. If
everyone only married if he or she could engage in a marriage with a spouse in the same religious
group, the average risk of divorce within ten years would be 10.8 percent. In a model of perfect
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mobility, the average risk of divorce would be 11.1 percent. Due to relatively small occurrence of
mixed groups, the clearly present micro level effect of religious heterogamy on divorce is rather
minuscule on the macro level.
2.4.4 Heterogamy of nationality
The relative frequencies in Table 2.5 show that 94 percent of the couples is homogamous and 6
percent is mixed with respect to nationality. This is mainly due to the large size of the category of
couples in which both spouses have the Dutch nationality. Therefore, inmarriage is large with
respect to nationality and heterogamy is relatively rare.
The first two panels of Table 2.5 show the observed and corrected probabilities of divorce
after ten years of marriage by the nationalities of husband and wife at the time of marriage. Once
more, my conclusions are based on the corrected probabilities in the second panel. On the main
diagonal, we can read the risks of divorce for homogamous couples, which indicate the influences
of nationality itself. The divorce risk of homogamous couples between two spouse who have
Dutch nationality is somewhere in the middle (9.0 percent). Marriages between two spouses from
neighbouring countries of the Netherlands, from Southern Europe and between spouses from
Turkey have a lower risk of divorce. Homogamous marriages among Moroccans and homogamous
marriages among other nationalities show higher risks of divorce.8 Unfortunately, it is impossible
to make firm statements about the influence of the spouses’ nationalities on the probability of
divorce, because marriages involving foreigners are relatively often dissolved abroad, especially if
the couple has returned to their country of origin in the meantime.
With respect to the nationalities of both spouses, even stronger indications can be found for the
existence of heterogamy effects than with respect to age and religion. In total, Table 2.5 contains
the probabilities of 13 heterogamous combinations which occur at least 100 times between 1974
and 1984. Of these, 11 end up higher, often much higher, than the maximum of both
accompanying homogamous probabilities. The heterogamy hypothesis is strongly supported here.
There are a few real extreme cases, like the corrected probability of 41.7 percent within ten years
for marriages between a Moroccan woman and a Dutch husband. The probability of the
combination the other way around is also not inconsiderable at 29.7 percent.
Another striking point is that the risk of divorce is higher for marriages in which the
husband has Dutch nationality and the wife does not, than for marriages between wives with
Dutch nationality and husbands with non-Dutch nationality. Dutch/Turkish marriages are the only
exception; here it is the other way around. Part of the high divorce rates of mixed marriages
between people with Dutch nationality and people with another nationality may have to do with
fictitious marriages which are contracted with the intention of arranging legal residence
documents. After three years of temporary, conditional residence permits because of a marriage, a
foreigner can obtain unconditional residence documents or apply for Dutch nationality. So, it is
likely that fictitious marriages will have a relatively high divorce risk after three years. This would
lead to an overestimation of the effect of ethnic heterogamy on the risk of divorce.
In my data, however, there are indications that the proportion of arrangements on these
grounds is not very large. Figure 2.1 depicts the uncontrolled survival rates of marriages by a
selection of nationalities of husband and wife, where the nationality of the husband is indicated
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Table 2.5 Observed and corrected probabilities of divorce within ten years of marriage (percentage)
and relative and absolute frequencies, by nationality of husband and wife on the wedding
day, marriages 1974-1984a
Observed probabilities of divorce
wife:
husband: Netherlands neighbour S. Europe Turkey Morocco other
Netherlands 11.4 22.3 28.1 39.2 63.6 35.0
neighbour 15.8 7.6 11.4
S. Europe 24.3 9.3 26.0
Turkey 56.0 0.7
Morocco 52.2 1.6
other 32.6 14.0 15.5
Corrected probabilities of divorce
wife:
husband: Netherlands neighbour S. Europe Turkey Morocco other
Netherlands 9.0 13.7 18.0 19.4 41.7 25.1
neighbour 9.8 4.0 6.1
S. Europe 15.6 7.2 18.6
Turkey 29.3 3.4
Morocco 29.7 15.6
other 19.0 6.1 10.2
Relative (overall) frequencies
wife:
husband: Neth. neighbour S. Europe Turkey Morocco other total
Netherlands 92.7 0.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.6 95.5
neighbour 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.3
S. Europe 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
Turkey 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4
Morocco 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3
other 1.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.8
96.0 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 2.0 100.0
% homogamous: 93.7
% mixed: 6.3
Absolute frequencies
wife:
husband: Neth. neighbour S. Europe Turkey Morocco other total
Netherlands 862,995 8,572 2,712 158 275 14,791 889,503
neighbour 9,742 1,570 39 0 3 421 11,775
S. Europe 4,708 63 1,047 1 4 123 5,946
Turkey 1,385 19 20 2,288 3 21 3,736
Morocco 1,706 26 34 2 1,258 40 3,066
other 13,143 628 93 13 39 3,256 17,172
893,679 10,878 3,945 2,462 1,582 18,652 931,198
a Neighbour stands for Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, United Kingdom and France; S. Europe for Portugal, Spain, Italy,
former Yugoslavia and Greece.
Source: Marriage and divorce files, Statistics Netherlands (CBS), own calculations. Empty cells: n < 100. Cells for
corrected probabilities of divorce which constitute a heterogamy effect are in bold. Total N = 931,198.
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Figure 2.1 Fictitious marriages? The survival of marriages by the nationality of husband and wife
Note: only combinations mentioned are depicted: neighbouring and Southern European countries are not shown. Only
homogamous combinations and mixed combinations between a person with the Dutch and a non-Dutch nationality are
shown.
Source: Marriage and divorce files, Statistics Netherlands (CBS), own calculations.
first. Survival curves are shown for homogamous couples with Dutch, Turkish and Moroccan
nationality, as well as couples in the categories of ‘other’ nationalities. The categories of
‘neighbouring countries’ and ‘Southern European countries’ are omitted here. Furthermore,
survival curves are shown for combinations of either a husband or a wife with Dutch nationality
married to a spouse from Turkey, Morocco or the category of ‘other’ countries. The figure shows
that in some cases the divorce rate increases after the first year of marriage, especially in the case
of a Dutch husband and a Moroccan wife. This is caused by the fact that there are hardly any
divorces in the first year. Around the third year, however, there are hardly any increases or
accelerations in the rate of divorce. I may conclude that the number of divorces caused by
fictitious marriages to obtain legal residence documents is probably very small. Therefore, the
effect of heterogamy of nationality on divorce cannot be attributed to fictitious marriages.
In sum, the percentage of cells outside the main diagonal which constitute a heterogamy
effect is very high with respect to nationality, at 85 percent. The strength of the heterogamy
effects that are present is also very strong with respect to nationality, with an average divorce risk
within ten years for mixed categories of 11.3 percentage points above the divorce risks of relevant
homogamous categories. This is very high compared to the average predicted risk in the model of
12.7 percent. All mixed categories occur relatively infrequently, though. This is shown in the lower
two panels of Table 2.5. Again, I will demonstrate the macro effect of this type of heterogamy on
divorce within ten years of marriage by comparing the divorce risks as they would have been in
the case of a completely closed society and in the case of a completely open society. If persons
would only marry an available spouse with the same nationality, a completely closed society, the
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risk of divorce within ten years would be 9.0 percent. In the model of perfect mobility, in which
spouses of different nationalities are assigned to each other by chance, the model predicts an
overall divorce rate within ten years of 9.9 percent. This implies that, on the macro level, some
effect is also noticeable of mixed marriage with regard to nationality on divorce.
Table 2.6 Observed and corrected probabilities of divorce within ten years of marriage (percentage)
and relative and absolute frequencies, by previous marital status of husband and wife,
marriages 1974-1984
Observed probabilities of divorce
wife:
husband: never married before widow divorced
never married before 10.6 12.3 25.7
widower 11.0 12.4 21.9
divorced 23.5 23.8 27.7
Corrected probabilities of divorce
wife:
husband: never married before widow divorced
never married before 5.4 8.9 14.2
widower 8.4 14.7 19.7
divorced 12.3 18.2 20.5
Relative (overall) frequencies
wife:
husband: never married before widow divorced total
never married before 86.4 0.3 3.6 90.3
widower 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.7
divorced 4.8 0.1 4.2 9.1
total 91.6 0.5 8.0 100.0
% homogamous: 90.7
% mixed: 9.3
Absolute frequencies
wife:
husband: never married before widow divorced total
never married before 804,779 2,485 33,395 840,659
widower 3,335 572 2,334 6,241
divorced 44,386 1,126 38,786 84,298
total 852,500 4,183 74,515 931,198
Source: Marriage and divorce files, Statistics Netherlands (CBS), own calculations. Total N = 931,198.
2.4.5 Marital status heterogamy
Table 2.6 contains the frequencies and the observed and the corrected probabilities of divorce by
previous marital status of both spouses. I made a distinction between persons who were never
married before, widowed persons and divorced persons. The percentage of mixed couples with
respect to previous marital status is not very large, namely about 9 percent. Most people marry
someone with the same marital status. As a result of a strong correlation between the age at
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marriage and previous marital status, large differences can be found between the observed and
the corrected probabilities of divorce, as I previously observed when discussing age at marriage.
As expected, the percentages on the main diagonal show a strong effect of previous marital
status itself. Marriages between men and women who were both not married before have the
lowest predicted probability of divorce of 5.4 percent. Marriages between a widow and a widower
have a higher probability of divorce within ten years (14.7 percent) and marriages between two
divorced persons have the highest probability of divorce by far (20.5 percent). There are at least
two reasons why people who had a divorce have the highest probability to divorce again. Firstly,
there is a selection effect. People who have already gone through one divorce, may be more
accepting of the idea of divorce whenever problems arise within the marriage. Secondly, the
second or later marriage of divorced persons may undergo problems as a result of their past. The
ex-spouse (and children) may be the cause of tension in the next marriage. Also, widowed persons
may have more difficulty with the attachment to a new spouse because of the memory of their
deceased spouse. Because of this, their probability of divorce is also higher than that of people
getting married for the first time.
The corrected percentages in the second panel of Table 2.6 immediately make clear that the
heterogamy hypothesis is not applicable here. For all combinations of couples who are
heterogamous with respect to their previous marital status, the probability of divorce is
somewhere between the probability of homogamous couples with the previous marital status of
the husband and the probability of homogamous couples with the previous marital status of the
wife.
2.4.6 Expected occurrence and heterogamy effects
From the point of view of the mean percentage of divorce, the contribution of heterogamy with
respect to age, religion and nationality to the rise in divorce risks in the Netherlands is not
unimportant. However, I already noted earlier that particularly categories which do not occur
frequently appear to have higher divorce risks. I need to be more modest when it comes to
providing an overall explanation of the risk of divorce by heterogamy on the macro level.
Because of the higher divorce risks in smaller categories, the question arises to what extent
unusual combinations have a higher risk of divorce. Whether a category is unusual could better be
indicated by the statistical unexpectedness of occurrence of a certain combination of husband’s
and wife’s characteristics than by its size. The association between this expectedness on the one
hand and the risk of divorce on the other hand would be an indication for a possible explanation
of the relationship between heterogamy and divorce. Unexpectedness of a combination does not
simply mean being smaller, but being smaller relative to expectation. In Table 2.4, for instance, we
can read that 17.9 percent of the marrying men are Dutch Reformed and 42.9 percent of the
marrying women are Catholic. If the distribution of husbands over wives were at random and
independent of religious affiliation, then we would expect 17.9 percent times 42.9 percent equals
7.7 percent of couples in the category with a Dutch Reformed husband and a Catholic wife. In fact,
there are only 3.6 percent of the couples in this category. Thus, this category is under-represented
with a factor (3.6 / 7.7) = 0.47.
For age, religion, nationality and previous marital status, I computed the absolute expected
frequency of every combination of husbands and wives, based on the marginal frequencies. These
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expected frequencies indicate how often each combination would appear if there were statistical
independence and people would marry each other at random, independent of their respective
characteristics. I divided the observed by the expected frequencies to obtain a measurement
indicating relatively high or low occurrence compared to statistical independence. Next, I
correlated this measurement in each category with the accompanying probabilities of divorce. The
measurement of unexpectedness is centred around 1: if a category occurs as often as in case of
statistical independence, the value of the measurement is 1; if a category occurs less often than
expected, the values range from 0 to 1; if a category occurs more often than expected, the values
range from 1 to infinity. Therefore, the correlations were computed on the natural logarithm of
the unexpectedness values, which is metrically centred around 0. The results are shown in Table
2.7.
Table 2.7 Correlations between the relative occurrence of categories of husband and wife and the
risk of divorce in those categories for age, church affiliation, nationality and previous marital
status.
age church nationality prev. marital status
all cells -0.56 -0.11 -0.22 0.61
cells n > 100 only -0.58 -0.28 -0.59 0.61
without main diagonal -0.61 -0.04 0.01 0.85
without main diagonal and n > 100 -0.68 -0.15 -0.63 0.85
Source: Marriage and divorce files, Statistics Netherlands (CBS), own calculations.
It becomes clear from the figures in Table 2.7, that there is indeed a strong negative relationship
between the expectedness of the occurrence of the categories and the risk of divorce.
Combinations of categories of husbands and wives which appear more often than can be expected
on the basis of the number of marriages which are contracted with husbands and wives in these
respective categories have a lower risk of divorce. If certain marriages are less common, the
divorce risk rises. This applies to categories of age, religion and nationality, but not at all for
combinations of previous marital status – the characteristic for which I did not find any
heterogamy effects on divorce. This relationship between the divorce risk and the frequency
relative to expectation is the highest for age combinations and the lowest for religious
combinations. After selecting the cells with an occurrence of at least 100 marriages for more
reliable results, like in all analyses in this chapter, the correlations become much stronger.
This chapter is all about effects of heterogamy on divorce. Therefore, let us have a look at
the correlation between the expectedness and the divorce risk for the heterogamous
combinations. This can be done by leaving out the main diagonal. For heterogamous combinations
separately, only a strong negative correlation is found for age combinations. If I select cells with a
frequency of at least 100 again without the main diagonal, the correlations are all clearly present
again. The relationship between unexpectedness and the divorce risks for categories of age at
marriage, religious denominations and nationalities is also graphically depicted in Figure 2.2.
Chapter 2
48
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
-4 -2 0 2 4
relative occurrence (nat. log)
di
vo
rc
e 
ris
k 
in
 1
0 
ye
ar
s
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
-2 -1 0 1
relative occurrence (nat. log)
di
vo
rc
e 
ris
k 
in
 1
0 
ye
ar
s
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
-3 -1 1 3
relative occurrence (nat. log)
di
vo
rc
e 
ris
k 
in
 1
0 
ye
ar
s
Figure 2.2 Scatter plot of the relationship between a category’s occurrence relative to expectation and
the divorce risk in ten years for heterogamous combinations occurring at least 100 times
a: for categories of age at marriage
b: for religious denominations
c: for nationalities
Source: Marriage and divorce files, Statistics Netherlands (CBS), own calculations.
I may conclude that combinations which occur more frequently than expected have a lower risk of
divorce then combinations which occur less frequently than expected. This also goes for the
heterogamous combinations separately. Certain mixed combinations of husband’s and wife’s
categories occur less often in society than expected if there was statistical independence. Those
relatively rare categories have higher divorce risks.
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2.5 Conclusions
In the course of this chapter, I have demonstrated, on the basis of large-scale data analyses, that
there is a strong relationship between heterogamy and divorce in the Netherlands. To do this, I
used registration data on all marriages (1974-1984) and divorces (1974-1994) in the Netherlands,
which had never been matched and analysed in this way until this study. Effects on the
probability of divorce were found for three out of four of the types of heterogamy under research.
Heterogamy with respect to age, church affiliation and nationality appear to have a positive
influence on the risk of divorce. I suspect that the explanation for these findings are to be found in
cultural differences and diverging preferences and taste. Spouses who do not share a common
background run a higher risk of seeing their relationship break down than spouses who resemble
each other. With respect to age, religion and nationality, relatively less common combinations
show relatively higher divorce risks. This is a first indication that less accepted combinations of
husband’s and wife’s characteristics are less supported by the social environment.
As a by-product supplied by my analyses of the influence of heterogamy on divorce, I mapped out
the influence of the characteristics themselves. As in previous research, I found that couples
marrying very young have an extraordinarily high risk of divorce. Second or later marriages,
especially after divorce, also have an increased probability of divorce compared to first marriages.
I could also discern the influence of religious values and norms concerning divorce: non-church
members have a relatively high divorce risk and also between denominations, differences exist.
Something similar can be found with respect to nationality. Prudence is required, though, due to
problems of comparability. Marriages of two foreigners may have been dissolved abroad. Divorces
abroad are not automatically registered in the Netherlands. According to Dutch statistics, these
marriages are still intact.
Finally, I want to stress the importance of longitudinal data for further research into the influence
of heterogamy on divorce. This research can only be carried out if marriages can be followed from
the beginning in order to compare marriages which end in divorce and marriages which do not.
This implies that for research into other aspects of heterogamy than studied in this chapter, such
as educational and social origin heterogamy, other longitudinal data sources have to be found, for
instance, from retrospective life course research. An additional demand on the data is that the
characteristics in question are known for both spouses in both existing and divorced
relationships. Also, it is only possible to investigate to what extent the unfavourable impact of
heterogamy on divorce is either compensated or strengthened during marriage with the use of
longitudinal data. After all, marital partners can grow towards each other or grow further apart,
something which has not come up in previous research. From Chapter 4 onwards, new data will
be presented containing information about several social characteristics of both spouses during
the course of their marriage.
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1. This chapter is an adapted version of an article published in Dutch in Bevolking en Gezin, 28 (1), pages 35-57.
Co-authors of that article were Paul M. de Graaf and Matthijs Kalmijn (Janssen, De Graaf & Kalmijn 1999). Early
versions of this chapter were presented at the NSV Marktdag Sociologie, Utrecht, the Netherlands, 29 May
1997; at the 14th ISA World Congress of Sociology, Montréal, Québec, Canada, 26 July-1 August 1998.
2. The division of labour as such is an economic factor, whereas opinions about them could be considered as a
cultural factor. These factors can also interact (Kalmijn, De Graaf & Poortman 2001).
3. Since 1994, these data are gathered in a different way, namely by taking information of persons from the
municipal registrations (Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie, GBA) every year.
4. A solution would be to correct my figures using death rates at the macro level. This implies that death risks
of both spouses would have to be taken into account given their ages in every year. Furthermore, combined
probabilities of divorce and death should be taken into account. Even if this were possible, I expect that such a
complicated procedure will hardly yield any profit compared to choosing my age selection. Death on the micro
level cannot be matched with my data.
5. Unfortunately, it is not possible with these data to discern persons originating from Surinam or Aruba and
the Netherlands Antilles. Surinam became independent at the end of 1975, Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles
are still part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. These people, therefore, have Dutch nationality.
Unfortunately, I do not know the nationality or the country of birth of the parents either, which may be a
better indicator because of the possible acquisition of the Dutch nationality.
6. In this case, we did not assign superfluous persons, leaving them unmarried. We could also assign them by
chance. This would make the difference between the predicted divorce rates somewhat smaller, but not very
much, since 77 percent can be assigned, based on the marginal frequencies. For church denominations even 98
percent and for nationality and marital status 99 percent can be assigned in this way.
7. Here, we are dealing with male or female dominance on a characteristic attributed to the couple as a whole:
the risk of divorce. Research has been carried out on male and female dominance on a personal characteristic
of both husband and wife separately. Results show, for example, that the husband’s class position may be
equal or even dominating the wife’s political and class orientation, but never the other way around (Van Berkel
1997).
8. The great difference between the observed and the corrected probabilities of divorce of homogamous
Turkish and homogamous Moroccan marriages probably stems from the fact that these mainly concern
marriages between two partners who marry for the first time. This factor lowers divorce risks. This is
statistically corrected in the second panel.
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3 Heterogamy and divorce within five, ten and fifteen
years in two marriage cohorts.
A dynamic analysis of Dutch register data 1974-1994.
T
he previous chapter indicated that heterogamy with respect to age, religion and nationality leads
to a higher risk of divorce. Levels of divorce vary over the course of a marriage and several
changes have taken place in society in recent decades with respect to divorce, individualization
and secularization. My data show that divorce between the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s has
increased, particularly in the first years of marriage. I have reassessed the findings of heterogamy effects
and made the analyses more dynamic. The research questions are whether the effect of heterogamy on
the risk of divorce changes during marriages and over cohorts. Again, I made use of marriage and
divorce registration data as collected by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). My data show that heterogamy
effects decline over the course of the marriage only for nationality differences, which indicates a growing
acceptance of spouses during marriage. When shifting from the 1970s to the 1980s, effects of heterogamy
on divorce only decreased for a few categories of religious mixed marriage in their first five years. I
attribute this to societal changes like individualization, secularization and a growing meritocracy. On the
whole, however, heterogamy effects are quite stable, both throughout the course of the marriages and
over the researched period of time in the 1970s and 1980s.
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I analysed data collected by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) concerning all
new marriages which took place in the Netherlands from 1974 to 1984. I could follow these
marriages until 1994. In those analyses, I could assess the effect of marital heterogamy with
respect to age, religion, nationality and previous marital status. The first three of these forms of
heterogamy indeed appeared to have a negative effect on marital stability.
As I followed the marriages which started between 1974 and 1984 until 1994, I was able to
follow every marriage for at least ten years, some for even longer. For practical reasons, I
investigated the effects of heterogamy on the risk of divorce within ten years. The question then
arises whether effects of heterogamy do not change over the course of the marriage. Marriages
can be ended by divorce in the first few years, but also later during the marriage. It would be
interesting to see whether heterogamy has the same effect throughout marriage or whether the
effects change when the marriage lasts longer. Therefore, the first research question in this
chapter is whether the effects of heterogamy on divorce are stable throughout marriage or
whether they increase or decrease over the course of the marriage.
The period in which the analysed marriages took place was a time when several social changes
occurred which are either directly related to my research topic or important for social trends in
society. Divorce rates rose gradually in the period under investigation. The yearly number of
divorces per 1000 married men1 slowly rose from 5.8 in 1974, to 7.5 in 1980 and 9.9 in 1985, which
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is an increase of about 70 percent in 11 years time. It then decreased slightly to 8.1 percent
between 1987 and 1991, before rising again to 10.2 percent in 1994 (CBS 1975-1999). This can be
seen in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 Divorce rate per year per 1000 married men (until 1977: per 1000 married couples)
Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS) (1975-1999).
The increase in divorce rates is also visible when following the marriages over their course, as was
done in the previous chapter and will be done again in this chapter. To illustrate this, the marital
survival rate over the course of marriage is broken down by marriage cohort – or more
specifically, marriage year – in Figure 3.2. This is a graphical presentation of the survival of every
marriage that was conducted in the Netherlands between 1974 and 1984 between spouses both
younger than 50 years of age at the time of marriage. For reasons of clarity, only marriage cohorts
from even years are depicted. Dissolutions as a result of death or divorce abroad are not in my
data. Therefore, the percentage of divorces will be slightly higher in reality. On the other hand, the
percentages of survival in my graph will be slightly higher than in figures for the whole
population, as a result of the selection of marriages between spouses below 50 years of age at
marriage. We may expect relatively more remarriages amongst people getting married at a later
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age (CBS 1998, p. 35), and second and later marriages have a higher risk of divorce. Figure 3.2
shows that younger marriage cohorts divorce faster than older cohorts. An increase in divorce
frequency is especially prominent in the cohorts between 1974 and 1978. After that, only
unsystematic fluctuations are present. After ten years, 11.6 percent of the marriage cohort 1974
got divorced and 14.5 percent of the marriage cohort 1984. The average percentage of divorce
after ten years across the 11 cohorts is 13.5 percent when counting each cohort equally. Taking all
marriages of these cohorts together – or: taking the number of marriages in each cohort into
account – leads to an average risk of divorce of 12.5 percent in the first ten years of marriage.
Figure 3.2 Surviving marriages (not dissolved by divorce) between spouses aged below 50 on the
wedding day by marital duration and year of marriage, 1974-1984 (even years)
Source: Marriage and divorce files, Statistics Netherlands (CBS), own calculations.
The rise in divorce rates can be seen in the light of a general trend towards more permissive
norms and values. People are more accepting of alternative forms of cohabitation and are more
permissive towards divorce (SCP 1994). These trends match the trends towards more
individualization and secularization. The clearest indicator is the percentage of church members.
Census data show that in 1971, 24 percent of the population was not a member of any church.
Subsequent estimations of trends based on surveys show that in 1975, about 26 percent of the
adult population was not a member of any church. This was 29 percent in 1980, 31 percent in
1985 and 38 percent in 1990 (Becker & Vink 1994).2
Also, the legislation pertaining to divorce has changed a few times in Dutch history. The
first Civil Law of the Netherlands after Napoleon in 1838 only allowed divorce on serious grounds
like adultery, long term abandonment or serious criminal punishment. No fault divorce based on
mutual consent was not allowed. A verdict of the Netherlands High Court in 1883 sustained as
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valid proof a guilty plea or non-appearance of the defending spouse in case of an accusation of
adultery. This led to a practice of mutual consent divorce under the guise of a fictitious adultery
‘committed’ by one of the spouses, also known as ‘the big lie’. This went on until the law was
changed in 1971. The new (current) legislation permits divorce as long as both spouses agree upon
a ‘durable disruption’ of the marriage, provided that the custody of the children and the division
of the property has been arranged. This change in law had a sizeable impact as it gave rise to a
large increase in divorce figures in 1972 and 1973. However, after that, the yearly rise in divorce
rates was no larger than before (Van Poppel & De Beer 1991). Therefore, legal changes did not
cause any change in trends in the 1974-1994 period investigated here.
Within the economy, there was a recession in the 1980s, particularly in the first half of the
decade. This can be illustrated by unemployment figures. During the mid and late 1970s, the
percentage of the labour force registered as unemployed was stable around 4 percent. It then rose
from 4.6 percent in 1980 to 14.0 percent in 1984. After that, the figures slowly declined and have
stabilized at between 6 and 8.5 percent since the end of the 1980s (CBS 1975-1999). Economic
problems are known to affect happiness and marital stability in a negative way. Tensions are
increased by recessions and this may make divorce risks rise.
Summarizing the above, important and significant cultural and economic changes took
place in society during the 1970s and 1980s. I would expect that this social change could have an
impact on divorce levels, but I do not know to what extent it had an effect on the effects of mixed
marriage on the risk of divorce. Even though this period is relatively short, it is, therefore,
constructive to look into trends with respect to heterogamy effects on divorce. The second
research question reads to what extent the influence of heterogamy on divorce has changed over
time, more specifically over marriage cohorts in the 1974-1984 period.
Note that I speak of relatively short periods and cohorts and I do not distinguish
theoretically between period and cohort. Changes of cohorts can also be considered as changes
over the course of time throughout this chapter. Due to the structure of the data, it is more
feasible to analyse different cohorts, as I will demonstrate later. Therefore, ‘cohort’ will be used
mostly in this chapter when changes are referred to which can be attributed both to changes over
cohort and changes over time.
In the next paragraph, I will deduct hypotheses about changes over the course of marriage and
over cohorts. To describe differences during marriage and between cohorts, I again employed the
official data kept by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) on all marriages registered in all Dutch
municipalities in the 1974 to 1984 period and on all divorces registered from 1974 until 1994.
These data will be described in the third paragraph. Using these data, I could investigate whether
marriages in which spouses differ from each other have a higher risk of ending in divorce than
marriages in which husband and wife resemble each other. In the analyses, I compared the effects
of heterogamy in the first, the second and third five years of marriage and in the marriage years in
the middle and late seventies and in the beginning of the eighties. In this way, I could find out to
what extent the role played by these three forms of heterogamy has changed during a marriage
and over time. Thus, I investigated duration and trend effects. These analyses will be described in
Chapter 4. I will conclude by summarizing the main findings and their meaning and with a
discussion of the implications for future research.
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3.2 Theory and hypotheses
As mentioned above, findings from Chapter 2 showed several positive effects of the types of
heterogamy used in this chapter on the risk of divorce. Differences in age appeared to lead to a
higher risk of divorce, especially if the wife is older than her husband. Differences in church
denomination also increase the divorce risk, especially between members of the Catholic church
on the one hand and members from the Dutch Reformed or Re-reformed church on the other.
Marriages between a man or a woman with Dutch nationality and someone with another
nationality show higher divorce risks in comparison to homogamous marriages with respect to
nationality. The analyses described in this chapter examine duration effects and trend effects of
heterogamy with respect to age, church denomination and nationality on the risk of divorce. In
this paragraph, I will deduct hypotheses about the expected changes in the impact of these types
of heterogamy over the course of marriage and about differences between cohorts.
3.2.1 Hypotheses on duration effects
Of all the marriages contracted in 1976, 6.6 percent had divorced after five years, 14.0 percent
after ten years, 18.4 percent after fifteen years and 22.3 percent after twenty years. Of all the
marriages started in 1981, 9.5 percent had divorced after five years, 16.1 percent after ten years
and 21.0 percent after fifteen years (CBS 1997a). This means that in the 1976 marriage cohort,
there is a slight initial increase in divorce risks over the marriage course followed by a clear
decrease, whereas in the 1981 cohort there is a clear decrease as well, all throughout the marriage
course. This is shown in Figure 3.3.
We can gain even more insight into trends over time and changes throughout the marriage
course by combining them as was done in Figure 3.4, using the marriage and divorce records from
my analyses concerning all marriages between spouses aged under 50 on the wedding day. In this
graph, the ‘mortality’ in the sense of divorce is displayed per year of marriage, broken down by
marriage cohort. For reasons of clarity, only even marriage years are displayed. Several things can
be observed from this figure. In general, we can see that the risk of divorce is high in the first
stage of a marriage and even increases a little in the first few years. After that, the risk of divorce
drops gradually over the course of marriage. This pattern, however, became clearer in the later
cohorts in the 1980s, but was much less pronounced in the earlier ones in the 1970s. The risk of
divorce in the first years of marriage is very different between marriage cohorts. After about five
years of marriage, however, the differences are smaller and after about ten years of marriage, the
risk of divorce per marriage year is about equal for the cohorts 1974-1984. From this, we can
conclude that the increase in the risk of divorce over marriage cohorts – see Figure 3.2 – comes
about by an increase in the number of divorces in the first five years of marriage.
The reason for looking at duration effects of heterogamy on divorce now is the supposition that
the influence of several forms of heterogamy on the risk of divorce will diminish when the
relationship lasts longer. The thought behind this is that couples who are already together for a
longer period of time have proven that they can survive crises. With respect to this idea, the theory
of growing acceptance, which assumes that the risk of divorce diminishes throughout a marriage
has been formulated (Manting 1993, 1994; Trussell, Rodriguez & Vaughan 1992). I will go one step
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Figure 3.3 Divorce rates over the marriage course for the 1976 and the 1981 cohort
Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS) (1997a).
Figure 3.4 Mortality (by divorce) of marriages between spouses aged below 50 on the wedding day by
marital duration and year of marriage, 1974-1984 (even years)
Source: Marriage and divorce files, Statistics Netherlands (CBS), own calculations.
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further and apply this theory not only to the extent of divorce, but to the effects of heterogamy on
divorce, in particular. Hereby, I have to bear in mind the theoretical starting-point (from the
previous chapter) which assumes that the influence of heterogamy on the divorce risk mainly
stems from getting along less well with each other and from a lack of support by parents and
others in the social environment. If heterogamy increases the risk of divorce for these reasons,
then I would expect the effect to diminish as the marriage progresses, because enduring
marriages have apparently proven that they were able to cope and that they indeed learned to
accept each other. Therefore, according to the growing acceptance hypothesis, I would expect the
positive effect of heterogamy on the risk of divorce to decline throughout a marriage.
An alternative hypothesis is derived from the theory of accumulated irritations (Manting
1993, 1994; Trussell, Rodriguez & Vaughan 1992) which predicts the opposite for the risk of
divorce during marriage, as spouses will get fed up with each other’s bad habits when time goes
by. This could also be extended to the influence of heterogamy on divorce. It seems rather illogical,
though, to expect that the impact of the incompatibility of a couple’s heterogamous characteristics
will keep on growing. I can unite and integrate this theory of accumulated irritations with the
previous theory of growing acceptance by assuming that marital instability - and also the influence
of heterogamy on it - will rise in the first few years. After all, the spouses still have to get
accustomed to each other and they will get to know each other better than before and from angles
which were ignored before they were married. After this period, the spouses become attuned to
each other. As a result of this, differences will become less threatening for the stability of the
marriage. People learn, they forgive and forget, and this is when the ‘growing acceptance’ starts
to work. This is my inverse-U-shaped heterogamy effect hypothesis, which is a competitor to the
growing acceptance hypothesis.
The initial increase in divorce risks during marriage is either absent or it can only be found
to a limited extent, as presented at the beginning of this subsection. I found that the risk of
divorce decreases over the course of marriage in accordance with the theory of growing acceptance.
Possibly an initial growth can be found in the effects of heterogamy on the risk of divorce.
3.2.2 Hypotheses on differences between cohorts
The rising divorce rates mentioned in the introduction of this chapter bring me to the point of
changes over time. Divorce risks have risen over time. With respect to mixed marriages this could
be expected from the fact that, for example, religiously mixed marriages have become more
common (Hendrickx 1994). Bearing the previous chapter’s observations in mind, we must
remember that the categories with the largest divorce rates are relatively small in size, which
results in small macro-level effects of heterogamy on the size of the contingency of divorcees.
Even though I relate an increase in the number of mixed marriages to a higher divorce
rate, this increase can, paradoxically, lead to a theoretical expectation of a decreasing influence of
heterogamy on divorce. Individualization and secularization have marked a shift in the norms and
values concerning religion, marriage, the family and divorce towards increasing permissiveness
(SCP 1994). A growing number of people no longer consider marriage as the only way to security.
Since becoming more individualistic, many people have become more interested in love, affection
and the possibility of self-fulfilment. All this implies, firstly, that a growing number of people find
that marriage is not necessarily for life and are more willing to break up a relationship which
Chapter 3
58
works out badly or does not yield what they expect from it (e.g. Janssen et al. 1998).
Since individualization and secularization make people more individualistic, these changes
also imply that we can expect people to be less tied to the social groups that they belong to. Those
social barriers are becoming fainter. This means that marrying outside social boundaries of
religious, ethnic and other social categories is becoming more common. People are becoming less
shocked by or opposed to such marriages. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that mixed
categories which occur less often than can be expected based on marginal frequencies have higher
divorce risks, while categories which occur more frequently than can be expected have lower
divorce risks. The increased occurrence of mixed marriages can be seen as a sign of more openness
in society. So, on the one hand, people depend to a lesser degree upon the restrictions of their
social environment. On the other hand, to the extent that they do still depend on them, certain
mixed categories have become more accepted than before, resulting in less tight restrictions.
Furthermore, religion has become less salient and less important as a moral guideline
(Wilson 1967). Therefore, marrying outside religious boundaries has become more common
(McCutcheon 1988; Hendrickx 1994) and can be expected to become less threatening for the
stability of a marriage. If seen within the light of an increasingly open society, I can extend the
prediction of a decreasing effect of religious heterogamy on divorce to the other types of
heterogamy under investigation in this chapter: nationality and age.
Another theory leads me to expect the influence of heterogamy on divorce to decrease over
time. Society has been changing from one in which positions are ascribed by inherited background
characteristics towards a more meritocratic one in which own achievement is more decisive.
Although the main emphasis of research in this field has been on the role of parental resources on
the achievement of one’s occupation, mixed marriages have already been considered in this light
since Blau and Duncan’s (1967) monograph on social mobility in the United States. Central in this
respect is the notion that positions which one can achieve in life have become increasingly less
dependent on characteristics ascribed by one’s social background and increasingly more
dependent on one’s own merits. With respect to choosing a spouse, Kalmijn (1991a, b) proposed
the hypothesis that the classic sociological distinction between ascription and achievement as
opposing ways to social status is also applicable to marriage markets. Research has indicated that
an individual achievement characteristic like the level of education has gained in importance
when choosing a spouse in comparison to characteristics ascribed by origin such as parental social
status, religion and ethnicity (Kalmijn 1991a, b; Hendrickx 1994, 1998). This notion can, therefore,
be applied to heterogamy and divorce as well. Age has nothing much to do with ascription or own
merits, but the other two characteristics on which I investigate the influence of heterogamy on
divorce do: nationality and religion are mostly inherited from family background. One might argue
that people can choose their own religion and to some extent, like when applying for
naturalization, for their nationality. However, most of the time, these characteristics are taken
from the parents – which is ascription – and if it is not, then it cannot be considered an
achievement on ‘merits’ anyway. So, in this chapter, I am mainly studying characteristics of
ascription. Therefore, looking at heterogamy and divorce from this view of ascription and
meritocratic achievement leads to the same prediction, namely a decrease in the effect of
heterogamy with respect to the characteristics investigated here on divorce.
In sum, I hold that an expected growing support for mixed marriages and a growing
meritocracy in achievement will lead to the expectation that mixed marriages will gain more
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support and will be considered more normal than was previously the case. Therefore, I expect a
trend towards a decreasing influence of heterogamy on the risk of divorce in my research period.
This is the decreasing heterogamy effect hypothesis. I will show my investigation on this for the
limited time span in my data set by comparing marriage cohorts.
3.3 Data and operationalization
3.3.1 Registration data and method
In order to test the hypotheses, I used data registered by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) supplied by
the Dutch municipalities on the marriages and divorces which they had registered. This method
allowed me to access data on every marriage contracted and dissolved by divorce in the
Netherlands. The marriages that I analysed started between 1974 and 1984. For these marriages, I
could find out whether they ended in divorce or not before 1994 by looking them up in the divorce
records using some key characteristics. The municipalities filled in some characteristics on the
registration forms at the time of the wedding ceremony. Therefore, this research is not dependent
on the reliability of retrospective questions. As in the previous chapter, I selected marriages
between spouses below 50 years of age on the wedding day. Furthermore, I selected marriages of
which the municipality was known because marriages with unknown municipalities only appear
in one of the cohorts. This accounts for the minor change in the total number of cases in my
analyses, which will be carried out per cohort.
As can be read from Table 3.1, I had 923,485 marriages to be analysed. In order to compare
changes over time, I distinguished two cohorts: the first consisting of the marriage years in the
seventies (1974 to 1979), the second of the marriage years in the eighties (1980 to 1984). The
former cohort consists of 531,015 marriages, the latter of 392,470. For these cohorts, I computed
logistic regression models for the divorce risk in the first five years of marriage. Within these
cohorts, 29,859 and 28,881 marriages, respectively, ended in divorce in the first five years. If one
leaves these marriages out, 501,156 and 363,589 are left in the respective cohorts. The remaining
marriages were analysed for another five years: the second five years of marriage. In this period,
34,402 marriages in the older and 23,127 marriages in the younger cohort ended in divorce. The
remaining marriages after ten years in the older cohort, 466,754 in total, could be followed for
another five years. Of these, another 21,909 appeared to divorce before the 15th anniversary. In
this way, I discerned two cohorts (1974-1979 and 1980-1984) and three marital durations (first,
second and third five years of marriage). I reiterate that the division into two cohorts may also be
seen as a division into two periods. The analysis, however, was an analysis of cohorts.
Techniques of analysis which use duration in the estimation of the parameters, like Cox
regression analysis or other types of event history analysis, are laborious and not feasible on this
large data set because all analyses were done on site at Statistics Netherlands. The use of logistic
regression analysis to compare three durations and two cohorts was the most suitable way of
analysis. The estimated parameters from the logistic regression analyses could be used to compute
expected divorce risks for all categories of independent variables.
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Table 3.1 Registered marriages and divorces in two cohorts
Marriages Divorces
Registered 1974-1994 1,928,463 581,040
Key not unique 59,851 9,868
Marriage before 1974 (not applicable) 297,169
Contracted abroad (not applicable) 101
Marriage not present in marriage files 46,384
Totally available 1,868,612 227,518
Both spouses younger than 50 years at time of
marriage performed between 1974-1984
931,198 158,620
After deselecting unknown municipality/abroad:
923,485 marriages to be split into 2 cohorts:
cohort 1974-1979 cohort 1980-1984
at the start of marriage 531,015 392,470
divorcing in first five years of marriage -/- 29,859 -/- 28,881
remaining after five years 501,156 363,589
divorcing in second five years of marriage -/- 34,402 -/- 23,127
remaining after 10 years 466,754 340,462
divorcing in third five years of marriage -/- 21,909
remaining after fifteen years 444,845
3.3.2 Operationalization
The dependent variable in the analyses was the divorce risk. This was analysed for three durations
of marriage. In this way, I could see whether the effects of heterogamy on divorce grew or
declined or first grew and then declined during marriage, as discussed in the theoretical part
above. Besides, I distinguished two cohorts in order to test whether being mixed has a declining
positive effect on the divorce risk over cohorts. As mentioned earlier, I analysed the influence of
three forms of heterogamy on divorce: heterogamy with respect to age, church denomination and
nationality. I used measurements similar to those used in the previous chapter, but on the basis of
the conclusions there, I simplified measurements wherever possible.
For age at marriage, the mean age of husband and wife was taken. For the age difference,
the age at marriage of the wife was subtracted from that of the husband. A negative difference
indicates the number of years that the wife is older. A positive difference indicates the number of
years that the husband is older. A value of 2 on the scale of age difference, for instance, indicates
that the husband is 2 years older than his wife, whereas a value of -3.5 denotes a wife who is 3.5
years older than her husband. A quadratic term was computed, too: the square of this age
difference. Adding the squared term made it possible in the analysis to model the divorce risk to
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rise in both directions: when the husband is older or when the wife is older. In this way, less
parameters were needed than in the previous chapter where categories of combinations of
husband’s and wife’s age were distinguished. Besides, the combination of a linear and quadratic
term allowed me to find the ‘optimal age difference’ at which the risk of divorce is the lowest.
For church denomination, seven categories have been registered: no church affiliation,
Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed, Re-reformed (gereformeerden), other Christian, Jewish,
other/unknown. In the analyses, the divorce risks of several combinations of the church
denominations of husband and wife was analysed. To do this, I produced a variable with
combinations of the husband’s and the wife’s church affiliations. To prevent categories being too
small and to produce sensible comparisons, I distinguished homogamous combinations of non-
church members, Catholics, Dutch Reformed, Re-reformed, other Protestants and others; next, all
possible mixed combinations of each spouse being in any category of non-church members,
Catholics, Dutch Reformed or Re-reformed and, finally, one category for all other mixed
combinations. Because of the large number of categories and cases, mirrored combinations, like a
non-church member husband with a Catholic wife and a non-church member wife with a Catholic
husband, were taken together into the same category. It is plausible to do this with respect to
religion, since the analyses in the previous chapter displayed no systematic direction of divorce
rates for these mirrored combinations. In this way, I limited the number of parameters.
New in these analyses, compared to the previous chapter, is the addition of a categorical
variable indicating whether a marriage ceremony in church3 has taken place or not. This is the
indicator available in these files that can be controlled to see to what extent the official
registration is still correct and to see whether people who are registered as church members still
feel attached to their church or not. In this way, I could control the fact that marriages which are
supposedly mixed are, in fact, not so very mixed if the spouses are not really involved with their
church affiliation. It can be assumed that couples who do not marry in church are less religious
than couples who do. Thus, I could find purer effects of religious differences between spouses,
both for spouses with different denominations and for marriages between a church member and a
non-church member.4 I could control the variations in church involvement by taking the inter-
actions between the performance of a church ceremony and church denomination into account.
Six categories of nationality were distinguished, being those of the Netherlands,
neighbouring countries (broadly defined as Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and
France), Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece), Turkey, Morocco and other
countries.5 In the analyses, I looked separately at every homogamous combination and at every
combination of a Dutch spouse and any possible category of a foreign spouse. Other mixed
combinations of two foreigners with a different nationality appear too infrequently in the data
and have been placed together in one miscellaneous category. Previous analyses showed that the
influence of nationality on the divorce risk is not symmetrical. It does make a difference whether
the husband or the wife has Dutch nationality, since I found a higher divorce risk among the
former in the previous chapter. Therefore, I decided, with respect to nationality, in contrast to
church affiliation, to make a distinction between mirrored categories: a Dutch husband with a
Turkish wife was in a different category than a Turkish husband with a Dutch wife. Still, I used as
few categories as possible in this way.
A drawback of using registration data is that it is unknown how many marriages are
dissolved abroad. I expect that this will not influence the results with respect to heterogamy of
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age and religion, but more caution is necessary when it comes to heterogamy of nationality.
Foreigners married in the Netherlands often return to their country of origin. It is unknown to
what extent this will influence my results.
As categorical control variables I took into the analyses: the province where the marriage
started, the degree of urbanization of the municipality where the marriage took place in five
categories, the year of marriage categorically and the marital status of both spouses before
marriage, discerning never married, widowed and divorced. In this way, I could take the influence
of geographical and historical differences and previous marriage history of the spouses on the
divorce rate into account.
3.4 Analyses and results
3.4.1 Frequency of heterogamy
Before going into the analyses, I would like to show how much heterogamy actually exists. This is
shown in Appendices 3.1 to 3.3. These appendices indicate which percentage of the couples is in
each of the categories (of age at marriage, church denomination and nationality, respectively) as
distinguished in the logistic regression analyses. There are panels for each of the durations
investigated – the first five years, the second five years and the third five years of marriage – for
each cohort – 1974-1979 and 1980-1984. Only panels for the first and second five years are
available for the younger cohort, as this cohort could only be followed for ten years. Furthermore,
there is a sixth panel for the situation at the beginning of the marriage – which is equal to the
situation for the first five years of marriage – for both cohorts together, 1974-1984.
With respect to the occurrence of age heterogamy in Appendix 3.1, the total percentage of
people marrying in different age groups shows a slight increase over time: in the second cohort,
there are more mixed couples. In the first five years of marriage, this increase over time is from
51.6 to 52.4 percent, in the second five years from 51.1 to 51.5 percent. Progressing down the
length of the marriage, it can be noted that the percentage of mixed couples among the remaining
ones after five and ten years, kept on decreasing. This clearly demonstrates that mixed couples
have a higher divorce rate than homogamous couples. Also clearly visible in these tables is that
age heterogamy occurs mainly over small distances of adjacent categories, mostly in the direction
of an older husband. Very large age differences are rare. In total, a little more than half of the
couples consisted of husbands and wives in different categories.
Changes over cohorts in the occurrence of religiously mixed couples do not occur between
the 1974-1979 and 1980-1984 period, as can be read from Appendix 3.2. The percentages remained
about the same. The level of inmarriage is high: at least two thirds of the couples belong to the
same group. Going down over the marriage course, we can see a slight decrease in the relative
number of mixed couples. This is related to the higher divorce risk of mixed couples.
Appendix 3.3 shows the frequencies for categories of nationality. Similar to the findings for
age heterogamy in Appendix 3.1, heterogamy with respect to nationality increases over historical
time (from 5.3 to 7.0 percent and from 4.8 to 5.7 percent in the first and second five years of
marriage, respectively) and decreases over the marriage course (in the older cohort from 5.3 via
4.8 to 4.4 percent and in the younger cohort from 7.0 to 5.7 percent). Levels of inmarriage are
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extremely high. Of course, this is due to the fact that most marriages registered in the Netherlands
consist of two persons with Dutch nationality.
Although these figures are illustrative, they cannot show how strong the effects of
heterogamy on divorce are. For this, we need to compare homogamous and heterogamous couples
in the correct manner, as will be demonstrated in the next subsection.
3.4.2 Testing the hypotheses: logistic regression models
I estimated the parameters of a logistic regression model for all durations and cohorts
distinguished. In this model, I regressed the probability of divorce on the following variables, the
operationalization of which is described in section 3.3 above:
- the mean age at marriage of both spouses;
- the age difference;
- the age difference squared;
- the categorization of both spouses’ church affiliations at the start of the marriage;
- a dichotomous variable indicating whether a church ceremony took place;
- interaction terms of the latter two;
- the categorization of both spouses’ nationalities at the start of the marriage;
- the previous marital status of both spouses;
- the year in which the marriage took place;
- the province in which the marriage took place;
- the degree of urbanization of the municipality in which the marriage took place.
Processing the adjustments compared to the previous chapter with respect to age, religion and
nationality and adding a church wedding ceremony and interaction terms, leads to the following
logistic regression equation:
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In this equation, p stands for the probability of divorce within a certain time span in marriage (in
this chapter: specific periods of five years in a marriage), _’s are regression coefficients, x’s are
variables. The content of the variables and their coefficients are indicated: year is the marriage
year, mean age is the average age of both spouses, religion is the combination of both spouses’
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religions, church ceremony is the dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the couple also
married in church, nationality is the combination of both spouses’ nationalities, marital status
husband and idem wife is the previous marital status (never married, widowhood or divorced),
urbanization is the degree of urbanization of the municipality where the marriage took place and
province is the province in which that municipality is situated. With respect to categorical
variables for which I used dichotomous dummies, deviation contrasts were used, so that the
average effect for all cases formed the reference in the analysis.
Parameters of this model were estimated for five samples: for the oldest distinguished
cohort 1974-1979, I estimated the model parameters of divorce in the first, second and third five
years of marriage; for the cohort 1980-1984, I estimated the model parameters of divorce in the
first and second five years of marriage. For the model parameters in the second five years, I used
the marriages which survived the first five years and analysed whether they divorced before their
tenth anniversary. For the model parameters in the third five years, I used the marriages which
survived the first ten years and looked whether they divorced before their fifteenth anniversary.
Next, I computed the expected divorce risks for combinations of church affiliation of both
spouses and of nationalities of both spouses based on these logistic regression analyses. In the
expected probabilities, the average age at marriage is set at 25 years. Since age at marriage has a
negative effect on the risk of divorce, a lower age results in higher probabilities of divorce, whilst
a higher age results in lower probabilities of divorce. For age heterogamy, I also computed
expected divorce risks for couples with varying marriage ages. In the computations of divorce
risks, the controlling categorical variables were set to the overall mean by using a deviation
contrast in the logistic regression analysis.
When depicting and evaluating the corrected divorce risks computed from the logistic
regression analysis, special attention should be given to the way in which they have to be
evaluated. In which way can we compare divorce risks and see whether there is an effect of
heterogamy or not? At first sight, it may seem reasonable to compare homogamous and
heterogamous couples in general, but this is quite senseless. In the previous chapter, I
demonstrated that a marriage only ‘suffers’ from a heterogamy effect if divorce risks are higher
than could be expected on the basis of the characteristics of the spouses. For example, if we want to
know whether the divorce risk of a mixed marriage between a non-church member husband and a
Catholic wife shows a heterogamy effect, it is no use comparing their divorce risk with the one for
Protestants. Instead, this divorce risk should be compared to the divorce risk in the category of the
husband, in this case non-church members, and the risk in the category of the wife, in this case
Catholics. I will do this analogously for all mixed categories of age, religion and nationality.
Tables of all predicted divorce risks will be presented per characteristic in the subsections
below. For age, this will be done by presenting computed probabilities for the marriage ages of 18,
23, 28, 33, 38, 43 and 48. For purposes of illustration, I also present the observed probabilities of
divorce in Appendices 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 for age, church affiliation and nationality, respectively. I use
the same categories as in the corrected tables of church affiliation and nationality in the
subsections below. In the table for observed probabilities of age categories, I distinguish age
categories below 20, 20-25, 25-30, 30-35, 35-40, 40-45 and 45-50 years old. The tables in
Appendices 3.4 to 3.6 are not corrected for other characteristics. To test the hypotheses, however,
I will refer to Tables 3.2 to 3.5 as given below in the subsections. Since they are corrected for all
other characteristics in the analyses, they give the net influence of heterogamy on divorce risks.
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Table 3.2 Corrected probabilities (percentages) of divorce by age and age difference of husband and
wife in three periods of marriage and two marital cohorts
a: first five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
18 23 28 33 38 43 48
18 19.4 17.9 18.2 20.3 24.9 32.6 44.4
23 17.0 14.1 13.0 13.2 14.9 18.5 24.9
28 16.5 12.3 10.1 9.3 9.4 10.7 13.4
33 17.6 11.9 8.8 7.2 6.5 6.6 7.6
38 20.7 12.8 8.5 6.2 5.0 4.6 4.6
43 26.5 15.2 9.1 6.0 4.3 3.5 3.2
48 35.9 19.8 10.9 6.4 4.2 3.0 2.4
effect of mean age at marriage -0.0758
effect of (age husband minus age wife) -0.0059
effect of (age husband minus age wife)2 0.0024
b: second five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
18 23 28 33 38 43 48
18 24.8 21.7 20.8 21.8 25.0 30.8 40.0
23 22.1 17.6 15.2 14.5 15.3 17.7 22.3
28 21.5 15.5 12.1 10.4 9.9 10.5 12.2
33 22.8 15.0 10.6 8.2 7.0 6.6 7.0
38 26.4 16.0 10.2 7.1 5.4 4.6 4.4
43 32.8 18.8 11.0 6.9 4.7 3.6 3.0
48 42.8 24.0 13.0 7.4 4.6 3.1 2.4
effect of mean age at marriage -0.0872
effect of (age husband minus age wife) 0.0019
effect of (age husband minus age wife)2 0.0023
c: third five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
18 23 28 33 38 43 48
18 11.0 9.8 9.6 10.5 12.6 16.7 23.8
23 9.7 7.7 6.8 6.7 7.4 8.9 12.0
28 9.5 6.8 5.4 4.7 4.7 5.1 6.2
33 10.3 6.6 4.7 3.7 3.3 3.2 3.5
38 12.3 7.2 4.6 3.2 2.5 2.2 2.2
43 16.2 8.7 5.0 3.2 2.2 1.7 1.5
48 23.0 11.6 6.1 3.5 2.2 1.5 1.2
effect of mean age at marriage -0.0776
effect of (age husband minus age wife) -0.0007
effect of (age husband minus age wife)2 0.0023
d: first five years, cohort 1980-1984
wife
husb.
18 23 28 33 38 43 48
18 28.9 27.5 28.9 33.4 41.6 53.7 68.5
23 25.5 21.7 20.5 21.7 25.4 32.6 44.1
28 24.8 18.9 15.9 14.9 15.8 18.8 24.8
33 26.9 18.3 13.7 11.4 10.7 11.3 13.6
38 31.9 20.0 13.3 9.7 8.0 7.5 8.0
43 40.8 24.2 14.5 9.4 6.8 5.6 5.2
48 53.8 31.9 17.8 10.4 6.6 4.7 3.9
effect of mean age at marriage -0.0771
effect of (age husband minus age wife) -0.0104
effect of (age husband minus age wife)2 0.0028
e: second five years, cohort 1980-1984
wife
husb.
18 23 28 33 38 43 48
18 24.2 21.9 22.1 24.8 30.7 40.5 54.7
23 21.7 17.5 15.7 15.9 18.0 22.7 31.2
28 21.7 15.5 12.3 11.0 11.1 12.7 16.3
33 24.1 15.5 10.9 8.5 7.6 7.7 8.8
38 29.6 17.4 10.9 7.5 5.8 5.2 5.2
43 39.0 21.8 12.3 7.5 5.1 4.0 3.5
48 52.8 29.8 15.6 8.5 5.1 3.5 2.7
effect of mean age at marriage -0.0818
effect of (age husband minus age wife) -0.0013
effect of (age husband minus age wife)2 0.0028
Note: effects of mean age, age difference and age difference squared are included in the model. Multivariate model. Bold
effects constitute heterogamy effects.
Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands) Marriage and Divorce Files 1974-1994, own calculations. Cohort 1974-1979: first
five years, N = 531,015; second five years, N = 501,156; third five years, N = 466,754; cohort 1980-1984: first five years,
N = 392,470; second five years, N = 363,589.
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3.4.3 Age differences
In Table 3.2, I present the divorce risks for husbands and wives of different ages with a five-year
interval. The age at marriage itself has a clear impact on the risk of divorce. Throughout marriage
and in both cohorts, the effect in the logistic regression model equals around -0.08. This implies
that marrying young brings about a higher risk of divorce than marrying at a more mature age.
We can also see this in the risks shown in Table 3.2. In order to see the effect of age and not the
effect of age heterogamy, I look at divorce risks of homogamous couples in the main diagonal. In
all panels of Table 3.2, a decline in divorce risk is depicted as the spouses are older on their
wedding day.
Furthermore, I found effects of heterogamy. Except for the second five years of marriage in
the 1974-1979 cohort, the effect of age differences is slightly negative. The effect of the quadratic
term is positive. This implies that the relationship has a U-shape and that the ‘optimal’ age
difference with the lowest divorce rate is that of a slightly older husband. In Table 3.2, going
further off the diagonal, the divorce risks rise. This especially applies to extreme age differences.
Close to the diagonal, divorce risks generally show an initial drop. This can be ascribed to the main
effect of mean age at marriage. For moving away from the diagonal implies that the age of one of
the spouses is increasing. These findings are similar to those in the previous chapter.
The effects allow me to compute the predicted age difference with the lowest divorce rate.
For the older and the younger cohort, for the first five years of marriage, this ‘optimal’ age
difference is reached if the husband is 1.23 and 1.86 years older, respectively. For the second five
years of marriage, this ‘optimal’ age difference is close to 0: if the wife is older by 0.41 years and if
the husband older by 0.23 years, respectively. For the third five years of marriage in the older
cohort, the age difference with the lowest risk of divorce is even closer to 0: it can be found for a
husband just 0.15 years older. These differences come about by changes in the linear parameter.
The effects of the quadratic term, nevertheless, remain present to roughly the same extent
across cohorts and over the marriage course. Apparently, the age heterogamy effects on divorce
are robust over cohorts and over the marriage course: the divorce risks keep going up to about the
same extent with increasing age differences in either direction.
3.4.4 Religious differences
To evaluate the effects of religious heterogamy, I will look at the expected divorce risks computed
from the logistic regression model. These corrected probabilities can be found in Table 3.3. The
mean age at marriage in these models is set to 25 years.
3.4.4.1 Religious differences: pattern in the first five years in the 1974-1979 cohort
Panel A in Table 3.3 shows the divorce risks within five years for several combinations of church
affiliation for couples married between 1974 and 1979. The main diagonal shows the divorce risks
of homogamous couples. Below the diagonal, the probabilities of mixed categories can be found.
For the mixed couples involving the smaller categories of ‘other Protestants’ and ‘other religions’,
one overall probability is given at the bottom part of the panel.
It is clear that among the homogamous couples on the main diagonal, non-church
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members have the highest corrected divorce risk of 16.9 percent. This is followed by the ‘other
Protestant’ and ‘other’ categories, 12.4 and 13.9 percent respectively. Of all distinguished
homogamous categories, the church members of the three main religious denominations in the
Netherlands, Catholics, Dutch Reformed and Re-reformed, show the lowest divorce rate in that
order, with the homogamous Re-reformed showing the lowest divorce rate of all categories. These
findings corroborate findings of the previous chapter.
Table 3.3 Corrected probabilities (percentages) of divorce by church denomination of husband and
wife in three periods of marriage and two marital cohorts, mean age at marriage set to 25
a: first five years, cohort 1974-1979
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 16.9
Cath. 14.9 12.1
D.R. 13.9 12.7 8.4
Reref. 14.1 12.8 9.6 6.9
oth. Prot. 12.4
other 13.9
oth. het. 16.4
b: second five years, cohort 1974-1979
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 17.0
Cath. 16.5 17.3
D.R. 14.4 15.2 10.9
Reref. 15.2 16.0 13.1 11.6
oth. Prot. 15.8
other 18.0
oth. het. 17.9
c: third five years, cohort 1974-1979
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 7.5
Cath. 7.4 7.1
D.R. 6.6 6.9 5.2
Reref. 7.3 7.8 5.7 5.1
oth. Prot. 5.0
other 8.0
oth. het. 8.6
d: first five years, cohort 1980-1984
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 21.3
Cath. 21.6 22.0
D.R. 19.2 19.5 14.3
Reref. 18.4 18.9 16.4 12.5
oth. Prot. 19.5
other 24.9
oth. het. 24.3
e: second five years, cohort 1980-1984
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 17.2
Cath. 16.8 15.7
D.R. 14.8 14.8 10.9
Reref. 15.3 17.7 12.2 11.8
oth. Prot. 15.9
other 18.7
oth. het. 18.5
Note: ‘none’ stands for no church affiliation; ‘Cath.’ for Catholics; ‘D.R.’ for Dutch Reformed; ‘Reref.’ for Re-reformed; ‘oth.
Pr.’ for other Protestant/Christian; ‘other’ for all other church affiliations’; ‘oth. het.’ for all other mixed combinations in the
table (the darkest empty cells together). Mirrored cells taken together. Multivariate models. Bold effects constitute
heterogamy effects.
Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands) Marriage and Divorce Files 1974-1994, own calculations. Cohort 1974-1979: first
five years, N = 531,015; second five years, N = 501,156; third five years, N = 466,754; cohort 1980-1984: first five years,
N = 392,470; second five years, N = 363,589.
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To establish the effect of heterogamy on divorce, I compared the mixed couples with the
homogamous couples in the category of the husband and the category of the wife. For example, a
marriage between a non-church member and a Catholic, has a modelled divorce probability of 14.9
percent in the first five years of marriage. Comparing this to the percentage of homogamous non-
church members, 16.9, and that of Catholics, 12.1, it is clear that the number is in between and
therefore does not constitute a heterogamy effect. This apparently goes for all probabilities of
mixed marriages in which non-church members are involved. This can be expected to be an effect
of church leaving, because these marriages will, to a large extent, consist of persons registered as
members of a certain religious denomination marrying a non-church member. There is probably
more chance that they will not have a particularly strong attachment to their original affiliation,
that this attachment will weaken or that they will even abandon their faith and leave the church
altogether.
However, heterogamy effects are found for all distinguished categories of mixed marriages
between two church members of different denominations. When Catholics, Dutch Reformed or Re-
reformed intermarry, the divorce rate of the arising couple in the first five years of marriage is
higher than that of the homogamous couples in each denomination involved. The 12.7 percent of
Catholic/Dutch Reformed mixed marriages, for instance, are higher than the percentages of both
homogamous Catholics, 12.1, and homogamous Dutch Reformed couples, 8.4 percent. Note that
even though statistical significance was found, formally I cannot speak of significance of
differences here, since I analyse population data.
3.4.4.2 Religious differences: trends over cohorts
The pattern described in the previous section refers to the first five years of marriages with
spouses at an average age of 25 years in the 1974-1979 cohort. If we compare the older cohort
with the younger, which married in the 1980-1984 period, then two things become clear. Firstly,
all estimated divorce risks are higher than their counterparts for the older cohort. This clearly
shows the rise in divorce rates over marriage cohorts in the period under investigation. Marriages
performed in the eighties divorce more often than marriages performed in the seventies and this
goes for all combinations of religious affiliation of husbands and wives. Secondly, the pattern of
the effects is different. Catholic marriages in the younger cohort appear to break up much more in
their first five years than in the older cohort. This brings about a rise in the divorce rate which lets
the Catholics overtake the non-church members. Homogamous Catholics divorce more than mixed
married Catholics, resulting in the disappearance of heterogamy effects for mixed marriages
between Catholics and others. Only Dutch Reformed and Re-reformed intermarriage leads to a
higher divorce risk in this cohort. A post hoc statement about this could be that secularization is
an important factor and these results indicate the secularization of Catholics in the beginning of
the eighties (Becker & Vink 1994). Anyway, the changing pattern means that religious heterogamy
is losing its effect on the risk of divorce in the first five years across cohorts.
This diminishing effect, however, cannot be found for the second five years of marriage. In
the 1974-1979 cohort, as will be described later, only one heterogamy effect is found – for
marriages between Dutch Reformed and Re-reformed – while in the 1980-1984 cohort, there is
also a heterogamy effect of Catholic/Re-reformed marriages. This shows that heterogamy effects
on divorce risks do not all diminish over time, depending on the duration of the marriage.
Heterogamy and divorce within five, ten and fifteen years in two marriage cohorts: register data
69
3.4.4.3 Religious differences: changing influence over the course of marriage
I will now address the changing influence of religious differences on divorce over the course of
marriage. This was already touched upon in the previous section when I discussed trends over
cohorts. I compared the predicted divorce rates for the first five years of marriage in the cohort
1974-1979 with those in the second five years in the same cohort.
Firstly, all rates in the second five years are higher than their counterparts in the first five
years. This means that in all combinations of religious denominations of the spouses, more
marriages divorce between their fifth and their tenth anniversary than between the start of the
marriage and their fifth anniversary.
Secondly, the pattern is different across the course of marriage. With respect to
homogamous marriages, the highest divorce risk is found among the non-church members. But in
the 1974-1979 cohort, the Catholics overtake that role in the second five years. Besides, in both
cohorts, the Re-reformed catch up with the Dutch Reformed.
Next, I looked at the patterns of heterogamy effects over the course of marriage. Only one
heterogamy effect is found in the second five years, namely for Dutch Reformed/Re-reformed
mixed marriages. There is even one opposite effect in the older cohort for the second five years of
marriage, showing that mixed marriages are more stable than homogamous ones: none church
members with Catholics show a relatively low predicted divorce rate of 16.5 percent compared to
17.0 and 17.3 for homogamous non-church members and homogamous Catholics, respectively.
These patterns show a decreasing impact of heterogamy on divorce over the marriage course in
the 1974-1979 marriage cohort. After the tenth anniversary, though, this trend turns around a bit.
In the third five years of marriage, two heterogamy effects can be found: for Catholics with Re-
reformed and for Dutch Reformed with Re-reformed.
Just as the trend over cohorts depends on the duration of the marriage, so do the changes
over the marriage course depend on the cohort. In the 1980-1984 cohort, there was only one
positive effect of heterogamy on divorce in the first five years of marriage. In the second five years
of marriage, there are two: Re-reformed with either Catholics or Dutch Reformed.
With respect to the impact of religious heterogamy on divorce, I may conclude that
changing patterns across marriage cohorts and over the marriage course can be described, but
that the direction is ambiguous. The finding in the older cohort that a few heterogamy effects first
disappear after five years and then come back again after ten years is completely contrary to the
inverse U-shape hypothesis.
3.4.4.4 Marriage ceremony in church
In the logistic regression model, the presence or absence of a church ceremony is controlled, as
well as interactions between this dichotomous variable and church denomination. The findings
above refer to the average in the model. Because of differences in church involvement, it is
interesting to see what happens if I compute all predicted divorce rates in the model for couples
who had a marriage ceremony in church. An important reason to do so is to ascertain that we are
looking at the core church members who are involved with their religion. Then, I can rest more
assured that the registered denomination really stands for a church membership. After all, I am
using official registrations of church membership.
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The predictions of the risk of divorce for marriages with a church ceremony are displayed
in Table 3.4. It is to be expected that people who are more involved in church will marry in church
and will display lower divorce rates. The table indeed displays lower divorce rates. Equally
obviously, non-church members’ divorce rates will diminish less in these tables than church
members’ divorce rates, since marriage in church has not much meaning and importance to non-
church members.
Table 3.4 Corrected probabilities (percentages) of divorce by church denomination of husband and
wife in three periods of marriage and two marital cohorts, mean age at marriage set to 25
and church ceremony set to yes
a: first five years, cohort 1974-1979
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 15.9
Cath. 12.2 8.4
D.R. 12.6 9.8 6.4
Reref. 13.0 10.4 7.2 4.7
oth. Prot. 12.9
other 12.1
oth. het. 13.6
b: second five years, cohort 1974-1979
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 19.3
Cath. 15.8 11.0
D.R. 14.6 13.3 8.4
Reref. 14.7 14.6 9.6 7.7
oth. Prot. 14.6
other 14.7
oth. het. 16.3
c: third five years, cohort 1974-1979
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 9.0
Cath. 7.0 4.9
D.R. 6.6 6.1 4.0
Reref. 7.0 6.4 4.7 3.7
oth. Prot. 6.8
other 7.0
oth. het. 7.1
d: first five years, cohort 1980-1984
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 20.9
Cath. 18.9 13.5
D.R. 17.0 14.3 9.7
Reref. 16.4 13.4 9.4 7.2
oth. Prot. 22.9
other 22.0
oth. het. 18.3
e: second five years, cohort 1980-1984
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 17.9
Cath. 15.3 10.9
D.R. 15.0 13.4 8.6
Reref. 14.2 12.1 9.0 7.1
oth. Prot. 10.5
other 18.0
oth. het. 16.2
Note: ‘none’ stands for no church affiliation; ‘Cath.’ for Catholics; ‘D.R.’ for Dutch Reformed; ‘Reref.’ for Re-reformed; ‘oth.
Pr.’ for other Protestant/Christian; ‘other’ for all other church affiliations’; ‘oth. het.’ for all other mixed combinations in the
table (the darkest empty cells together). Mirrored cells taken together. Multivariate models. Bold effects constitute
heterogamy effects.
Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands) Marriage and Divorce Files 1974-1994, own calculations. Cohort 1974-1979: first
five years, N = 531,015; second five years, N = 501,156; third five years, N = 466,754; cohort 1980-1984: first five years,
N = 392,470; second five years, N = 363,589.
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Table 3.4, for people marrying in church, displays lower divorce risks than Table 3.3, the average
model. There are only a few exceptions to this statement. For some combinations, marrying in
church diminishes the divorce risk only in the beginning of the marriage. In general, though,
people marrying in church, which is an indicator for church involvement, have divorce risks which
are much lower (as displayed in Table 3.4) than the average model (as displayed in model 3.3) in all
distinguished stages and cohorts of marriage.6
As to the divorce risks of homogamous couples, we can clearly see that the non-church
members – and also the mixed group of ‘other Protestants’ and ‘others’ – always have the highest
divorce risks in Table 3.4. Catholics have a lower divorce risk, Dutch Reformed even lower and Re-
reformed the lowest in all the panels of this table. This collaborates with the above findings and
those from the previous chapter in a nice way, namely by zooming into church members who can
be expected to be involved with their church, since they marry in church. The fact that for
homogamous non-church members the church ceremony is also set to ‘yes’ does not undermine
the findings. If we replace the upper left cells for homogamous non-church members in all the
panels in Table 3.4 by the values of the corresponding cells in Table 3.3, the average model, then
the finding still clearly holds.
Looking at the pattern of heterogamy effects on divorce, I find for all but one panel that
mixed marriages between two church members have a higher divorce risk than the homogamous
couples in both the category of the husband and the category of the wife. These clear heterogamy
effects are absent for mixed marriages between a church member and a non-church member in
these models, like in the average models above. The only exception is panel D for the first five
years of marriage in the 1980-1984 cohort. There, only Catholic/Dutch Reformed marriages show a
heterogamy effect. Generally, I can say that, controlling for having a marriage ceremony in church,
in all but one cohort/marriage stage, all categories of religiously mixed marriage between two
members of the three main denominations in the Netherlands have a higher risk of divorce than
expected upon the divorce risks in the homogamous categories from which both spouses stem.
From the results depicted in Table 3.4 compared to those depicted in Table 3.3, I can
conclude that religious heterogamy effects are more stable and robust when I use a church
wedding as an indicator of church involvement. This means that the unclear trends of religious
heterogamy effects on divorce over cohorts and changes of these effects over the course of the
marriage are not of much significance. The only clear changes found now are a decreasing
heterogamy effect on divorce over marriage cohorts in the first five years of marriage of Catholics
or Dutch Reformed people married to Re-reformed people.
This also indicates that the sometimes unclear changes in heterogamy effects over cohorts
and over marriage duration as found in Table 3.3 can largely be ascribed directly to secularization.
The reasoning behind this is that mixed couples are more prone to losing their religion over the
course of the marriage. There has also been a process of secularization over time. In this way,
some people who are religiously mixed in the data are, in fact, no longer mixed. Therefore, higher
divorce rates of initially mixed couples can be expected to diminish over time and over the
marriage course. This can be considered as an artefact of secularization. Controlling a church
ceremony filters out some of the diminishing effects of the people who are most prone to losing
their religion and therefore not being mixed anymore if they were before. What is left is, perhaps,
a more realistic image of the changes of the influence of mixed marriage on the risk of divorce.
These changes are rather small.
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3.4.5 Differences in nationality
Similar tables for corrected divorce risks as for categories of church denominations can be found
for categories of nationality of both spouses in Table 3.5. Because sometimes differences were
found for mirrored categories in the previous chapter, a distinction is made between a Dutch
husband with a non-Dutch wife and a non-Dutch husband with a Dutch wife. Because of small
numbers in the categories, I only looked at homogamous couples in all categories and mixed
couples involving one Dutch spouse and one foreign spouse. All other heterogamous couples are
grouped together in one category. It should be emphasized that with these analyses, I cannot
draw firm conclusions with respect to ethnically mixed marriages, since nationality does not tell
me about the origin of persons and their parents, their ethnic heritage etc. Next, people from the
Netherlands Antilles and, until 1975, Surinam will be registered as Dutch. Furthermore, marriages
in which foreigners are involved have a higher chance of being dissolved abroad in the country of
origin of the spouses, especially with respect to homogamous foreign marriages, due to re-
migration. Therefore, I present these figures with some prudence.
3.4.5.1 Differences in nationality: pattern in the first five years in the 1974-1979 cohort
The first panel in Table 3.5 displays the corrected divorce risks for categories of spousal nationality
for the first five years of marriage for the 1974-1979 cohort. Again, the age at marriage is
controlled and fixed at 25 years for both spouses. With respect to homogamous couples, the panel
shows that people with other than Dutch nationality have a lower risk of divorce in the
Netherlands, especially Turks and people from neighbouring countries. They may, however,
divorce more often in their country of origin.
With respect to mixed marriages, panel A shows that all mixed marriages between a Dutch
and a non-Dutch person have higher divorce risks than can be expected from the divorce risk of
homogamous Dutch and homogamous people of the other nationality in question. Although
divorce abroad may play a role in over-estimating heterogamy effects, it is very likely that
substantive heterogamy effects are present because of the huge divorce risks of heterogamous
couples. See, for example, the expected divorce risk of 42.6 percent in the first five years for a
couple aged 25 on average of which the wife comes from Morocco and the husband from the
Netherlands. Looking at mirrored probabilities, I find that in most instances, the divorce risk
within five years is higher when the wife is non-Dutch and the husband is Dutch. For
Turkish/Dutch mixed marriages, though, this relationship is the other way around.
I do not know whether those differences are in this direction because couples are more
likely to live in the husband’s country and in that case I cannot see if they got divorced. This does
not seem very likely, however, because the divorced Dutch women would probably return to the
Netherlands and have the divorce registered there.
3.4.5.2 Differences in nationality: trends over cohorts, changes over the marriage course
In the second cohorts and later in the course of marriage, we can see that among homogamous
marriages, it is no longer the Dutch marriages which have the highest expected divorce risk.
Homogamous marriages of other nationalities show increasing divorce rates compared to the
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Dutch, especially the Moroccans, Southern Europeans and the category of others. Furthermore, a
few mixed categories lose their heterogamy effect later in marriage for the older 1974-1979
cohort, especially Moroccan/Dutch mixed marriages. Most heterogamy effects remain
overwhelming over cohorts and during the marriage course, though.
Table 3.5 Corrected probabilities (percentages) of divorce by nationality of husband and wife in three
periods of marriage and two marital cohorts, mean age at marriage set to 25
a: first five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
NL nghbr. S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 10.0 13.2 20.7 20.8 42.6 23.5
nghbr. 10.6 4.4
S-Eur. 18.8 6.8
Turkey 34.7 0.2
Moroc. 30.5 9.0
other 20.6 9.6
oth. het. 9.3
b: second five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
NL nghbr. S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 11.8 15.9 16.0 28.2 15.2 19.6
nghbr. 11.7 3.5
S-Eur. 17.5 10.6
Turkey 32.5 7.9
Moroc. 28.6 22.6
other 19.5 11.5
oth. het. 11.4
c: third five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
NL nghbr. S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 7.3 7.8 9.5 12.5 4.1 9.7
nghbr. 6.7 4.0
S-Eur. 10.5 6.7
Turkey 12.1 0.2
Moroc. 14.6 17.0
other 9.6 6.4
oth. het. 4.4
d: first five years, cohort 1980-1984
wife
husb.
NL nghbr. S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 12.1 19.4 28.0 24.1 56.2 42.4
nghbr. 14.8 5.2
S-Eur. 18.8 13.2
Turkey 33.8 6.2
Moroc. 29.8 16.2
other 25.0 15.2
oth. het. 10.4
e: second five years, cohort 1980-1984
wife
husb.
NL nghbr. S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 10.4 15.2 18.9 16.4 23.1 18.6
nghbr. 12.4 7.2
S-Eur. 19.7 10.4
Turkey 28.5 3.4
Moroc. 39.1 17.4
other 22.9 12.2
oth. het. 11.6
Note: ‘NL’ stands for Netherlands; ‘nghbr’ for Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, United Kingdom and France; ‘S-Eur.’ for
Portugal, Spain, Italy, former Yugoslavia and Greece; ‘Moroc.’ for Morocco; ‘other’ for all other countries; ‘oth. het.’ for all
other mixed combinations in the table (the empty cells together). Multivariate models. Bold effects constitute heterogamy
effects.
Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands) Marriage and Divorce Files 1974-1994, own calculations. Cohort 1974-1979: first
five years, N = 531,015; second five years, N = 501,156; third five years, N = 466,754; cohort 1980-1984: first five years,
N = 392,470; second five years, N = 363,589.
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An interesting change is found with respect to mirrored effects. For the second five years of
marriage in both cohorts, I found that, with the sole exception of marriages between Dutch
nationals and persons from neighbouring countries, the divorce risk becomes higher if the
husband is non-Dutch and the wife is Dutch than the other way around. In the third five years,
this is mixed.
3.4.6 Social acceptance as an explanation
The explanation for the effect of heterogamy on divorce has to be found in the colliding
expectations of couples who have less characteristics in common and in the lack of support by the
differing spouses’ social environment. No indicators are available in the registration data that
would allow me to test this explanation. However, as a first step, I can find out to what extent the
occurrence of the categories in society is related to the divorce risk. The reasoning behind this is
that combinations which occur more frequently will be more common and, therefore, more
accepted by the social environment.
I can do this by relating the predicted divorce risks in all categories to the relative
occurrence of those categories. To do this in a proper way, I computed the expected frequencies in
case of statistical independence of all categories of age, religion and nationality based on the
marginal frequencies in the tables. This was not so easy, since both religion and nationality are
not in squared tables in the logistic regression analyses. I just spread the miscellaneous categories
out over the categories to which they refer. Next, I computed the relative occurrence of all
categories by dividing the actually observed frequencies by the expected frequencies. Finally, I
computed the correlation coefficient for the natural logarithm of this division with the predicted
divorce risks in my model. I did this for all cohorts and marriage durations as in the logistic
regression analysis. Obviously, because I had to spread out some categories, the results of this
have to be interpreted with some prudence with respect to religion and nationality. With respect
to age, though, the results are more secure.
The correlation coefficients are given in Table 3.6. In panels A, B and C on the left, the
correlations are based on all cells. In panels D, E and F on the right, the correlations are computed
without the homogamous main diagonal cells and cells with a frequency lower than 100.
With respect to age, a very clear correlation in the expected direction was found. The more
a category with a certain age of the husband and a certain age of the wife relatively occurs, the
lower the risk of divorce. For all cohorts and durations, the correlation coefficients in panel A are
about -0.80, with the lowest being -0.76 for the second five years in the youngest marriage cohort.
Selection of the heterogamous cells with an occurrence of at least 100 gives equal or slightly
stronger results.
With respect to religion, the results are similar, but less pronounced. In panel B based on
all cells, the correlation is negative in the first and third five years of marriage in the oldest cohort,
as expected, -0.21 and -0.39; in the second five years of the youngest cohort this is only -0.02. The
other two coefficients are slightly positive, ranging from 0.01 to 0.03. After selecting the mixed
categories – all categories occurring at least 100 times – the correlation coefficients are all clearly
in the expected direction, ranging from -0.13 to -0.54.
Finally, nationality shows medium and large negative correlations when computed over all
cells, ranging from -0.09 to -0.54. This is mainly based on the homogamous categories, though,
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because without those cells and when looking at cells with a frequency of at least 100, all
correlations switch to large positive ones ranging from 0.41 to 0.65.
For all forms of heterogamy, but less clearly with respect to nationality, therefore, there
are clues that acceptance of a certain combination of spousal characteristics is an explanation for
the level of divorce.
Table 3.6 Correlations between the relative occurrence of categories of husband and wife and the
risk of divorce in those categories
a: age of husband and wife
cohort:
duration:
1974-1979 1980-1984
first five years -0.81 -0.80
second five years -0.78 -0.76
third five years -0.77
b: religion of husband and wife
cohort:
duration:
1974-1979 1980-1984
first five years -0.21 0.01
second five years 0.03 -0.02
third five years -0.39
c: nationality of husband and wife
cohort:
duration:
1974-1979 1980-1984
first five years -0.54 -0.39
second five years -0.29 -0.43
third five years -0.09
d: age, no main diagonal, cells n > 100 only
cohort:
duration:
1974-1979 1980-1984
first five years -0.85 -0.86
second five years -0.78 -0.78
third five years -0.79
e: religion, no main diagonal, cells n > 100 only
cohort:
duration:
1974-1979 1980-1984
first five years -0.21 -0.13
second five years -0.27 -0.54
third five years -0.34
f: nationality, no main diagonal, cells n > 100 only
cohort:
duration:
1974-1979 1980-1984
first five years 0.50 0.42
second five years 0.44 0.41
third five years 0.65
Note: categories and cases used are the same as in Tables 3.2 to 3.5.
Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands) Marriage and Divorce Files 1974-1994, own calculations.
3.5 Conclusions and discussion
In this chapter, I investigated to what extent effects of heterogamy on divorce change during
marriage and over time. To investigate this, I compared the first, second and third five years of
marriage and I compared two marriage cohorts, 1974-1979 and 1980-1984. In the analyses, I used
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registered data on all marriages that started in the Netherlands between 1974 and 1984 between
two spouses younger than 50 years on the wedding day. I could follow them through time to see
whether they ended in divorce between the start of the marriage and 1994.
I found that marriages do better if the spouses were not too young at the time of marriage
and if they are not too different in age. The most favourable age difference for surviving the first
five – and for the younger cohort even the first ten – years of marriage is a slightly older husband.
This is in accordance with previous findings. New findings in this chapter show that the most
advantageous age difference shifts during marriage towards a more equal age. In all of the
researched marriage durations and cohorts, a more mature age at the time of marriage
strengthens the marriage, whereas greater age differences, given the ‘optimal’ age mentioned
above, weaken marital stability. This age heterogamy effect does not change over the marriage
course or over cohort.
Church members of one of the three main Christian denominational groups in the
Netherlands divorce less often than non-church members. Differences can also be found between
denominations. Among the three main denominations in the Netherlands, Catholics have the
highest and Re-reformed (gereformeerden) the lowest divorce rates. In the later cohort and in the
second five years of marriage, Catholics show higher divorce risks, even overtaking the non-
church members. It can be assumed that this is a consequence of different degrees of
secularization within different denominations. Different denominations have different moments
of secularization: The Dutch Reformed Church suffered from secularization mainly just before the
period studied here, whereas the Roman Catholic church did mainly in this period (Becker & Vink
1994). Therefore, I also looked at probabilities of divorce for marriages conducted in church. This is
considered as an indicator for church involvement. As can be expected, the overtaking of the
highest divorce rate by Catholics is indeed not present in the predicted divorce risks for people
marrying in church.
The lower divorce risk for couples marrying in church compared to the risk for the ones not
marrying in church is also found for mixed church member marriages. It can be expected that
these couples are more accepted by their environment, including local representatives of the
church, because they are following at least some traditional rites, compared to others in the same
mixed combination.
Homogamous marriages have more chance to survive than mixed marriages with respect
to religious affiliation. This goes for marriages consisting of two church members from different
denominations. However, this effect could not be found for marriages consisting of a church
member and a non-church member. This has to do with secularization. Church members marrying
non-church members can be expected to become more secularized after marriage, even if there
was a church ceremony, compared to church members intermarrying with other church members.
This means that the church member/non-church member marriages can be expected to be less
heterogamous in daily life. Of course, this cannot be tested with these data. To examine this, I
would need information about if and at which point, people leave church during their marriage.
In my later cohort and later in marriage, some heterogamy effects – especially the ones in
which Catholics are involved – disappear. However, the heterogamy effects remain clearer if the
predicted divorce rates are computed for marriages with a church ceremony. Therefore, it can be
expected that the diminishing heterogamy effects, again, have to do with different degrees of
secularization. The changes do not constitute a decrease of the impact of heterogamy per se,
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1. Due to, for example, mixed marriages divorced abroad, the number of divorces per 1000 married men and
per 1000 married women is not exactly equal. For purposes of availability of official figures, I use the number
of divorces per 1000 married men here. Published figures pertaining to the period before 1978, however, are
based on the number of married couples.
2. Survey questions in two steps – first asking: “Do you consider yourself a church member,” then, if yes:
“Which church are you a member of?” – yield higher percentages of non-church members but also a trend
towards secularization. The percentage of non-church members then runs from 42 in 1975 to 50 in 1980, 52 in
except for Catholic/Re-reformed and Dutch Reformed/Re-reformed couples.
Heterogamy with respect to nationality – a Dutch person married to a non-Dutch person –
has a positive effect on divorce. In the older cohort, this seems to become a little bit weaker
during marriage, but it is still very strong.
To summarize, I can say that, on the one hand, my multivariate results showed effects
corroborating previous findings. Heterogamy generally increases the divorce risk. On the other
hand, I could establish the trends through time and changes over the course of marriage. The
findings indicated that the effects of heterogamy regarding nationality on divorce slightly, but not
consistently, decline over the marriage course. This corroborates hypotheses derived from the
theory of growing acceptance to a very limited extent and refutes the theory of accumulated
irritations and the combination of the two theories that I made, predicting an increase followed by
a decrease of the effect over the course of marriage. Generally, however, all of the theories lack
much support, since effects of heterogamy on divorce are rather stable over the course of
marriage. Besides, the predicted decline of heterogamy effects over cohorts was only reliably
found for a few categories of religious heterogamy in the first five years of marriage. To the extent
that such a decline is present, I attribute it to changes over time within society, like an increase of
meritocracy, individualization and secularization.
I had a great opportunity to study official records of all marriages in the Netherlands.
However, to gain more insight into the effects of heterogamy on divorce and of the changes of
these effects, I would need data with more information. Specifically, I would like to have more
characteristics of spouses and better measurements of ethnic origin than official nationality.
Information on heterogamy with respect to level of education, social origin and social status
would be of great interest. I also need more information about changing characteristics during
marriage, for example with respect to church affiliation. Another useful extension of data sources
is information about colliding preferences of spouses and support for the marriage by the social
environment. With all the extensions of information just mentioned, I can more adequately
investigate effects and changes and trends of effects of heterogamy on divorce during marriage.
Furthermore, I will be able to test more hypotheses related to the explanation of the relationship
between heterogamy and divorce. In this and the previous chapter, a first clue was found for an
explanation: categories of spousal age and nationality which occur more frequently, have lower
divorce risks than less common combinations. From the next chapter onwards, I will use newly
gathered survey data.
Notes
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1985 and 57 in 1991 (Becker & Vink 1994).
3. In the Netherlands, all marriages are initially civil and registered by a registrar, normally an official of the
municipality. In order to create control and equality, it is prohibited to have a church marriage performance
before civilly registering the marriage. This official registration being done, everyone is free to celebrate or
register the marriage in any religious place. Therefore, a church ceremony in the Netherlands is a simple but
quite good indicator of church involvement available in these official records.
4. With respect to the registration data, I have to make a marginal note that the registered church
denomination does not always have to be accurate. Many have turned their backs on religion without
informing the municipal administration. Because of this, I may firstly underestimate the effects of being a
church member. After all, the divorce risks of persons registered as church members can less well be discerned
from those of non-church members, because a part of the persons registered as a church member have in fact
left the church. Secondly, the effects of heterogamy can be distorted. On the one hand, the effect of
heterogamy may be somewhat underestimated because the distinction between the divorce risk of the
homogamous and of the heterogamous becomes smaller in the data set, especially with respect to marriages
between a church member and a non-church member. On the other hand, the effects of heterogamy may also
be somewhat overestimated, especially when looking at divorce risks of heterogamous marriages in which
both spouses are affiliated but within different denominations. This will be the case if there are relatively
many heterogamous people among church leavers who are still registered as church members.
5. Unfortunately, with these data it is not possible to distinguish people from Surinam or Aruba and the
Netherlands Antilles. In 1974, Surinam was not yet independent, Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles are still a
part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Regrettably, I do not know the nationality or the country of birth of
the parents either, which may be a better indicator because of possible naturalizations and the acquisition of
Dutch nationality.
6. The following are the few exceptions. In panels A, C and D, the somewhat mixed and unclear group of ‘other
Protestants’ show somewhat higher divorce risks in Table 3.4. Furthermore, compared to the average model,
marriages between non-church members and Dutch Reformed, when married in church, show a higher divorce
risk in the second five years, but these differences are relatively small (14.6 versus 14.4 in the oldest and 15.0
versus 14.8 in the youngest marriage cohort). This also goes for homogamous non-church member marriages
in the second and third five years of marriage (19.3 versus 17.0, 9.0 versus 7.5 and 17.9 versus 17.2 in panels B,
C and E, respectively). In the first five years, however, the expected divorce probabilities are clearly lower, also
for these non-church member couples, if they had a marriage ceremony in church.
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Appendix 3.1 Relative frequencies (percentages) of all discerned categories of couples with respect to
age at marriage
a: first five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
<20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50
<20 1.8 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
20-25 12.9 36.2 2.9 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
25-30 2.9 19.0 7.7 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
30-35 0.3 2.5 2.9 1.5 0.4 0.1 0.0
35-40 0.1 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.0
40-45 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.1
45-50 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
% homogamous: 48.2
% mixed: 51.6
b: second five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
<20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50
<20 1.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
20-25 12.7 36.9 2.9 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
25-30 2.8 19.3 7.8 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
30-35 0.3 2.5 2.9 1.5 0.4 0.1 0.0
35-40 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.0
40-45 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1
45-50 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
% homogamous: 48.8
% mixed: 51.1
c: third five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
<20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50
<20 1.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
20-25 12.3 37.5 2.9 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
25-30 2.7 19.6 7.9 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
30-35 0.3 2.4 2.9 1.4 0.3 0.1 0.0
35-40 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.0
40-45 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1
45-50 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
% homogamous: 49.3
% mixed: 50.3
d: first five years, cohort 1980-1984
wife
husb.
<20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50
<20 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
20-25 7.4 32.7 2.8 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
25-30 1.8 21.3 10.0 1.5 0.3 0.1 0.0
30-35 0.3 3.2 4.7 2.5 0.6 0.1 0.0
35-40 0.1 0.7 1.4 1.5 0.9 0.3 0.1
40-45 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.1
45-50 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3
% homogamous: 47.6
% mixed: 52.4
e: second five years, cohort 1980-1984
wife
husb.
<20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50
<20 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
20-25 7.1 33.4 2.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
25-30 1.7 21.8 10.2 1.5 0.3 0.0 0.0
30-35 0.2 3.1 4.6 2.5 0.6 0.1 0.0
35-40 0.1 0.7 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.2 0.1
40-45 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.1
45-50 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2
% homogamous: 48.3
% mixed: 51.5
f: beginning of marriage, both cohorts 1974-1984
wife
husb.
<20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50
<20 1.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
20-25 10.6 34.7 2.9 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
25-30 2.5 19.6 8.7 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.0
30-35 0.3 2.8 3.7 1.9 0.5 0.1 0.0
35-40 0.1 0.6 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.2 0.1
40-45 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.1
45-50 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
% homogamous: 47.8
% mixed: 52.0
Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands) Marriage and Divorce Files 1974-1994, own calculations. Cohort 1974-1979: first
five years, N = 531,015; second five years, N = 501,156; third five years, N = 466,754; cohort 1980-1984: first five years,
N = 392,470; second five years, N = 363,589; both cohorts 1974-1984: N = 923,485.
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Appendix 3.2 Relative frequencies (percentages) of all discerned categories of couples with respect to
church denomination
a: first five years, cohort 1974-1979
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 16.4
Cath. 8.2 34.1
D.R. 5.6 7.2 10.1
Reref. 1.8 1.8 3.9 5.5
oth. Prot. 0.1
other 1.5
oth. het. 3.8
% homogamous: 67.7
% mixed: 32.3
b: second five years, cohort 1974-1979
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 15.8
Cath. 8.0 34.7
D.R. 5.5 7.2 10.4
Reref. 1.8 1.8 4.0 5.7
oth. Prot. 0.1
other 1.4
oth. het. 3.5
% homogamous: 68.1
% mixed: 31.8
c: third five years, cohort 1974-1979
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 15.2
Cath. 7.7 35.2
D.R. 5.4 7.1 10.8
Reref. 1.7 1.8 4.1 6.0
oth. Prot. 0.1
other 1.4
oth. het. 3.4
% homogamous: 68.7
% mixed: 31.2
d: first five years, cohort 1980-1984
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 19.0
Cath. 8.5 32.0
D.R. 5.1 6.8 9.2
Reref. 1.9 1.9 3.8 5.5
oth. Prot. 0.1
other 2.2
oth. het. 4.2
% homogamous: 68.0
% mixed: 32.2
e: second five years, cohort 1980-1984
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 18.3
Cath. 8.2 32.7
D.R. 5.1 6.8 9.6
Reref. 1.9 1.9 3.9 5.8
oth. Prot. 0.1
other 2.0
oth. het. 3.8
% homogamous: 68.5
% mixed: 31.6
 f: beginning of marriage, both cohorts 1974-1984
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 17.5
Cath. 8.3 33.2
D.R. 5.4 7.0 9.7
Reref. 1.8 1.8 3.8 5.5
oth. Prot. 0.1
other 1.8
oth. het. 4.0
% homogamous: 67.8
% mixed: 32.1
Note: ‘none’ stands for no church affiliation; ‘Cath.’ for Catholics; ‘D.R.’ for Dutch Reformed; ‘Reref.’ for Re-reformed; ‘oth.
Pr.’ for other Protestant/Christian; ‘other’ for all other church affiliations’; ‘oth. het.’ for all other mixed combinations in the
table (the darkest empty cells together). Percentages in light cells are mirrored (including mirroring cells).
Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands) Marriage and Divorce Files 1974-1994, own calculations. Cohort 1974-1979: first
five years, N = 531,015; second five years, N = 501,156; third five years, N = 466,754; cohort 1980-1984: first five years,
N = 392,470; second five years, N = 363,589; both cohorts 1974-1984: N = 923,485.
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Appendix 3.3 Relative frequencies (percentages) of all discerned categories of couples with respect to
nationality
a: first five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
NL nghbr S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 94.1 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.0
nghbr 1.1 0.1
S-Eur. 0.5 0.1
Turkey 0.1 0.0
Moroc. 0.2 0.0
other 1.2 0.3
oth. het. 0.1
% homogamous: 94.6
% mixed: 5.3
b: second five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
NL nghbr S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 94.7 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.9
nghbr 1.0 0.1
S-Eur. 0.5 0.1
Turkey 0.1 0.0
Moroc. 0.1 0.0
other 1.1 0.3
oth. het. 0.1
% homogamous: 95.2
% mixed: 4.8
c: third five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
NL nghbr S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 95.0 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.8
nghbr 1.0 0.2
S-Eur. 0.5 0.1
Turkey 0.0 0.0
Moroc. 0.1 0.0
other 1.0 0.3
oth. het. 0.1
% homogamous: 95.6
% mixed: 4.4
d: first five years, cohort 1980-1984
wife
husb.
NL nghbr S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 92.4 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 1.9
nghbr 1.0 0.2
S-Eur. 0.5 0.1
Turkey 0.2 0.0
Moroc. 0.2 0.0
other 1.6 0.4
oth. het. 0.2
% homogamous: 93.1
% mixed: 7.0
e: second five years, cohort 1980-1984
wife
husb.
NL nghbr S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 93.6 0.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.3
nghbr 1.0 0.2
S-Eur. 0.4 0.1
Turkey 0.1 0.0
Moroc. 0.2 0.0
other 1.3 0.3
oth. het. 0.2
% homogamous: 94.2
% mixed: 5.7
f: beginning of marriage, both cohorts 1974-1979
wife
husb.
NL nghbr S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 93.4 0.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.4
nghbr 1.0 0.2
S-Eur. 0.5 0.1
Turkey 0.1 0.0
Moroc. 0.2 0.0
other 1.4 0.3
oth. het. 0.2
% homogamous: 94.0
% mixed: 6.0
Note: ‘NL’ stands for Netherlands; ‘nghbr’ for Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, United Kingdom and France; ‘S-Eur.’ for
Portugal, Spain, Italy, former Yugoslavia and Greece; ‘Moroc.’ for Morocco; ‘other’ for all other countries; ‘oth. het.’ for all
other mixed combinations in the table (the empty cells together).
Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands) Marriage and Divorce Files 1974-1994, own calculations. Cohort 1974-1979: first
five years, N = 531,015; second five years, N = 501,156; third five years, N = 466,754; cohort 1980-1984: first five years,
N = 392,470; second five years, N = 363,589; both cohorts 1974-1984: N = 923,485.
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Appendix 3.4 Observed probabilities (percentages) of divorce by age and age difference of husband and
wife in three periods of marriage and two marital cohorts 
a: first five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
<20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50
<20 11.1 10.5 18.8 16.7 30.0 25.0 50.0
20-25 7.3 3.9 5.7 13.2 21.1 27.5 26.7
25-30 8.3 4.4 4.6 7.3 14.3 23.6 20.5
30-35 13.0 7.8 6.9 7.6 10.2 13.6 15.6
35-40 17.1 11.5 9.2 8.5 9.4 11.2 13.3
40-45 14.0 11.5 9.4 7.6 9.2 8.6 13.1
45-50 21.2 11.0 7.6 7.4 9.7 8.6 8.9
b: second five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
<20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50
<20 13.2 12.0 17.9 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
20-25 9.2 5.4 6.5 13.4 16.1 13.8 4.6
25-30 10.7 5.5 5.7 9.1 12.6 15.7 16.7
30-35 13.6 8.9 8.1 8.1 10.6 13.7 13.5
35-40 15.8 12.7 10.3 8.9 10.1 8.0 9.5
40-45 19.6 17.0 10.4 9.8 9.0 7.6 9.0
45-50 9.8 13.6 10.1 7.9 7.8 6.6 5.9
c: third five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
<20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50
<20 8.2 8.9 5.7 15.0 0.0 33.3 0.0
20-25 6.2 3.9 4.8 9.2 6.6 8.0 14.3
25-30 6.8 3.9 4.1 6.1 6.4 6.0 10.9
30-35 9.6 6.0 5.0 5.5 7.3 7.1 2.9
35-40 12.0 7.5 7.2 5.6 5.5 2.9 4.5
40-45 9.5 10.4 7.1 5.6 4.3 3.9 4.2
45-50 5.4 7.9 6.8 4.4 3.9 3.4 2.6
d: first five years, cohort 1980-1984
wife
husb.
<20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50
<20 16.6 15.4 28.5 36.4 28.6 50.0 50.0
20-25 10.7 5.2 8.5 18.0 28.3 34.3 46.9
25-30 12.6 5.5 5.7 9.8 19.0 33.2 34.2
30-35 18.6 10.2 7.7 8.8 11.4 19.5 19.9
35-40 26.7 15.2 10.4 10.5 10.9 14.0 22.0
40-45 16.9 19.5 13.5 11.8 11.1 12.5 14.2
45-50 26.5 19.0 12.2 11.3 9.5 10.3 11.1
e: second five years, cohort 1980-1984
wife
husb.
<20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50
<20 14.0 13.3 19.3 28.6 20.0 0.0 100.0
20-25 9.3 5.1 7.0 11.4 22.9 20.5 17.7
25-30 10.8 5.2 5.3 8.2 12.9 14.8 16.0
30-35 13.3 8.3 6.6 7.0 10.9 11.3 15.5
35-40 16.4 11.7 8.7 7.8 7.5 9.1 11.7
40-45 25.9 14.1 10.2 8.4 7.4 7.4 6.9
45-50 20.0 19.6 10.4 9.1 6.8 7.6 5.8
Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands) Marriage and Divorce Files 1974-1994, own calculations. Cohort 1974-1979: first
five years, N = 531,015; second five years, N = 501,156; third five years, N = 466,754; cohort 1980-1984: first five years,
N = 392,470; second five years, N = 363,589; both cohorts 1974-1984: N = 923,485.
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Appendix 3.5 Observed probabilities (percentages) of divorce by church denomination of husband and
wife in three periods of marriage and two marital cohorts, mean age at marriage set to 25 
a: first five years, cohort 1974-1979
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 8.9
Cath. 8.5 4.1
D.R. 6.5 5.7 2.9
Reref. 6.3 5.5 3.0 1.7
oth. Prot. 4.8
other 8.5
oth. het. 12.0
b: second five years, cohort 1974-1979
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 10.4
Cath. 9.7 5.5
D.R. 7.9 7.1 3.9
Reref. 7.9 7.5 4.3 3.0
oth. Prot. 6.5
other 10.0
oth. het. 11.6
c: third five years, cohort 1974-1979
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 6.7
Cath. 6.4 4.0
D.R. 5.5 5.0 3.0
Reref. 5.8 5.3 3.3 2.4
oth. Prot. 4.3
other 6.4
oth. het. 7.2
d: first five years, cohort 1980-1984
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 10.8
Cath. 10.4 5.5
D.R. 7.8 6.4 3.4
Reref. 7.1 5.9 3.3 2.0
oth. Prot. 8.1
other 15.6
oth. het. 16.8
e: second five years, cohort 1980-1984
none Cath. D.R. Reref. oth. Pr. other
none 9.2
Cath. 8.6 5.1
D.R. 6.9 6.0 3.4
Reref. 6.8 6.3 3.5 2.5
oth. Prot. 5.5
other 11.0
oth. het. 12.5
Note: ‘none’ stands for no church affiliation; ‘Cath.’ for Catholics; ‘D.R.’ for Dutch Reformed; ‘Reref.’ for Re-reformed; ‘oth.
Pr.’ for other Protestant/Christian; ‘other’ for all other church affiliations’; ‘oth. het.’ for all other mixed combinations in the
table (the darkest empty cells together). Mirrored cells taken together.
Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands) Marriage and Divorce Files 1974-1994, own calculations. Cohort 1974-1979: first
five years, N = 531,015; second five years, N = 501,156; third five years, N = 466,754; cohort 1980-1984: first five years,
N = 392,470; second five years, N = 363,589; both cohorts 1974-1984: N = 923,485.
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Appendix 3.6 Observed probabilities (percentages) of divorce by nationality of husband and wife in three
periods of marriage and two marital cohorts, mean age at marriage set to 25 
a: first five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
NL nghbr S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 5.1 10.3 16.3 25.5 49.0 19.1
nghbr 6.9 3.8
S-Eur. 13.0 3.8
Turkey 40.2 0.0
Moroc. 30.9 12.5
other 16.8 6.7
oth. het. 8.6
b: second five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
NL nghbr S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 6.5 12.3 12.4 31.6 19.2 15.1
nghbr 7.9 3.2
S-Eur. 12.1 6.4
Turkey 33.7 8.3
Moroc. 26.8 28.6
other 15.3 8.4
oth. het. 10.2
c: third five years, cohort 1974-1979
wife
husb.
NL nghbr S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 4.6 6.6 8.1 15.4 4.8 8.0
nghbr 5.0 3.8
S-Eur. 7.9 4.5
Turkey 14.2 0.0
Moroc. 15.5 20.0
other 8.1 5.3
oth. het. 4.3
d: first five years, cohort 1980-1984
wife
husb.
NL nghbr S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 6.1 15.0 22.4 27.5 61.4 36.8
nghbr 10.3 4.3
S-Eur. 13.8 9.4
Turkey 38.7 6.3
Moroc. 30.8 22.2
other 22.0 12.5
oth. het. 10.3
e: second five years, cohort 1980-1984
wife
husb.
NL nghbr S-Eur. Turkey Moroc. other
NL 5.8 12.0 15.0 18.2 26.9 15.1
nghbr 9.0 6.3
S-Eur. 14.6 7.5
Turkey 31.3 3.7
Moroc. 38.7 23.8
other 19.7 10.0
oth. het. 11.3
Note: ‘NL’ stands for Netherlands; ‘nghbr’ for Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, United Kingdom and France; ‘S-Eur.’ for
Portugal, Spain, Italy, former Yugoslavia and Greece; ‘Moroc.’ for Morocco; ‘other’ for all other countries; ‘oth. het.’ for all
other mixed combinations in the table (the empty cells together).
Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands) Marriage and Divorce Files 1974-1994, own calculations. Cohort 1974-1979: first
five years, N = 531,015; second five years, N = 501,156; third five years, N = 466,754; cohort 1980-1984: first five years,
N = 392,470; second five years, N = 363,589; both cohorts 1974-1984: N = 923,485.
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4 Does heterogamy increase the risk of divorce
and, if so, why?
A descriptive and explanatory analysis of SIN98.1
A
re marriages in which partners do not resemble each other with respect to age, level of education,
occupational status, religion, ethnic background and social origin more likely to end in divorce
than marriages in which partners have similar characteristics? And if so, how can this
relationship between heterogamy and divorce be explained? To answer these questions, I employed a
recent data set, SIN98, based on a survey among almost 2,400 married, divorced and remarried people in
the Netherlands. The impact of the social characteristics mentioned is investigated both separately and
simultaneously. I tested the main heterogamy hypothesis, which states that, in general, mixed marriages
have a greater chance of ending in divorce, and, for heterogamy with respect to age, level of education
and social status, the asymmetry or hypergamy hypothesis, which predicts that this effect is stronger if
the wife is in a better position than her husband. For a number of forms of heterogamy, these effects are
found even for inherited characteristics such as church denomination and socioeconomic origin. Next, I
tested the explanatory hypotheses to see whether or not disapproval by the social environment and
differences of opinion between spouses form the basis of the positive effects of heterogamy on divorce.
Social disapproval and differences of opinion do have strong effects on divorce and they have some
explanatory power as to why the effects of heterogamy are present.
4.1 Introduction
Of all marriages contracted in the Netherlands in 1976, 6.6 percent ended in divorce after five
years, 14.0 percent after ten years, 18.4 percent after fifteen years and 22.3 percent after twenty
years. Of the marriages begun in 1981, 9.5 percent ended in divorce after five years, 16.1 after ten
and 21.0 percent after fifteen years (CBS 1997a). The strong increase in divorce risks is generally
explained by social changes like the increased economic independence of women and changing
norms and values (e.g. Janssen, Poortman, De Graaf & Kalmijn 1998).
The topic of marriage patterns, and heterogamy and divorce is important to research into
the openness of society. If society becomes more open, different groups within society may be
expected to come closer to each other, with more mixed, or heterogamous, marriages as a result.
In this way, mixed marriages form an important indicator for the openness of society.2 For that
reason, research has been carried out to assess the level of homogamy. In the Netherlands,
generally, husband and wife bear a fairly strong resemblance to each other, that is to say, they are
fairly homogamous, with respect to level of education, age, social background and religion
(Hendrickx 1994, 1998; Hendrickx, Lammers & Ultee 1991; Hendrickx, Schreuder & Ultee 1994;
Hendrickx, Uunk & Smits 1995; De Hoog 1982; Smits 1996; Smits, Ultee & Lammers 1999; Uunk
1996).
Rising divorce rates make it possible to extend the research into mixed marriage to divorce
patterns in order to see whether or not mixed marriages have higher divorce risks. Marriages can
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be mixed with respect to several social characteristics. In this chapter, I will investigate
homogamy with respect to age, level of education, social status of the spouses, religion, ethnic
background and social origin. More types of heterogamy will be studied in this chapter than in the
preceding ones. Another extension here is that I will elaborate on theories by deriving
explanations of the effects of heterogamy on divorce. The explaining factors are related to
disagreements between spouses and disapproval by the social environment. We can no longer use
the registration data used earlier for the extensions in this chapter because they are limited in the
number of variables. Instead, data from a new survey, SIN98, will be used because it contains the
necessary information.
4.1.1 Previous research
So far, research on the impact of social heterogamy on the probability of divorce in the
Netherlands has scarcely been investigated. There are some bivariate studies which show that
marriages have a higher probability of divorce if they are mixed with respect to ethnicity (Van der
Heijdt 1996; Harmsen 1998), church denomination and age (CBS 1958; Dumon & Kooy 1983).
In the United States and a few other countries, more research has been conducted. Those
studies take at most a few heterogamy characteristics into account simultaneously. This results in
the finding of some positive effects of heterogamy on divorce rates. If spouses differ in age, the
risk of divorce increases (Bumpass & Sweet 1972). Also marriages in which spouses have different
levels of education have a higher risk of divorce (Bumpass & Sweet 1972; Tzeng 1992; Wagner
1993), even though it is not always present when controlled for heterogamy with respect to job
characteristics (Tzeng & Mare 1995). Ethnically mixed marriages are worse off than ethnically
homogamous marriages (Jones 1994, 1996; Roloff 1998), even though an American research shows
that racially mixed marriages do not have to be less stable than racially homogamous ones,
depending on age at marriage and marriage number (Cuningham 1990). The reciprocal
relationship between religion in general and marital quality is weak (Booth, Johnson, Branaman &
Sica 1995). Still, being mixed with respect to religion also leads to less satisfaction and higher
levels of divorce in comparison to religiously homogamous couples, even though the effects in
American literature are sometimes limited (Burchinal & Chancellor 1963; Bumpass & Sweet 1972;
Heaton 1984; Huber & Spitze 1980; Lehrer & Chiswick 1993). In fact, the question whether
Catholic/Protestant mixed marriages have higher divorce risks has interested American
researchers for a long time. The presence of such an effect of mixed marriage has already been
shown since at least the 1930s and 1940s (Bell 1938, Weeks 1943, Landis 1949), be it mostly for
selective samples of schoolchildren from certain regions or students following marriage lectures
who were questioned about their parents’ marriages. Kalmijn (1991a, b) shows that intermarriage
between Protestants and Catholics has increased dramatically since the 1920s, while
intermarriages between different educational groups has decreased. This seems to indicate an
increase in the strength of educational boundaries and a decrease in the strength of religious
boundaries. Nevertheless, Bumpass and Sweet (1972) find that, with respect to divorce risks,
effects of educational differences are small compared to heterogamy effects of age and religion.
Heterogamy with respect to social class, social class of origin and level of education is found to
have little effect on divorce risk in Norway, but this was not compared to other types of
heterogamy (Hansen 1995). However, job status heterogamy is also found to have a positive effect
Does heterogamy increase the risk of divorce and why?
87
on divorce (Philliber & Hiller 1983), contrary to heterogamy with respect to income (Tzeng & Mare
1995). Sometimes effects of heterogamy go in a specific direction, namely of a higher divorce risk
in the case of a better situated wife. Divorce risks increase if a wife has a higher level of education
than her husband (Wagner 1993) or if the traditional division of labour is broken and the wife is
working more than the husband (Tzeng 1992; Tzeng & Mare 1995).
In the previous chapter, I analysed official registration data of marriage and divorce in a
multivariate way and the effect of heterogamy was determined with respect to age, religion and
nationality. The results indicated that, in the Netherlands, marriages of couples who are mixed
with respect to age, religion and nationality have a higher chance of ending in divorce than
homogamous marriages. Marriages between people with Dutch nationality and people from the
Mediterranean countries which supplied the Netherlands with migrant workers, have especially
high risks of divorce. With respect to the effects of religious heterogamy, the higher divorce risk
for mixed marriages between the three Christian denominations is the most important. Age has
especially large effects if age differences are large and if the wife is older than her husband. In the
previous chapter, all of the marriages contracted between 1974 and 1984 were analysed to
determine whether they ended in divorce between the start of the marriage and 1994. Being able
to follow about a million marriages obviously has advantages with respect to statistical power.
The drawback of using official records is that only a few characteristics of the married couple are
available. Levels of education, social statuses and social origins are not recorded in official
marriage records. Furthermore, the data available in these official registrations do not offer
information to explain the relationship between heterogamy and divorce.
A test of effects of heterogamy on divorce requires data containing information about
respondents and partners both in existing marriages and in marriages which have ended in
divorce. Since no such data sets containing enough characteristics were available for the
Netherlands to do such analyses on the causes of divorce, divorce was approximated by marital
instability as subjectively experienced or estimated by the marriage partners themselves (Kooy
1969, 1984; Janssen et al. 1998; in the US: Booth, Johnson & Edwards 1983). Findings from these
studies indicated that instability was increased by heterogamy in some instances, mainly when
the wife is older or when spouses have different social origins.
4.1.2 This chapter
The research question in this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I pose the question whether mixed
marriages have a higher risk of divorce than homogamous marriages when taking many forms of
heterogamy into account simultaneously. Answering this question by researching many types of
heterogamy simultaneously will fill a gap, because systematic research in this way has not been
carried out before. The second part of the question is how heterogamy effects on divorce can be
explained by differences of opinion or disagreements between spouses on the one hand and lack
of support and disapproval by the social environment on the other hand. For this explanation, I
will look at the theoretical disadvantages of heterogamy for the marriage. In this way, I can test
theories as to why heterogamy effects on divorce exist. Empirical explanatory answers for the
relationship between heterogamy and divorce have not as yet been given. Hence, this is another
extension of previous research.
I will investigate the impact of several forms of heterogamy on divorce by using the
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recently conducted survey Divorce in the Netherlands (Scheiding in Nederland 1998, SIN98). This
data set fills a lack by providing information on several social characteristics of both spouses
during their marriage. In this way, my analyses on register data in Chapters 2 and 3 can be
extended. So, in the previous chapters, I used huge, or shall I say, complete population data, while
from this chapter onwards, the data stem from sample surveys which are much richer in content.
In the next paragraph, I will go into the theoretical background and hypotheses. Next, the
data and operationalization will be described. I will explain the method of analysis before
revealing the results. I will end this chapter by concluding on the results and a short discussion of
their implications.
4.2 Theory and hypotheses
4.2.1 Homogamy and heterogamy
Heterogamy occurs less frequently than homogamy. Spouses tend to be similar with respect to
social characteristics such as age, religion, ethnicity, level of education and social background (CBS
1997b; De Hoog 1982; DiMaggio & Mohr 1985; Hendrickx 1994, 1998; Hendrickx, Lammers & Ultee
1991; Hendrickx, Schreuder & Ultee 1994; Hendrickx, Uunk & Smits 1995; Kalmijn 1991a, b, 1994;
Mare 1991; Smeenk 1998; Smits 1996, Smits, Ultee & Lammers 1999; Vossen 1999; Uunk 1996).
There are at least three sets of reasons for the existence of homogamy (Kalmijn 1991b, 1998). The
most prominent explanation for the existence of homogamy assumes that choosing a spouse who
has similar social characteristics stems from choosing a spouse with similar taste and expectations
with whom one can communicate well. Life is easier if partners agree on the organization of the
relationship, life style, division of labour and the upbringing of the children. With respect to status
homogamy, two alternatives can be discerned as to why people’s preferences lead to homogamy
(Kalmijn 1994). On the one hand, the reasoning is as simple as the argument just made: people
simply look for spouses who are as similar in status as possible (Kerckhoff & Davis 1962; DiMaggio
& More 1985). By choosing a spouse with similar characteristics, one creates a common room of
discourse and shared interests in life. On the other hand, it can be argued that people prefer to
marry someone of as high a status as possible (Elder 1969; Mare 1991). This leads to the same
marriage pattern. High-status candidates will get the first proposals. High-status proposers will be
accepted first, which implies that the least attractive will be left for each other.
A second explanation for homogamy concerns the support given to the relationship by the
social environment. If husband and wife have equal characteristics, there will be more
resemblances between their respective friends and relatives. This means that people within the
social networks of both spouses are better able to get along with each other, which leads to more
support for the marriage.
A third explanation for a strong resemblance between marriage partners has nothing to do
with preferences, but can be found in opportunity. Potential marriage partners often meet in
school, at work, when going out or at a friend’s place. That is why they will relatively often meet
people who share their social characteristics (Kalmijn 1998; Smeenk 1998).
If homogamy is so advantageous for the quality of the relationship, the question arises why mixed
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marriages exist at all. At least five reasons for the existence of heterogamy can be given. Firstly,
some people may find certain dividing lines irrelevant when selecting a marriage partner. They
argue that love is (socially) blind. The second reason is closely related to the first. Even though
chances of finding a spouse with similar preferences and a similar taste are higher if that person
has the same social characteristics, social equality is not always necessary: it is not impossible to
find a spouse with similar preferences among people with different social characteristics. Thirdly,
people do not always take the time to select a spouse with similar characteristics, for example by
marrying young. As a result, the probability may be higher that they end up with a spouse who
apparently does not fit that well. Fourthly, the opportunity structure plays a role (Becker, Landes &
Michael 1977; Stier & Shavit 1994). When no similar spouse is available, a heterogamous marriage
may occur. Anyway, it is hard to find a spouse who is equal in all respects. Fifthly, it is possible
that certain types of heterogamy are useful. This is the case when it comes to division of labour
according to Becker’s (1981; Becker, Landes & Michael 1977) theories. These theories claim that
stability within marriage is greater if tasks within the household are divided: one spouse is
responsible for the housekeeping, the other makes a living by working outside the home, resulting
in some kind of exchange. This entails heterogamy with respect to labour force position and
human capital investment. The breadwinner with a payed job, in case of division of labour usually
the man, will be investing in his career and in his economic status. This is also of importance as to
age differences. Men, in most instances the money earners in situations of task specialization,
have a better position when they have more experience on the labour market, which implies that
they are a bit older. This offers an explanation for the well-established finding that men tend to be
somewhat older than their wives (Mare 1991; Smeenk & Ultee 1997).
4.2.2 Heterogamy and divorce
The first question in this chapter is whether different forms of heterogamy bring about a decrease
in marital stability. To answer this question, I can simply turn to two of the advantages of
homogamy mentioned before. Spouses with similar social characteristics share ideas about the
organization of life and will probably get along with each other better than spouses who are less
alike. Also, the odds will be that the families, friends and acquaintances of both spouses will be
more alike and that they will be able to get along much better with each other and with both
spouses. This implies that they will give greater support to the marriage, also in bad times, and
that the step towards divorce will be less easily taken than in mixed marriages. The way in which
I describe it here suggests that these considerations are always made consciously and deliberately,
but of course that does not need to be the case.
One counter hypothesis against the reasoning that mixed marriages are less stable may be
that heterogamous couples have thought through all the aforementioned disadvantages and still
come to the conclusion that their love is much stronger than those disadvantages. This reasoning
implies that, even though mixed marriages are less likely, those that do come about are a special
selection of stable marriages. Furthermore, people who get involved in mixed networks may make
every effort necessary to get along with those different people in the mixed networks. They will be
more tolerant and will avoid conflict and disagreements as a result of social differences with, for
example, the in-laws (Blau & Schwartz 1984; Hondius 1999). People might be able to get over
different preferences and lack of support by the social environment in the beginning of a
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relationship or during the honeymoon period, nevertheless, the expectation here is that after
marriage, the lack of a common social background will bring about a higher divorce risk. Problems
due to heterogamy may also arise after child birth, when spouses discuss how to raise their
children (Booth & White 1980). Furthermore, even though the marriage partners may be willing to
overcome differences and accept the in-laws and respective friends as they are, the family and
friends may not be willing to do so in return. This is beyond the control of the marriage partners
and will result in a lack of support for the marriage.
The above reasoning implies that mixed marriages are more unstable than homogamous
marriages. The question is, however, whether this is true to the same extent for all types of
heterogamy under investigation in this chapter. To obtain a more differentiating view, I will make
a distinction between characteristics ascribed by inherited background and characteristics
achieved on one’s own merits. These concepts were introduced by Blau and Duncan (1967) in their
study of the American occupational structure. Kalmijn (1991a, b) applied these concepts to
marriage markets.
Religion, ethnicity and social status of origin can be considered as ascribed characteristics.
Of course, one might argue that people can choose their own religion. Nevertheless, religious
affiliation is usually inherited from one’s parents – which is ascription – and if it is not, then it can
still not be considered an achievement on one’s own ‘merits’. Level of education and social status
can be considered as achieved on one’s own merits. It is hard to consider age as either ascription
or achievement on one’s own merits because age is not inherited and everyone gets older as time
goes by through no effort of their own.
The distinction between ascription and achievement on one’s own merits can be applied to
the question whether heterogamy leads to more unstable marriages. According to Becker (1981),
division of labour and task specialization is useful and stabilizes marriage. If one spouse keeps
house and the other has a payed job, this implies that the former does not invest in an
occupational career, while the latter does. This will favour heterogamy not only with respect to
social status, but also with respect to the other meritocratic characteristic under consideration,
level of education, and age to some extent. This is expected because a career requires a certain
level of education and being a bit older also enhances success in a career because of the level of
experience. Following Becker’s expectations, the resulting heterogamy with respect to the
meritocratic characteristic of social class is associated with marital stability and is not considered
to be harmful. This may also be the case for the associated characteristics of the level of education
and age to some extent. Of course, this may differ for whether it is the husband or the wife who is
making a career. I will go into asymmetric expectations below.
The above may be summarized by the expectation that mixed couples have a higher probability of
divorce than homogamous ones. I call this the heterogamy hypothesis. I expect this hypothesis to be
fully applicable for heterogamy with respect to the ascribed characteristics of religion, ethnic
background and social origin. For heterogamy with respect to spouses’ own social status,
however, I expect this effect on divorce to be reduced to zero or even to be turned around to a
negative one, because of the expected positive effects of a traditional division of labour. I call this
the specialization hypothesis.
When it comes to the characteristics of age and the level of education, it is unclear what to
expect. These characteristics are not only associated with the division of labour. Age has also a
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maturity component. Education is also associated with culture (e.g. DiMaggio & More 1985). In
sum, I expect a weak heterogamy effect for age differences and educational heterogamy.
Even with respect to social class of the spouses themselves, I can make a distinction
between different components. Bourdieu (1979) makes a distinction between economic and
cultural dimensions of occupations. These can have different implications for the marriage market
(Kalmijn 1994). I would like to apply this to the matter at hand. I have already demonstrated that
economic differences between spouses are related to a traditional division of labour, which is
considered to be supportive for the marriage. This led us to the specialization hypothesis. Cultural
differences, however, are not associated with the advantages of specialization. They are
considered to be rather detrimental to communication and mutual understanding between
spouses. Therefore, for the cultural dimension of occupations, the heterogamy hypothesis will still
be present to a limited extent.
A supplementary hypothesis can be formulated with respect to some forms of heterogamy. The
first instance is heterogamy with respect to age. Marriages in which the wife is older than the
husband are less frequently found than marriages in which the husband is older (Mare 1991;
Smeenk & Ultee 1997). One possible reason for this is task specialization, which is considered to be
positively related to marital stability. Besides, when marriages in which the husband is older are
the standard, it might be generally less accepted when the wife is older than the husband.
Furthermore, women themselves prefer a husband who is a bit older, not only for reasons of
custom (social environment), but also for practical and maturity reasons (Vossen 1999), which has
to do with preferences, taste and satisfactory communication between spouses. Therefore, I
expect the probability of divorce to be greater when the wife is the older spouse, controlling for
absolute age differences.
A similar reasoning with specialization and with occurrence and acceptance can be made
for differences in level of education and social status. A wife with a higher education or a higher
social status than her husband is marrying downward. For marrying upward and downward, the
terms hypergamy and hypogamy are in use. Because it is less accepted if the wife has a higher
educational or social status position than the other way around, this will give rise to a higher
probability of divorce. This is the asymmetry or hypergamy hypothesis with respect to heterogamy
of age, level of education and social status. As to heterogamy with respect to religion, social origin
and ethnic background, I do not find reasons to formulate such an asymmetry hypothesis.
4.2.3 Explaining heterogamy effects on divorce
To answer the second research question for an explanation of the effects of heterogamy on
divorce, I will once more look into the theoretical advantages of homogamy. In the above theory, it
is emphasized that heterogamy will lead to a higher divorce risk because marriage partners, on
average, are less able to get on with each other because of differing preferences or expectations.
Furthermore, it has been asserted that mixed social environments will be less willing to accept the
marriage. This will lead to less support for the marriage and the inclination to support a divorce
when the marriage is going through difficult times. In other words, I expect that heterogamy leads
to conflict and lack of support, and that these, in turn, have a negative effect on marital stability.3
Therefore, my explanatory conflict hypothesis with respect to divorce reads that differences of
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opinion within the marriage explain the effects of heterogamy on divorce. My explanatory support
hypothesis with respect to divorce reads that disapproval by the social environment explains the
effects of heterogamy on divorce.
These hypotheses can be made more specific. In order to do this, I refer to the distinction
made above between characteristics which are ascribed by inherited background and
characteristics which are achieved on one’s own merits (Blau & Duncan 1967; Kalmijn 1991a, b). I
considered religion, ethnicity and social origin as ascribed characteristics and level of education
and own social status as being achieved on one’s own merits. Age is neither, but is more
associated with characteristics achieved on one’s own merits.
Social support or disapproval for the marriage stems from the social environment, whilst
differences of opinion between the spouses stem from their own efforts. I can use this to specify
the explanatory conflict and support hypotheses. As they are related to the social environment, I can
expect the effect of heterogamy with respect to religion, ethnicity and social origin on divorce to
be explained mainly by social disapproval for the marriage. Conversely, since they are related to
achievement, I can expect the effect of heterogamy with respect to the level of education and
social class on divorce to be explained mainly by differences of opinion between the spouses. In
addition, we have to bear in mind that education, social status and age are the main determinants
of a whole range of lifestyle preferences (Ganzeboom 1988). These explanatory hypotheses will be
called the ascription explanation hypothesis and the achievement explanation hypothesis, respectively.
Note that these hypotheses are specifications of the explanatory conflict and support hypotheses.
With respect to characteristics relating to one’s own achievement, however, I have to make
an exception for the additional effects which are expected from the direction of the differences. I
predicted earlier that there would be an asymmetry effect signifying that couples in which the
wife is older, has a higher level of education or a higher job status compared to the husband will
have a higher divorce risk because those combinations are less accepted by the social
environment. Since I am talking about acceptance, I expect the ascription explanation hypothesis
also to be valid for asymmetric effects. This does not mean that the achievement explanation
hypothesis will not work here. I already noted above that age differences, for example, also stem
from own preferences. In sum, I expect that asymmetry effects will be explained both by lack of
support from the environment and by differences of opinion between spouses.
4.3 Data and operationalization
4.3.1 Organization of the data set
For the analyses in this chapter, I used the SIN98 data set (Kalmijn, De Graaf & Uunk 1999). This
data set was especially designed for my analyses and it contains sufficient information about the
two spouses in both intact and divorced relationships. The survey was conducted in autumn 1998,
winter 1998/1999. Within a sample of municipalities in the Netherlands, representative with
respect to region and degree of urbanization, three sub-samples were taken: one from married
people in their first marriages, one from divorced people who were then single and one from
divorced people who remarried, all aged between 30 and 75 years old. In order to have sufficient
divorced and remarried people in the sample, the second and third strata were over-represented.4
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Out of all the people in the sample, 78.9 percent could be reached, of whom 57.7 percent
completed the survey, which was administered by interviewers using a paper questionnaire. This
brought the response rate to 45.6 percent. This percentage is certainly not disappointing,
considering the sensitivity of the subject and the over-sampling of divorced people. One way in
which this response rate was accomplished was by not stressing the fact that the interview was
about “divorce”, but instead saying it was about “life course and relationships of Dutch people”. In
total, the survey was completed among 2,346 individuals: 1,795 respondents (77 percent) had been
divorced and 551 (23 percent) were in their first marriages.
Respondents were questioned about their life history, their (past and/or present) marriage
and their working careers, amongst other things. The design was such that extended information
about the marital relationship and the spouse is available for one marriage, being the present
marriage for married people in their first marriage and the past marriage for divorcees, whether
remarried or not. If a person had got divorced more than once, the longest lasting relationship
was taken. By following both surviving marriages and marriages that ended in divorce, I could
simultaneously investigate the effects of different forms of heterogamy on the probability that a
marriage did not survive due to divorce. I followed marriages over the marriage course, comparing
marriages that end in divorce and still existing marriages.
4.3.2 Operationalization
In this chapter, I will focus on forms of heterogamy at the beginning of the marriage. The question
as to what extent heterogamy develops in the course of marriage is kept for the next chapter. The
main reason for looking at characteristics at the beginning of the marriage is that one of the
research questions examines the explanation of the relationship between heterogamy and divorce.
The explanatory variables that I will introduce were only available at one time in the marriage.
Lack of support for the marriage choice was asked for around the time of marriage and differences
of opinion between spouses were asked for the time after about five years of marriage (or before
that if the marriage did not last that long). It was, therefore, not useful to use dynamic variables in
these analyses.
Firstly, I describe the variables for age and the characteristics associated with achievement
on one’s own merits. The average age at marriage of both spouses was taken into account in the
analyses. Age was computed in years. On average, couples are about 24 years old when they marry
or start living together, as can be seen in Table 4.1. Age heterogamy was computed by taking the
absolute difference between the husband’s and the wife’s age. To control for the direction, a
dummy was added indicating whether the wife is older (at least one year) than her husband (value
1) or not (value 0). Table 4.1 shows that, on average, couples differ almost 3½ years and in 34
percent of the cases, the wife is older. Alternatively, I also constructed a variable which equals 0 if
there is no difference in age, negative if the wife is older and positive if the husband is older. The
value -3.5, for example, on this variable indicates a couple in which the wife is 3 years and 6
months older than the husband. The square of this is added in order to let divorce risks go up to
either side like a U-curve: when the wife is older or when the husband is older. This second
construction makes it possible to ascertain at which age difference marital stability is optimal. I
would expect that this optimal situation will occur when the husband is somewhat older than his
wife.
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Table 4.1 Description of variables used in the analyses
variable valid N min max mean
standard
deviation
weighted
mean
standard
deviation
divorced* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.763 0.426 0.193 0.395
year of cohabitation or marriage 2261 43.00 97.00 72.849 10.337 74.047 11.246
average age at marriage 2261 15.00 62.50 23.975 4.023 24.677 4.389
absolute age difference 2261 0.00 26.75 3.457 3.240 3.461 3.176
wife older (at least by 1 year)* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.341 0.474 0.380 0.485
mean education (years) 2261 6.00 18.00 12.675 2.675 12.569 2.651
absolute educational difference (years) 2261 0.00 12.00 2.566 2.437 2.526 2.371
wife higher education* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.244 0.429 0.211 0.408
mean economic occupational status 2261 -1.81 2.43 -0.321 0.599 -0.312 0.598
absolute economic status difference 2261 0.00 3.98 0.788 0.719 0.795 0.742
wife higher economic status* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.292 0.455 0.283 0.451
mean cultural occupational status 2261 -1.40 2.57 -0.235 0.697 -0.220 0.707
absolute cultural status difference 2261 0.00 3.46 0.683 0.640 0.695 0.660
wife higher cultural status* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.504 0.500 0.549 0.498
church: none* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.353 0.478 0.287 0.453
church: none/Catholic* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.105 0.307 0.072 0.259
church: none/Protestant* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.073 0.260 0.066 0.248
church: Catholic* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.262 0.440 0.325 0.469
church: Catholic/Protestant* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.029 0.167 0.022 0.146
church: Protestant* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.098 0.298 0.147 0.355
church: other homogamous* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.027 0.162 0.051 0.219
church: other mixed* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.052 0.223 0.030 0.171
ethnicity: Dutch* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.748 0.435 0.770 0.421
ethnicity: foreign* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.050 0.219 0.061 0.240
ethnicity: Dutch/foreign* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.188 0.390 0.158 0.365
ethnicity: mixed foreign* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.015 0.120 0.011 0.105
mean economic status origin 2261 -1.40 2.43 0.009 0.656 -0.002 0.650
absolute economic origin difference 2261 0.00 3.61 0.842 0.786 0.792 0.755
wife higher economic origin* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.468 0.499 0.463 0.499
mean cultural status origin 2261 -1.40 2.57 -0.378 0.638 -0.414 0.649
absolute cultural origin difference 2261 0.00 3.87 0.743 0.738 0.728 0.746
wife higher cultural origin* 2261 0.00 1.00 0.467 0.499 0.480 0.500
number of kids in marriage 2261 0.00 11.00 1.671 1.362 2.012 1.376
lack of support environment (z score) 2254 -0.74 4.59 0.002 1.001 -0.297 0.763
differences of opinion 5 years (z score) 2248 -1.28 3.89 -0.001 0.998 -0.424 0.779
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98).
Note: * indicates a dichotomous variable. A first selection before analysis is made for sufficient information as mentioned
in the text, maximum N=2,261. Valid N listwise: 2,241. Because weight factor is based on full N (2,346), effective N differs
slightly in weighted columns.
I had information on the highest completed level of education for both spouses, which I recoded
into the number of years needed to complete that level. The mean level was computed for the
couple. On average, this mean level lies between 12 and 13 years, as can be read from Table 4.1.
Heterogamy was measured by a variable indicating the absolute difference between the number
of years of education of the husband and of the wife. In order to investigate the asymmetry or
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hypergamy hypothesis, a dichotomous variable was constructed to indicate whether the wife has a
higher level of education than the husband (1) or not (0). The mean absolute educational difference
between husband and wife amounts to about 2½ years, with 24 percent of the wives being more
highly educated than their husbands. Analogous to age differences, an alternative measurement of
the difference in the level of education was computed, being negative if the wife is more highly
educated than her husband, and the square of this difference.
Occupational status can be measured in several ways. There is a cultural and an economic
component in occupational status (De Graaf & Kalmijn 1995). In the theory, I claimed that stability
of homogamous marriages can come from joint expectations and preferences of spouses. This can
be associated with the cultural dimension. The stability caused by the division of labour, however,
is more associated with the economic dimension. For this reason, I used a two dimensional scale
which takes cultural and economic dimensions of occupational status into account.
Both dimensions of occupational status were measured using the scales developed by De
Graaf and Kalmijn (1995) derived from the occupational codes. For both spouses, I used the
occupation at the time of marriage or cohabitation or, if unavailable, the latest before that or the
one closest in time. An occupational history of the spouse who answered the questionnaire was
available. For reasons of reliability, the occupations of the (ex-)partner were only inquired after at
specific points in the relationship which included the commencement of cohabitation or marriage.
Heterogamy for both the economic and the cultural scale was measured by taking the absolute
difference of husband’s and wife’s social status. Dichotomous variables were also constructed to
indicate if the economic or cultural status of the wife is higher than the husband’s (1) or not (0). As
can be seen in Table 4.1, the mean economic status of husband and wife ranges from -1.81 to 2.43
and the mean absolute difference is 0.79, with the wife having a higher position in 29 percent of
the cases. The mean cultural status of husband and wife ranges from -1.40 to 2.57 and the mean
absolute difference is 0.68, with a higher position of the wife in about half of the cases. An
alternative difference scale with negative values for a higher status wife, and the square of that,
were also computed.
I would now like to turn to the operationalization of characteristics of inherited ascription. With
respect to religion, I distinguished non-church members, Catholics, Protestants – defined as Dutch
Reformed and Re-reformed (gereformeerden) taken together – and other denominations. This
distinction was made because those churches have different levels of orthodoxy. Although
differences within these churches exist, in the Netherlands, people who consider themselves as
Catholics are, on average, less strict and orthodox than people who count themselves among the
Dutch Reformed, whilst the Re-reformed are the most orthodox of the main three Christian
denominations. Historically and internationally, this may seem somewhat odd because of the
position taken by the official Roman Catholic Church. This is, however, the result of different levels
and timings of secularization among the denominations in the Netherlands (Dumon & Kooy 1983:
111; Becker & Vink 1994). I also distinguished a category of ‘other denominations’, including
miscellaneous denominations which appear too infrequently in the data set, like those of other
Protestants, Jews and Muslims. Religious affiliation was derived for the moment at which the
spouses started living together. If this was not available, but religious affiliation was known at
another time, then this was taken. A categorization is made of the denomination of husband and
wife which distinguishes these eight categories:
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- both non-church members (homogamous), 35 percent of the couples in the analysis.
- mixed non-church member/Catholic, 11 percent.
- mixed non-church member/Protestant, 7 percent.
- both Catholics (homogamous), 26 percent.
- mixed Catholic/Protestant, 3 percent.
- both Protestants (homogamous), 10 percent.
- other, but same denomination (homogamous), 3 percent.
- other mixed, 5 percent.
Ethnic differences were operationalized using the country of birth of the parents of both spouses.
Within the questionnaire it is possible to discern people born in The Netherlands, Indonesia
(including Ambon/Moluccas), Turkey, Morocco, Suriname, Netherlands Antilles (including Aruba),
Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and other countries. Unfortunately, due to
infrequent occurrence, it was not possible to discern combinations of these. Therefore, only four
categories could be distinguished: homogamous Dutch couples (75 percent of the couples in the
file, see Table 4.1), homogamous foreign couples (5 percent), mixed Dutch/foreign couples (19
percent) and mixed foreign couples (2 percent). A spouse with parents from the same country who
is married to someone with parents from different countries will also come into contact with
several cultural backgrounds. Therefore, such a marriage is considered ethnically mixed.
To measure social origin and heterogamy with respect to social origin, I looked at the
occupational status of the fathers of both spouses. I decided to construct exactly analogous
variables for fathers’ occupational statuses as I did for the spouses’ own occupational statuses. I
made the same distinction between cultural and economic status and derived heterogamy
variables in the same way as described above for spousal status differences. As can be read from
Table 4.1, the mean of husband and wife on the economic origin scale ranges from -1.40 to 2.43,
with an average difference between husband and wife of 0.84. In 47 percent of the cases, the wife
stems from a higher economic status of origin. The spousal mean on the cultural scale of origin
ranges from -1.40 to 2.57, with an average spousal difference of 0.74. Again, in 47 percent of the
cases, the wife stems from a higher cultural status of origin.
I postulated two explanations of heterogamy effects: lack of support by the social environment
and lack of mutual preferences of the spouses. For both explanatory factors, I constructed a scale.
However, it was difficult to convert the explanations into direct questions for the questionnaire.
The fact that the questions had to be asked retrospectively did not make this task any easier. To
enhance reliability, the wording in the questionnaire stressed the fact that we were inquiring
about the situation in the beginning of the marriage or cohabitation. The scale for lack of social
support is an additive scale of 8 items indicating whether or not relatives, friends, people in the
neighbourhood and representatives from church ever made negative remarks about the marriage
or the choice of that specific spouse around the time the marriage was contracted. These
questions were only posed to the primary respondent in the survey. The items yielded different
degrees of positive answers, ranging from 2.3 percent who experienced negative remarks from
someone of the church about the spouse to 35.1 percent who experienced such remarks from
relatives. Overall, there is a reasonable amount of dispersion in the answers. This can be seen in
panel A of the Table 4.2, in which a description of the items is given. Cronbach’s alpha for the
Does heterogamy increase the risk of divorce and why?
97
constructed scale is 0.70, which is very reasonable for this number of items. I computed the
number of positive answers on the eight items and allowed some missing values. Scale values
were computed on at least four valid answers. In this way, only 7 missing values on the scale
occur.
Table 4.2 Frequencies of indicators of lack of support from the social environment and of differences
of opinion between spouses
a: indicators of lack of support from the social environment: around the time of marriage (or cohabitation),
have there been negative remarks...
characteristic valid N % yes % no
about the marriage by relatives 2338 27.5 72.5
about the marriage by friends 2333 9.9 90.1
about the marriage by people in the neighbourhood 2329 6.2 93.8
about the marriage by a clergyman/priest/someone of the church 2332 4.7 95.3
about the spouse by relatives 2342 35.1 64.9
about the spouse by friends 2337 16.8 83.2
about the spouse by people in the neighbourhood 2334 8.8 91.2
about the spouse by a clergyman/priest/someone of the church 2328 2.3 97.7
b: indicators of differences of opinion: after about 5 years of marriage (or before if marriage did not last 5
years), did you have differences of opinion with your spouse about...
characteristic valid N % hardly/never % sometimes % often
religion, philosophy of life, politics 2329 71.5 21.8 6.7
taste on furnishing, television, clothing 2329 57.9 32.8 9.3
leisure activities of spouse 2325 61.8 23.3 14.8
personal habits of spouse 2327 39.5 38.2 22.3
division of household tasks 2329 55.9 30.5 13.6
having children 2325 81.1 12.9 5.9
raising the children 2316 68.7 21.8 9.4
too much work by spouse 2324 75.7 15.3 9.0
expenditures of spouse 2325 63.9 20.1 16.0
drinking habits or drug use of spouse 2328 77.8 9.4 12.8
sexuality 2332 62.5 25.8 11.7
adultery of spouse 2329 81.9 8.7 9.4
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98). Valid N based on file before selections. No weight applied. Not applicable is
recoded to negative answer.
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The scale for conflict between spouses is an additive scale of 12 items about whether or not there
have sometimes or often been differences of opinion between the spouses about religion, politics,
lifestyle, division of labour, children, sexual behaviour and money. The indicators refer to the
period after about five years of marriage, or earlier if the marriage (has) lasted shorter than five
years. A description of the items is given in panel B of Table 4.2, in which it becomes clear there is
enough dispersion in the pattern of answers. The percentage of having differences of opinion
sometimes or often ranges from 18.1 percent with respect to adultery of the spouse to 60.5
percent with respect to personal habits of the spouse. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is 0.76. I took
the average value on the items, in which 0 means never or hardly ever differences of opinion, 1
sometimes, and 2 often. I allowed some missing values and scale values are computed on at least
six valid answers. Only 13 respondents have a missing value on this scale. This coincides with the
number of missing values if the scale were computed on seven valid answers.
Figure 4.1 Distribution of the sum of scores on the items used for the scales for lack of support from
the environment and differences of opinion between spouses
a: lack of support from the environment b: differences of opinion between spouses
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98).
Note: No weight applied. Scores on panel A can range from 0 to 8, on panel B from 0 to 24. If half or less of the items
have a missing value, the score is based on the valid answers, multiplied accordingly and rounded to the nearest integer
value in these graphs.
Both scales have quite some dispersion. This is illustrated by Figure 4.1 in which the distributions
of the sums of both scales are visualized by histograms. Respondents may give a distorted image
of their past marriage. Especially if the divorce was particularly nasty or if the respondent has not
been able to cope with it, we can expect the respondent to give a more negative account of the
relationship and of the social support and disagreements. We tried to minimize this kind of
distortion by explicitly stressing the fact that we are asking questions about the beginning of the
relationship. Questions about negative remarks from the social environment refer to the moment
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that a couple started the formation of one household; questions about differences of opinion refer
to the time about five years after that. The possibility of overestimating the differences between
married and divorced people regarding rejection and disagreements cannot completely be ruled
out. If there really is such an overestimation, it would lead to an overestimation of the effects of
the scale of a lack of social support and the scale of disagreements between spouses on the risk of
divorce. However, the Pearson correlation between both scales is 0.36. If divorcees gave a
systematically negative image of their past marriage, this correlation would probably be
considerably higher.
Finally, both scales were standardized to z-values with a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1.
4.3.3 Description of the data
To keep as many observations as possible, I substituted the mean value for the social status and
status difference scales of a spouse if the status value in question was known for the other spouse.
The other couples and couples with missing values on the heterogamy characteristics or on the
marriage and divorce dates or with very unlikely young ages at marriage, as well as 4 homosexual
couples were removed. I had 2,261 cases (96.4% of 2,346) left for analysis. When using the scales
for lack of support from the environment and differences of opinion between spouses, the number
of cases was 2,241.
Because the stratified sample contained an over-representation of divorced persons and
because of other, smaller selectivity in response, a weight factor is computed to present better
descriptive statistics. The applied weight factor restores the proportion of characteristics in the
population aged 30 to 75 years, from which the sample was taken. In the first place, the weight
corrects the proportion of persons who are in their first marriages, of persons who are divorced
and alone now, and of persons who got divorced and remarried. Furthermore, the division of
region, degree of urbanization, sex and age group corresponds to the division for the population
aged between 30 and 75 years after applying the weight factor.
In Table 4.1, which contains descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses for
the 2,261 cases, columns are added to show means and standard deviations after applying the
weight as well. The correction of the ratio between persons in their first marriage and divorcees
can be seen in the decrease of the percentage of first relationships which ended in divorce in my
selection from 76.3 percent to 19.3 percent, which corresponds to the actual figure in the Dutch
population of persons aged between 30 and 75.
Table 4.1 shows that most means of characteristics do change somewhat, whereas others
hardly change. When weighted and observed means diverge, these differences are obviously
related to divorce. Characteristics which promote divorce will be less present after applying the
weight factor. I can see that in my sample, there are less homogamous church members than in
the population. After applying the weight factor, homogamous church members occur more often,
whereas the proportions of non-church members, mixed church members and also ethnically
mixed couples decrease. This suggests that heterogamy effects are indeed present. Some other
differences between spouses diminish on average after applying the weight, such as the absolute
difference of economic origin and the wife having a higher level of education. The average number
of children rises from 1.67 to about 2, as can be expected. This variable is shown here, because the
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presence of children below 13 years of age at each specific year of the marriage was controlled in
some models. The lack of support from the environment and differences of opinion between
spouses decreases after weighing the percentage of divorce down to actual proportions. We have
to bear in mind that this table does not control for right censoring. 
After applying the weight factor, the mean of the average age of both spouses is 24.7 years,
with the husband being 3 years and 5 and a half months older than his wife. In 38 percent of the
cases, the wife is at least a year older. On average, the spouses have a bit more than 12.5 years of
education and a mean difference of 2.5 years within couples. In 21 percent of the cases, the wife
went to school longer than the husband. There are some differences in occupational status. The
economic status of the wife is higher in 28 percent of the cases; the cultural status of the wife is
higher in a small majority of cases, namely 55 percent. With respect to church affiliation, 19
percent of the couples are mixed. The largest three groups are the homogamous Catholics (32.5
percent), non-church members (28.7 percent) and Protestants (14.7 percent). The division of
religion is graphically depicted in panel A of Figure 4.2. With the definition above, 83.1 percent of
the couples are ethnically homogamous: 77.0 percent Dutch and 6.1 percent foreign couples. The
remaining 16.9 percent are ethnically mixed. For the larger part, these couples consist of a spouse
of Dutch origin and a spouse of foreign origin. This is illustrated graphically in panel B of Figure
4.2. When it comes to the differences in status of origin, the husband has the highest position in
just over half the couples.
Figure 4.2 Distribution of church affiliation and ethnicity
a: church affiliation
homogamous: 81.0%
mixed: 19.0%
b: ethnicity
homogamous: 83.1%
mixed: 16.9%
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98). Weighted figures (see Table 4.1).
4.4 Method
In the analysis, I estimated effects on the risk of a couple getting divorced. For this purpose, I
employed a discrete time event history analysis (Allison 1984; Yamaguchi 1991). In this way, I can
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regress the relative probability of getting divorced in a specific year versus not getting divorced in
that year to my independent variables. The necessary person-period, or better couple-period file,
was created by deriving a record for every year starting from the year that the couple started to
live together (married or not) until the divorce or until the time of the interview if no divorce had
taken place by then. In every year in the file, the couple is at risk of getting a divorce. After
divorce, no subsequent years are in the file for that couple, since that specific couple is no longer
at risk. In the analyses, 37,399 records based on 2,261 couples were available to us, in the
explanatory models, we have 37,134 records based on 2,241 couples.
To estimate the models on the couple-year file, I needed a dichotomous variable indicating
whether or not a relationship ended in divorce in a specific year. Estimated effects in a logistic
regression are effects on the logit, which is the logarithm of the odds p / (1-p), in which p is the
probability of divorce in year t, given that the marriage still survived in the year t-1. In all of the
regressions, I included a linear and a quadratic term for the duration since the start of the
relationship, as well as a linear and a quadratic term for the year of the record minus 1943, the
oldest year in the file. As indicated before, the analyses in this chapter are about heterogamy at
the start of marriage and, except for duration and year, there were no time-dependent variables in
the analyses. The only exception to this is the presence of children below 13 years of age. After all,
measuring the presence of children at the beginning of the marriage makes no sense and, in fact,
taking the presence of children on a time-dependent basis is the only valid way to proceed.5
The over-sampling of divorced and remarried people has an influence on the intercept in
those models, because there are more divorced people in the sample. For the other parameters,
though, the stratification of the sample has no influence, because divorced and none-divorced
relationships are compared. So, the analyses will be carried out without applying a weight factor.
Firstly, I estimated separate baseline models to determine the baseline effects of each of the six
types of heterogamy. In these models, I only controlled for duration, duration squared, year (minus
1943, the earliest year) and year (with the same subtraction) squared (all dynamically over the
marriage course) and for the concerned base characteristics of husband and wife. These are
limited multi-variate analyses. They are intended to show the effects of heterogamy – either as an
absolute or as a dichotomous difference – without controlling for the other types of heterogamy.
For each of these separate baseline models, the main effects of the base characteristics had
to be controlled. In this way, I could be sure that the effects are indeed effects of heterogamy and
not side effects of the main effects or bottom and ceiling effects. For example, if the average age or
level of education of a couple is extremely high or extremely low, less heterogamy is possible than
when the average age or level of education is somewhere in the middle. Therefore, in the model of
age heterogamy, the mean age of both spouses at the start of cohabitation or marriage was taken
into account. Likewise, in the models of education, occupational status and father’s occupational
status, the effect of the mean level of husband and wife was controlled for. Besides, these models
included a dichotomy whether the wife is older or has a better position than the husband in order
to test the asymmetry hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts an extra effect of the wife being older,
being better educated or having a higher social status than the husband. For this reason, the
dichotomy has value 1 if the wife is older by at least one year, is more highly educated, has a
higher social status or has a higher social status of origin. The dichotomy has value 0 if the
difference is in the other direction or if there is no difference at all. No asymmetry effect was
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predicted for social status of origin.
The assessment of the heterogamy effects of a categorical characteristic like denomination
forms a special case. To obtain the right effect of religious heterogamy, I needed to compare the
divorce risk of mixed categories with the homogamous categories in the denominations of both
the husband and the wife. Therefore, I needed to compare a non-church member/Catholic mixed
marriage to marriages between two non-church members and marriages between two Catholics
(as already explained in Chapter 2). To gain full insight in the divorce risk of all mixed
combinations, parameters of models with several reference categories were computed using an
indicator contrast. This resulted in two significance levels for each mixed combination: one
compared to homogamous marriages in the category of the husband, one compared to
homogamous marriages in the category of the wife.6 The risk of divorce of a mixed combination
needs to be significantly higher than that of both categories that it is compared to in order to
constitute a heterogamy effect. This is because the heterogamy effect predicts that the risk of
divorce for mixed categories is higher than the risk of homogamous categories, i.e. of the
categories of both husband and wife. If only one of both comparisons yields a significantly higher
divorce risk for a mixed combination, then the risk may be considered to be between the risk of
husband’s and wife’s categories, which is not a heterogamy effect.
Some forms of heterogamy may be correlated, as those characteristics themselves are correlated,
or some characteristics imply or exclude one another. For example, people who have a higher level
of education because they went to school for a longer period of time, will generally marry at a
later age (Smeenk 1998). If these people also meet each other more often in school, I may expect
age at marriage and homogamy with respect to age on the one hand to be correlated with
educational homogamy on the other hand. Similar reasoning may be true for social origin, religion
and age. In order to gain insight in the real impact of different forms of heterogamy on divorce, I
simultaneously investigated effects of these different forms of heterogamy.
Therefore, I continued testing the hypotheses by full multivariate models. In these models,
the main effects and the heterogamy effects of all sources of heterogamy in this chapter were
taken into the model: age, level of education, occupational status of the spouses, church
denomination, ethnic background and social origin (i.e., social status of the fathers). Furthermore,
duration and year of each record, as well as their squares, were taken into the analysis as was
done in the previous separate models. Thus, I could find the net effects of the different types of
heterogamy. This model is called the multivariate baseline model.
Parameters for an extended model, in which the presence of children under the age of 13 is
added, were also computed. In this way, I could control for a characteristic which generally delays
divorce (Waite & Lillard 1991). If the effects of heterogamy are also present in this model, this is an
indication that heterogamy has an effect on the risk of divorce for couples with children as well.
I also tested the hypothesis that heterogamy leads to a higher divorce risk because of differences of
opinion between husband and wife and because of disapproval and lack of support by the social
environment. Several explanatory models, therefore, extended on the previous ones by adding
indicators for lack of support of the marriage by the social environment and differences of opinion
between the spouses within the relationship.
The general model, then, can be represented by the following equation:
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In the equation above, the logit of divorce in a certain year is a function of a constant and 27 sets
of variables with parameters _. Variables are as described above. Most of them are metric, among
which a few dichotomous. Religion and ethnicity, however, consist of respectively 8 and 4
categories of combinations of husband and wife. Each category has its own _-parameter. In all of
the models, a constant and the effects of year and duration and their squares were included. Other
parameters that belong together were grouped in the separate models. All of them taken together,
except those on the bottom line of the equation, formed the first full multivariate model. The
variables on the bottom line were entered afterwards: the presence of children in the extended
model and social support and differences of opinion in the explanatory models.
I also looked at the effects of heterogamy characteristics on both explanatory variables. After all, if
these characteristics are to explain the relationship between heterogamy and divorce, then
heterogamy has to have an effect on the lack of support from the social environment and on the
differences of opinion between spouses, or else I cannot speak of an explanation. Unfortunately, it
is not possible to make a full path model with logistic regression models. It suffices to establish
the relationship between heterogamy on the one hand and lack of support and differences of
opinion on the other hand. Because lack of support and differences of opinion were measured by
standardized scales which do not change over the course of marriage, I used OLS regression of
those scales on heterogamy characteristics and some control variables on the original cross-
sectional data file. I should find positive effects of heterogamy on the lack of support and
differences of opinion.7
4.5 Results: effects of heterogamy
4.5.1 Separate models for heterogamy effects on divorce
The results of the analyses in separate baseline models are shown in Table 4.3a as models 1. Many
heterogamy effects prove to be significant. I will now discuss the effects.
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Table 4.3a Event history analysis: divorce risk regressed on heterogamy and other characteristics
model 1 (separate baseline) 2 (multivariate baseline) 3 (extended)
variables b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
duration at t (several) 0.114 *** 0.010 0.138 *** 0.011
duration at t squared (several) -0.003 *** 0.000 -0.004 *** 0.000
year-1943 (several) 0.138 *** 0.022 0.123 *** 0.022
year-1943 squared (several) -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.000
average age at marriage -0.040 *** 0.008 -0.039 *** 0.008 -0.043 *** 0.008
absolute age difference 0.040 *** 0.009 0.037 *** 0.009 0.039 *** 0.009
wife older (at least by 1 year) -0.086 ns 0.053 -0.041 ns 0.056 -0.047 ns 0.056
mean education (years) 0.012 ns 0.010 -0.003 ns 0.014 -0.005 ns 0.014
absolute educ. difference 0.006 ns 0.011 0.013 ns 0.011 0.014 ns 0.011
wife higher education 0.187 ** 0.061 0.162 * 0.066 0.159 * 0.066
mean economic occupational status 0.097 ns 0.070 0.063 ns 0.072 0.051 ns 0.072
absolute economic status difference -0.008 ns 0.043 0.002 ns 0.044 0.007 ns 0.044
wife higher economic status 0.149 * 0.064 0.088 ns 0.066 0.085 ns 0.066
mean cultural occupational status -0.085 ns 0.062 -0.065 ns 0.073 -0.048 ns 0.073
absolute cultural status difference -0.067 ns 0.049 -0.058 ns 0.051 -0.059 ns 0.051
wife higher cultural status -0.172 ** 0.057 -0.155 ** 0.059 -0.144 * 0.059
church: none 0.182 *** 0.051 0.221 *** 0.055 0.199 *** 0.055
church: none/Catholic 0.399 *** 0.073 0.434 *** 0.077 0.410 *** 0.077
church: none/Protestant 0.085 ns 0.086 0.122 ns 0.090 0.117 ns 0.090
church: Catholic -0.348 *** 0.058 -0.256 *** 0.062 -0.270 *** 0.062
church: Cath./Protestant 0.119 ns 0.127 0.093 ns 0.130 0.096 ns 0.130
church: Protestant -0.516 *** 0.085 -0.412 *** 0.089 -0.397 *** 0.089
church: other homogamous -0.543 *** 0.159 -0.756 *** 0.181 -0.694 *** 0.181
church: other mixed 0.623 *** 0.096 0.554 *** 0.104 0.539 *** 0.104
ethnicity: Dutch -0.234 *** 0.063 -0.200 ** 0.074 -0.199 ** 0.074
ethnicity: foreign -0.081 ns 0.100 0.045 ns 0.113 0.038 ns 0.113
ethnicity: Dutch/foreign 0.025 ns 0.071 -0.059 ns 0.078 -0.052 ns 0.078
ethnicity: mixed foreign 0.291 ~ 0.152 0.213 ns 0.164 0.213 ns 0.164
mean economic status origin -0.209 ** 0.067 -0.156 * 0.068 -0.154 * 0.069
absolute economic origin difference 0.141 *** 0.042 0.135 ** 0.042 0.141 *** 0.043
wife higher economic origin 0.011 ns 0.059 0.018 ns 0.060 0.019 ns 0.060
mean cultural status origin 0.262 *** 0.070 0.211 ** 0.076 0.203 ** 0.076
absolute cultural origin difference -0.078 ~ 0.046 -0.073 ns 0.048 -0.068 ns 0.048
wife higher cultural origin -0.056 ns 0.059 -0.051 ns 0.060 -0.051 ns 0.060
presence of child(ren) under 13 -0.389 *** 0.056 -0.364 *** 0.057
lack of support from environment (z) 0.204 *** 0.026
differences of opinion couple (z) 0.323 *** 0.026
constant (several) -6.348 *** 0.520 -5.808 *** 0.519
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98). N=37,399 records based on 2261 couples.
Note: ns p > 0.10; ~ 0.05 < p  0.10; * 0.01 < p  0.05; ** 0.001 < p  0.01; *** p  0.001. Church and ethnicity: deviation to
overall model contrast.
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Table 4.3b Event history analysis: divorce risk regressed on heterogamy – continued from Table 4.3a
model 3 (extended) 4 (explanation:
support)
5 (explanation:
opinion)
6 (explanation: both)
variables b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
duration at t 0.138 *** 0.011 0.143 *** 0.011 0.152 *** 0.011 0.154 *** 0.011
duration at t squared -0.004 *** 0.000 -0.004 *** 0.000 -0.004 *** 0.000 -0.005 *** 0.000
year-1943 0.123 *** 0.022 0.121 *** 0.022 0.096 *** 0.022 0.100 *** 0.022
year-1943 squared -0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001 * 0.000 -0.001 * 0.000
average age at marriage -0.043 *** 0.008 -0.036 *** 0.008 -0.034 *** 0.008 -0.031 *** 0.008
absolute age difference 0.039 *** 0.009 0.027 ** 0.009 0.033 *** 0.009 0.026 ** 0.009
wife older (at least by 1 year) -0.047 ns 0.056 0.014 ns 0.057 0.062 ns 0.057 0.088 ns 0.057
mean education (years) -0.005 ns 0.014 -0.015 ns 0.014 -0.006 ns 0.014 -0.011 ns 0.014
absolute educ. difference 0.014 ns 0.011 0.013 ns 0.011 0.009 ns 0.011 0.009 ns 0.011
wife higher education 0.159 * 0.066 0.093 ns 0.066 0.049 ns 0.067 0.025 ns 0.067
mean economic occ. status 0.051 ns 0.072 0.041 ns 0.072 0.066 ns 0.071 0.058 ns 0.072
abs. econ. status difference 0.007 ns 0.044 0.004 ns 0.044 -0.012 ns 0.044 -0.014 ns 0.044
wife higher economic status 0.085 ns 0.066 0.078 ns 0.066 0.089 ns 0.066 0.078 ns 0.066
mean cultural occ. status -0.048 ns 0.073 -0.012 ns 0.074 -0.055 ns 0.074 -0.031 ns 0.074
abs. cultural status difference -0.059 ns 0.051 -0.067 ns 0.051 -0.038 ns 0.051 -0.043 ns 0.051
wife higher cultural status -0.144 * 0.059 -0.148 * 0.059 -0.169 ** 0.059 -0.167 ** 0.059
church: none 0.199 *** 0.055 0.207 *** 0.055 0.209 *** 0.055 0.219 *** 0.055
church: none/Catholic 0.410 *** 0.077 0.368 *** 0.077 0.376 *** 0.077 0.352 *** 0.078
church: none/Protestant 0.117 ns 0.090 0.119 ns 0.090 0.115 ns 0.089 0.112 ns 0.090
church: Catholic -0.270 *** 0.062 -0.260 *** 0.062 -0.260 *** 0.062 -0.252 *** 0.062
church: Cath./Protestant 0.096 ns 0.130 0.033 ns 0.131 0.032 ns 0.130 -0.010 ns 0.131
church: Protestant -0.397 *** 0.089 -0.353 *** 0.089 -0.349 *** 0.089 -0.327 *** 0.089
church: other homogamous -0.694 *** 0.181 -0.621 *** 0.182 -0.619 *** 0.181 -0.581 ** 0.181
church: other mixed 0.539 *** 0.104 0.507 *** 0.104 0.496 *** 0.104 0.488 *** 0.104
ethnicity: Dutch -0.199 ** 0.074 -0.165 * 0.074 -0.166 * 0.074 -0.149 * 0.074
ethnicity: foreign 0.038 ns 0.113 0.109 ns 0.114 0.056 ns 0.112 0.107 ns 0.113
ethnicity: Dutch/foreign -0.052 ns 0.078 -0.072 ns 0.078 -0.073 ns 0.079 -0.082 ns 0.078
ethnicity: mixed foreign 0.213 ns 0.164 0.129 ns 0.164 0.184 ns 0.165 0.124 ns 0.164
mean economic status origin -0.154 * 0.069 -0.124 ~ 0.069 -0.143 * 0.069 -0.124 ~ 0.069
abs. econ. origin difference 0.141 *** 0.043 0.123 ** 0.043 0.125 ** 0.043 0.119 ** 0.043
wife higher economic origin 0.019 ns 0.060 0.016 ns 0.061 0.054 ns 0.060 0.043 ns 0.061
mean cultural status origin 0.203 ** 0.076 0.186 * 0.076 0.195 * 0.076 0.179 * 0.076
abs. cultural origin difference -0.068 ns 0.048 -0.063 ns 0.048 -0.080 ~ 0.048 -0.076 ns 0.048
wife higher cultural origin -0.051 ns 0.060 -0.040 ns 0.061 -0.074 ns 0.060 -0.064 ns 0.061
presence of child(ren) under 13 -0.364 *** 0.057 -0.362 *** 0.057 -0.406 *** 0.057 -0.396 *** 0.058
lack of support environment (z) 0.265 *** 0.025 0.168 *** 0.027
differences of opinion couple (z) 0.372 *** 0.026 0.325 *** 0.027
constant -5.808 *** 0.519 -5.852 *** 0.516 -5.521 *** 0.510 -5.663 *** 0.511
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98). N=37,399 records based on 2,261 couples, in explanatory models: 37,134
records based on 2,241 couples.
Note: see note Table 4.3a.
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I will begin by looking at the effects of characteristics of achievement through people’s own
merits and age. The younger the partners are when they start living together, married or not, the
higher the risk of divorce. Converting the parameter in the table to odds effects by computing the
inverse natural logarithm yields the value 0.96. This indicates that a one year increase of the
average age of husband and wife decreases the odds of divorce by about 4 percent. Note that this
refers to the odds, in any year during the marriage, of divorcing in that year. I can compute this
for a greater difference in age by multiplying the effect and then take the inverse natural
logarithm. So, the odds of divorce for a couple aged 28 years at the time of marriage are 0.96 times
the odds for a 27-year-old couple and only 0.67 times the odds for an 18-year-old couple.
The greater the age difference between husband and wife, the higher the divorce risk. The
increase of the odds is 4 percent for a one year difference. For a couple in which spouses differ 17
years and 3 months in age, the odds of divorce are double the odds for spouses of the same age.
This multiplication of the odds ratio is visualized in panel A of Appendix 4.1, in which all
significant effects of model 1 are shown. This is a clear heterogamy effect, which is symmetric. It
does not matter much which one of the two spouses is the oldest, since the asymmetry effect is
not significant. This is also supported by a curvilinear model with the average age of the spouses,
the age difference with a negative value when the wife is older (instead of the absolute age
difference), and that age difference squared. Alternative models are displayed in panel A of Table
4.4. In the curvilinear model, the linear parameter for the age difference is not significantly
different from zero and the quadratic parameter is positive, which, in a quadratic function,
indicates that the age difference with the lowest divorce rate is zero and that divorce rates go up
if age differences become larger in either direction. These findings are in accordance with the
heterogamy hypothesis, but they do not support the asymmetry hypothesis which expects that the
wife being older is worse for the survival chances of a marriage. However, if I model age
differences as a log ratio, also shown in panel A of Table 4.4, then the model parameters show
significant linear and quadratic effects. The lowest divorce rate is found if the husband is 14
percent older than the wife. This point of the lowest divorce risk can be computed by taking the
negative of the linear parameter divided by twice the quadratic parameter. This gives a natural
logarithm of the age ratio. This corresponds to an age ratio of 1.14, meaning the husband is 14
percent older at marriage.
Mean education does not have a significant effect. Neither does the absolute educational
difference, which contradicts the heterogamy hypothesis. Still, effects of educational heterogamy
can be found, but fully on account of the direction of the difference: in accordance with the
asymmetry hypothesis, divorce risks are higher if the wife is more highly educated than the
husband. In that case, the odds of divorce are multiplied by 1.21. This is visualized in panel B of
Appendix 4.1. Modelling this with a curvilinear model, as displayed in panel B of Table 4.4, shows
both the ‘normal’ heterogamy effect and the asymmetry effect. A U-shape relationship is shown
with divorce risks going up if differences in the level of education become larger. The point of the
lowest divorce risk is found when the husband has 3.4 more years of education.8 The fact that this
optimum goes in this direction is in accordance with the above finding that the divorce risk rises
if the wife has a higher level of education than her husband.
Occupational status is measured by economic and cultural status. Mean economic status
itself does not have any effect. Nor do the absolute differences between husband and wife in this
respect. This is in accordance with the specialization hypothesis based on Becker (1981), which
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predicts that the advantages of task specialization reduce the heterogamy effect or even turn it
around. There are effects of heterogamy in the asymmetric way: if the wife has a better economic
Table 4.4 Alternative separate models
a: age
model linear + direction parabolic age ratios
variables b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
average age at marriage -0.040*** 0.008 -0.041*** 0.008 -0.039*** 0.007
absolute age difference 0.040*** 0.009
wife older (at least by 1 year) -0.086ns 0.053
age difference (husband-wife) 0.007ns 0.006
age difference squared 0.003*** 0.001
age ratio (husband/wife) natural log -0.949*** 0.223
age ratio squared 3.686*** 0.591
constant -6.431*** 0.467 -6.345*** 0.469 -6.346*** 0.469
b: level of education
model linear + direction parabolic
variables b s.e. b s.e.
mean education (years) 0.012ns 0.010 0.014ns 0.010
absolute educational difference 0.006ns 0.011
wife higher education 0.187** 0.061
educational difference (husband-wife) -0.025*** 0.007
educational difference squared 0.004** 0.001
constant -7.528*** 0.441 -7.527*** 0.440
c: economic and cultural status
model linear + direction parabolic
variables b s.e. b s.e.
mean economic occupational status 0.097ns 0.070 0.088ns 0.071
absolute economic status difference -0.008ns 0.043
wife higher economic status 0.149* 0.064
economic occ. status difference (husband-wife) -0.067~ 0.039
economic occ. status difference squared 0.016ns 0.018
mean cultural occupational status -0.085ns 0.062 -0.069ns 0.062
absolute cultural status difference -0.067ns 0.049
wife higher cultural status -0.172** 0.057
cultural occ. status difference (husband-wife) 0.020ns 0.037
cultural occupational status difference squared -0.026ns 0.021
constant -7.241*** 0.432 -7.291*** 0.430
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Table 4.4 Alternative separate models, continued
d: economic and cultural status of origin
model linear + direction parabolic
variables b s.e. b s.e.
mean economic status origin -0.209** 0.067 -0.234*** 0.069
absolute economic origin difference 0.141*** 0.042
wife higher economic origin 0.011ns 0.059
economic origin difference (husband-wife) -0.005ns 0.029
economic origin difference squared 0.052*** 0.014
mean cultural status origin 0.262*** 0.070 0.307*** 0.071
absolute cultural origin difference -0.078~ 0.046
wife higher cultural origin -0.056ns 0.059
cultural origin difference (husband-wife) 0.028ns 0.033
cultural origin difference squared -0.042* 0.017
constant -7.291*** 0.432 -7.271*** 0.431
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98). N=37,399 records based on 2,261 couples.
Note: Duration at t, duration at t squared, year-1943, year-1943 squared are also taken into the models. The linear +
direction models are equivalent to models 1 in Table 4.3a. The separate models for church and ethnicity can be found in
Table 4.3a as well.
ns p > 0.10; ~ 0.05 < p  0.10; * 0.01 < p  0.05; ** 0.001 < p  0.01; *** p  0.001.
position than her husband, then the odds of divorce are relatively large, namely 16 percent larger.
A graphical representation is available in panel C of Appendix 4.1. This effect is in accordance with
the asymmetry hypothesis. A quadratic model, as displayed in panel C of Table 4.4, confirms these
findings, be it that the asymmetry has a significance level of between 5 and 10 percent.
Cultural status and differences in absolute cultural status do not have a significant effect
either. I expected that there would be some heterogamy effect with respect to cultural status, but
this was refuted: the specialization hypothesis also goes for differences in cultural status, instead of
the heterogamy hypothesis. Again, I found an asymmetry effect, but its direction is contrary to
expectation. If the wife has a higher cultural status than her husband, the odds of divorce are 16
percent lower. See also panel D in Appendix 4.1. A merely post-hoc explanation for this
counterintuitive finding could be found in sex specificity. Economic and cultural effects may be
seen as counterbalancing as a result of typical male or female jobs or work patterns. We take into
account that many typically female jobs, like secretaries, nurses and teachers, have a higher
cultural status than many typically male jobs in, for example, the building and transportation
sector. It is possible that marriages in which husband and wife have gender specific jobs comply
with the specialization model and, therefore, have greater marital stability. We have not explicitly
tested this supposition. Anyway, the negative asymmetry effect cannot be found in the quadratic
version as shown in panel C of Table 4.4. When a single dimension status scale was used, like a
scale of occupational prestige (Ultee & Sixma 1984), no effect was found either (not displayed).
Next, I looked at the influence of characteristics of ascription. The effects of church denomination
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of both spouses as shown in Table 4.3 were computed for dichotomous dummies with a contrast
to the overall model, the so-called deviation contrast. From the logic of that contrast, it follows
that the parameter value of each dummy is the negative sum of the parameters of all the other
dummies. Therefore, it is possible to show parameters for all of the categories without leaving out
a reference category.9 Looking at the effects of church denomination, we can, firstly, see that the
risk of divorce is lower for church members than for non-church members, because the effects of
all homogamous church member categories (Catholics, Protestants and others) are significantly
lower than the effect of non-church members. All denominations have significant negative
deviation effects, whereas the parameter for non-church members is significantly positive.
Protestants and the category of other homogamous couples have the lowest divorce risk, while the
Catholics are in between. This is as can be expected in the Netherlands in this period (Dumon &
Kooy 1983: 111; Becker & Vink 1994; also see Chapter 2).
Table 4.5 Effects and significance levels of religious heterogamy on the risk of divorce
model 1 (separate baseline) 2 (multivariate baseline) 3 (extended)
categories first
category
last
category
first
category
last
category
first
category
last
category
none/Catholic 0.2169
(0.0094)
0.7461
(0.0000)
** 0.2123
(0.0129)
0.6894
(0.0000)
* 0.2110
(0.0135)
0.6795
(0.0000)
*
none/Protestant -0.0970
(np)
0.6011
(0.0000)
np -0.0990
(np)
0.5346
(0.0000)
np -0.0819
(np)
0.5136
(0.0001)
np
Catholic/
Protestant
0.4662
(0.0019)
0.6351
(0.0001)
** 0.3491
(0.0225)
0.5055
(0.0028)
* 0.3658
(0.0170)
0.4928
(0.0036)
*
other mixed (see
note)
1.1658
(0.0000)
0.4411
(0.0001)
*** 1.3103
(0.0000)
0.3327
(0.0064)
** 1.2328
(0.0000)
0.3399
(0.0055)
**
model 4 (explanation: support) 5 (explanation: opinions) 6 (explanation: both)
categories first
category
last
category
first
category
last
category
first
category
last
category
none/Catholic 0.1604
(0.0612)
0.6273
(0.0000)
~ 0.1672
(0.0521)
0.6359
(0.0000)
~ 0.1329
(0.1238)
0.6032
(0.0000)
ns
none/Protestant -0.0883
(np)
0.4717
(0.0002)
np -0.0937
(np)
0.4639
(0.0003)
np -0.1066
(np)
0.4395
(0.0007)
np
Catholic/
Protestant
0.2924
(0.0574)
0.3856
(0.0235)
~ 0.2914
(0.0576)
0.3804
(0.0250)
~ 0.2416
(0.1184)
0.3173
(0.0638)
ns
other mixed
(see note)
1.1275
(0.0000)
0.2995
(0.0147)
* 1.1155
(0.0000)
0.2874
(0.0184)
* 1.0687
(0.0000)
0.2690
(0.0279)
*
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98).
Note: given are indicator contrast effects (significance levels between parentheses) of the category in question compared
to both homogamous categories of husband and wife (e.g. none/Catholic: none and Catholic); for ‘other mixed’, highest
and lowest effects are given, because four comparisons are possible. Symbols are given for the highest level of
significance (least significant effect): ns p > 0.10; ~ 0.05 < p  0.10; * 0.01 < p  0.05; ** 0.001 < p  0.01; *** p  0.001.
np: heterogamy effect not present (divorce risk is not higher than both reference categories). Significance of the presence
of a heterogamy effect depends on the highest significance level. Model numbers refer to the models in Table 4.3. N as in
Table 4.3.
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Differences in church denomination of the spouses lead to a higher divorce risk, as expected. As
discussed above, the parameters for religiously mixed couples must be compared to the parameter
of homogamous couples in the category of the husband and to the parameter of homogamous
couples in the category of the wife. The effects of both comparisons of each mixed combination
and the accompanying significance levels are given in Table 4.5. We can speak of a heterogamy
effect only if both these comparisons yield statistical significance.
The effects and significance levels for model 1 in Table 4.5 show that, except for the
combination of non-church members with Protestants, all other combinations show significant
heterogamy effects. This means that couples consisting of a non-church member and a Catholic, of
a Catholic and a Protestant, and unspecified mixed marriages have a higher risk of divorce than
can be expected from the divorce risks within the categories of husband and wife if no
heterogamy effect were present.
This indicates that the parameter of 0.399 for non-church member/Catholic mixed
marriages in model 1 of Table 4.3a is significantly higher than both the parameter of 0.182 for
homogamous non-church member marriages and the parameter of -0.348 of homogamous Catholic
marriages. Converting these parameters to odds ratios, this amounts to 49 percent higher odds of
divorce for non-church member/Catholic mixed marriages compared to the average marriage,
whereas the odds of divorce for homogamous non-church members are ‘only’ 20 percent higher
than the average marriage, and the odds of divorce for homogamous Catholics are even 29 percent
lower than for the average marriage. I can also convert the parameters in Table 4.5 into odds
ratios to see that the odds of divorce for non-church member/Catholic marriages are 24 percent
higher than the odds for homogamous non-church members – because exp (0.2169) = 1.24 – and
even 111 percent higher than homogamous Catholics – because exp (0.7461) = 2.11.
In the same way, the odds of divorce for mixed marriages consisting of a Catholic and a
Protestant are not, at 13 percent, significantly higher than for the average marriage. But this is
significantly higher than the odds for homogamous Catholics and the odds for homogamous
Protestants, which are 29 and 40 percent lower than for the average marriage, respectively. We
can quantify the difference again by computing the exponents of the effects in Table 4.5.
Catholic/Protestant mixed marriages appear to have divorce odds that are 59 percent above those
of homogamous Catholics and 89 percent above those of homogamous Protestants.
The category of other, unspecified mixed marriages has the highest odds of all categories:
86 percent higher than the average marriage, constituting a significant heterogamy effect. Only
non-church member/Protestant mixed marriages do not show a heterogamy effect. Even though
their odds of divorce are 82 percent higher than the odds of divorce for homogamous Protestants,
their odds of divorce are not significantly different from non-church members.
To visualize the results for the main groups, the odds of divorce of non-church members,
Catholics, Protestant and their combinations are graphically depicted in panel E of Appendix 4.1.
The odds ratios in this panel are standardized in such a way that value 1 represents the average
married couple. This means that, for instance, 1.25 implies a 25 percent higher odds of divorce
than the average marriage. Non-church member marriages are shown twice, so that all mixed
categories are next to the homogamous categories of husband and wife. The graph clearly shows
the presence of the heterogamy effect for non-church member/Catholic and Catholic/Protestant
marriages and the absence of the effect for non-church member/Protestant marriages.
Unfortunately, due to small numbers in the sample, I could not discern many categories of
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ethnicity. Again, deviation contrasts were used. Model 1 in Table 4.3a shows that homogamous
couples with a Dutch ethnic background have significantly lower divorce risks than average.
Mixed couples consisting of two foreigners have higher divorce risks than average, if we are
satisfied with a 10 percent significance level. This suggests some heterogamy effect, because
mixed ethnic foreigners have higher divorce risks than homogamous ethnic foreigners. It is
obvious, though, that Dutch/foreign mixed marriages, who have significantly higher divorce risks
than homogamous ethnic Dutch couples, do not significantly differ from homogamous ethnic
foreign couples. Only if this were the case could we speak of a heterogamy effect. I could not make
the proper comparisons within smaller categories due to small numbers. If I were able to make
those comparisons, it may well be possible that I would find certain mixed combinations of ethnic
Dutch and ethnic foreigners with a higher divorce risk than both the ethnic group of the husband
and the ethnic group of the wife (Van der Heijdt 1996; see Chapter 2 in the present study for an
approach using nationality).
Status of the fathers has an influence. If husband and wife, on the average, are from
economically better situated families, the divorce risk decreases. If they are from culturally higher
situated families, the divorce risk rises. This is a clear instance of differences between the
economic and cultural dimensions of status. The cultural elite, apparently, has more modern,
tolerant and individualistic norms, leading to an easy step towards divorce, whereas the economic
elite is more traditional and conservative in cultural matters, including marriage and divorce. This
is in line with Bourdieu’s (1979) concept of the difference between cultural and economic status.
Being mixed with respect to social origin also affects divorce risks with respect to the
economic dimension. Regardless of the direction of the difference, spouses have a higher chance to
end their marriage in divorce if the gap between the economic status of their fathers becomes
larger. A one point increase on the scale ranging from -1.40 to 2.43 (see Table 4.1) multiplies the
odds of divorce by 1.15. Graphically, this is shown in panel F of Appendix 4.1. This effect can also
be seen from the positive quadratic term in the quadratic model in panel D of Table 4.4. Cultural
differences of origin have a negative effect on divorce risk. Apparently, couples originating from
different cultural backgrounds have more stable marriages than couples with the same cultural
background. An increase by one point on the scale ranging from -1.40 to 2.57 (see Table 4.1)
decreases the odds of divorce by 7.5 percent. This downward line for the odds of divorce is visible
in panel G of Appendix 4.1. In the linear model 1 of Table 4.3a and in panel D of Table 4.4, this is
significant at a 10 percent level, whereas the significance level in the quadratic model is 5 percent.
As with own social status, these different directions of the heterogamy effect for the economic and
the cultural dimension may be ascribed to complementarity of both dimensions. When a single
dimension status scale was used, like the Ultee-Sixma scale of occupational prestige, then no effect
was found (not displayed).
4.5.2 Multivariate models of heterogamy effects on divorce
I continued my analyses by simultaneously estimating parameters of the models with a linear and
a directional term. This means that I combined the parameters as given in model 1 in Table 4.3a
(and in the left-side models in Table 4.4). These models are closest to the hypotheses that go into
absolute differences and asymmetric differences. The parameters of the multivariate baseline
model are shown in Table 4.3a as model 2. In this model, all types of heterogamy were entered in
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the analysis. The extended model 3 adds the presence of children under 13 years as a control
variable. This is quite standard, because the presence of children reduces the risk of divorce and
marriages ending in divorce may not last long enough to produce children. Only multivariate
baseline and extended models with absolute differences plus a directional variable are shown.
Taking all forms of heterogamy and possibly the presence of young children into account
changed the parameters somewhat, but not dramatically. The parameter for absolute age
differences is about the same size in models 2 and 3 as it was in model 1. The negative effect of
the wife being older than the husband, is still absent.
The effect that couples of whom the wife has the highest level of education have a higher
risk of ending in divorce becomes only a bit smaller in models 2 and 3, and it still has a 5 percent
significance level.
In the separate model, I found a significant asymmetry effect of economic status
differences indicating a higher divorce risk for couples with an economically better situated wife.
In the multivariate baseline model, where other characteristics like educational heterogamy are
controlled, this effect is no longer significant. The negative effect of a higher culturally positioned
wife is still present.
As to church denomination, effects go down only to a limited degree. We can still see that
church members have lower divorce rates than non-church members. Also the heterogamy effects
are still clearly present, as can be read from the effects and significance levels in models 2 and 3 in
Table 4.5.
The effects of ethnicity become a bit smaller in models 2 and 3 in Table 4.3a. The effect that
mixed couples with two foreign ethnicities have higher divorce risks than average, becomes
insignificant. The effect of homogamous Dutch couples having a lower divorce risk remains
present, still giving some unclear indication of a heterogamy effect.
Heterogamy with respect to social origin still has a positive effect on divorce risk in
multivariate baseline model 2 and extended model 3 when it comes to the economic dimension. If
husbands and wives come from different economic settings, the risk of divorce rises. The slight
effect which lowers the divorce risk if spouses are from different cultural origin is no longer
significant at a 10 percent level. The fact that children from economically better situated fathers,
on average, divorce less is still present, be it a bit weaker. The fact that children from culturally
better situated fathers divorce more on average, can still be found in the controlled baseline and
extended models as well.
The control variables duration and year of record have also clearly significant linear and
quadratic effects in models 2 and 3. The functions of both duration and year display a reverse U-
shape. Divorce is slowly rising over the course of marriage until about 15 to 20 years after
marriage, after which the risk of divorce slowly goes down again. Similarly, over the course of
time, divorce risks go up, but this rise comes to a standstill at the end of the period under
investigation. As can be expected, couples appear to delay divorce if children under the age of 13
are present, as can be seen in model 3. After converting this effect to odds ratio effects, the risk of
divorce appears to be 31 percent lower when the couple has one or more children. Above, it
became clear that, compared to model 2, the effects of heterogamy on divorce are persistent in
model 3 in which the presence of children is controlled. This is an indication that heterogamy has
an effect on divorce among couples with and without children. I will deal with this more
thoroughly in the following subsection.
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4.5.3 The presence of children
Not presented by model 3 or any other model here is the answer to the question whether the
presence of children brings about a higher effect of heterogamy on divorce as was suggested in
the theory section. Such a question implies the idea that heterogamy leads to divorce only or
especially when other causes give rise to problems or disputes, like the presence of children.
Methodologically, this implies the addition of interaction terms of the presence of children with
each heterogamy variable in model 3.
I accomplished this, but there is hardly any proof for the idea that the presence of a child
increases heterogamy effects. The interaction effect of the presence of a child and an economically
higher status wife, significant on a 10 percent level, is negative instead of positive. The effect of
the wife being in a culturally higher job status is positive, but this only diminishes the unexpected
negative main effect. Homogamous marriages in the category of ‘other’ denominations divorce
even less than they already do. This means that their difference with relatively small category of
‘other’ mixed marriages becomes larger. This hardly considerable fact is the only instance in
which the effect of heterogamy becomes really larger when children are present. The final
interaction effect which reaches statistical significance is that of the presence of children with
both spouses being ethnically foreign, but homogamous. The interaction effect is positive, which
may only imply that heterogamy effects, if present, decrease when the couple has children. All of
the other interaction parameters do not even come close to statistical significance. I may conclude
that the presence of children does not strengthen heterogamy effects, except maybe for mixed
marriages between spouses who are neither non-church members, Catholics nor Protestants.10
Another question which arises is whether heterogamous couples postpone childbirth or refrain
from having a child. Since the effects in model 3 do not differ much from model 2, I suspect there
is no such influence of heterogamy on having a child. To gain full insight into this, I estimated an
event history model regressing first childbirth on all variables in model 2. The result is presented
in Table 4.6.
There are not many significant effects in Table 4.6. No form of heterogamy has any effect
on childbirth. Even the significant effects of church affiliation, when compared to the appropriate
reference category (not presented) like above, do not constitute heterogamy effects. The
significant effects of church affiliation only indicate that church members have a higher
probability of having their first child at any moment after marriage than non-church members.
This can be seen best by comparing the odds of having a child for all homogamous categories to
the average marriage. These odds can be computed from the parameters in the model. Among
non-church members, the odds of first childbirth are 18 percent lower than for the average couple.
Homogamous Catholics have an average score. Among Protestants, the odds of a child being born
are 35 percent higher in the event history analysis. Miscellaneous categories score even 51 percent
above average.
The other significant effects in Table 4.6 indicate that the probability of the first child to be
born increases from the start of the marriage until 5 years after marriage (which can be computed
by taking minus the linear effect divided by twice the quadratic effect of duration). Then the
probability decreases again. Across historical time, the probability decreases. This indicates that,
across the years, people have been increasingly postponing the birth of their first child. The higher
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Table 4.6 Event history analysis: getting first child regressed on heterogamy and other characteristics
variables b s.e.
duration at t 0.310 *** 0.026
duration at t squared -0.031 *** 0.003
year-1943 -0.046 *** 0.012
year-1943 squared 0.000 ns 0.000
average age at marriage -0.004 ns 0.008
absolute age difference 0.003 ns 0.010
wife older (at least by 1 year) -0.005 ns 0.061
mean education (years) -0.054 *** 0.015
absolute educational difference -0.006 ns 0.012
wife higher education 0.041 ns 0.072
mean economic occupational status -0.077 ns 0.078
absolute economic status difference 0.051 ns 0.047
wife higher economic status -0.064 ns 0.070
mean cultural occupational status 0.057 ns 0.079
absolute cultural status difference 0.057 ns 0.054
wife higher cultural status 0.147 * 0.063
church: none -0.194 *** 0.059
church: none/Catholic -0.288 *** 0.088
church: none/Protestant 0.008 ns 0.096
church: Catholic -0.004 ns 0.063
church: Catholic/Protestant -0.051 ns 0.145
church: Protestant 0.301 *** 0.086
church: other homogamous 0.412 * 0.171
church: other mixed -0.184 ns 0.121
ethnicity: Dutch -0.019 ns 0.087
ethnicity: foreign 0.240 ~ 0.123
ethnicity: Dutch/foreign 0.122 ns 0.093
ethnicity: mixed foreign -0.343 ~ 0.208
mean economic status origin -0.021 ns 0.075
absolute economic origin difference 0.029 ns 0.047
wife higher economic origin -0.075 ns 0.064
mean cultural status origin -0.064 ns 0.084
absolute cultural origin difference -0.025 ns 0.053
wife higher cultural origin -0.014 ns 0.064
constant -0.044 ns 0.337
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98).
Note: ns p > 0.10; ~ 0.05 < p  0.10; * 0.01 < p  0.05; ** 0.001 < p  0.01; *** p  0.001. N=17,592 records. Church and
ethnicity: deviation to overall model contrast.
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the average level of education of the spouses, the longer they postpone the birth of their first
child. Finally, if the wife has a higher cultural status than her husband, the probability of
childbirth is increased. I do not have a clear explanation for the latter effect, but it might be that
these people deviate strongly from the traditional division of labour or that they are more likely to
use day care facilities for their children.
4.6 Results: explaining heterogamy effects
The next step in the analysis is to explain the relationship between heterogamy and divorce by
lack of support for the marriage by the social environment and differences of opinion between the
spouses. Before looking at those models, however, I address the question whether the heterogamy
characteristics have a positive effect on the extent of lack of support and of differences of opinion.
For, if lack of support and differences of opinion are to form an interpretation of the relationship
between heterogamy and divorce, then heterogamy has to have an effect on the lack of support
from the social environment and the differences of opinion between spouses. As indicated in the
method section, I used OLS regression for this.
4.6.1 Effects of heterogamy on the explanatory variables
The results of the OLS regression models for lack of support by the social environment and
differences of opinion between the spouses are presented in Table 4.7. I found significant effects
indeed. Couples who marry young experience less support from their social environment and
more differences of opinion between themselves. Apparently, parents and the social network have
their doubts when a couple decided to marry young. Also, the partners themselves are, on
average, less mature and they may not know each other well enough, resulting in more
disagreements. The effects show that couples who differ in age are less supported by their
environments and experience more discord between each other, as could be expected. The wife
being older softens this effect, contrary to what could be expected, but because of the positive
effects of the absolute age differences, lack of support and differences of opinion are still possible
explanations of the relationship between age heterogamy and divorce.
Educational differences and the wife having a higher education leads to more lack of
support from the social environment and – with respect to the effect of a more highly educated
wife – to more differences of opinion between the spouses. Both lack of support and differences of
opinion can be considered possible explanations for the relationship between the asymmetric
heterogamy effect which I found concerning the level of education on the divorce risk.
Heterogamy with respect to social status, both economically and culturally, does not have
any significant effects on lack of support for the marriage or differences of opinion between the
spouses. This means that there can be no explanation of the effect of status heterogamy on
divorce by lack of support from the social environment or by discord between the spouses.
Without describing the relationship in great detail, it can be seen that religious
heterogamy also promotes lack of support for the marriage by the social environment. A
significant negative effect on lack of support can be found for homogamous Protestant couples, as
well as significant positive effects for several mixed combinations. This does not go for mixed non-
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Table 4.7 OLS regression on the cross-sectional data of lack of support from the environment and
differences of opinion between spouses on the predictors in the event history model
model lack of support differences of opinion
variables b s.e. b s.e.
year of marriage-1943 -0.060* 0.023 0.050* 0.023
year of marriage squared 0.000** 0.000 -0.000ns 0.000
average age at marriage -0.026*** 0.006 -0.020*** 0.006
absolute age difference 0.035*** 0.007 0.018* 0.007
wife older (at least by 1 year) -0.204*** 0.046 -0.300*** 0.045
mean education (years) 0.017ns 0.011 -0.008ns 0.011
absolute educational difference 0.021* 0.009 0.008ns 0.009
wife higher education 0.155** 0.054 0.306*** 0.053
mean economic occ. status -0.013ns 0.057 -0.004ns 0.057
abs. economic status difference -0.000ns 0.036 0.024ns 0.035
wife higher economic status 0.059ns 0.053 0.007ns 0.052
mean cultural occupational status -0.065ns 0.059 0.011ns 0.058
absolute cultural status difference 0.050ns 0.041 -0.032ns 0.041
wife higher cultural status 0.008ns 0.048 0.023ns 0.047
church: none reference reference
church: none/Catholic 0.166* 0.073 0.101ns 0.031
church: none/Protestant 0.104ns 0.085 0.069ns 0.083
church: Catholic -0.053ns 0.054 -0.067ns 0.053
church: Catholic/Protestant 0.257* 0.128 0.123ns 0.125
church: Protestant -0.194* 0.076 -0.124~ 0.075
church: other homogamous -0.235ns 0.150 -0.303* 0.149
church: other mixed 0.130ns 0.103 0.141ns 0.102
ethnicity: Dutch reference reference
ethnicity: foreign -0.159ns 0.110 0.073ns 0.110
ethnicity: Dutch/foreign 0.141** 0.055 0.064ns 0.054
ethnicity: mixed foreign 0.026ns 0.180 0.016ns 0.182
mean economic status origin -0.084ns 0.055 -0.020ns 0.054
abs. economic origin difference 0.020ns 0.034 0.067* 0.034
wife higher economic origin 0.021ns 0.049 -0.031ns 0.049
mean cultural status origin 0.041ns 0.062 0.044ns 0.061
absolute cultural origin difference 0.036ns 0.040 -0.014ns 0.039
wife higher cultural origin -0.020ns 0.050 -0.005ns 0.049
constant 2.196* 0.875 -1.771* 0.866
R2 (adjusted R2) 0.061 (0.048) 0.084 (0.072)
N 2254 2248
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98).
Note: ns p > 0.10; ~ 0.05 < p  0.10; * 0.01 < p  0.05; ** 0.001 < p  0.01; *** p  0.001. Church, ethnicity: indicator contr.
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church member/Protestant marriages, but, as discussed above, this combination did not show
heterogamy effects to be explained, anyway. With respect to differences of opinion between
husband and wife, I can throw doubt on effects of religious heterogamy: there are hardly any
significant effects. Therefore, lack of support is a possible explanation for the relationship
between religious heterogamy and divorce, whereas differences of opinion are not.
For ethnic differences, I did not find significant effects on differences of opinion, but I did
on lack of support by the social environment. Dutch/foreign mixed marriages are significantly
more disapproved of by their environment than homogamous Dutch and foreign couples. So, lack
of support is a possible explanation for the relationship between ethnic heterogamy and divorce.
With respect to heterogamy of social origin, there is only one significant effect, namely of
economic status of origin on differences of opinion. So only spousal differences of opinion may be
an explanation for the relationship between heterogamy with respect to economic status of origin
and the risk of divorce.
In these models, the marriage cohort was also controlled by including the year of the
marriage and its square. Lack of support from the environment decreases, but this decrease slows
down. This can be seen from the fact that the relationship between the year of marriage and lack
of support describes a U-shaped relationship, in which the minimum will not be reached during
the period under investigation.11 Apparently, social environments in the Netherlands are
becoming more accepting and supportive towards marriages in general, controlling for all forms
of heterogamy. The quadratic parameter is not significant for the statistical relationship between
year of marriage and differences of opinion. The linear term is positive. This indicates that,
controlling for all forms of heterogamy, differences of opinion are increasing over time between
marriage partners in the Netherlands.
4.6.2 Heterogamy effects explained?
Now, I can turn to the logistic regression models 4 to 6 in order to see to what extent heterogamy
effects on the divorce risk are explained by lack of support for the marriage by the social
environment and by differences of opinion between the marriage partners. The parameters of
explanatory models 4 to 6 are shown in Table 4.3b. The parameters of model 3 are repeated from
Table 4.3a in order facilitate comparison. In model 4, lack of support from the social environment
was added as an explanatory variable; in model 5, differences of opinion between the spouses
were added; in model 6, both explanatory variables were added together. We can see that both
lack of support from the social environment of the choice of the marriage partner and differences
of opinion between the spouses increase divorce risks considerably. The effect of differences of
opinion is about twice as large as the effect of lack of support.
Having a higher divorce risk after marrying young is likely to arise partly from having more
differences of opinion within the marriage or experiencing more lack of support from the
environment. The effect decreases somewhat, especially if both explanatory variables are added to
the model. I set out, though, to explain heterogamy effects. The effect of age heterogamy
decreases when adding the explanatory variables. When comparing models 3, 4, 5 and 6, it
becomes clear that lack of support, in particular, is partially responsible for the relationship
between age differences and the risk of divorce. A way of presenting the level of explanation is by
indicating the percentage of the relationship which is explained. In the extended model, the effect
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of absolute age difference is 0.039. In model 4, adding lack of support by the environment, this is
reduced to 0.027, a reduction of 31 percent. The reduction by adding differences of opinion is 15
percent and the total reduction by adding both is 33 percent. These percentages of explained
relationships are printed in Table 4.8. This table also shows the effects as found in the extended
model in Table 4.3 and indicates which hypotheses are corroborated.
The asymmetry effect of educational differences is explained by both lack of support from
the environment and differences of opinion within the married couple. The extended model 3
shows that couples in which the wife has a higher education than her husband have a higher
divorce risk. This effect is no longer significant after controlling for either lack of support or
differences of opinion or both. Also the percentages of the relationship explained, shown in Table
4.8, indicate that both lack of support and differences of opinion diminish this asymmetry effect
by 42 percent and 69 percent, respectively, and by 84 percent in total.
The unexpected negative effect of couples in which the wife has the highest cultural job
status cannot be explained by lack of support and differences of opinion: after controlling, the
effects are at least as large as before and status differences do not have an effect on either lack of
support or differences of opinion, as indicated above. The positive asymmetry effect of economic
heterogamy on the divorce risk in model 1 was already explained by controlling the other types of
heterogamy in model 2.
The effects on divorce found for being religiously mixed are reduced by differences of
opinion and lack of support for the marriage to a large extent. This can be seen in Table 4.5. In
model 4 and 5, the heterogamy effects of having a mixed non-church member/Catholic marriage or
a Catholic/Protestant marriage are no longer significant at a five percent level after controlling for
differences of opinion within the marriage or lack of support for the marriage by the social
environment, respectively. Controlling both in model 6 even makes the significance level rise
above 10 percent.12 Only the diverse category of otherwise mixed couples remain with a
significantly higher divorce risk than any homogamous category. Both lack of support from the
environment and spousal discords seem to be highly responsible for the fact that non-church
member/Catholic marriages and Catholic/Protestant marriages have higher divorce risks. Both
explanatory variables reduce the effect to an almost equal degree. This can also be concluded by
looking at the explained percentages in Table 4.8. These are computed as follows. I computed the
minimal percentage by which the probability of divorce for a mixed category (compared to
average) exceeds the probability of divorce in both the category of the husband and the category
of the wife (compared to average). Next, I computed how much of this percentage was explained
by adding the explanatory variables. The exceeding divorce risk for non-church members married
to Catholics decreases by 25 percent when lack of support by the environment is controlled, by 22
percent when differences of opinion are controlled and by 38 percent when both are controlled, as
can be seen in Table 4.8. The heterogamy effect of Catholic/Protestant mixed marriages decreases
to about the same extent, namely by 22, 22 and 37 percent, respectively. The reduction of the
heterogamy effect of other mixed marriages is 13 percent by lack of support, 17 percent by
differences of opinion and 22 percent by both simultaneously. However, with respect to religious
heterogamy, I can only speak of an explanation of the heterogamy effect by lack of support. Before,
I demonstrated that religious heterogamy has no effect on differences of opinion (Table 4.7).
The only significant effect among the discerned ethnic categories, the negative effect of
homogamous Dutch couples on divorce risk, is reduced by lack of support and differences of
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Table 4.8 Presence of heterogamy and asymmetry effects and percentages of relationship explained
model predictions 3 (extended) 4 (support) 5 (opinion) 6 (both)
variables
hypothesis:
direction
effect, hypothesis
corroborated
%
explained
%
explained
%
explained
absolute age
difference
heterogamy: +,
specialization: 0 + heterogamy 31 15 33
wife older (at least
by 1 year) asymmetry: + 0 (none)
absolute educ.
difference
heterogamy: +,
specialization: 0 0 specialization
wife higher
education asymmetry: + + asymmetry 42 69 84
absolute economic
status difference specialization: 0 0 specialization
wife higher
economic status asymmetry: + 0 (none)
absolute cultural
status difference
heterogamy: +,
specialization: 0 0 specialization
wife higher cultural
status asymmetry: + - (none)
church:
none/Catholic heterogamy: + + heterogamy 25 22* 38
church:
none/Protestant heterogamy: + 0 (none)
church:
Cath./Protestant heterogamy: + + heterogamy 22 22* 37
church: other
mixed heterogamy: + + heterogamy 13 17* 22
absolute economic
origin difference heterogamy: + + heterogamy 13* 11 16
wife higher
economic origin (no asymmetry: 0) 0 no asymmetry
absolute cultural
origin difference heterogamy: + 0 (none)
wife higher cultural
origin (no asymmetry: 0) 0 no asymmetry
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98).
Note: Third column indicates which hypothesis is corroborated; (none) indicates that none is corroborated. Reduction
marked with an * does not constitute an explanation because the type of heterogamy in question does not have an effect
on the explanatory variable in question. N=37,399 records based on 2,261 couples, in explanatory models: 37,134
records based on 2,241 couples. Explained percentages for heterogamous categories of church affiliation are computed
as follows. The minimal increase in probability of divorce compared to the relevant reference category of homogamous
marriages (as explained in the method section) is computed. The ratio of this increase for the explanatory models
compared to this increase in model 3 is given as percentage of the relationship that is explained.
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opinion to about the same extent, but remains significant. This does not clearly constitute an
example of explanation of heterogamy by lack of support or differences of opinion, but it is an
indication of a possible explanation. Since there were no significant effects of ethnic heterogamy
on differences of opinion, the explanation would be on account of lack of support for the marriage
by the social environment. It is not possible, though, to make the correct comparisons to compute
the percentage of the relationship explained.
The positive effect of heterogamy with respect to economic origin, as well as the mean
cultural status of both fathers, does diminish very slightly if lack of support from the environment
or differences of opinion between husbands and wives are controlled. Since absolute economic
origin differences only have a significant effect on differences of opinion, as indicated above, there
may only be a little explanation of the absolute economic origin difference effect by differences of
opinion, but this is negligible. Expressed as percentage of the relationship explained, this amounts
to 11 percent explanation by differences of opinion.
Apparently, lack of support from the social environment for the choice of the spouse and
differences of opinion between the spouses do form a partial and sometimes substantial
explanation for the higher divorce risks for mixed marriage couples. This does not apply to the
asymmetry effect of economic status differences of the spouses, since that effect was caused by
other forms of heterogamy, like being mixed with respect to level of education. For ethnicity there
are only indications of heterogamy effects and explanations because I do not have enough cases to
make the proper comparisons. In sum, this means that the explanatory conflict hypothesis and the
explanatory support hypothesis are supported in several instances but not overall.
I tried to specify these explanatory hypotheses with the ascription explanation hypothesis
and the achievement explanation hypothesis. This is supported to a limited degree. Based on these
hypotheses, I expected lack of support – and not differences of opinion – to be responsible for a
part of the effects of religious and ethnic heterogamy and absolute economic and cultural status
origin differences. In fact, religious heterogamy effects were reduced by both explanatory
variables to about the same extent but were only really explained partly by lack of support, since
religious heterogamy affects lack of support, but does not affect differences of opinion (Table 4.7).
The little explanation of absolute economic origin difference can only go through differences of
opinion, since this type of heterogamy does not have an effect on lack of support by the
environment (Table 4.7).
Furthermore, I expected differences of opinion – and not lack of support – to be responsible
for a part of the effects of absolute educational differences and own economic and cultural social
status heterogamy; but those effects were absent, in accordance with the specialization hypothesis.
Finally, asymmetry effects – the wife being older or in a better educational or social status
position than her husband – were expected to be explained by both lack of support and
differences of opinion. This is correct, but there is only one asymmetry effect to be explained,
being that of a wife with a higher education than her husband. This effect is explained almost
completely by both lack of support and differences of opinion, and by both to a high degree. So,
this distinction between ascription and achievement on one’s own merits can be made when it
comes to explaining heterogamy effects, but not very clearly.
We have to bear in mind that real path models are hard to establish when using logistic
regression. With dichotomous dependent variables, like divorce risk, we are dependent on logistic
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models. Testing explanatory models by adding variables is difficult in logistic models and such
tests are more conservative than desired, because effects decline less easily when controlling
other variables (Long 1997).
4.7 Conclusion and discussion
In this chapter, I tested hypotheses about the effects of heterogamy at the beginning of the
marriage on divorce and the explanation of the effects. First, this adds to research on heterogamy
in the Netherlands. Does the fact that people prefer to marry someone who is socially alike imply
that people who choose not to do so have less stable marriages? Secondly, by doing this research, I
have filled a lack of multivariate testing of heterogamy effects on divorce worldwide. And thirdly, I
have supplemented previous research by assessing the explanation of the effects.
The first question of this chapter was whether heterogamy leads to divorce. I hypothesized that
the answer would be yes when it comes to heterogamy with respect to ascription characteristics
of religious denomination, ethnic background and social origin (that is: the social status of the
fathers of the spouses) and also to some degree with respect to age and level of education. This
was tested by applying event history models to the SIN98 data file. These effects are indeed
present when there is no mutual control for different forms of heterogamy. For educational
differences, it is only present if the wife is better educated than her husband. The effects of ethnic
heterogamy are only provisional, because I could not make every comparison due to a lack of
sufficient different mixed and homogamous categories for several ethnicities. Chapter 2 provided
us with strong, though also provisional, indications that differences in nationality go together
with higher divorce risks.
In extended multivariate models, taking all of the forms of heterogamy into account, we
could see whether the effects of all of the forms of heterogamy discerned are persistent. Although
the strength of some effects decreased somewhat, most effects which were present remained
clearly present. Overall, I can say that many heterogamy effects were found: mixed couples
generally have a higher divorce risk than homogamous couples. This confirms findings in Chapter
2, where heterogamy with respect to age, religion and nationality was positively associated with
the risk of divorce.
Becker’s (1981) theory predicts stability in the case of task specialization if the husband
earns the money and the wife takes care of the housework. This brings about economic status
differences between husband and wife. In my specialization hypothesis based on Becker, therefore, I
predicted the absence of the heterogamy effect or even a negative effect of status heterogamy on
divorce. The fact that the effect is indeed absent confirms the expectations.
An extra hypothesis, based on advantages of task specialization and acceptance by the
social environment, was formulated to answer the first question. It predicted that there would be
an asymmetry effect for heterogamy of age, level of education and social status. This prediction
implies that divorce risks are increased by a wife who is older, has a higher education or a higher
social status compared to her husband. I did not find this asymmetric effect for age, but I did find
it for educational differences and own economic occupational status. The economic status
asymmetry effect disappears when other forms of heterogamy are controlled for. Note that in
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Chapter 2, that were indications that an asymmetric effect for age was present. The absence of
this effect here cannot only be attributed to the use of different data and the different time span,
but also to different control variables and the fact that in Chapter 2, we were limited to an
analysis of the risk of divorce after specific periods of time in marriage.
An additional finding from my analyses showed that heterogamy does not influence
childbirth. The probability of having the first child and the timing of that event are not affected by
any of the types of heterogamy under investigation in this chapter, except maybe for religiously
mixed couples in which at least one of the spouses is neither a non-church member, nor a
Catholic, nor a Protestant.
The second question was to be answered by the explanatory conflict and support hypotheses. This
question asked for an explanation of heterogamy effects and the hypotheses stated that
heterogamy leads to a raise of the divorce risk because the spouses have more differences of
opinion and their relationship is less approved of by their social environment. Several forms of
heterogamy in my analyses indeed appeared to have effects on differences of opinion and even
more on lack of support for the choice of the marriage spouse by the social environment. The
effects of differences of opinion and lack of support on divorce are also clearly present. The answer
to the explanatory question is that some explanation is indeed given by differences of opinion and
social disapproval. When taking them into account, the effects of age heterogamy, most of
religious heterogamy, maybe ethnic heterogamy and the effect of a wife being more highly
educated than her husband lose significance or become smaller. The effect of differences in
economic social origin on divorce is related to differences of opinion and lack of support only to a
limited extent and not always causally. The effect of the spouses’ own economic status
heterogamy was already explained by other forms of heterogamy.
The distinction between ascription and achievement on one’s own merits can be made
when it comes to explaining heterogamy effects, but not very clearly. This means that the
explanation, if present, of characteristics related to ascription is more often accounted for by a
lack of support by the social environment, whilst the explanation, where present, of
characteristics related to achievement on one’s own merits, is more often accounted for by
differences of opinion between spouses. This was predicted by the ascription explanation hypothesis
and the achievement explanation hypothesis.
Something caught my eye when making the distinction between ascription and
achievement. Even though a wife being better educated than her husband has a positive effect on
the divorce risk, it is striking that inherited characteristics of ascription, such as religion, have
such large effects on the risk of divorce. Also, status and differences in status play a more
important role with respect to the divorce risk when measured from parental characteristics than
when measured from the characteristics of the spouses themselves. Apparently, characteristics of
ascription are still important when it comes to the stability of a marriage.
I may conclude that certain forms of heterogamy do indeed lead to a higher divorce risk and that
this is partly caused by the fact that the spouses disagree on certain subjects, on the one hand,
and by lack of emotional support from family, friends and others, on the other hand. Future
research may look for other explanations for the relationship between heterogamy and divorce or
may try to find extended measurements.
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1. A shortened and adapted version of this chapter was published in Dutch in Mens & Maatschappij, 75 (4),
pages 298-319. Co-author of that article was Paul M. de Graaf (Janssen & De Graaf 2000). Several earlier versions
of this paper were presented at the 4th ESA Conference of Sociology ‘Will Europe Work?’ Amsterdam, The
Netherlands, 18-21 August 1999; at the Annual Conference of the British Sociological Association, York, United
Kingdom, 17-20 April 2000; at the Sociaal-Wetenschappelijke Studiedagen, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 3 May
2000; at the Conference at the 50th anniversary of RC28, ISA Research Committee on Social Stratification,
Libourne, France, 11-14 May 2000.
2. If a certain group is very isolated, but becomes more integrated, then this process of integration and the
resulting emancipation can be considered as growing openness towards this group. See for example the Jewish
population in Europe before the second world war (Ultee & Luijkx 1996, 1998).
3. We will not go into the process of how conflict leads to a higher risk of divorce. The risk of divorce is raised
if the ratio of positive versus negative affect between spouses goes too far in the direction of negative affect
(Gottman 1994). It is sufficient here to note that more conflict implies more negative affect and less positive
affect which leads to higher divorce risks.
4. De facto, I also looked at relationships of people cohabiting without being married which also occur in the
sample by chance in any of the three sub-samples mentioned. Note that persons who cohabit for the first time
are missing. In the municipalities they are in the marital status category of the never married and, therefore,
were not sampled.
5. Of course, taking childbirth at any time during marriage as a time constant variable is also incorrect, since
marriage duration affects childbirth during marriage (e.g. Yamaguchi 1991: 26).
6. The combination of ‘other’ mixed couples has to be compared to all homogamous combinations and,
therefore, has four comparisons and significance levels. For in this category one of the spouses may be a
member of any discerned denomination.
Besides this, cohort or period comparisons can be made to detect trends in the importance
of different forms of heterogamy as to the probability of getting divorced. This is also important in
order to find trends with respect to the relative importance of characteristics of ascription
compared to characteristics of achievement. I found a strong relative importance of inherited
characteristics. Trends may shed more light on this issue.
Furthermore, in a next step, analyses should be even more dynamic than the ones in this
study. Status differences and church denomination have been measured at one point in time, but
they can change during marriage. Marriage partners can grow towards each other or they can
grow apart. This will yield a more complete image of the effects of heterogamy on divorce.
Especially with respect to testing Becker’s theory, it is important to have measurements across the
marriage course, since differences in status due to differences in investment in human capital as a
result of the division of labour come about to a large extent during marriage. So, if marriages are
followed through time, as in my present analyses, changes of the characteristics should be taken
into account. Also, changes in the effects over the course of marriage and over time were not
investigated in this chapter. These more dynamic analyses will be conducted in the next chapter.
Notes
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7. The presence of children was not included in that analysis, since using it makes no sense in a non-time-
dependent model: it is unknown whether divorce is influenced by the children or whether the couple had
children because they did not divorce.
8. This was computed on one more digit than given in Table 4.4.
9. In practice, using SPSS, one reference category has to be assigned to let the algorithm run. To obtain the
correct parameter value and standard deviation of the omitted category, the model can be recomputed with
another reference category.
10. Apart from a theoretical motive to investigate these interaction effects of heterogamy and the presence of
children, there is also relevance to the study of changes over the course of marriage. The presence of children
indicate a certain stage in marriage. Hence, the interaction effects of heterogamy and the presence of children
on the risk of divorce will be studied more dynamically in the next chapter on trends and changes over the
course of marriage.
11. Computing the year with minimal lack of support on as many digits as possible amounts to the year 1943
+ 70 = 2013.
12. Significance levels are used here instead of effect sizes, because so many different comparisons of
categories have to be made to establish the size of the religious heterogamy effect. Obviously, significance
levels depend on the sizes of both the effects and the standard errors. The rise of the significance levels here
can be attributed fully to changes in effects. As can be seen in Table 4.3b, the standard errors are completely
stable across models.
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Appendix 4.1 Graphical representation of the significant heterogamy and asymmetry effects in model 1 in
Table 4.3a: multiplications of odds ratios (y-axis) against heterogamy characteristics (x-
axis) - part 1: achievement
a: absolute age difference (y=1 if age difference=0)
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
2.25
2.50
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
b: wife higher educated (y=1 if no)
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
no yes
c: wife higher economic status (y=1 if no)
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
no yes
d: wife higher cultural status (y=1 if no)
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
no yes
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Appendix 4.1 Continued: Graphical representation of the significant heterogamy and asymmetry effects in
model 1 in Table 4.3a: multiplications of odds ratios (y-axis) against heterogamy
characteristics (x-axis) - part 2: ascription
e: church denomination (heterogamous categories
depicted amidst the homogamous categories of
husband and wife; y=1 denotes the average
marriage)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
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none none/
Cath.
Cath. Cath./
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Prot.
none
f: absolute economic origin difference (y=1 if
difference=0)
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g: absolute cultural origin difference (y=1 if
difference=0)
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5 Changing effects of heterogamy on the risk of divorce?
A dynamic analysis of SIN98 over the life course and over cohorts.1
I
n this chapter, I have furthered the analyses in the previous chapter by using more dynamics and
by looking into trends and changes, both over the course of marriage and over historical time. The
same data set was applied, namely SIN98, a survey among married, divorced and remarried persons
in the Netherlands. Over the course of marriage, status differences appear to increase slightly, whilst
religious heterogamy clearly occurs less often. Over historical time in the second half of the 20th century,
economic status differences between spouses have declined, whilst differences in educational level and
cultural status have seen periods of rise and fall, and inherited characteristics like religion and ethnicity
show rising levels of heterogamy. Despite these trends, the effects of heterogamy which I found in the
previous chapter hardly change over the course of marriage or over historical time. There is, however, one
clear directional effect of religious changes during marriage: if initially homogamous couples grow apart
with respect to religion, their divorce risk rises.
5.1 Introduction and research questions
In the previous chapter, I showed the influence of 6 types of heterogamy on the risk of divorce.
Positive effects of heterogamy on divorce were found for age differences, a wife being better
educated than her husband, church affiliation and economic status differences of parental origin.
Some of the effects were explained in part by lack of support from the social environment and
conflict between spouses.
In the previous chapter, all marriage years and durations were taken together. Even
though time and duration were controlled in the models, those models assumed that heterogamy
was constant across the marriage and that the effects of heterogamy were constant over time and
over the course of marriage. In Chapter 3, I already stressed the fact that effects of heterogamy on
divorce over the course of marriage is not necessarily constant. Secondly, I emphasized that
during the period under investigation, changes have taken place in society which may have
altered the effect of heterogamy on divorce across time. Therefore, the discrete time event history
models of the previous chapter have now been extended. I will continue to examine heterogamy
with respect to age, level of education, social status of the spouses (both economically and
culturally), church affiliation, ethnicity and social origin. Social origin is defined as the social
status of the fathers (both economically and culturally). In this chapter, I will set out to determine
trends in time and changes over the course of marriage.
I have derived the following research questions from the above. Firstly, there is a question
about changes over the course of marriage which contains three sub-questions. The second
question concerns trends over time.
1a. Are heterogamy effects on divorce different if heterogamy is measured dynamically over the course of
marriage?
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1b. Does adaptation, in the sense of growing towards each other, lead to a decreasing divorce risk and
alienation, in the sense of growing apart, to an increasing divorce risk?
1c. Do heterogamy effects increase or decrease during marriage?
2. Can any trends be discerned over the course of time with respect to the effects of heterogamy on
divorce?
In the next section, the theoretical framework of Chapter 3 will be extended to cover the several
forms of heterogamy now under investigation. This constitutes a provisional answer to the
research questions. These answers will then be empirically tested by extending upon the analyses
of Chapter 4 using data of SIN98. After that, I will discuss the results in the concluding section.
5.2 Theory and possible answers
In this section, I will develop hypotheses on changes during marriage in the influence of
heterogamy on divorce and hypotheses on trends over time with respect to the effects of
heterogamy on divorce.
5.2.1 Changes over the course of marriage
In Chapter 3, I derived some hypotheses about the effects of heterogamy on divorce from the
theory of growing acceptance and that of accumulated irritations (Manting 1993, 1994; Trussell,
Rodriguez & Vaughan 1992). These theories were originally formulated with respect to general
patterns of divorce risk over the course of marriage. I reasoned that they are logically even more
suitable for my research problem of the effect of heterogamy on divorce. In Chapter 4, I predicted
and demonstrated that the effects of heterogamy on divorce partly come about by the fact that
mixed couples cannot get along very well. They have different preferences and expectations in life.
Besides, the social environment of parents, friends and others will be less accepting, and hence,
less supportive of the marriage of a mixed couple.
Surviving marriages, even the heterogamous ones, have proved that they can handle their
situation. Thus, the hypothesis of growing acceptance predicts that the positive effects of
heterogamy on divorce will decline during marriage. The hypothesis of accumulated irritations,
however, predicts that spouses will get more and more fed up with their differences, resulting in
an increase of the effects of heterogamy on divorce over the course of marriage. An additional
hypothesis predicts an inverse U-shape pattern in which the effects of heterogamy on divorce first
increase and then decline.
Findings in Chapter 3 are in accordance with a pattern of growing acceptance, involving
declining effects, to a small extent. The pattern was not very clear. We have to bear in mind that
in Chapter 3, the analysis was limited to age and two inherited characteristics of ascription,
namely religion and nationality. Besides, the life course perspective was limited and it was not
possible to do full marriage course analyses due to practical limitations. Now I can build on this by
following couples over their whole course of marriage with information on six types of
heterogamy using the SIN98 data set.
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Besides these methodological advances, I will also elaborate on Chapter 3 in a theoretical
way. For this, I will return to the distinction between inherited characteristics of ascription and
meritocratic characteristics of achievement used in the previous chapters. The hypothesis of
growing acceptance will be used as a starting point. We can expect both that the spouses
themselves will become more accepting of each other and that the social environment will become
more accepting of the marriage. However, even though they do not always succeed, it is
reasonable to expect that the couples themselves will put more effort into accepting each other
than their social environment will – after all, it is their marriage.
From this, I can predict that the effect of heterogamy regarding characteristics of
ascription – church affiliation, ethnicity and social origin – on divorce will decrease to a limited
extent over the course of marriage. Apart from heterogamy effects of absolute differences, I also
discerned asymmetry effects in the previous chapter. These are effects of the direction in which
the difference goes, namely whether the risk of divorce is raised by a wife who is older, more
highly educated or in a better status position than her husband. Asymmetry effects are more
connected to acceptance, as discussed in Chapter 4. Therefore, the same expectation of a slight
decrease of the effect over the course of marriage can be made for asymmetry effects. I call all this
the ascription and asymmetry part of the growing acceptance hypothesis over the marriage course.
Characteristics of achievement are more connected to the spouses themselves than to their
social environment. That is why I expect an even more pronounced decrease over the course of
marriage of the effects of heterogamy concerning level of education, spousal social status and age
on the risk of divorce. This is the achievement part of the growing acceptance hypothesis over the
marriage course.
Changes over the course of marriage do not need to be linear with regard to marriage
duration in years. Marriages will go through different stages of the family cycle. The presence of
children in the family can be seen as a clear distinguishing period in this cycle. As I had already
found in the previous chapter, the presence of children under 13 years of age lowers the risk of
divorce. The presence of children, therefore, can also be expected to dim the effects of differences
between the spouses.2 Hence, the above hypotheses concerning changes over the course of
marriage can also be formulated in terms of changes over the family cycle: effects of heterogamy
can be expected to decrease during the stage in which children are present in a marriage.
For a correct test of all these hypotheses, I took changes of heterogamy into account for so
far as they were available in the data. This means that I could also make predictions about
changing heterogamy within marriages and the probability of divorce. I will test the growing
together-growing apart hypothesis which postulates that married couples who adapt to each other
by growing towards each other have lower divorce risks, whereas couples who become alienated
from one another by growing apart have higher divorce risks.
5.2.2 Changes over historical time
In Chapter 3, two types of changes were referred to with respect to changes in society over time.
The first type of change concerns the trend towards individualization and secularization and the
accompanying shift in norms and values (SCP 1994). The second type of change, which is related to
the first, is one towards a society in which positions are less often acquired by characteristics
ascribed by social origin and increasingly by characteristics achieved on one’s own merits (Blau &
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Duncan 1967). The latter change has been taken to account for rising or stable levels of
educational homogamy alongside declining levels of homogamy regarding social origin (Forsé &
Chauvel 1995, Uunk 1996). I will now apply it to the influence of heterogamy on divorce risks.
Both of the changes mentioned – individualization and secularization, and meritocrati-
zation – would lead one to predict the same for changes in the effects of heterogamy on the risk of
divorce over time. The changes suggest that characteristics of social origin, characteristics
inherited from the parents, have become less important, whereas personal characteristics of the
spouses themselves which are not directly inherited from the parents have become more
important. I will use the same distinction between ascription and achievement as already made in
the previous chapters. Thus, I predict that the effect of differences between husband and wife
regarding characteristics of ascription, namely religion, ethnicity and social origin, on the risk of
divorce is decreasing and the effect of differences between husband and wife regarding age and
characteristics of achievement, namely level of education and spousal social status, on the risk of
divorce is increasing. These are the ascription part and the achievement part of the trend hypothesis.
5.3 Data and description of changes
5.3.1 Data set
I used the same data for this chapter as in Chapter 4. In this way, I extended the analyses by
including changes over the course of marriage and changes over historical time. Information
about SIN98 (Kalmijn, De Graaf & Uunk 1999) as used here can be found in the previous chapter.
The operationalization of heterogamy in Chapter 4 was extended with dynamic variables
for the analyses discussed in this chapter. This means that for characteristics of heterogamy for
which I knew changes over the course of marriage, I included variables indicating the level of this
type of heterogamy in each year during marriage instead of on the wedding day. The variables for
which I could do this are: the age ratio, social status and religion.3 Ethnicity and social origin
cannot change, since they are measured as being the ethnic origin of the parents and social status
of the fathers of the spouses and were asked about in general without specific point in time. The
level of education can change, but it does not often do so during marriage. In this case, I have the
problem that changes are only known for one spouse. Level of education, ethnicity and social
origin, therefore, remained static in the analyses.
By using dynamic information on whether the husband and the wife are working during
marriage, I was able to test hypotheses derived from Becker with regard to the division of labour
more directly. Static information as used in the previous static chapter is not suitable for this
direct test, because in many couples both spouses work until marriage, but this does not
necessarily stay that way during marriage. Many wives, especially those married before the 1970s,
stopped working when they got married. The dynamic information whether no, one or two
spouses are working in a payed job (and which one) was used alongside and instead of status
information. Dynamic information on labour histories, including social status histories, is
restricted in the sense that full information is only available for the primary respondent. For the
spouse, I only have information at the moment of marriage or cohabitation and after five years. I
used the former as a proxy for the labour force situation in the first five years and the latter as a
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proxy for the time from five years after marriage until the end of the observation.
5.3.2 Description of changes over the course of marriage
Since I now have dynamic information for some aspects of heterogamy, I can answer the question:
what does the distribution of those types look like across the course of marriage? I have displayed
Figure 5.1 Changes in the level of heterogamy over the course of marriage, unweighted (solid lines)
and weighted (dashed lines)
a: age ratio
b: economic status difference
c: cultural status difference
d: proportion heterogamy church affiliation
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Figure 5.2 Changes in the level of heterogamy over the course of marriage broken down by marriage
cohort, unweighted
a: age ratio
b: economic status difference
c: cultural status difference
d: proportion heterogamy church affiliation
the level of heterogamy over the course of marriage with respect to age, economic and cultural
status and church affiliation for all marriages in the file together. The distinction between
economic and cultural status was made in the previous chapter for theoretical reasons.
In Figure 5.1, the solid lines display unweighted levels of heterogamy, whereas the dashed
lines represent numbers on which the same weight factor is applied as in the previous chapter.
This weight factor restores the proportion of characteristics in the population aged between 30
and 75 years old, from which the sample was taken. In the first place, the weight corrects the
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proportions of persons who are in their first marriages, of persons who are divorced and now
without a partner, and of persons who are divorced and remarried. Furthermore, the division of
region, degree of urbanization, sex and age group corresponds to the division for the population
between 30 and 75 years of age after applying the weight factor. The comparison of the solid and
dashed lines in Figure 5.1 shows that some differences in the level of heterogamy, like a lower
proportion of church heterogamy, occur after applying the weight factor. Altogether, the
differences are not systematic and the general pattern is quite similar before and after applying
the weight factor.
I also have to take into account the fact that I have relatively longer observations for older
marriages, which are composed of older people. In other words, I can correct for marriage cohort
to get a better image. That is why Figure 5.2 displays the changes in the level of heterogamy over
the course of marriage for marriage cohorts in the 1940s and 1950s, the 1960s, the 1970s and the
1980s separately. For each marriage cohort, levels of heterogamy are given for durations for which
I can follow all marriages in that specific cohort. In Figure 5.2, only non-weighted figures are
displayed for reasons of clarity. Except for cultural status difference, the graphs look quite similar
after controlling cohort.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are to be considered as mainly descriptive for first marriages of the
1998 population of 30 to 75 year old married, divorced and remarried persons. They clearly show
how the levels of heterogamy in all marriages develop on average over the course of marriage. It is
to be kept in mind that several factors play a role in the changes displayed in the figures. Both
adaptation and alienation of spouses as well as drop out as a result of different divorce risks affect
the patterns in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. To establish the effect of changes in heterogamy, I refer to the
analyses which will follow later in this chapter.
The changes of the age ratio are displayed in panel A of Figure 5.1. Age ratio is used here,
because it can change over the course of marriage, whereas absolute age differences stay the
same. The use of the age ratio assumes that equal absolute differences are more important for
divorce risks at lower ages, because those difference are then proportionally larger. Panel A shows
that the age ratio drops over the course of marriage. This is natural, since the absolute age
differences between spouses remain the same over the course of marriage, but they constitute a
relatively smaller difference if age increases. For example, a 20 year old wife is only 80 percent as
old as her husband aged 25. When the wife turns 45, the husband will reach the age of 50. Then,
the wife’s age is 90 percent of the age of her husband. Panel A in Figure 5.1 shows that, at the
start of the marriage, the husband is about 12 percent older than his wife, on average. This level
slowly drops. Controlling for cohort in Figure 5.2 leads to the same results per cohort.
Social status differences generally increase during marriage. Panels B and C show the level
of status heterogamy on the economic and the cultural scale, respectively. The patterns are similar
for unweighted and weighted data. During the first 25 years of a marriage, status differences go
up. This is more clear for cultural differences than for economic differences, because cultural
status differences between husband and wife are smaller to begin with, on average. This is due to
the fact that there are relatively more couples in which the wife has a higher cultural status than
there are couples in which the wife has a higher economic status compared to her husband, as we
have seen in Table 4.1 in the previous chapter. After 25 years, the economic status heterogamy
stays at a constant level, whereas cultural status heterogamy drops somewhat.
After controlling for cohort in Figure 5.2, the results with respect to economic status
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heterogamy are quite similar with the exception of the 1960s. Marriages solemnized in the 1960s
display a slight initial rise in the level of economic status differences between husband and wife.
This is reversed already after about 15 years of marriage. After about 25 years, the level of
heterogamy rises again. The results for cultural status differences are quite different after
controlling for cohort in Figure 5.2. The rise in heterogamy followed by a decline occurred at
different points in the marriage course for the several cohorts. For the 1960s, the decline is
followed by a second wave of increase of differences in the third decade of the marriage. The short
observation period of the 1980s displays little negative differences, which implies that, on
average, marriages in the 1980s are composed of couples in which the wives have a slightly higher
cultural status than their husbands.
The proportion of mixed couples with respect to church heterogamy drops over the course
of marriage. Panel D in Figure 5.1 shows that the percentage of religiously mixed couples drops
from about 27 at the beginning of the marriage to about 8 after 40 years. This drop goes from 18
to 6 percent for the weighted figures. The changes over the course of marriage look the same for
the marriage cohorts separately, as can be seen in Figure 5.2.
Closer inspection teaches us that the proportion of couples who are homogamous church
members is increasing, while the proportions of non-church members and mixed couples are
decreasing over the course of marriage. This can be seen in Appendices 5.1 and 5.2 for unweighted
and weighted data, respectively. Of course, these changes are related both to a change in the
composition, which is related to different divorce risks for types of homogamous and
heterogamous couples, and to the fact that I have relatively longer observations for older
marriages, which are composed of more church members and less non-church members. What the
exact effect of changing heterogamy is on divorce can only be answered with multivariate event
history analysis. This applies to all types of heterogamy here.
5.3.3 Description of changes over time
To illustrate changes over time, I will look at how heterogamy changes over historical time. Since
heterogamy changes over the course of marriage, as shown above, it is necessary to look at cohort
differences at one specific duration. Hence, I selected the level of heterogamy at the start of the
marriage. In this way, changes over time and changes over the course of marriage do not become
confused. In fact, this comes down to displaying heterogamy at the start of marriage for different
marriage cohorts. The panels in Figure 5.3 display the levels of heterogamy between 1950 and
1995. Because of small numbers in the data file, I left out the marriage cohorts 1943-1949 and
1996-1998 in these depictions. Furthermore, I present the levels of differences between husbands
and wives as a moving average of 5 years: the cohort in question itself and the four preceding
cohorts.
In panels A to D of Figure 5.3, the trend is shown for age and the meritocratic
characteristics of achievement. We can see that the age ratio shows fluctuations without any clear
systematic pattern, even though the weighted figure suggests that the age ratio went down in the
beginning and mid 1950s, stayed low for a while and rose again in the 1970s.
The trend of educational differences is roughly the opposite. At first the differences
increased until about 1960 (unweighted) or 1970 (weighted). After that, a decrease in educational
differences can be seen, with a break in the trend in the 1980s. The decrease of educational
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differences may firstly be attributed to the rising importance of choosing a spouse with a similar
level of education. Secondly, the initial rise of differences followed by a decline may be attributed
to initial increasing and subsequent decreasing differences between male and female levels of
education in society caused by the fact that educational expansion took place earlier for men than
for women (cf. Smeenk 1998).
Figure 5.3 Changes in the level of heterogamy over time (marriage years), unweighted (solid lines)
and weighted (dashed lines), five year moving averages
a: age ratio
b: number of years more education of husband
c: economic status difference
d: cultural status differences
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Figure 5.3 Changes in the level of heterogamy over time (marriage years), continued
e: proportion heterogamy church affiliation
f: proportion heterogamy ethnicity
g: economic origin differences
h: cultural origin differences
A similar trend can be found for the economic dimension of social status, another meritocratic
characteristic. Panel C in Figure 5.2 shows that differences between husband and wife decreased
particularly in the 1970s. The downward movement of cultural status differences in the 1970s,
however, is one in which a higher average cultural status of husbands was replaced by a higher
cultural status of wives: the figure goes from positive to negative, as can be seen in Panel D of
Figure 5.3. This is preceded and followed by an opposite trend in the 1950s and the 1990s.
Next, we take a look at the inherited characteristics of ascription in panels E to H of Figure
5.3. If characteristics like religion and ethnicity become less important as a selection criterion,
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then I would expect an increase in mixed marriage (cf. Hendrickx 1994). Indeed, according to this
expectation, the differences between husband and wife with respect to church affiliation and
ethnicity have increased. The proportion of couples who are religiously mixed at the start of
marriage increased from somewhere between 0.2 and 0.3 in the 1950s to scores above 0.35 or 0.4
around 1990, depending on whether the weight factor is applied or not. The increase in the
percentage of ethnically mixed marriages is even a little larger and more recent: this trend only
started in the mid 1980s.
The trends on unweighted and weighted data with respect to the sizes of all discerned
categories can be seen in Appendices 5.3 and 5.4 for church affiliation and in Appendices 5.5 and
5.6 for ethnicity. With respect to church affiliation, we can see an increase in the size of mixed
groups and a decrease in the size of homogamous groups across marriage cohorts. In the 1990s,
however, the group of non-church members again became smaller, whereas the group of ‘other
mixed marriages’ increased in number. This coincides with the increase in ethnically mixed
marriages between persons with Dutch and non-Dutch roots, as indicated by the appendices.4
The trend of social origin, displayed in panels G and H of Figure 5.3, is less clear. Both the
economic and the cultural dimension of differences regarding social origin show ups and downs
without any recognizable pattern.
5.4 Method and results
In this section, I will demonstrate the models and the parameters of the analyses in order to test
the hypotheses. The research questions to be answered by the analyses are the questions about
changing effects of heterogamy on divorce during marriage (research question 1) and the question
about changing effects over historical time (research question 2).
5.4.1 Models to answer the questions
The research question concerning changes over the course of marriage contains three sub-
questions. The first one is whether dynamic observations give a better, or at least a different,
image of the impact of heterogamy on divorce. To answer it, I estimated parameters of a model in
which characteristics of spouses can change during marriage. I had information on different
points in time for age ratio, social status and religion. By using this information, I extended on the
discrete time event history analysis models in Chapter 4. The resulting model is this chapter’s
model 1. The equation of the regression is similar as the one given in Chapter 4; the difference is
that some variables were measured continuously.
Another extension which could be made to the models in Chapter 4 is the addition of the
direction of changes for these characteristics. For example, heterogamy can increase or decrease
and a better position of the wife compared to her husband can come about or disappear. The
model in which this was incorporated is called model 2. The equation pertaining to this model
extends on the equation shown in the previous chapter by adding some variables indicating the
direction of change, namely for a growing or decreasing level of heterogamy with respect to status
and religion. With this model, I will answer the second sub-question in research question 1 for
social status and religion. This sub-question is about the effect of growing closer (adaptation) or
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growing apart (alienation), on divorce.
The third sub-question can be answered for all types of heterogamy under research,
whether measured (quasi) continuously or at one moment in time. This question is concerned with
whether heterogamy effects increase or decline over the course of marriage. The test of this
implies that the logistic regression event history models are extended with interaction terms
between the duration of marriage and types of heterogamy. This was done in model 3. Besides, I
tried out an alternative model in which the phase of marriage or the family cycle was taken into
account rather than simply the duration of the marriage. This means that the interaction terms
between duration and heterogamy were replaced by interaction terms of the presence of children
under 13 years of age and heterogamy. This is model 4. Again, the regression equation extends on
the one in Chapter 4. The extension in this model 4 is the addition of interaction terms between
duration and heterogamy.
The second research question is concerned with changes over time. To test the hypotheses on this,
I added interaction terms of historical time – which is: the year of each record in the file – and the
six types of heterogamy. In this way, we can see whether and in which direction the effects of the
several types of heterogamy changed over historical time. This is model 5. The addition to the
regression equation of Chapter 4 is similar to the one in model 4, but with interaction terms
between historical time (instead of duration) and heterogamy characteristics.
5.4.2 Extending to a time varying model
As mentioned above, I firstly extended on the previous chapter by making variables time varying.
In the models in Chapter 4, only duration, year and the presence of children were time varying. In
this chapter’s analyses, social status heterogamy, both economically and culturally, and
heterogamy concerning church affiliation were measured as time varying. Besides, age differences
were time varying by replacing the age differences by age ratios between husband and wife. These
extensions and changes were made on model 3 in Table 4.3 in the previous chapter. The new
model is presented as this chapter’s model 1 in Table 5.1.
The parameters of model 1 in Table 5.1 are quite similar to those of model 3 in Table 4.3.
Age differences, however, have been replaced by age ratio and age ratio squared, at time t. The
quadratic parameter is positive, which indicates a parabolic relationship with a minimum. So,
divorce risks rise if age differences between husband and wife go up in either direction of the
minimal divorce risk. Since the linear parameter is negative, couples with a slightly older husband
have the lowest divorce risk. The ‘optimal’ age ratio with the lowest risk of divorce is found by
subtracting 1 from the exponent of minus the linear parameter divided by twice the quadratic
parameter. This yields a husband who is 8 percent older than his wife. Taking the age ratio at the
beginning of marriage and not controlling for other types of heterogamy, this optimal situation is
found for a husband who is 14 percent older than his wife, as was found in the previous chapter.
As mentioned before, I cannot use education and educational differences between spouses
as time varying variables. That is why they are entered into the model as measured at the
beginning of the marriage, as in model 3 of Table 4.3. It cannot be any surprise that the results are
similar here: absolute educational differences do not affect the risk of divorce, but the risk of
divorce increases when the wife has attained a higher level of education than her husband.
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Table 5.1 Event history analysis: divorce risk regressed on several types of heterogamy and other
characteristics at marriage or at time t and effects of changes during marriage
model model 1 model 2 main effects model 2 directional
variables b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
duration at t 0.177*** 0.013 0.137*** 0.011
duration at t squared -0.004*** 0.000 -0.004*** 0.000
year-1943  0.117*** 0.022 0.114*** 0.022
year-1943 squared -0.001** 0.000 -0.001** 0.000
average age# -0.037*** 0.008 -0.042*** 0.008
age ratio (natural logarithm)# -0.729** 0.280 -0.624** 0.225
age ratio squared# 4.581*** 0.923 3.228*** 0.615
mean education (years) -0.006ns 0.014 -0.005ns 0.014
absolute educ. difference 0.011ns 0.011 0.012ns 0.011
wife higher education 0.177** 0.064 0.181** 0.064
mean economic occ. status# -0.027ns 0.069 0.061ns 0.072
abs. econ. status difference# 0.022ns 0.041 0.007ns 0.047 0.011ns 0.049
wife higher economic status# 0.088ns 0.066 0.111ns 0.075 0.035ns 0.079
mean cultural occ. status# -0.025ns 0.071 -0.051ns 0.073
abs. cultural status difference# -0.082~ 0.049 -0.086ns 0.055 -0.078ns 0.062
wife higher cultural status# -0.160** 0.059 -0.193** 0.066 -0.085ns 0.074
church: none# 0.238*** 0.054 0.179** 0.055 0.449*** 0.083
church: none/Catholic# 0.516*** 0.076 0.494*** 0.078
church: none/Protestant# 0.248** 0.087 0.235** 0.091
church: Catholic# -0.317*** 0.066 -0.305*** 0.063
church: Cath./Protestant# 0.040ns 0.156 0.133ns 0.130
church: Protestant# -0.672*** 0.111 -0.480*** 0.091
church: other homogamous# -0.529** 0.169 -0.859*** 0.183
church: other mixed# 0.475*** 0.094 0.602*** 0.105
ethnicity: Dutch -0.197** 0.071 -0.180* 0.073
ethnicity: foreign -0.016ns 0.109 0.058ns 0.111
ethnicity: Dutch/foreign -0.010ns 0.077 -0.025ns 0.077
ethnicity: mixed foreign 0.223ns 0.158 0.147ns 0.161
mean economic status origin -0.136* 0.068 -0.147* 0.069
abs. economic origin difference 0.138** 0.042 0.140*** 0.042
wife higher economic origin 0.024ns 0.060 0.028ns 0.060
mean cultural status origin 0.199** 0.076 0.176* 0.077
abs. cultural origin difference -0.075ns 0.048 -0.065ns 0.048
wife higher cultural origin -0.054ns 0.060 -0.043ns 0.060
presence of child(ren) under 13 -0.364*** 0.057 -0.355*** 0.057
constant -5.850*** 0.509 -5.597*** 0.512
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98). N=37,399 records based on 2,261 couples.
Note: # indicates variable measured at time t in model 1, while in model 2 (except for ageing), the first column contains
effects of characteristics at the time of marriage, the second one effects of the direction of changes during marriage
(positive: towards heterogamy; negative: towards homogamy).  denotes that figure is the effect of religiously growing
towards each other (-1) or growing apart in the direction of more heterogamy (+1). See Table 5.3 for more variants. ns p >
0.10; ~ 0.05 < p  0.10; * 0.01 < p  0.05; ** 0.001 < p  0.01; *** p  0.001. Church, ethnicity: deviation contrast.
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In the previous chapter, I concluded that differences in economic status between spouses have no
direct effect on divorce. Using the present model, I could check whether a more dynamic
measurement would change my previous conclusions. However, it does not: the effects of
economic occupational status and economic occupational status differences do not become
significant when information on jobs of husbands and wives during marriage is used. Dynamics
cannot explain the unexpected findings with respect to cultural status differences either. The wife
having a higher cultural status still negatively affects the risk of divorce. Even the negative
parameter for absolute cultural status differences appears to have a questionable 10 percent
significance in this model.
It was hypothesized in this chapter and in the previous one that economic status
differences would not be very damaging to marital stability. According to Becker’s theory, the
traditional division of labour, which can expected to bring about status differences between
husband and wife due to their differing levels of investment in human capital, is expected to be a
stabilizing component. This, of course, is a very indirect derivation from Becker’s theory. It would
be better to directly examine whether husband and wife are participating in the work force. In the
previous chapter, this was difficult to accomplish because in many couples both husband and wife
participated in the labour force until the year of marriage. Using this information in our data set
would not tell us anything about whether they continued to do so or not. In this chapter’s
analyses, however, when using dynamics, I could use information about labour force participation
during marriage.
Using dynamic information on labour force participation of both spouses instead of or in
addition to economic and cultural status scales hardly alters the other parameters. Labour force
participation itself shows interesting results. I added this information to model 1 in Table 5.1. The
traditional situation in which the husband is the sole breadwinner is taken as a reference
category. If both spouses are out of the labour force for any reason, then the risk of divorce is not
significantly different (effect of -0.079, standard error 0.083). If, at any time during marriage, the
wife is working instead or if both spouses are working, the risk of divorce is significantly higher at
that moment. The effects are 0.193 (standard error 0.086) and 0.228 (standard error 0.061),
respectively. The latter two effects are close together. They appear not to differ significantly from
each other, which I tested in a model with both spouses working as a reference category. This
shows that when the wife is working, either as a sole breadwinner or in a double income
situation, the risk of divorce is higher. In terms of Becker we can say that when a couple deviates
from the traditional division of labour, then the risk of divorce is higher.
The effects of religious heterogamy have to be interpreted in the same way as in the
previous chapter. The correct comparisons are presented in Table 5.2. There, I list the effects and
significance levels of religious heterogamy computed by using models with different indicator
contrasts. This table is similar to Table 4.5 in the previous chapter. The results of model 3 in Table
4.5 are repeated in Table 5.2.
As explained in the previous chapters, an effect has to be larger than both references to
constitute a heterogamy effect. Therefore, the presence and strength of the heterogamy effect is
indicated by the smallest effect with the highest significance level. With the highest significance
level, I mean the highest figure, or in other words, the least significant effect. For non-church
members married to Catholics, for example, the relevant effect is 0.2110 (which is in comparison
to non-church members) with a significance level of 0.0135 in the previous chapter’s model. For
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the new model, the effect is 0.2779 with a significance level of 0.0008. Comparing the new and the
old estimates, we can see that for non-church member/Catholic mixed marriages, the effect is
somewhat larger when time varying information on church heterogamy is used. For non-church
member/Protestant mixed marriages, the effect remains insignificant. For Catholic/Protestant and
miscellaneous mixed marriages, the effects decrease slightly or are almost constant when
heterogamy is measured on the basis of time varying information instead of information at the
beginning of the marriage. Overall, the image is not really different from the previous chapter.
When the effect increases, I would advocate the use of religion as a time varying variable in order
to obtain a better measurement. A decrease of the effect means that the measurement at the
beginning of the marriage is better and that adaptation during marriage in most instances may be
halfhearted or a practical solution, leading to disagreements in the end. It is obvious that I cannot
test this post-hoc statement with my data.
Table 5.2 Effects and significance levels of religious heterogamy on the risk of divorce
model one moment:
Table 4.5, model 3
time varying:
Table 5.1, model 1
categories first category last category first category last category
none/Catholic 0.2110
(0.0135)
0.6795
(0.0000)
* 0.2779
(0.0008)
0.8330
(0.0000)
***
none/Protestant -0.0819
(np)
0.5136
(0.0001)
np 0.0096
(0.9199)
0.9202
(0.0000)
ns
Catholic/Protestant 0.3658
(0.0170)
0.4928
(0.0036)
* 0.3571
(0.0521)
0.7125
(0.0007)
~
other mixed (see note) 1.2328
(0.0000)
0.3399
(0.0055)
** 1.1477
(0.0000)
0.2371
(0.0291)
*
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98). N=37,399 records based on 2,261 couples.
Note: given are indicator contrast effects (significance levels between parentheses) of the category in question compared
to both homogamous categories of husband and wife (e.g. none/Catholic: none and Catholic); for ‘other mixed’, highest
and lowest effects are given, because four comparisons are possible. Symbols are given for the highest level of
significance (least significant effect): ns p > 0.10; ~ 0.05 < p  0.10; * 0.01 < p  0.05; ** 0.001 < p  0.01; *** p  0.001.
np: heterogamy effect not present (divorce risk is not higher than both reference categories). Significance of the presence
of a heterogamy effect depends on the highest significance level.
The remaining variables in model 1 of Table 5.1 are measured at the beginning of marriage only,
as in model 3 of Table 4.3 in the previous chapter. It will be no surprise that their effects are
similar. With respect to ethnicity, the only significant effect is the lower divorce risk for
homogamous Dutch ethnic couples. As already found in the previous chapter, persons with
parents in an economically better position divorce less than persons with parents in an
economically worse situation, while cultural status of origin is positively related to the risk of
divorce. Economic origin differences between husband and wife enlarge the risk of divorce.
Cultural origin differences do not have a significant effect.
The final effect, of the presence of children up to 12 years old, is negative. Equal to the
finding in the previous chapter, divorce risks are lower if the couple has one or more children.
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We have now seen that differences between time varying and time constant models are not very
large with respect to effects of heterogamy on divorce. I will continue and test the hypotheses
which answer the second and third part of the research question concerning changes over the
course of marriage.
5.4.3 Growing closer or growing apart
We have already seen in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 that on average, heterogamy with respect to church
affiliation, a characteristic of ascription, decreases over the course of marriage. Economic and
cultural status differences, meritocratic characteristics, increase during a considerable period of
marriage. Of course, individual couples can go in any direction. The question now is whether
couples who grow closer and couples who grow apart have different risks of divorce. This is one of
the specific research questions in this chapter. I tackled this by using another parametrization.
Instead of using time varying variables, I used the situation at the beginning of marriage and
added variables indicating whether differences between spouses increase or decrease during
marriage. The expectation is that increasing differences lead to more divorce and decreasing
differences to less divorce. For the age ratio, the trend over the course of marriage is very obvious:
a certain absolute age difference – which is constant over the course of marriage – will always
decrease over the course of marriage, because ages increase and the same difference will be a
smaller proportion of the age of the couple. Therefore, this way of parametrization was only used
for the other characteristics on which I had more time points of measurement: own social status,
both economically and culturally, and church affiliation.
The model with parameters for spouses growing closer and growing apart is given as
model 2 in Table 5.1. The first column referring to model 2 contains the main effects, the column
on the right gives the directional effects of growing closer or growing apart. For variables without
directional effects or without significant directional effects, the main effects are similar to those in
model 3 of Table 4.3 in the previous chapter and those in model 1 of Table 5.1 in this chapter.
Changes in the social status distance between the spouses during marriage appear not to
matter at all: whether economic or cultural status differences between husbands and wives grow
or diminish does not have a significant effect on the risk of getting a divorce. The same goes for
the asymmetry effects: whether the wife attains a higher status than her husband during
marriage or the other way around does not have a significant effect on the divorce risk.
The only significant directional effect in the model is found for church affiliation. It matters
whether spouses adapt to each other or not with respect to religion. Controlling for the situation
at the beginning of the marriage, the parameter has a positive effect. No changes during marriage
are indicated by 0, growing closer – that is: towards homogamy – by minus 1 and growing apart –
that is: towards heterogamy – by plus 1. Thus, the positive directional effect found here indicates
that couples who become heterogamous during marriage increase their risk of divorce, whereas
couples who adapt diminish their risk of divorce.
The question arises whether this effect is mainly caused by couples growing apart or
couples growing towards each other. That is why I decided to use two parameters. The reference
category, again, is no change during marriage. One parameter indicates a change towards each
other, to homogamy, another parameter indicates a change away from each other, to heterogamy.
This model is indicated as model b in Table 5.3. Now, it becomes obvious that growing together
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does not matter much, since the risk of divorce is not significantly lower when spouses grow
towards each other during marriage. The divorce risk is raised clearly and significantly, though, if
one of the spouses turns away from the other one after homogamy, letting heterogamy arise.
Table 5.3 Event history analysis: effects of different measurements of changes in religious
heterogamy during marriage
model model 2 directional
operationalization of changes in religious heterogamy b s.e.
a: one parameter (1: towards heterogamy; -1: towards homogamy;
0: unchanged, reference), see Table 5.1
0.449*** 0.083
b: two parameters: reference: no change
b: towards homogamy -0.167ns 0.117
b: towards heterogamy 0.681*** 0.106
c: four parameters: reference: no change
c: towards homogamy, non-church members -0.106ns 0.127
c: towards homogamy, church members -0.409ns 0.252
c: towards heterogamy, changer leaves church 0.672*** 0.127
c: towards heterogamy, changer becomes/stays church member 0.693*** 0.180
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98). N=37,399 records based on 2,261 couples.
Note: Model a is presented in Table 5.1; models b and c are alternative measurements. The same variables as in model 2
in Table 5.1 are taken into the models. ns p > 0.10; ~ 0.05 < p  0.10; * 0.01 < p  0.05; ** 0.001 < p  0.01; *** p  0.001.
I even went somewhat deeper into this to investigate whether it matters in which direction
spouses move towards each other or away from each other. This is shown in model c in Table 5.3,
containing 4 parameters. Again, the non-changers are the reference category. For the couples who
were initially heterogamous, but adapted towards homogamy, I made a distinction between
church members changing to non-church members and non-church members changing to church
members. This, however, does not make any difference: both categories display a non-significant
effect. In a similar way, I distinguished two categories among couples who were initially
homogamous, but who grew apart during marriage. In the first category, the person who changes
away from his or her spouse leaves church, while the spouse does not. In the other category, the
changing spouse becomes a church member or changes denominations. Both categories show a
clear positive effect of about the same size on the risk of divorce.
These findings indicate that couples who are initially homogamous with respect to
denomination, but who become heterogamous during marriage display higher risks of divorce
than others.
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5.4.4 Changes of heterogamy effects during marriage
Up till now, I have addressed the effects of changes in the level of heterogamy during marriage on
the risk of divorce. Now, I will turn to changes of the heterogamy effects themselves over the
course of marriage. This means that I will go into the research question whether effects of
heterogamy on divorce increase or diminish during marriage. Hypotheses derived from the theory
of growing acceptance predict a decrease. In order to investigate this, I needed to extend on model
1 in Table 5.1 by adding interaction effects of heterogamy with the duration of marriage. The
resulting model is model 3 presented in Table 5.4. When looking at the interaction effects of model
3, the absence of significance is very striking. There are only two interaction effects which are
significant at a 5 percent significance level and two other ones significant at a 10 percent level.
The two effects which are significant at a 5 percent level are ethnic effects: both the effect
on the risk of divorce for ethnically homogamous Dutch and ethnically heterogamous Dutch/non
Dutch couples increase over the course of marriage. Since these effects are equally large in the
same direction, this does not imply any increase or decrease of the heterogamy effect over the
course of marriage. After all, for a change in the effect of heterogamy, the heterogamous and the
homogamous have to diverge. In this case, however, both a homogamous and a heterogamous
group go in the same direction.
One of the interaction effects with duration which is significant at a 10 percent level is the
quadratic natural logarithm of the age ratio. It is positive and about doubling the effect at
duration 0 after 10 years of marriage. This means that the rise in divorce risk caused by a
deviation from the ‘optimal’ age ratio increases over the course of marriage. In other words, the
same age ratio leads to a greater likelihood of divorce whenever the marriage lasts longer. This is
not much of a surprise, since a couple’s age ratio decreases naturally over the course of marriage.
The same age ratio represents a larger absolute age difference at an older age. If the absolute age
difference is included in the model, then the effect appears to be not at all significant.5
The little interaction effect of duration with homogamous non-church members implies
that the heterogamy effects of non-church members married to Catholics and miscellaneous mixed
marriages increases slightly. The interaction effect, however, is very small and only significant at a
10 percent level.
Altogether, this analysis shows hardly any changes during marriage of the effect of the
several types of heterogamy on the risk of divorce. There are no findings here which even slightly
go in the direction of the growing acceptance hypothesis predicting a decrease of heterogamy effects
over the course of marriage. In an attempt to trim the models, interaction effects of heterogamy
with the duration of the marriage were entered characteristic by characteristic. This yielded
comparable results.
Of course, the relationship does not need to be linear, but it is not feasible to interpret any other
interaction models than linear ones. However, it would be worthwhile to see whether a more
constructive and meaningful measurement than duration gives the same results. As already
mentioned in the theory section, an important characteristic would be the phase in which a
marriage is. The most straightforward way is to model interactions of the several types of
heterogamy with the presence of children under 13 years of age in the marriage. This is done in
model 4, presented in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4 Event history analysis: changes over the course of marriage of the effects of several types
of heterogamy on the risk of divorce
model model 3: interaction with duration model 4: interaction with presence children
main effects interaction effects main effects interaction effects
variables b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
duration at t 0.154 *** 0.017 0.177 *** 0.014
duration at t squared -0.004 *** 0.000 -0.004 *** 0.000
year-1943 0.116 *** 0.022 0.122 *** 0.022
year-1943 squared -0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.000
average age at t -0.040 *** 0.008 -0.036 *** 0.008
age ratio (natural logarithm) at t -0.916 * 0.431 0.004 ns 0.042 -0.634 ~ 0.372 -0.410 ns 0.582
age ratio squared at t 3.028 * 1.341 0.314 ~ 0.170 3.242 ** 1.237 3.276 ~ 1.734
mean education (years) -0.006 ns 0.014 -0.009 ns 0.014
absolute educ. difference 0.011 ns 0.021 0.000 ns 0.001 0.006 ns 0.016 0.012 ns 0.022
wife higher education 0.062 ns 0.115 0.009 ns 0.008 0.113 ns 0.092 0.112 ns 0.127
mean economic occ. status at t -0.036 ns 0.069 -0.033 ns 0.069
abs. econ. status difference at t -0.024 ns 0.075 0.004 ns 0.005 0.023 ns 0.057 -0.011 ns 0.078
wife higher economic status at t -0.021 ns 0.121 0.009 ns 0.008 0.228 * 0.093 -0.273 * 0.132
mean cultural occ. status at t -0.013 ns 0.071 -0.021 ns 0.071
abs. cult. status difference at t -0.113 ns 0.088 0.003 ns 0.006 -0.089 ns 0.067 0.026 ns 0.090
wife higher cultural status at t -0.093 ns 0.109 -0.005 ns 0.007 -0.303 *** 0.084 0.276 * 0.117
church at t: none 0.377 *** 0.102 -0.012 ~ 0.007 0.071 ns 0.079 0.300 ** 0.108
church at t: none/Catholic 0.538 *** 0.137 -0.001 ns 0.010 0.465 *** 0.108 0.082 ns 0.152
church at t: none/Protestant 0.084 ns 0.173 0.011 ns 0.011 0.163 ns 0.132 0.158 ns 0.176
church at t: Catholic -0.227 ~ 0.128 -0.007 ns 0.008 -0.348 *** 0.091 0.019 ns 0.131
church at t: Cath./Protestant -0.300 ns 0.321 0.028 ns 0.022 -0.077 ns 0.234 0.207 ns 0.314
church at t: Protestant -0.600 ** 0.228 -0.007 ns 0.013 -0.648 *** 0.156 -0.061 ns 0.223
church at t: other homogamous -0.384 ns 0.306 -0.010 ns 0.022 0.003 ns 0.253 -0.882 ** 0.339
church at t: other mixed 0.513 ** 0.167 -0.003 ns 0.012 0.371 ** 0.134 0.177 ns 0.187
ethnicity: Dutch -0.397 *** 0.117 0.021 * 0.009 -0.124 ns 0.100 -0.121 ns 0.143
ethnicity: foreign 0.218 ns 0.182 -0.023 ns 0.015 -0.138 ns 0.165 0.249 ns 0.221
ethnicity: Dutch/foreign -0.219 ~ 0.126 0.021 * 0.010 0.060 ns 0.108 -0.096 ns 0.154
ethnicity: mixed foreign 0.398 ns 0.244 -0.019 ns 0.020 0.203 ns 0.217 -0.033 ns 0.319
mean economic status origin -0.138 * 0.069 -0.134 * 0.069
abs. economic origin difference 0.141 ~ 0.074 -0.000 ns 0.005 0.153 * 0.060 -0.031 ns 0.078
wife higher economic origin 0.013 ns 0.110 0.001 ns 0.007 0.027 ns 0.084 0.016 ns 0.120
mean cultural status origin 0.198 ** 0.076 0.203 ** 0.076
abs. cultural origin difference -0.135 ~ 0.080 0.006 ns 0.005 -0.033 ns 0.064 -0.089 ns 0.082
wife higher cultural origin 0.061 ns 0.110 -0.009 ns 0.007 -0.021 ns 0.084 -0.088 ns 0.120
presence of child(ren) under 13 -0.376 *** 0.057 -0.447 * 0.189
constant -5.496 *** 0.532 -5.893 *** 0.516
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98). N=37,399 records based on 2,261 couples.
Note: ns p > 0.10; ~ 0.05 < p  0.10; * 0.01 < p  0.05; ** 0.001 < p  0.01; *** p  0.001. Church, ethn.: deviation contrast.
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The increase in the age heterogamy effect over the course of marriage is also found once children
are present. Again, this is only significant at a 10 percent level. As before, in the case of duration,
if the absolute age difference is taken into the model, the effect is not significant.6
One interesting finding concerns wives with higher economic statuses than their
husbands. In the previous chapter, I found that couples in which the woman has a higher
economic status than her husband have a higher divorce risk, but this effect was explained by the
other types of heterogamy. In the present interaction model, the effect becomes visible again. It
appears to be the case that at times when there are no children in the marriage, couples with a
higher status wife do indeed have a higher risk of divorce. Once there are children in the family,
this effect disappears. This may be caused by a high degree of household care by married women
with children. Still, this finding is a bit of a surprise, since we could expect women with a better
position to be more vociferous in demanding an equal division of labour, something which could
give rise to marital tension. This finding, however, seems to suggest that these women either
resign themselves to caring tasks or manage to deal with this situation and bringing about a
peaceful agreement between husband and wife.
The inexplicable negative effect of a wife having a higher cultural social status than her
husband (-0.303) appears to be especially present if there are no children below the age of 13 in
the household. When there are children, then this effect is reduced considerably, as can be seen
from the positive interaction effect of 0.276, which is significant at a 5 percent level.
The significant positive interaction effect of non-church members and the presence of
children under 13 implies that once children are present, the homogamous category of non-church
members and mixed non-church member/Catholic marriages grow closer. This implies that for
that type of religiously mixed marriages, the heterogamy effect is diminished by the presence of
children. For the category of ‘other mixed marriages’, this would indicate the same, but the
significant negative interaction effect of ‘other homogamous marriages’ indicates an increase in
the heterogamy effect for ‘other mixed marriage’ once children are present.
These findings indicate that once the marriage reaches the state in which young children
are present, a few heterogamy effects decrease. However, most effects do not. Thus, I can state
that, controlling for the level of divorce during marriage, the effects of heterogamy remain present
to a large degree during different stages of marriage.
5.4.5 Changes of heterogamy effects over time
Finally in this section, I will address the second research question concerning changes over
historical time. Have effects of heterogamy on divorce stayed constant in history or have they
increased or decreased? Are changes different for different types of heterogamy? The answer to
these questions can be given by extending on model 1 in Table 5.1 by adding interaction terms of
heterogamy with time, or: the calender year in each record of the couple-year file. The parameters
of the resulting model are shown as model 5 in Table 5.5.
There is only one significant trend effect, a decreasing divorce risk of homogamous couples
of non-Dutch ethnicity. This means that homogamous couples decrease their risk on divorce over
time, also in comparison to heterogamous couples. Even though we cannot make the correct
comparisons of heterogamous and homogamous couples of the same origin, this is an indication
that the effect of ethnic mixed marriage on the risk of divorce increases over time. Otherwise,
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Table 5.5 Event history analysis: changes over historical time of the effects of several types of
heterogamy on the risk of divorce
model model 5: interaction with year
main effects interaction effects
variables b s.e. b s.e.
duration at t 0.177*** 0.014
duration at t squared -0.004*** 0.000
year-1943 0.128*** 0.025
year-1943 squared -0.001** 0.000
average age at t -0.035*** 0.008
age ratio (natural logarithm) at t 0.974ns 1.513 -0.039ns 0.035
age ratio squared at t 3.665ns 3.622 0.010ns 0.087
mean education (years) -0.006ns 0.014
absolute educ. difference -0.012ns 0.055 0.001ns 0.001
wife higher education 0.041ns 0.321 0.003ns 0.008
mean economic occ. status at t -0.024ns 0.069
abs. econ. status difference at t -0.156ns 0.202 0.004ns 0.005
wife higher economic status at t 0.143ns 0.335 -0.001ns 0.008
mean cultural occ. status at t -0.029ns 0.071
abs. cult. status difference at t -0.049ns 0.237 -0.001ns 0.006
wife higher cultural status at t 0.180ns 0.289 -0.008ns 0.007
church at t: none 0.544~ 0.283 -0.007ns 0.007
church at t: none/Catholic 0.569ns 0.397 -0.001ns 0.009
church at t: none/Protestant -0.012ns 0.460 0.006ns 0.011
church at t: Catholic -0.245ns 0.344 -0.002ns 0.008
church at t: Cath./Protestant -1.123ns 0.999 0.027ns 0.022
church at t: Protestant -0.295ns 0.555 -0.009ns 0.013
church at t: other homogamous 0.033ns 0.806 -0.011ns 0.019
church at t: other mixed 0.530ns 0.448 -0.002ns 0.011
ethnicity: Dutch -0.230ns 0.371 0.001ns 0.009
ethnicity: foreign 1.454** 0.522 -0.035** 0.012
ethnicity: Dutch/foreign -0.405ns 0.400 0.010ns 0.009
ethnicity: mixed foreign -0.819ns 0.872 0.024ns 0.020
mean economic status origin -0.132~ 0.068
abs. economic origin difference 0.336~ 0.189 -0.005ns 0.005
wife higher economic origin -0.086ns 0.306 0.003ns 0.007
mean cultural status origin 0.193* 0.076
abs. cultural origin difference -0.280ns 0.216 0.005ns 0.005
wife higher cultural origin 0.299ns 0.305 -0.009ns 0.007
presence of child(ren) under 13 -0.363*** 0.057
constant -6.279*** 0.717
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98). N=37,399 records based on 2,261 couples.
Note: ns p > 0.10; ~ 0.05 < p  0.10; * 0.01 < p  0.05; ** 0.001 < p  0.01; *** p  0.001. Church, ethn.: deviation contrast.
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there are no indications of trends in the strength of heterogamy effects on the risk of divorce
during the second half of the 20th century. The analysis was repeated, replacing the interaction of
heterogamy with year by the interaction of heterogamy with the divorce rates in a year, as a proxy
of developments in society. This yields comparable results (parameters not shown). In an attempt
to trim the models, interaction effects of heterogamy with year were entered characteristic by
characteristic. This also gives comparable results.
It may be possible that the shape of the trend is other than linear. To test this, I decided to
directly compare two periods in time by cutting the file in two. I used a similar model as model 5
in Table 5.5, but with a dichotomous instead of a linear interaction. Marriage years between 1943
and 1969 were compared to those between 1970 and 1998. The parameters of this model are not
shown here. There were no significant changes between those periods except for a decreasing
divorce risk for non-church member/Catholic mixed marriages. The effect suggests that the
heterogamy effect of this specific group was reduced after 1970. However, the effect is only
significant at a 10 percent level.
I even went one step further and decided to compare more remote periods, namely 1943-
1959 versus 1986-1998, in a similar way. Parameters are not shown here. Again, changes are
limited, but the one effect found to be significant at a 5 percent level is an interesting one. Until
now, I have found that spouses of different economic origin have a higher risk of divorce, but it
does not matter which one of the spouses has the highest economic social origin. The significant
main effect (1.660) and interaction effect (-1.583) in this model, however, indicate that this was
different in the 1940s and 1950s. In those days, the marriages in which the wives originated from
higher status families and the husbands did not, had an especially high risk of divorce.
These results lead to the conclusion that most effects of several types of heterogamy on the risk of
divorce, as already found in the previous chapter, have been there since the beginning of the
period under investigation, namely the mid 20th century, and have remained about equally strong
throughout the remainder of that century. Changes in the effects were very minor or absent.
5.5 Conclusions and discussion
In this chapter, I set out to answer questions about trends and changes both over the course of
marriage and over historical time. More specifically, the questions were concerned with changing
effects or effects of changing levels of heterogamy on divorce across the course of marriage
(question 1) and across historical time (question 2). These questions were answered by logistic
regression models in a discrete time event history analysis. Changes appeared to be very limited.
There were three sub-questions concerning changes over the course of marriage (research
question 1). The first one was whether using dynamic information on heterogamy yields different
results than those gained when using static information. Dynamic information was available for
spousal differences concerning age ratio, economic and cultural social status and church
affiliation. Patterns were quite similar to findings in the previous chapter. Apparently, the
moment of measurement does not really matter. The level of heterogamy at the beginning of the
marriage suffices to predict the influence of mixed marriage on the risk of divorce.
Nevertheless, I went deeper into the effects of heterogamy on specific times during
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marriage by answering the second sub-question about changes over the course of marriage. This
sub-question is concerned with the effects of change itself during marriage. It was only possible to
answer this sub-question for heterogamy with respect to economic and cultural status and
religious denomination of the spouses. The growing together-growing apart hypothesis formulated to
answer this sub-question predicted that spouses who adapt to each other will lower their risk of
divorce, whereas spouses who grow apart and become alienated from each other during marriage
will increase their risk of divorce. This effect was only found for church denomination, but was
very pronounced. In particular, spouses who grow apart raise their divorce risks. If differences in
religion, which were not present in the beginning, arise in the course of a marriage, one can
predict that conflicts will arise and that the husband and the wife will no longer be able to get on
with each other. Religious changes towards each other by spouses who were initially mixed do not
significantly lower the risk of divorce. A possible explanation is that those who do not formally
adapt but who do not divorce have in fact already adapted and come to terms with the situation,
whereas those who adapt but still divorce may have adapted, converted, in name, but not
wholeheartedly, causing false expectations and tension.
A general note with respect to adaptation in the overlap of cultural and occupational fields
can be made when taking trends in society into account. In the past, adaptation would mean that
the wife adapted to fit the husband’s social environment. Wives are becoming more involved in
pursuing their own occupational careers and, hence, are less inclined to adapt to their husbands
(Oppenheimer 1988).
The third sub-question within research question 1 deals with changing effects of
heterogamy across the course of marriage and within stages of marriage. From the theory of
growing acceptance, I derived the growing acceptance hypothesis predicting a decrease over the
course of marriage of characteristics of ascription, asymmetry and achievement, with the largest
decrease for the latter. This, however, was not corroborated by the analyses. Over the course of
marriage, the effects of none of the types of heterogamy appeared to decrease at all. When
children are present, there are only a few indications of a decreasing effect of heterogamy on
divorce, namely for the asymmetry effect of a wife with a higher social status than her husband
and for the specific category of non-church member/Catholic mixed marriages.
The second research question about changes over historical time can be answered in a
straightforward manner: there are hardly any changes over time as to the influence of heterogamy
on divorce. The trend hypotheses predicted decreasing heterogamy effects of inherited
characteristics of ascription and increasing heterogamy effects of characteristics of achievement.
This was refuted by the analyses, except for a possible decrease of the divorce risk for non-church
member/Catholic mixed marriages when comparing the period before and after 1970. For
ethnicity, there were even indications that the heterogamy effect could possibly have increased
over time.
Only a limited number of changes over time and over the marriage course which indicated a
declining effect of heterogamy on divorce were found in Chapter 3, but the results were not very
clear. In this chapter, I have used information on more characteristics, a longer historical period
and longer observations for marriages. This did not lead to finding more decreasing effects of
heterogamy over time or over the course of marriage. Heterogamy effects appear to be quite
stable. Even though the number of years analysed is high and the non-significant interaction
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1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of CFR, ISA Research Committee on
Family Research, Uppsala, Sweden, 20-23 June 2000.
2. There is an alternative hypothesis predicting that children give rise to new conflicts as a result of e.g. the
care they need and the concern they cause (Booth & White 1980; Janssen, Poortman, De Graaf & Kalmijn 1998).
3. I consider religion as an inherited characteristic of ascription. It has to be noted that it is now in a special
position since I ‘allow’ people to change it themselves.
4. The increase in the 1990s of mixed couples of ethnic Dutch and ethnic foreign persons coincides with a
relatively large decrease of ethnically homogamous Dutch couples. This can be explained by the fact that I use
parental information about the country of birth and the definition of ethnically mixed couples is very wide.
Couples of which one of the four parents is born outside the Netherlands is considered as being mixed, see
Chapter 4.
5. Together with the absolute age difference, the asymmetry effect of the wife being older than her husband
was included. The effect is decreasing over the course of marriage. However, this interaction effect with
duration is only significant at a 10 percent level. Furthermore, the main effect is insignificant and this
asymmetry effect was not found in the previous chapter either. I may conclude that the effects of age
differences do not decline over the course of marriage.
6. Again, together with the absolute age difference, the asymmetry effect of the wife being older than her
husband was included. The effect is decreasing once children are present. However, this interaction effect with
the presence of children is only significant at a 10 percent level. Furthermore, the main effect is insignificant
and this asymmetry effect was not found in the previous chapter either. I may conclude that the effects of age
differences do not decline once children are present.
effects are very small and not even close to any level of significance, it has to be noted that there
is still a possibility that there is not enough statistical power in the analyses.
For the moment, the conclusion must be that over time and over the course of marriage,
heterogamy effects do not or hardly change. On the macro level, this means that heterogamous
combinations which are disappearing, like those with large educational or status differences, will
proportionally contribute less to the number of divorces, while heterogamous combinations which
are becoming more common, like ethnic and religious mixed marriages, will proportionally
contribute more to the number of divorces.
Notes
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Appendix 5.1 Distribution of church affiliation of both spouses over the course of marriage, unweighted
a: at the start of marriage
b: after 10 years
c: after 20 years
d: after 30 years
Appendix 5.2 Distribution of church affiliation of both spouses over the course of marriage, weighted
a: at the start of marriage
b: after 10 years
c: after 20 years
d: after 30 years
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Appendix 5.3 Distribution of church affiliation of both spouses at the start of marriage over time (marriage
years), unweighted
a: 1943-1959
b: 1960s
c: 1970s
d: 1980s
e: 1990-1998
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Appendix 5.4 Distribution of church affiliation of both spouses at the start of marriage over times
(marriage years), weighted
a: 1943-1959
b: 1960s
c: 1970s
d: 1980s
e: 1990-1998
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Appendix 5.5 Distribution of ethnicity of both spouses at the start of marriage over time (marriage years),
unweighted
a: 1943-1959
b: 1960s
c: 1970s
d: 1980s
e: 1990-1998
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6 Does the quality of spouse selection affect the risk of
divorce because of heterogamy?
A descriptive and explanatory analysis of SIN98.1
T
his chapter sets out to study the effect of the quality and intensity of spouse selection on the risk
of divorce. Data from the survey ‘Divorce in the Netherlands 1998’ (SIN98) show that the divorce
rate is higher when there are indications that the spouse has been chosen hastily. Marrying young
and a short courtship duration have large effects on the divorce risk. Pregnancy before cohabitation,
however, does not seem to increase the divorce risk when appropriate control variables are included in the
model. Although it is plausible that couples who cohabited before marriage have searched better for a
suitable spouse, these couples have higher divorce rates. The explanation is that these couples adhere to
traditional values towards marriage to a lesser degree. Social heterogamy hardly intervenes in the
association between search behaviour and the risk of divorce. It is likely that other forms of similarity
and maturity play a role in this association.
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will investigate the relationship between spouse selection and divorce. To what
extent does the search for a spouse influence marital stability? Do people who marry each other
relatively quickly have more chance of their marriage going wrong? Or reversely, do people who
search longer and maybe better for a suitable marriage partner have more chance that the
marriage will last? This is the first, descriptive research question of this chapter.
The general expectation is that, when one has not searched long or well enough for a
spouse, one runs a higher risk of making a ‘wrong’ choice. This does not only reveal itself in an
increased marital instability and a higher risk of divorce, but also in a higher chance of marrying a
less compatible spouse (Becker, Landes & Michael 1977). This implies, for instance, that a bad
search and a hasty decision lead to greater differences between spouses regarding their
personalities and their social characteristics. Marriages in which husband and wife differ in social
respects are called heterogamous marriages.
In heterogamous marriages, spouses have less things in common than in homogamous
marriages. Firstly, if husband and wife differ in terms of personality and social characteristics, this
entails that they will have different tastes and preferences. A lack of shared interests and taste
may translate into a higher marital instability in the course of marriage. Secondly, social
differences between husband and wife bring along that their families and social networks will
also differ from each other. Therefore, there is a relatively high chance in heterogamous marriages
that husband and wife feel less at ease with their respective parents-in-law and mutual friends,
and the other way around. This can lead to a lack of social support for the marriage. In times of
marital problems, this may express itself in a higher probability of divorce. For that reason, it is no
surprise that the positive relationship that indeed exists between mixed marriage and the
probability of divorce can, in part, be explained by both differences of opinion between the
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spouses themselves and a lack of social support for the marriage by parents, friends and others
(see Chapter 4).
The possible differences between spouses resulting from a less intensive search leads to
the second research question. It reads: to what extent does a ‘worse match’ as indicated by social
heterogamy offer an explanation for the relationship between the quality or intensity of the
search for a spouse and the probability of divorce? After all, if the people who made quick
decisions have a higher chance of divorce, then it is reasonable to expect that this is the result of
having a less compatible spouse who is different in social respect. Spouses differ from each other
in social respect if they have a different level of education or a different religion, if they stem from
a different social background or if there is an age gap between them.
For the record, the term ‘marriages’ also refers to unmarried cohabitation unions, except
when married and unmarried cohabiting couples are explicitly contrasted.
6.2 Hypotheses
It is possible to discern different aspects of the intensity and quality of searching for a marital or
cohabiting partner. Firstly, age at marriage will be used in this chapter. Previous research (Becker,
Landes & Michael 1977; Janssen, Poortman, De Graaf & Kalmijn 1998; Manting 1993, 1994; Morgan
& Rindfuss 1985; South & Spitze 1986; Thornton & Rodgers 1987; Tzeng & Mare 1995; Wagner
1993) has demonstrated that the younger a couple is at the time of marriage, the higher the risk of
divorce. The most common explanation for this is that persons who marry young have not
searched long enough for suitable partners. The chances are higher that their choices were
impetuous and hasty, and that the social and personality differences between the spouses are
large. Even when husband and wife initially seem to fit together sufficiently, it is possible that, in
a later stadium of their relationship, they will encounter still unknown differences. On the one
hand, this is caused by the fact that husband and wife are still young and developing, as a result
of which they may grow apart. On the other hand, differences which were overcome in the
beginning of the relationship may become a problem in later stages of the marriage, for example,
when there are children. An additional explanation of the effect of the age at marriage on the risk
of divorce is that couples who marry young have less experience of life and personal relationships.
This lack of maturity for marriage may result in a higher risk of divorce.
The second measurement for the intensity or the quality of spouse selection is more direct.
If a longer search leads to a qualitatively better choice, then a longer duration of courtship should
lead to lower probabilities of divorce. Whereas the age at marriage relates to the total time of the
search, the duration of courtship refers to the time of the search related to a specific partner. It
indicates how long someone has observed his or her partner before deciding to marry or start
living together.
The third indicator for the quality of search behaviour is a premarital pregnancy. The
supposition is that couples who decided to marry because the wife got pregnant unintendedly
have terminated their search for a suitable spouse early. Several orders of events can be
distinguished (Morgan & Rindfuss 1985):
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a) marriage - conception - birth;
b) conception - marriage - birth;
c) conception - birth - marriage.
The first order is the most traditional one. In the other two cases, we are dealing with birth or
conception out of wedlock, but these cases are not identical either. We can expect that the
marriage in the second case, familiarly called a shotgun marriage, is more or less forced, which
raises the probability that a premature decision is taken. The chances are higher that the spouses’
match is less well and that their risk of divorce is relatively high. The third variant does not occur
so frequently, but also in this case the marriage will relatively often be forced.
The hypothesis about the meaning of premarital pregnancy has to be viewed in the light of
recent developments regarding unmarried cohabitation. Since the 1980s, premarital cohabitation
has become more common and has even become the dominant pattern of the formation of long-
term relationships. Often, a couple lives together and decides to marry when they want children
or they consciously wait until a child is on its way. This cannot be seen as a forced and shortened
decision to choose for each other: the choice for each other has already been made before
pregnancy. Therefore, the term ‘premarital pregnancy’ in this hypothesis can better be changed in
the direction of a ‘pregnancy before cohabitation’. For the rest, the reasoning and expectations
stay the same. The hypothesis then reads that couples who expected a child before (married or
unmarried) cohabitation have a higher probability of divorce than couples who did not.
The relatively new phenomenon in society to live together for a period of time before
marriage, brings us to the fourth aspects of search behaviour for a suitable partner: unmarried
cohabitation. Living together before marriage is often considered as an extension of the search
period. Although an increasing number of people see unmarried cohabitation as a full alternative
to marriage, many see it as a trial or test period (Rindfuss & Van den Heuvel 1990). In those cases,
having lived together before marriage is an indication of the quality of the search behaviour. We
can expect more divorces within the test period than during marriage (Manting 1993; Teachman,
Richmond & Paasch 1991). However, the idea is that a marriage which arises from such a
relationship of cohabitation after surviving this test period will be more stable (Klijzing 1992).
However, much international research has demonstrated that couples who live together
before marriage have a higher risk of divorce than couples who marry directly (Balakrishnan, Rao,
Lapierre-Adamcyk & Krotki 1987; Bennett, Blanc & Bloom 1988; Bracher, Santow, Morgan &
Trussell 1993; Bumpass & Sweet 1989; Cunningham & Antill 1994; Hall & Zhao 1995; Janssen et al.
1998; Manting 1993; Teachman & Polonko 1990; Thomson & Colella 1992; Trussell, Rodriguez &
Vaughan 1992; Trussell & Rao 1989). The explanation for this finding is generally attributed to the
fact that cohabitation before marriage reflects a lower degree of adherence to traditional norms
and values regarding marriage and the family (Axinn & Thornton 1992; Clarkberg, Stolzenberg &
Waite 1995).2 Once they are married, such couples will still have less ‘respect’ for eternal fidelity
and they will be more likely to leave a marriage than couples who married directly.
The above can be summarized by the hypothesis that the longer and more intense one has
searched for a spouse, the lower the risk of divorce. In this chapter, this hypothesis will be tested
by investigating to what extent the age at marriage, the duration of courtship, a pregnancy before
cohabitation and unmarried cohabitation influence the risk of divorce.
In the test, a number of standard characteristics of which previous research showed that
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they influence the risk of divorce, were taken into account. These are characteristics in the field of
traditionality and experiences in the past. Children of divorced parents have a higher risk of
divorce than children from intact families (Amato 1996; De Graaf 1996a, b; Diefenbach 1997;
Diekmann & Engelhardt 1995; Dronkers 1997; Manting 1994; McLanahan & Bumpass 1988;
Wagner 1993; Webster, Orbuch & House 1995; Wolfinger 1999). Similarly, a previous divorce of the
spouses themselves raises the risk that they will divorce again. Having modern values also
increases the risk of divorce. I expect that people who were raised in the city have more modern
values than people who grew up in municipalities with a lower degree of urbanization. This also
goes for people whose mother was not a church member, had a higher level of education or was
working when she had children. In such cases, someone is raised in less traditional circumstances
and it can be expected that he or she has a higher risk of divorce than someone who grew up in
opposite circumstances. It is important to take such characteristics into account statistically,
because they can distort the relationship between the search characteristics and the risk of
divorce. For example, it is possible that children of divorced parents leave the parental home at a
younger age and also start living together more hastily.
An additional question which will be answered in this chapter is whether the influence of the
quality of search behaviour on the risk of divorce has been constant. Unmarried cohabitation has
normalized and pregnancy before cohabitation is accepted to an increasing degree. This leads to
the expectation that the impact of these characteristics is decreasing over time.
As well as a descriptive research question, an explanatory research question is raised in this
chapter: does social heterogamy offer an explanation for the relationship between search
characteristics and the risk of divorce? Does a hasty choice for a spouse raise the risk of divorce
because of the fact that spouses who do so, resemble each other to a lesser extent in social respect
(Becker, Landes & Michael 1977)? From the previous chapters, it is already known that several
forms of heterogamy raise the risk of divorce in the Netherlands. This goes for heterogamy with
respect to religion, level of education, age, social origin and nationality. The question is whether
these types of heterogamy intervene in the effect of spouse selection on the risk of divorce.
6.3 Data and operationalization
For the analyses in this chapter, I used the SIN98 data collection (Kalmijn, De Graaf & Uunk 1999).
This is a survey among 2,346 married, divorced and remarried persons. To obtain sufficient
numbers of divorced and remarried people in the data file, these groups were over-represented in
the sample design. The data contain many aspects of causes and consequences of divorce, among
which the information which is necessary for our research questions on characteristics regarding
marriage, spouse selection and heterogamy.
A description of the used variables can be found in Table 6.1. For each variable, the
minimum and maximum value, the mean and standard deviation is presented after applying a
weight factor. This weight factor restores the distribution of characteristics in the married and
divorced population aged between 30 and 75 years, from which the sample was taken. In the first
place, this weight factor corrects the proportion of persons in their first marriage, persons who
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Table 6.1 Description of used variables
characteristic min. max. weighted mean standard dev.
age at marriage of youngest spouse (years) 14 61 22.95 4.13
duration of courtship (years) 0 17 2.86 2.27
pregnancy played role to marry* 0 1 0.14 0.35
unmarried cohabitation* 0 1 0.34 0.48
parents of respondent divorced* 0 1 0.09 0.28
husband previously divorce* 0 1 0.06 0.23
wife previously divorced* 0 1 0.04 0.18
respondent grew up in a city* 0 1 0.29 0.45
non-church membership of mothers 0 1 0.21 0.33
level of education mother respondent 0 1 0.20 0.24
labour force participation of mother during youth of respondent 0 1 0.24 0.40
absolute age difference 0 26.75 3.46 3.18
wife older (at least by 1 year)* 0 1 0.38 0.49
mean education (years) 6 18 12.57 2.65
absolute educ. difference 0 12 2.53 2.37
wife higher education* 0 1 0.21 0.41
mean economic occupational status -1.81 2.43 -0.31 0.60
absolute economic status difference 0 3.98 0.80 0.74
wife higher economic status* 0 1 0.28 0.45
mean cultural occupational status -1.40 2.57 -0.22 0.71
absolute cultural status difference 0 3.46 0.70 0.66
wife higher cultural status* 0 1 0.55 0.50
church: none* 0 1 0.29 0.45
church: none/Catholic* 0 1 0.07 0.26
church: none/Protestant* 0 1 0.07 0.25
church: Catholic* 0 1 0.32 0.47
church: Catholic/Protestant* 0 1 0.02 0.15
church: Protestant* 0 1 0.15 0.35
church: other homogamous* 0 1 0.05 0.22
church: other mixed* 0 1 0.03 0.17
ethnicity: Dutch* 0 1 0.77 0.42
ethnicity: foreign* 0 1 0.06 0.24
ethnicity: Dutch/foreign* 0 1 0.16 0.36
ethnicity: mixed foreign* 0 1 0.01 0.10
mean economic status origin -1.40 2.43 0.00 0.65
absolute economic origin difference 0 3.61 0.79 0.75
wife higher economic origin* 0 1 0.46 0.50
mean cultural status origin -1.40 2.57 -0.41 0.65
absolute cultural origin difference 0 3.87 0.73 0.75
wife higher cultural origin* 0 1 0.48 0.50
year of cohabitation or marriage 43 97 74.05 11.25
divorced* 0 1 0.19 0.39
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands 1998 (SIN98). N=2,241.
Note: * indicates a dichotomous variable (dummy). Because the weight factor is based on the complete data set
(N=2,346), the effective N slightly differs in weighted figures (N=2,252).
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got divorced and who are single at the moment of interview, and persons who got divorced and
subsequently remarried. Next, the distributions of region, degree of urbanization, sex and age
group are in correspondence with the Dutch population between 30 and 75 years of age after
application of the weight factor. On the basis of this weighted sample, we obtained an overview of
divorces taking place between 1949 and 1998. Most divorces took place in the 1980s in the 1990s.
The age on the wedding day or at the beginning of cohabitation was taken from the
youngest partner, since it indicates whether at least one of both partners started living together
at a young age. For the couples in our analysis, this youngest age at marriage is between 14 and
61 with a weighted average of about 23. The respondent was also asked when they started their
relationship (courtship), which allowed me to compute the duration of courtship. This varies from
0 years (courtship less than six months) to 17 years, with an average of two years and ten months.
In the questionnaire, the time of the beginning of cohabitation and of the birth of the first
child was measured in full years only. That is why it was impossible to reliably compute, in case of
a pregnancy or birth in the wedding year or the year afterwards, whether a marriage or
cohabitation had been forced by that pregnancy. The exact order of or the time span between
conception, birth and marriage or cohabitation is unclear. Nevertheless, a list was presented to
the respondent containing possible reasons to get married or to commence cohabitation. In this
way, a question was included whether a pregnancy before marriage or cohabitation played no,
some or an important role in the decision to start cohabitation, either married or unmarried.
Among the people in the analysis, 14 percent, after weighting, indicated that the wife expected a
child and that this played either some or an important role in the decision to start cohabitation.
Next, 34 percent of all couples appear to have lived together before marriage.
The controlling variables were operationalized as follows. The parents of 9 percent of the
respondents had been divorced at some point. Obviously, there is quite some variation in the age
of the respondent at which his or her parents divorced and it is even possible that the parents
divorced later than the respondent himself or herself. Even in such cases, the parental divorce tells
us something about the quality of the marital relationship of the parents. Of all men in the
analysis, 6 percent experienced a divorce or a termination of cohabitation themselves. Among
women, this amounts to 4 percent.
To measure the degree of urbanization, I made use of a dichotomous variable which
indicates whether the respondent grew up in a city or not, which goes for 29 percent of the
respondents. Cities were defined as municipalities which reached the number of 100,000
inhabitants in 1990 or before. For the religious climate during someone’s youth, one indicator was
available for both the respondent and his or her (ex-) partner: the religion of the mother. For both
mothers, a dummy variable was constructed indicating whether or not the mother was a non-
church member. Subsequently, the average of these two dummies has been computed. The mean
scale value is 0.21. Information about the cultural climate in the parental home was determined
on the basis of the level of education of the mother of the respondent. This was firstly recoded to
the number of years necessary to reach that level without delay. Next, these scores, varying from 6
to 18, were recoded to a scale running from 0 to 1, with a mean value of 0.20. Besides, a scale was
constructed for the mother’s labour force participation during the upbringing of the respondent
until about the age of 14. The scale got the value 0 for never, 0.5 for sometimes and 1 for regular
labour. The average value is 0.24.
In order to determine the effects of social heterogamy, a number of variables were
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constructed. For characteristics of heterogamy measured on the interval level, the average of the
couple, the absolute difference between husband and wife and the direction of the difference were
determined. This applies to age, level of education, job status of the spouses themselves and of the
fathers. The direction of the difference is of importance to see whether the wife or the husband is
the oldest, most highly educated, etcetera, which may make a difference in the risk of divorce (see
Chapter 4). The age of both partners was measured in years, the level of education in the
minimum number of years necessary to reach that level. Social statuses were determined on the
basis of the jobs of both spouses at the beginning of cohabitation. It was divided in two
dimensions (De Graaf & Kalmijn 1995). The economic status of a job or profession stands for the
typical level of income for that job or profession and the cultural status for its average level of
education.
It is impossible to compute averages and differences with regard to religious denomination
and ethnicity. Instead, classifications were used, based on both partners’ categories. For religious
affiliation, combinations were made of the denomination of both partners on the wedding date (or
the start of cohabitation). A distinction was made between the categories non-church member,
Catholic, Protestant and otherwise. Many marriages appear to be characterized by religious
homogamy: in 29 percent of the marriages, both husband and wife are not a member of any
church, in 32 percent of the marriages, both are Catholic, in 15 percent, both are Protestant and in
5 percent of the marriages, the couple is religiously homogamous in another religious
denomination. The largest heterogamous groups consist of a non-church member and a Catholic
partner (7 percent) and a non-Church member and a Protestant partner (also 7 percent). Marriages
in which both spouses consider themselves as a member of a religious group, but each of them a
different one, occur relatively infrequent in the Dutch population: about one in twenty.
Combinations of ethnicity were determined on the basis of the countries of birth of the
parents of both spouses. As a result of low numbers of specific allochthonous categories, it only
appeared feasible to distinguish between homogamous autochthonous marriages, homogamous
allochthonous marriages, heterogamous marriages between an autochthonous and an
allochthonous partner, and heterogamous marriages between allochthonous partners of different
ethnic origin. The majority of couples is ethnically homogamous: 77 percent autochthonous, 6
percent allochthonous. Of the 17 percent mixed marriages, the larger part consists of an
autochthonous and an allochthonous partner.
Furthermore, Table 6.1 shows that the oldest relationship in the analysis started in 1943
and the youngest in 1997. Marriages were followed from beginning to end, which is either divorce
or the moment of interview. This resulted in information for many marriage years. These
differences in time were used to investigate whether the influence of search behaviour has
changed in the course of time. Finally, it appears from Table 6.1 that in 1998, 19 percent of all
those aged between 30 and 75 who married (discarding widowhood), got divorced.
6.4 Analyses and results
A discrete time event history analysis was performed (Allison 1984) in order to test the
hypotheses. For this reason, a couple-year file (person-period file) was constructed, containing one
record of data for each year that each couple was at risk of getting divorced starting from the
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moment of cohabitation. In other words, there is one record for each year of marriage or
cohabitation of every couple in the file. The event history analysis was done by means of logistic
regression. The dependent variable in this analysis is the natural logarithm of the conditional odds
of divorce in a particular year, given that the couple is still together in the beginning of that year.
The advantage of event history analysis is that the fact is taken into account that some marriages
have not (yet) divorced and that some never will during the time of observation. In all models,
linear and quadratic effects were included of the calendar year and of the duration of the
relationship. In this way, changing divorce rates over time and over marriage duration were
statistically controlled. In the discussion of the results, effects called ‘present’ or ‘significant’ are
significant at a level of five percent or less unless stated otherwise.
6.4.1 Descriptive analyses and trends
In Table 6.2, separate and simultaneous models are displayed of the effects of the intensity or
quality of search behaviour on the probability of divorce. Model 1 represents separate baseline
models in which the influence of each characteristic of search behaviour was analysed separately.
Only the current duration of the marriage and the calender year (minus 1943) and the square of
both were controlled. Model 2 contains the multivariate baseline model in which all used
characteristics of search behaviour are entered into the logistic regression analysis at once.
It appears from the models, that a younger age at marriage (of the youngest of both
partners) coincides with a higher chance that the marriage will end in divorce. Depending on
whether the effects are tested separately or simultaneously, the model predicts a decrease in the
odds of divorce of not less than 3 to 4 percent for each year that the youngest partner is older at
the beginning of marriage or cohabitation. This percentage can be computed by taking the natural
exponents of the effects in the table (here -0.039 and -0.030, respectively) and subtract 1. The age
at marriage has a considerable influence on the odds of divorce.
The effect of the duration of courtship indicates that couples who knew each other for a
longer period of time before forming one household have a lower risk of divorce. This effect is
large as well. The separate effect amounts to -0.098, and taking the exponent of this shows that
the odds of divorce decrease by more than 9 percent for each extra year that the couple associated
with each other in a relationship before the start of their marriage or cohabitation. When all other
characteristics of search behaviour are statistically controlled, the effect decreases somewhat. But
it is still considerable and significant, with a decrease in the odds of divorce of 6 to7 percent for
every extra year of courtship.
If a premarital pregnancy was a reason to get married, then the odds of divorce increase by
29 percent in the separate model and 14 percent in the multivariate model.
Couples who cohabited before marriage have a 56 percent higher odds of divorce than
couples who started living together at marriage. In the multivariate baseline model, this effect
becomes a bit smaller, but still amounts to 40 percent. This result contradicts the hypothesis that
couples marrying after a period of cohabitation have searched better for a suitable spouse.
Therefore, this effect has to be seen in the light of a lower degree of adherence to traditional
norms and values with respect to marriage and the family. In other words: couples who marry
directly may not know each other that well, but their traditional attitudes make them less likely to
divorce. The sum of these opposite effects apparently goes in the direction of a lower risk of
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divorce for those who did not cohabit before marriage.
Except in the case of premarital cohabitation, the effects found are in agreement with the
hypothesis predicting that those who searched for a suitable spouse more intensively or during a
longer period of time have a lower probability of divorce.
Table 6.2 Event history analysis: regression of the risk of divorce on characteristics of spouse
selection, models 1 to 3
model 1 (separate
baseline)
2 (multivariate
baseline)
3 (multivariate
controlled)
variables b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
duration at t (several) 0.114*** 0.010 0.117*** 0.010
duration at t squared (several) -0.003*** 0.000 -0.003*** 0.000
year-1943 (several) 0.130*** 0.022 0.124*** 0.022
year-1943 squared (several) -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000
age at marriage of youngest spouse -0.039*** 0.008 -0.030*** 0.008 -0.036*** 0.008
duration of courtship (years) -0.098*** 0.013 -0.068*** 0.014 -0.050*** 0.014
pregnancy played role to marry 0.255*** 0.064 0.134* 0.066 0.070ns 0.067
unmarried cohabitation 0.445*** 0.058 0.339*** 0.061 0.180** 0.065
parents of respondent divorced 0.170* 0.081
husband previously divorce 0.314** 0.100
wife previously divorced 0.374*** 0.106
respondent grew up in a city 0.114* 0.054
non-church membership of mothers 0.312*** 0.072
level of education mother respondent 0.217* 0.103
labour force participation of mother 0.067ns 0.063
constant (several) -6.376*** 0.466 -6.388*** 0.471
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands 1998 (SIN98). N=37,116 marriage years based on 2,241 couples.
Note: ns p > 0.10; ~ 0.05 < p  0.10; * 0.01 < p  0.05; ** 0.001 < p  0.01; *** p  0.001.
In model 3 of Table 6.2, control variables have been added to the multivariate baseline model.
Some effects of the influence of the quality and intensity of search behaviour on the risk of divorce
indeed appear to become smaller if experiences with divorce in the past and the level of
traditionality during one’s upbringing are taken into account. Nevertheless, this does not apply for
the effect of age at marriage at all: it is even a bit larger than in model 2. The odds of divorce still
decrease by 3.5 percent for each year that the youngest spouse is older at the moment that the
couple starts the formation of one household. The effect of the duration of courtship decreases
from -0.068 to -0.050. The odds of divorce in a marriage year decreases by 5 percent for each extra
year of courtship. According to model 2, it was 6 to 7 percent, but here, the influence is still
considerable.
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The effects of both other variables decrease to a larger extent after adding the control
variables. The effect that marriages forced by pregnancy have a 14 percent higher odds of divorce
is even discarded and is no longer significant.3 The odds of divorce are higher for those who
cohabited before marriage than for those who got married right away. Compared to model 2,
however, this increase of the odds is halved in model 3, from 40 to 20 percent. The decrease of the
effect is according to expectation, because a traditional socialization is now controlled, and it is
likely that those who were raised less traditionally have a higher chance of both premarital
cohabitation and divorce.
Most control variables themselves have clear effects on the risk of divorce. The odds of
divorce increase by 19 percent if the parents were divorced, by 37 percent if the husband was
previously divorced, by 45 percent if the wife was previously divorced, by 12 percent if the
respondent grew up in the city, by 37 percent if both mothers were not affiliated to any religion
(compared to two church member mothers) and by 24 percent if the respondent’s mother had a
university degree compared to a mother who only went to elementary school. If all this is taken
into account, the mother’s labour force participation no longer has any significant effect. In sum,
the control variables demonstrate that a socialization in a more traditional environment and less
experiences with divorce in the past strongly reduce the odds of divorce.
In the theory section, it was suggested that the effects of the quality of search behaviour on the
risk of divorce could have decreased in the course of time. In model 4 (see Table 6.3), trend
interactions have been added for the four characteristics of search behaviour in model 3.
In model 3, each year that the youngest spouse was older at the start of the marriage or
cohabitation, resulted in a decrease of the odds of divorce by 3.5 percent. The significant
interaction effect of 0.002 in model 4 shows us that this effect has become weaker over the years.
Apparently, it is becoming less important for the probability of divorce whether one marries or
cohabits at a younger or older age.
The positive influence of the duration of courtship on marital stability has not changed
significantly in the past 50 years.
Also the influence of a premarital pregnancy as a reason to get married or start
cohabitation does not shown any linear trend. This means that, after controlling the variables
concerning socialization and the marital past, it has never had an influence on the risk of divorce.
In model 2, without statistically controlling those variables, premarital pregnancy does have a
significant effect on the risk of divorce. If a trend effect is added to that model (resulting in a
model not presented here), the trend is not significant either. It may be so that unmarried
motherhood has become more widely accepted and that this has led to a decrease in the number
of marriages forced by an unplanned pregnancy. Apparently, the shrinking group which does feel
forced to marry because of a pregnancy still runs a higher risk to have taken a rash decision and to
eventually divorce. But as described above, this can be completely attributed to socialization.
It is remarkable that the positive effect of premarital cohabitation on the risk of divorce
has increased over time. Even though it was not expected, it may be possible to give an
explanation for this. In the previous decades, the occurrence of unmarried cohabitation has
increased, while the phenomenon was very uncommon in the beginning of the period under
investigation here. In the 1940s and 1950s, premarital cohabitation was so rare, that we are
dealing with special cases which apparently do not run a higher risk of divorce.
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Table 6.3 Event history analysis: regression of the risk of divorce on characteristics of spouse
selection, models 3 to 5
model 3 (multivariate
controlled)
4 (trend effects) 5 (heterogamy
controlled)
variables b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
duration at t 0.117*** 0.010 0.121*** 0.010
duration at t squared -0.003*** 0.000 -0.003*** 0.000
year-1943 0.124*** 0.022 0.121*** 0.022
year-1943 squared -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000
age at marriage of youngest spouse -0.036*** 0.008 0.002* 0.001 -0.042*** 0.009
duration of courtship (years) -0.050*** 0.014 0.002ns 0.002 -0.039** 0.014
pregnancy played role to marry 0.070ns 0.067 0.000ns 0.008 0.003ns 0.069
unmarried cohabitation 0.180** 0.065 0.017* 0.008 0.076ns 0.068
parents of respondent divorced 0.170* 0.081 0.133ns 0.082
husband previously divorce 0.314** 0.100 0.314** 0.105
wife previously divorced 0.374*** 0.106 0.346** 0.108
respondent grew up in a city 0.114* 0.054 0.084ns 0.056
non-church membership of mothers 0.312*** 0.072 0.195* 0.094
level of education mother resp. 0.217* 0.103 0.160ns 0.115
labour force participation of mother 0.067ns 0.063 0.025ns 0.065
constant -6.388*** 0.471 -6.007*** 0.520
Source: Divorce in the Netherlands 1998 (SIN98). N=37,116 marriage years based on 2,241 couples.
Note: ns p > 0.10; ~ 0.05 < p  0.10; * 0.01 < p  0.05; ** 0.001 < p  0.01; *** p  0.001. The effects in model 4 are trend
effects. The accompanying main effects (with standard deviation) are: -0.117** (0.041); -0.119~ (0.069); 0.046ns (0.316);
-0.553~ (0.326).
6.4.2 Explanations by heterogamy?
In the theory section, it was predicted that a part of the effects of the quality and intensity of
search behaviour for a spouse on the risk of divorce can be explained by social heterogamy. The
idea is that a hasty choice leads to a worse match of the spouses, which expresses itself in social
heterogamy. For this reason, a number of types of heterogamy have been added to model 3,
resulting in model 5: with respect to age, level of education, social economic and cultural status,
religion, ethnicity and economic and cultural origin (or social status of the fathers).
The influence of heterogamy itself is not presented in this chapter: it can be found in
Chapter 4. In short, many types of heterogamy, as operationalized in this chapter, have an effect
on divorce. The largest effects are found for heterogamy with regard to age, level of education and
religion. In the case of age, the effect stems from the absolute difference in age, whereas in the
case of education, it is about the direction: if the wife has a higher level of education than her
husband, then this deviation from the traditional pattern leads to a higher risk of divorce.
In model 5 (see Table 6.3), I examine whether the effects of search behaviour change when
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the effects of heterogamy are added to the model. The effect of age at marriage of the youngest
spouse does not decrease after controlling for social heterogamy; it even becomes somewhat
stronger. So, social heterogamy does not offer any explanation here.
The effect of the duration of courtship has decreased, namely by 22 percent. The level of
explanation by social heterogamy is limited. The odds of divorce are still reduced by almost 4
percent for each extra year that a couple had a relationship before cohabitation or marriage.
Besides, we can see that the effect of a marriage forced by an unforeseen premarital
pregnancy, already no longer significant in model 3, is not significant in model 5 either.
The effect of an increased risk of divorce for couples who cohabited before marriage is no
longer significant after taking heterogamy into account. The explanation has succeeded here.
Perhaps, premarital cohabitation goes together with heterogamy in such a way that keeping
heterogamy constant makes the effect of premarital cohabitation on the risk of divorce disappear.
However, we should not forget that controlling heterogamy in model 5 also implies that church
membership and other social characteristics are controlled. Compared to model 3, the
traditionality of the spouses themselves is taken into account in a better way. This may lead to the
disappearance of the effect of premarital cohabitation. For reasons of comparison, a model can be
set up in which the main effects, without heterogamy effects, of age, education, social status,
religion, ethnicity and social origin are added to model 3. (The parameters of that model are not
presented here.) From that model, it appears that more than half of the decrease of the effect of
premarital cohabitation in model 5 compared to model 3 stems from the main effects. The effect of
unmarried cohabitation in that model amounts to 0.122, with a significance level of 0.07.
6.5 Conclusions and discussion
In this chapter, the influence of a number of characteristics of the quality of search behaviour for a
suitable partner on the risk of divorce has been investigated. The main finding is that this
influence of the quality of search behaviour indeed exists and is fairly strong. Getting married or
embarking on cohabitation at a more mature age and after a longer period of courtship is more
favourable to the stability of a marriage than starting cohabitation at a premature age with
someone whom one has not known for very long.
 Does heterogamy play a role in these effects of search behaviour? The influence of age at
marriage cannot be explained at all by differences between spouses regarding age, education,
social status, religion, ethnicity and social origin. It is probably more about being socially and
emotionally mature for marriage. The effect of age at marriage on the risk of divorce is declining
over time, which is an indication that there is a trend towards postponing marriage or
cohabitation until one is emotionally ready for it. Postponing marriage or cohabitation further
does not give any extra protection for the subsistence of the relationship.
The influence of the duration of courtship is explained by social heterogamy to a small
extent. I presume that the explanation of the effects of both age at marriage and duration of
courtship may be found in another type of heterogamy, namely with respect to personality.
According to this argumentation, a hasty, premature marriage does not so much lead to marrying
someone with another level of education or another religious affiliation, but someone with non-
complementary personality characteristics. Research into marriage patterns has shown that the
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1. A Dutch version of this chapter was published in Sociale Wetenschappen, 44 (2), pages 53-68 (Janssen 2001).
2. Present differences with respect to adhering to traditional values between the married who previously
cohabited with each other and those who married directly do not have to explain the difference in marital
stability between both groups (DeMaris & MacDonald 1993). Due to self selection, the same couples who have a
higher risk of divorce are also the ones who choose unmarried cohabitation. Controlling this should yield
results which support the idea of cohabitation as a test marriage, making a subsequent marriage more stable.
Brüderl, Diekmann and Engelhardt (1997) use indirect methods to fix self selection in order to test whether
cohabitation before marriage does have a stabilizing effect on the marriage. The positive effect of premarital
cohabitation on the risk of divorce in a subsequent marriage decreases, but the negative effect in their probit
model with double dependency is not significant. This chapter does not aim at these double dependencies and
suchlike models will not be applied here.
commonplace that opposites attract is not generally valid. And when opposites do attract, they
often quickly repel.
Another characteristic regarding search behaviour is a marriage forced by pregnancy, a
shotgun marriage. At first sight, suchlike marriages have a higher risk of divorce, but this effect is
fully explained by characteristics related to the marital past and traditionality during socialization.
This corroborates the idea that the hasty occurrence of a marriage or cohabitation forced by
pregnancy is predominantly related to social circumstances and social pressure. Marriages not
forced by pregnancy in the same circumstances appear to have a comparable risk of divorce. And
heterogamy of whatever kind does not play a role in this aspect of search behaviour.
Premarital cohabitation can be interpreted as an extension of the search period for a
spouse by considering it as a test marriage. However, as previously demonstrated, it is exactly the
married couples who lived together before their marriage who have a higher risk of divorce. In
this light, cohabitation must be seen as a lower level of adherence to traditional norms and values
regarding marriage and the family. It is striking that controlling for heterogamy makes the effect
of unmarried cohabitation on the risk of divorce disappear. However, this was largely caused by
the main effects of religion, education, social status, ethnicity and social origin. This strengthens
the idea that people with less traditional views often start with unmarried cohabitation and,
moreover, that they are the ones who more easily take the step towards divorce.
In sum, search behaviour appears to play an important role in marital stability, but social
heterogamy does not play a role in the relationship between search behaviour and stability. An
explanation for the influence of the intensity of the search for a spouse on the risk of divorce has
rather to be found in two other aspects. The first aspect is that, when one makes one’s choice too
early, the marriage takes place before one is ready and mature. If this happens and the persons
concerned are still developing during marriage, then the stability of marriage suffers from it. The
second aspect is that, after a hasty choice for a spouse, one does not yet have sufficient knowledge
about the other partner’s personality. This results in a higher chance that the marriage is
heterogamous with regard to personality and that spouses do not match well in this respect.
Notes
Chapter 6
170
3. Note that the presence of children in the family is not controlled, which has an effect on divorce according
to the analyses in Chapter 4. One may argue that it can be of importance here, since marriages forced by
pregnancy will, by definition, soon have children. In order to make a fairer comparison, parameters of model 3
were computed after adding the presence of children under 13 years of age in the family. The effect of a
shotgun wedding is not significant in that model either. The effect of a shotgun wedding which was found in
model 2 is still present, even a little more pronounced, if the presence of children is added to that model. So
the effect of premarital pregnancy on the divorce risk is still explained by traditionality and divorce
experiences in the past.
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7 Conclusion
I
n the empirical research papers forming Chapters 2 to 6, research questions were answered by
empirically testing hypotheses derived from theories and other research findings. In this final
chapter, my findings will be brought together in order to answer the general research questions
raised in Chapter 1. Those research questions were descriptive, explanatory, trend and life course
questions with respect to the influence of heterogamy on divorce. Besides, a descriptive and an
explanatory question were raised with respect to the impact on divorce of the intensity or quality of
search behaviour in the spouse selection process.
7.1 Questions, findings and answers
I will now bring all of the findings together, grouped by the research question that they are
supposed to answer. An answer will then be formulated for each general research question raised
in Chapter 1.
7.1.1 Heterogamy and divorce
In Chapters 2 and 4, hypotheses were presented concerning the effects of mixed marriage on the
risk of divorce. These are tools to answer the first general research question posed in Chapter 1,
which read:
1 Does heterogamy with respect to (1) age, (2) level of education, (3) social status, (4)
religion, (5) ethnicity, and (6) social origin, have an influence on the risk of divorce
in the Netherlands? And which types of heterogamy have the largest impact?
The most basic and general hypothesis is the heterogamy hypothesis, which states: “Heterogamous
couples have a higher risk of divorce than homogamous couples.” A further specification was
made, taking into account that certain combinations are less accepted than others in society when
it comes to divisions between husband and wife. More specifically, this is about whether the
husband or the wife has a better position. The asymmetry hypothesis or hypergamy hypothesis was
formulated, stating: “The probability of divorce in a mixed marriage is higher if the wife is older,
has a higher level of education or a higher social status position than her husband”.
Another hypothesis concerned with traditional divisions between husband and wife was
introduced in Chapter 4. Since a traditional division of labour between husband and wife is
expected to stabilize their marriage, the specialization hypothesis weakens the heterogamy
hypothesis in certain respects. It reads: “With respect to the (economic) social status of husband
and wife, the effect predicted in the heterogamy hypothesis will be reduced or even be turned
around”. A traditional division of labour is expected to be associated with a somewhat older
husband for whom the level of education is more important than for his wife. Nevertheless,
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reduction due to specialization of the effects of heterogamy with respect to age or education was
not expected to be very large, since these characteristics are also associated with culture, taste
and preferences.
Were the hypotheses borne out by the findings? The hypotheses were tested using population
registrations at Statistics Netherlands (Chapter 2) and survey data of SIN98 (Chapter 4). By using
the registration data on almost a million marriages, the hypotheses could be tested in multivariate
models for heterogamy with respect to age, church affiliation, nationality and previous marital
status. The survey data contain information on more types of heterogamy in almost 2,400 existing
or dissolved marriages. I could investigate spousal differences with respect to age, education,
social status, religion, ethnicity and social origin. The survey data also allowed more sophisticated
analyses over the course of marriage. In general, clear effects of heterogamy on divorce were
found in the registration data for heterogamy with respect to age, church affiliation and
nationality. With SIN98, I could, again, demonstrate the influence of heterogamy on the risk of
divorce. Spousal differences regarding age, level of education, religion and economic origin have
the greatest impact on the risk of divorce. Let me go into this in more detail.
According to the registration data, more couples divorced within ten years if their age
differences were larger. This heterogamy effect was found for 42 percent of the distinguished
heterogamous combinations of age. This influence is present, net of the main effect of age at
marriage itself: the younger the couple is on the wedding day, – measured by looking at youngest
spouse – the higher their risk of divorce.
Religious differences also raise the risk of divorce. The most important heterogamy effects
in Chapter 2 were for the main Christian denominations: mixed Catholic/Protestant couples had
higher divorce risks. Of all the combinations analysed, 51 percent of the cells showed the
heterogamy effect. Once more, these impacts are net of the main effects of religion, which indicate
that homogamous non-church members have the highest and homogamous Re-reformed have the
lowest risk of divorce.
Ethnic differences promote the risk of divorce in a comparable way. In Chapter 2, only the
official nationality was available and only registrations of marriages and divorces processed in the
Netherlands could be analysed. Therefore, the results were assessed with prudence. Nevertheless,
I can conclude that an ethnic heterogamy effect is present, because of the extremely high divorce
risks within ten years of mixed couples compared to their homogamous counterparts. Only 13
combinations of nationalities could be compared, of which 11 (85 percent) showed the heterogamy
effect.
Because of the relatively small numbers of mixed marriages, the impact of mixed marriage
on the risk of divorce as found on the micro level, is not as large on the macro level. However,
comparing an imaginary fully open society with a fully closed one, demonstrates that heterogamy
with respect to age and nationality does have some macro level implications towards the average
divorce risk.
The above conclusion drawn from information on the whole marriage population about
heterogamy pertaining to age can also be drawn from the event history analyses on the survey.
The greater the age difference, the higher the risk of divorce. The odds of divorce increase by 4
percent for each year of age difference and the odds are doubled if a couple differs 17 to 18 years
of age compared to an equally aged couple.
Conclusion
173
Religious heterogamy effects in the survey are shown in higher divorce risks for mixed
marriages between a non-church member and a Catholic, a Catholic and a Protestant and some
other not further specified mixed combinations compared to their homogamous counterparts. The
non-church member/Catholic mixed marriages have odds of divorce which are 24 percent higher
than the odds for homogamous non-church member couples and even 111 percent higher than for
homogamous Catholic couples. The Catholic/Protestant mixed marriages have odds of divorce
which are 59 percent above those of homogamous Catholics and 89 percent above those of
homogamous Protestants.
Another ascribed characteristic, only available in the survey data, which displays an effect
of heterogamy on divorce is economic origin: as the difference between the economic social status
of the husband’s and the wife’s father becomes larger, the odds of divorce become somewhat
higher, namely 15 percent per unit on a scale which, in our data, ranges from -1.40 to 2.43.
Thus, some clear effects were found on both registration and survey data which are in accordance
with the heterogamy hypothesis. The findings also confirm patterns in accordance with the
asymmetry hypothesis. The combinations of age categories displaying an impact of heterogamy in
the registration data are, for the larger part, combinations in which the wife is older than her
husband. The survey data lack evidence of an asymmetry effect of age. However, the impact of
educational heterogamy in SIN98 is asymmetric in nature: only if the wife has a higher level of
education than her husband, do the odds of divorce rise by 17 percent (in an extended model) to
21 percent (not controlling for other types of heterogamy). An asymmetry effect for economic
status was found in a model which does not control for other types of heterogamy, but was
explained in a multivariate model.
Furthermore, the specialization hypothesis is confirmed in the absence of the effects of absolute
differences between spouses concerning level of education and both the economic and cultural
dimensions of social status. The heterogamy effect on divorce is compensated here by the
advantages brought by task specialization.
The above results still stand if the presence of children in the family is taken into account.
Having a family with one or more children lowers the risk of divorce, but the effect of heterogamy
on divorce is not explained by having children, nor is the probability of first childbirth affected by
heterogamy.
The above description forms the answer to the first research question. In short, the answer
could be summarized as:
Heterogamy with respect to age, level of education, religion, ethnicity and social origin
has an influence on the risk of divorce in the Netherlands. The effect of educational
differences takes an asymmetric shape. The heterogamy effect of absolute origin
differences is found in the economic dimension. Differences regarding social status of the
spouses themselves do not have an independent influence of increasing the rate of
divorce. A wife with a higher cultural job status than her husband even appears to have a
lower risk of divorce. The sizes of the impacts were described in Chapters 2 and 4. Age
differences, (asymmetric) educational differences and religious differences seem to have
the largest impact on the risk of divorce.
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To give some concrete examples, I could say that, on average, the following situations would be
fairly stable:
– a couple not too young at the time of marriage and close in age, but if different,
then a slightly older husband – for example a 28 year old bride and a 30 year old
groom;
– the educational and own social status level is not important but the husband
should not have a lower education than his wife, even though it would help if the
cultural job status of the wife is higher than her husband’s;
– both are religious in the same, more conservative stream, i.e. Re-reformed;
– both are Dutch;
– both originate from families who are economically, but not culturally well-off, for
example families in which both fathers are successful and prominent businessmen.
On the other hand, a higher divorce risk would have:
– a couple with large age differences, one of them being very young, the other middle
aged or over;
– the wife has a university degree and the husband does not have any educational
certificate;
– one of them is not a member of any church, the other one is a Catholic;
– possibly from different countries;
– one of them stems from a high economic social status family, while the other stems
from a low one, but both their cultural social origins are relatively high; for example
one of the fathers is a university professor, the other is an artist without a secure
economic position.
Of course, these examples are illustrative and based on averages. Pinpointing specific professions
is a bit risky because in the analyses, status scales were used instead of specific professions.
7.1.2 Explaining heterogamy effects on divorce
In Chapter 4, the survey data allowed for an extension towards a possible explanation of the
relationship between heterogamy and divorce. Hypotheses were derived to answer the second
general research question posed in Chapter 1:
2 How can the relationship between heterogamy and divorce be explained?
Hypotheses were derived from the advantages of homogamy. The theory emphasized that
heterogamy will lead to a higher divorce risk because spouses, on average, are less able to get on
with each other because of differing preferences or expectations. The explanatory conflict
hypothesis with respect to divorce predicts that differences of opinion between husband and wife
explain the effects of heterogamy on divorce. Next, it was noted that social environments, on
average, accept a mixed marriage to lower degree, which will lead to less support for the marriage
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and an inclination to support a divorce during hard times within the marriage. The explanatory
support hypothesis with respect to divorce reads that disapproval by the social environment
explains the effects of heterogamy on divorce.
Subsequently, the hypotheses are made more specific by referring to the distinction (Blau &
Duncan 1967) between characteristics which are ascribed by inherited background – the parents,
social environment – and characteristics which are achieved on one’s own merits – the spouses
themselves. The ascription explanation hypothesis predicts that the effects of heterogamy with
respect to religion, ethnicity and social origin on divorce can be explained mainly by social
disapproval of the marriage. The achievement explanation hypothesis predicts that the effect of
heterogamy with respect to the level of education and own social status on divorce will be
explained mainly by differences of opinion between the spouses. Asymmetry effects are expected
to be explained by both the lack of support from the social environment and the differences of
opinion between the spouses to about the same extent.
The analyses in Chapter 4 indeed showed that mixed marriage had an influence on differences of
opinion and disapproval of the marriage by the social environment and that these, in turn,
appeared to have an impact on divorce risks. Furthermore, some of the influence of mixed
marriage on divorce weakened after taking differences of opinion and disapproval of the marriage
by the social environment into account.
In which instances could we speak of a causal explanation? The effect indicating that age
differences between spouses, regardless of their direction, lead to a higher risk of divorce, was
explained for one third by the explanatory characteristics. It appeared to be mainly the lack of
support from parents, friends, neighbours and representatives of the church which is responsible
for this explanation. The asymmetry effect of a higher divorce risk for couples when the wife has a
higher level of education than her husband can be considered as completely explained by spousal
opinions and environmental support. As could be expected for a characteristic of one’s own
achievement, differences of opinion seem to have the largest share in the effect reduction, but, as
hypothesized for asymmetry effects, the role played by the social environment’s lack of support is
almost equally important.
Spousal opinions and disapproval from the environment explain more than one third of the
impact of being non-church member/Catholic or Catholic/Protestant mixed on the risk of divorce.
For religiously mixed marriages involving smaller groups, this explanatory power is a little more
than one fifth. Only the explanation offered by the social environment is statistically causal, in the
sense that it is intervening: religious heterogamy affects environmental support; support affects
the risk of divorce. This corroborates the ascription explanation hypothesis which predicts that the
influence of heterogamy with respect to ascribed characteristics on divorce can be explained
mainly by social disapproval for the marriage. This does not apply to the impact of differences in
economic parental background, which is only causally explained by differences of opinion to a
very limited extent.
Overall, these conclusions can be summarized in the following answer to the second
general research question posed in Chapter 1:
As to the impact of mixed marriage on the risk of divorce, there is an explanatory power
from differences of opinion and disapproval by the social environment, consisting of
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parents, friends and others. The differences of opinion consist of different expectations in
life, diverging life styles and experiences regarding the relationship. The disapproval by
the social environment manifests itself in a lack of support that the couple can fall back
on. The distinction between inherited characteristics of ascription and achieved
characteristics by own effort has only a mediocre meaning in the explanation of
heterogamy effects on divorce.
7.1.3 Macro-level trends
This study also looked into changes over historical time. Heterogamy affects the risk of divorce,
but this does not necessarily remain constant over time. This constitutes the third general
research question in Chapter 1:
3 Which trends can be discerned in the past few decades with respect to the
relationship between heterogamy and divorce?
Hypotheses were derived from the societal changes which took place in the past few decades. I
pointed out the trend towards individualization and secularization which was accompanied by a
shift in norms and values. This implies that, despite an increase in the number of divorces, the
growing liberalization of norms and values would lead to more acceptance of mixed marriage and,
thus, a decreased effect of mixed marriage on the risk of divorce: the decreasing heterogamy effect
hypothesis. A second type of change was also taken into account. Society is changing from one in
which positions are merely acquired by characteristics ascribed by social origin towards one in
which positions are acquired more by characteristics achieved on one’s own merits (Blau &
Duncan 1967). Before, this has been applied to account for the relatively higher importance of a
characteristic such as the level of education compared to characteristics such as religion or social
origin in the spouse selection process. In the same way, characteristics of ascription and
achievement can be used in the prediction of trends with respect to the influence of heterogamy
on the risk of divorce. The ascription part of the trend hypothesis predicts that the influence of
differences between husband and wife regarding religion, ethnicity and social origin on the risk of
divorce decreases over time. At the same time, the achievement part of the trend hypothesis predicts
that the influence of the level of education and spousal social status on the risk of divorce
increases over time.
With respect to changes over time, statistical analyses were possible on both the official
registrations and the survey data. This was accomplished in Chapters 3 and 5, respectively. The
general increase in the number of divorces, especially in the first few years of marriage, from the
beginning of the 1970s until the beginning of the 1980s was clearly demonstrated. Historical
trends in the absolute level of heterogamy in the data analysed in this study go in different
directions. Age differences fluctuated a little but do not show a clear pattern over time. The
absolute differences between husband and wife with regard to the level of education and
economic social status seemed to increase until the middle of the 1960s and subsequently
decrease until the 1980s. The absolute level of religiously mixed marriage increases over time, but
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this increase mainly takes place from the mid 1980s onwards. The same applies even more
extremely to the level of ethnic heterogamy. The trends regarding spousal differences in economic
and cultural social origin are less clear and lack a recognizable pattern.
Even though the levels of heterogamy may sometimes change, changes in the impact of
heterogamy on the risk of divorce over historical time are hardly or not found. Only very little
changes in line with the ascription part of the trend hypothesis were found on registration data in
Chapter 3. This is limited to a decreasing impact in the first five years of marriage of being a
Catholic/Re-reformed or a Dutch Reformed/Re-reformed couple on the divorce risk: those two
heterogamy effects do exist in the 1974-1979 cohort but they do not in the 1980-1984 cohort. This
trend is not found in Chapter 5 with survey data and more controlling variables. Only when
comparing the period before and after 1970, do non-church member/Catholic mixed marriages
have declining divorce risks, but this trend is not very convincing. In the survey data, the
measurement of religious affiliation is more honestly measured by a two step question, first
asking: “Do you consider yourself as a member of a church or religious group?” In Chapter 3, the
officially registered affiliation could only be corrected by taking a wedding ceremony in church
into account. According to the survey data, ethnically mixed marriages seemed to have an
increasing risk of divorce in the second half of the 20th century, but the correct group comparisons
could not be made. 
Summarizing, my answer to the third general research question is:
Overall, there are few indications that the influence of heterogamy on the risk of divorce
changes much in the second half of the 20th century.
7.1.4 Changes in the course of marriage
Apart from changes over historical time, changes can also occur during a marriage. This also goes
for heterogamy and the influence of heterogamy on divorce. That is why the forth general
research question was posed in Chapter 1. This research question consists of two parts.
4a Does the impact of mixed marriage on the risk of divorce change over the course
of marriage and in which direction?
4b What happens to the risk of divorce when heterogamy changes during marriage
in either direction?
In order to answer the first part of this research question, hypotheses were derived predicting the
direction taken by the impact of heterogamy on divorce over the course of marriage. The
hypothesis of growing acceptance predicts that spouses learn to accept their differences and this
causes the influence of heterogamy on divorce to decline during marriage. The hypothesis of
accumulated irritations, however, predicts that spouses will get more fed up with their differences
and this leads to an increase of heterogamy effects on divorce. A pattern of an initial increase
followed by a decline of heterogamy effects was predicted in the inverse U-shape hypothesis.
Proceeding on the hypothesis of growing acceptance, an ascription and asymmetry part and an
achievement part were distinguished. It was predicted that the decrease of the heterogamy effects
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during marriage will be small for characteristics of ascription, namely church affiliation, ethnicity
and social origin as well as for asymmetry effects. The effects of characteristics of achievement,
namely the level of education, own social status and also age, on divorce were predicted to show a
more pronounced decrease over the course of marriage.
With respect to the second part of the research question, I predicted that marriage
partners who adapt to each other by growing towards each other in terms of social heterogamy
have lower divorce risks, whereas partners who become alienated from one another in the sense
of a growing level of social heterogamy have higher divorce risks. This is called the growing
together-growing apart hypothesis.
Changing effects of heterogamy on the risk of divorce were analysed on the basis of registration
data in Chapter 3 and on the survey data in Chapter 5. The analyses were preceded by a
description of levels of heterogamy over the course of marriage. In the registration data, this
merely reflects heterogamy effects and not changes within married couples, since the level of
heterogamy could only be measured at the beginning of the marriage. In the survey data,
however, changes could be measured within married couples with respect to economic and
cultural status differences, and church affiliation. Age differences were dynamically measured by
using age ratios. Status differences between spouses rise during the first 25 years of their
marriage. This rise occurs most strongly in the cultural dimension of social status. The proportion
of religiously mixed marriages decreases over the course of marriage. These changes reflect both
heterogamy effects and adaptation.
Which conclusions were drawn with respect to changes of heterogamy effects on divorce during
marriage? A very slight and inconsistent decline of the heterogamy effect for some categories of
nationality was found. Any other linear changes over the course of marriage could not be found.
Comparison between the period before and after first child birth in the survey data reveals a
decreasing asymmetry effect of a wife with a higher economic status than her husband: before
childbirth, there is a significant effect towards a higher probability of divorce, after childbirth, this
effect disappears. Furthermore, there is a decreasing heterogamy effect after childbirth for the
specific category of mixed marriages between a non-church member and a Catholic. A short
answer to research question 4a can be formulated as follows:
Overall, there are little changes in the influence of heterogamy on the risk of divorce over
the course of marriage.
This leaves us with the question about how the risk of divorce is affected if spouses grow together
or apart. This question could only be answered for characteristics which were sufficiently
measured for both spouses at different points in time during marriage. These characteristics are:
economic and cultural status and religious denomination. For both dimensions of social status,
changes in the level of heterogamy during marriage do not affect the risk of divorce. Changes in
the level of religious heterogamy, however, do affect the risk of divorce but only if spouses are
growing apart. In short, the answer to research question 4b reads:
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Changes in the level of social status heterogamy during marriage do not affect the risk of
divorce. Changes in religious heterogamy do: if spouses have the same religion or both
have no religion when they marry, but one of them decides to change, then the divorce
risk increases.
7.1.5 Spouse selection
The focus was extended toward characteristics of spouse selection which precede heterogamy. Did
the spouses look well enough when selecting each other or did they marry in a hurry or under
social pressure? This concerns the intensity and quality of the search for a suitable spouse. The
following descriptive research question was put forward:
5 Does the intensity with which persons look for a spouse before deciding to marry
influence the risk of divorce?
Four indicators for the intensity or quality of the search behaviour for a suitable spouse were
investigated in Chapter 6: age at marriage, the duration of courtship, a premarital pregnancy
leading to a more or less forced marriage (shotgun marriage) and premarital cohabitation. The all-
encompassing quality of search behaviour hypothesis states that the longer and more intensive one
has searched for his or her spouse, the smaller the probability of divorce.
The most important finding in Chapter 6, using the survey data, is that the influence of the quality
of search behaviour on the risk of divorce does indeed exist and that it is fairly strong. Starting
married or unmarried cohabitation at a more grown-up age and after a somewhat longer period of
courtship is more favourable for marital stability than starting cohabitation at a premature age
with someone whom one has not known for long. For each year the youngest spouse is older at
the time of marriage, the odds of divorce decrease by 3 to 4 percent, depending on which control
variables are included. For each extra year of courtship, this decrease is 5 to 9 percent. The
influence of age at marriage or cohabitation on the risk of divorce decreases over time, which
could indicate that people are increasingly likely to engage in marriage or cohabitation when they
are emotionally ready for it. Any further postponements of marriage do not provide extra
protection for the continuity of the relationship.
Premarital pregnancy as a reason for cohabitation or marriage initially seems to increase
the risk of divorce. But this effect is completely explained by characteristics of the marital past and
traditionality during socialization. Instead of the quality of search behaviour, shotgun marriages
are associated with pressure from the social environment.
Premarital cohabitation could be considered as an extension of the search behaviour for a
spouse by calling it a test marriage. However, couples have a higher probability of divorce if they
lived together before marriage: the odds of divorce increase by at least 20 percent up to 56 percent
without controlling other variables. Unmarried cohabitation is associated with less adherence to
traditional norms and values concerning marriage and the family and not merely with a test
marriage.
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A short answer to the fifth general research question can be formulated as follows:
The influence of the quality and intensity of the search for a suitable spouse on the risk of
divorce is fairly strong. With regard to marital stability, it is, therefore, advisable to
marry at a more mature age and after a reasonable period of courtship instead of
marrying at a premature age with someone whom one has only known for a short period
of time. Cohabitation before marriage is associated with less adherence to traditional
norms and values concerning marriage and the family and, therefore, with a higher risk
of divorce.
The final research question in the present study is an explanatory one:
6 Can the influence of the intensity of search behaviour on the risk of divorce be
explained by mixed marriage?
The results in Chapter 6 showed that only the influence of the duration of courtship becomes a
little smaller after taking social heterogamy into account. Thus, the following answer can be
given:
The influence of the intensity of search behaviour on the risk of divorce can hardly be
explained by socially mixed marriage. It is to be expected that prematurity and
heterogamy with regard to personality characteristics play a more important role in that
influence.
The implications of the results for the hypotheses are schematically summarized in Table 7.1. In
this table, the main hypotheses from the previous chapters are listed, sometimes condensed,
followed by the characteristics for which they are confirmed or rejected by the registration data
from Statistics Netherlands and by the survey data of SIN98.
7.2 Discussion and implications
By answering the six general research questions above, I have sketched a more complete image of
the relationships between spouse selection, heterogamy and divorce. The magnitude of the
influence and changes in the influence on macro and micro level have been described and
explanations have been given.
Before this present study, little was known with regard to the relationship between
heterogamy and divorce in the Netherlands. A few bivariate studies indicated an increased risk of
divorce for mixed marriages with respect to ethnicity, church affiliation and age. Research into
explanations or trends were absent. In the United States and some other countries, more research
has been carried out in this field, but most studies were limited to describing the impact of one or
just a few types of heterogamy.
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Table 7.1 Main hypotheses: confirmations and rejections per data set
hypothesis content registrations
confirmed
registrations
rejected
SIN98 confirmed SIN98 rejected
heterogamy heterogamy
increases divorce
risk
age, religion,
ethnicity
(nationality)
marital
status
age, religion, social
origin (economic)
education (see asym-
metry & speciali-
zation), social status
(see specialization)
asymmetry increases risk if
wife in better
position
age education age, social status
(after controlling)
specialization no heterogamy
effect
education, social status
explanatory
conflict
education (asymmetry),
social origin
age, religion
explanatory
support
age, education
(asymmetry), religion
social origin
trend several
hypotheses
decreasing
religion
(hardly)
rest decreasing religion
(specific group; ?)
overall; ethnicity
opposite (increasing)
effect (?)
changes over
course of
marriage
several
hypotheses
decline
ethnicity
(nationality; ?)
rest after childbirth:
decreasing social status
(asymmetry), decreasing
religion (one group)
rest
growing
together-
growing apart
effect when
heterogamy level
changes
religion social status
quality of
search
behaviour
longer and better
search leads to
less divorce
age at marriage, period
of courtship
shotgun marriage
(after controlling),
premarital
cohabitation
explained by
heterogamy
spouse selection
effects explained
duration of courtship
(limited)
rest
It is no surprise that, for the Netherlands, no suitable data were available to carry out the
investigations as they were in this present study. However, official registrations of marriages and
divorces which were kept at Statistics Netherlands were matched as part of this study. These
valuable data had never before been used for profound analysis and were stored on a computer
system after separate basic descriptive statistics on marriages and divorces had been published. A
survey was needed for characteristics which are not registered in the official registrations, such as
the level of education, social status, spousal differences of opinion, disapproval by the social
environment and the intensity of searching for a spouse. At the start of this present study, a
suitable survey was not available in which a sufficient number of divorced and non-divorced
couples could be compared. Then the Divorce in the Netherlands (SIN98) survey (Kalmijn, De Graaf
& Uunk 1999) was carried out and this present study participated in it. We gathered the necessary
and previously unavailable information from both married and divorced couples in order to be
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able to carry out several research projects, including this one.
An important point of discussion concerns the difference between the micro and macro impact of
the effects of heterogamy on divorce. In Chapter 2, I already stressed the fact that a large influence
of heterogamy on the risk of divorce on the micro level does not necessarily contribute a great
deal to the divorce figures on the macro level. After all, married couples are quite homogamous on
average. If a relatively small group of mixed couples has a higher divorce risk, then this only
makes a little contribution to the total number of divorces. In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that the
contribution of age and ethnic heterogamy to the total amount of divorce is still notable. If the
occurrence of mixed marriage increases, the contribution to the divorce figures on the macro level
will also increase under the condition that heterogamy effects on divorce remain stable.
A relatively high contribution of heterogamy to divorce figures has implications for
research into homogamy and heterogamy as well. The higher the proportion of divorce among
mixed couples compared to homogamous couples, the more likely it is that a survey among (still)
married couples is a selective sample of relatively homogamous couples. If information for
research purposes on homogamy is gathered among the presently married and only present
marriages are taken into account, then this can distort the results by an overestimation of
homogamous couples, since there is a higher probability of the mixed marriages already having
ended in divorce and therefore being absent in the sample.
A striking finding in this study is that there are many characteristics of ascription
amongst the characteristics of heterogamy which have an effect on the risk of divorce. This goes
for differences with respect to religion, coming from families with a different economic status and
wealth and, seemingly, ethnic differences. This is contradictory to expectations based on a
meritocratization of society. According to this expectation, characteristics which are inherited
from the parents should become less important in comparison to characteristics achieved on one’s
own merits when it comes to achieving certain social positions and also when it comes to
choosing a spouse. Stronger decreases of effects of heterogamy with respect to social origin and
religion could be expected. Earlier research indicated that religion has become less important,
whereas the level of education has become more important as a selection criterion with respect to
marriage (Kalmijn 1991a, b). This research demonstrates that, regardless of these possible changes
in preferences at the time of the marriage, these dividing lines of ascription continue to exert their
impact on the risk of divorce.
Not only the dividing lines of ascription still continue to have their impact on the risk of
divorce. In fact, all types of heterogamy studied here, whether associated with characteristics of
achievement or characteristics of ascription, hardly showed significant changes over time
concerning their effect on the risk of divorce. Simultaneously, heterogamy with respect to certain
characteristics of achievement occurs less frequently and heterogamy with respect to certain
characteristics of ascription occurs more frequently. On the macro level, the result will be that the
share in the total divorce rate of couples who are mixed on characteristics of ascription will
increase while the share of couples who are mixed on characteristics of achievement will decrease.
In this way, more openness on the wedding side coincides with a ‘correction’ on the divorce side,
because the openness of society has not yet penetrated there.
Maybe people’s preferences regarding their marriage partners change over time, but the
mechanisms of divorce remain the same. The result of which marriages survive, therefore,
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remains the same. The only difference is that the level of divorce is higher, along with the
occurrence of certain types of heterogamy. It is possible that it is not the openness of society
which is changing here, but the attitudes towards the value of marriage. A growing number of
people want to reach personal goals with their marriage. Those people consider marriage not as a
sacred goal by itself, but as a means of achieving these goals. If a marriage does not yield what
they expect from it, they are willing to end their marriage.
It is important to note that it is a worthwhile exercise to replicate the trend analyses on
more data when they become available. As always with analyses including interaction parameters,
the statistical power of data sets is easily exhausted. In the present study, this does not apply to
the population data, but it does apply to the survey data. I tried to capture this by also entering
interaction parameters characteristic by characteristic or by comparing dichotomously defined
periods. Still, confirmation of trend effects is necessary.
Changes within marriages were studied as well. With respect to changes of the level of
heterogamy during marriage, only a few characteristics were sufficiently measured at different
points in time for both spouses, namely occupations and religion. To be able to draw more
conclusions on changes during marriage or to measure the correct temporal and causal order of
events, more points of measurement of characteristics of both spouses are necessary. The fact that
this kind of information can only be obtained in a retrospective design or a panel study of decades
makes it more difficult to reliably gather this information on both existing marriages and
marriages which have ended in divorce.
In this study, explanatory mechanisms for the effects of heterogamy on divorce were
tested. Differences of opinion between spouses regarding a wide range of subjects and
disapproval of the marriage or the spouse by parents, friends and others in the social environment
constitute a partial explanation of heterogamy effects on the risk of divorce. Of course, an
extended test is possible in future research if the appropriate information is available. Not only
differences of opinion, but also different expectations in the relationship, such as the division of
labour and household tasks, and different lifestyle characteristics, such as cultural participation
and time and money spending, could be taken into account when heterogamy effects on the risk
of divorce are to be explained. With respect to the disapproval of the marriage by the social
environment, an extension of explanatory characteristics is conceivable in the sense of more
blatant or more subtle social pressure by, for example, the parents. Attention of parents given to
the couple, contact between the couple and the parents or a parental attempt to stop the marriage
could be taken into account.
Another possible extension is to introduce psychological causes. If persons with colliding
personalities have higher risks of divorce, then this can also be used for the explanation of effects
of heterogamy on the risk of divorce. This study showed that sociological and demographic
characteristics play a role in the risk of divorce. The explanation of this is sometimes sociological,
but may as well be psychological. More integration in research may be possible. In this way,
heterogamy with respect to personality characteristics can also be integrated in research in this
field. In Chapter 6 regarding the spouse selection process, it was already put forward that this may
be a possible explanation for the influence of the quality of searching for a suitable spouse on the
risk of divorce. Obviously, integrating sociological and psychological aspects demands a data set
which combines information in both fields.
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Another recommendation can be made in relation to theory testing. It was said that
homogamy is prevailing because it ensures that spouses have similar tastes, preferences and
lifestyles. When dealing with the reasons of the existence of heterogamy, it was said that one may
find a spouse with corresponding ideas, opinions, behaviour and expectations but deviating social
characteristics. The question, then, is whether socially heterogamous couples who decide to
marry, do so because their opinions and behaviour correspond, despite their social differences.
More insight can be obtained by comparing levels of heterogamy on social and personality
characteristics between couples who marry and those who decide not to marry and break up their
relationship. This will shed more light on the spouse selection process. These new-to-gain findings
will strengthen or weaken the findings up till now that birds of a feather flock together and that
opposites repel rather than attract.
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Inleiding
I
n 1950 lag het aantal echtscheidingen in Nederland per jaar nog op 30 per 10.000 gehuwde
paren, in 1985 was dit aantal gestegen tot 99. Vooral de jaren ’70 en de eerste helft van de
jaren ’80 vertoonden een stijging. In de tweede helft van de jaren ’80 en in de jaren ’90
vertoonde het cijfer enige schommelingen, maar bleef tussen pakweg 80 en 100. De toename van
de echtscheidingsfrequentie wordt veelal toegeschreven aan ontwikkelingen in de samenleving
zoals een toenemende economische onafhankelijkheid van vrouwen en veranderende normen en
waarden.
Heterogamie
In deze studie onderzoek ik enkele specifieke sociaal-culturele echtscheidingsoorzaken:
partnerselectie en, in het bijzonder, gemengd huwen. Gemengde huwelijken worden ook wel
heterogame of exogame huwelijken genoemd, terwijl niet-gemengde huwelijken wel worden
aangeduid met de term homogame of endogame huwelijken. In deze studie worden verschillende
vormen van heterogamie onderzocht voor wat betreft hun invloed op de echtscheidingskans:
heterogamie naar leeftijd, opleidingsniveau, sociale status, religie, etniciteit en sociale herkomst.
Gemengde huwelijken worden vaak geassocieerd met godsdienst en etnische herkomst.
Wat godsdienst betreft denkt men in Nederland van oudsher aan de verschillen tussen
katholieken en protestanten – in Nederland met name hervormden en gereformeerden. De
traditionele reserveringen ten aanzien van huwelijken tussen partners uit beide groepen komen
tot uitdrukking in het gezegde: “Twee geloven op één kussen, daar slaapt de duivel tussen”. Bij
koninklijke huwelijken krijgt het gemengd trouwen naar religie en etniciteit heden ten dage
nationale aandacht, zoals bij de volgens traditie Nederlands hervormde prins Maurits met de
katholieke Marilène van den Broek en bij de Nederlands hervormde kroonprins Willem-Alexander
met de katholieke en Argentijnse Máxima Zorreguieta.
Maar er zijn meer herkomstkenmerken waarop huwelijkspartners kunnen verschillen.
Man en vrouw kunnen uit een verschillend economisch of cultureel milieu stammen: van een rijke
of arme familie met een meer of minder verfijnde culturele bagage. Vaak worden dit soort
kenmerken eenvoudig afgelezen aan het beroep van de vader, hetgeen blijkt uit vragen als: “Wat
doet je vader?”. Ook ouders stellen dit soort vragen over de vader van de vriend of vriendin van
hun dochter of zoon.
Bovenstaande kenmerken waarop huwelijkspartners al dan niet kunnen verschillen zijn
geërfd van de ouders. Dit wordt aangeduid met de term toegeschreven kenmerken of ascriptie.
Zelfs de religie, in principe een persoonlijke keuze, is doorgaans overgenomen van de ouders,
tenzij men besluit de kerk te verlaten. Conversie van de ene naar de andere religie is in Nederland
vrij zeldzaam. In een meritocratische samenleving zijn, naast de toegeschreven kenmerken, juist
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ook kenmerken van belang die voortkomen uit eigen verdienste. Men vraagt immers niet meer
alleen naar het beroep van de vader, maar vooral ook naar het beroep van de aanstaande
huwelijkspartner zelf. Met deze zogenaamde verworven kenmerken, ook wel aangeduid met de
Engelse term achievement, doelen we op het opleidingsniveau en het beroepsniveau van de
echtgenoten. Daarnaast kijk ik naar leeftijdsverschillen tussen partners.
Heterogamie en echtscheiding: relevantie
De relatie tussen sociale heterogamie en de kans op echtscheiding zoals bestudeerd in deze studie
is een stap in het zogenaamde mobiliteitsonderzoek. Deze tak van onderzoek is onderdeel van de
sociologische vraag naar sociale ongelijkheid. Omdat sociale ongelijkheid niet stabiel hoeft te zijn,
hebben onderzoekers gekeken naar veranderingen in sociale ongelijkheid. Deze veranderingen
zijn ook te onderzoeken tussen generaties: zonen kunnen stijgen en dalen ten opzichte van hun
vaders voor wat betreft hun sociale klasse, status of opleidingsniveau. Ook door te trouwen kan
men in andere sociale kringen terecht komen. Een volgende stap is derhalve de sociale mobiliteit
ten gevolge van een huwelijk met een partner met verschillende sociale kenmerken. De
sociologische mobiliteitsvragen gaan specifiek over kenmerken als status en opleiding.
Sociaal-culturele kenmerken als godsdienst en etniciteit worden nu in het onderzoek betrokken.
De demografische inslag van familiebanden en het sociologische aspect van
verbintenissen tussen vertegenwoordigers van verschillende sociaal-culturele groepen geven deze
studie ook relevantie op het gebied van een andere sociologisch vraag, namelijk die naar sociale
cohesie in de samenleving. De mate waarin gemengde huwelijken voorkomen is een indicator
voor de mate waarin leden van verschillende groepen in de samenleving integreren of gescheiden
blijven, ofwel: de openheid van de samenleving. In Nederland lijken huwelijkspartners over het
algemeen nogal sterk op elkaar wat sociale kenmerken betreft. Dit is onderzocht voor het
opleidingsniveau, leeftijd, sociale achtergrond en godsdienst. De mate van homogamie is niet
noodzakelijkerwijs constant over de tijd, zoals voor Nederland is aangetoond. Een verandering in
de mate van heterogamie kan worden beschouwd als een verandering in de openheid van de
samenleving.
We kunnen echter een uitgebreidere kijk op de openheid van de samenleving krijgen door de
andere kant van de medaille te onderzoeken: eindigen gemengde huwelijken eerder in een
echtscheiding dan homogame huwelijken? Stijgende echtscheidingscijfers maken het zowel
interessant als mogelijk om dergelijk onderzoek uit te voeren.
In de Verenigde Staten en enkele andere landen is de relatie tussen heterogamie en
echtscheiding voor verschillende decennia onderzocht. Desondanks was dit onderzoek niet erg
systematisch en nam het maar één of enkele typen heterogamie per studie in ogenschouw. Voor
Nederland zijn er enkele bivariate statistische artikelen en een studie voorhanden die aantonen
dat huwelijken een grotere echtscheidingskans hebben wanneer ze gemengd zijn naar etniciteit,
kerkelijke affiliatie of leeftijd. Behalve het feit dat met weinig kenmerken rekening gehouden
wordt, is een ander nadeel van deze studies dat zij de vergelijking tussen homogame en
gemengde categorieën niet altijd expliciet op de juiste manier maken, ook als de gegevens
daaromtrent beschikbaar zijn. Dit is met name het geval waar het gaat over kerkelijke gezindte
waarbij effecten van zowel denominatie als heterogamie bestaan, zodat ze verstrengeld kunnen
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raken en uit elkaar gehaald moeten worden. In deze studie wordt daar rekening mee gehouden.
De mate van heterogamie kan gezien worden als de uitkomst van het
partnerselectieproces. Wanneer mensen zoeken naar een geschikte huwelijkspartner kunnen ze
lang op zoek zijn of degene met wie ze hun leven willen delen snel vinden. Een lange zoekperiode
kan resulteren in langer wachten tot een meer volwassen leeftijd, in het hebben van meer
verkeringen of in het observeren van een kandidaat-echtgenoot gedurende een langere periode
alvorens zeker te zijn de ware gevonden te hebben. Dit klinkt als een bewuste en nauwkeurige
calculatie, maar dit proces is vanzelfsprekend subtieler en deels onbewust. Het selecteren van de
‘perfecte’ huwelijkspartner kan, hoe dan ook, een tijdrovende zaak zijn.
Onderzoeksvragen
De onderhavige studie heeft tot doel om het eerder onderzoek systematisch uit te breiden. In mijn
onderzoeksvragen richt ik mij in eerste instantie op een zo volledig mogelijk beeld van de invloed
van heterogamie op de echtscheidingskans, waarbij met zoveel mogelijk aspecten rekening
gehouden wordt. In het verleden werden deze aspecten vaak afzonderlijk en sommige niet
onderzocht. De eerste beschrijvende onderzoeksvraag luidt:
1 Heeft heterogamie met betrekking tot (1) leeftijd, (2) opleidingsniveau, (3) sociale status, (4) godsdienst,
(5) etniciteit, en (6) sociale herkomst, een invloed op de echtscheidingkans in Nederland? En welke typen
heterogamie hebben de grootste invloed?
 
Natuurlijk is het interessant om te kijken naar de echtscheidingskans van een paar dat naar
bijvoorbeeld opleidingsniveau gemengd is zonder naar andere sociale verschillen te kijken. Dit kan
echter een onvolledig of vertekend beeld geven. Sommige kenmerken kunnen immers gecorreleerd
zijn. Vandaar dat het noodzakelijk is om met verschillende vormen van heterogamie rekening te
houden. Wanneer de invloed van verschillende vormen van heterogamie is vastgesteld, dan
resteert de vraag naar de oorzaken van deze invloed. Dit is een verklaringsvraag:
2 Hoe kan de relatie tussen heterogamie en echtscheiding worden verklaard?
Naast beschrijvingen en verklaringen worden trends besproken. In de samenleving hebben zich in
de afgelopen decennia allerlei sociaal-culturele veranderingen voorgedaan die gerelateerd zijn aan
het onderzoeksveld van deze studie. De mate van heterogamie en echtscheidingscijfers zijn niet
constant. Dit is ingebed in twee soorten veranderingen in de samenleving. De eerste soort
veranderingen is individualisering en secularisering, tezamen met een verandering in normen en
waarden en een groeiende acceptatie van echtscheiding. De tweede soort betreft
meritocratisering: de samenleving is veranderd van een waarin posities kunnen worden
verworven op basis van sociale afkomst naar een waarin men posities bereikt op basis van eigen
verdiensten. De vraag is wat er gebeurd is met de relatie tussen heterogamie en echtscheiding. Dit
leidt tot mijn macro-trendvraag:
3 Welke trends kunnen in de afgelopen decennia worden onderscheiden met betrekking tot de invloed van
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heterogamie op de echtscheidingskans?
Ook binnen huwelijken kunnen veranderingen optreden. Twee typen veranderingen zijn hier van
belang: die in de invloed van heterogamie op echtscheiding en die in de mate van heterogamie
zelf. Wat de veranderingen in de invloed van heterogamie op echtscheiding betreft, kan men zich
afvragen of mensen gedurende het huwelijk steeds meer geïrriteerd raken door hun echtgenoot
die van hen verschilt. Of wellicht is het andersom en raken echtgenoten steeds meer gewend aan
elkaars sociale verschillen. Wat ook mogelijk is – en dit brengt ons naar veranderingen in de mate
van heterogamie gedurende het huwelijk – is dat echtgenoten naar elkaar toe groeien,
bijvoorbeeld doordat de laagst opgeleide partner een aanvullende opleiding volgt of doordat een
echtgenoot zich bekeert tot het geloof van de ander. Natuurlijk kunnen deze persoonlijke
veranderingen in de tegenovergestelde richting gaan van vervreemding of sociaal uit elkaar
groeien van de huwelijkspartners. Wat levensloopveranderingen betreft zijn er twee deelvragen:
 
4a Verandert de invloed van heterogamie op het echtscheidingsrisico gedurende de loop van het huwelijk
en in welke richting?
4b Wat gebeurt er met het echtscheidingsrisico wanneer de mate van heterogamie verandert gedurende
het huwelijk in welke richting dan ook?
De laatste onderzoeksvragen gaan in op de intensiteit van het zoekgedrag, zoals een korte
zoekduur of een haastig beëindigde zoekperiode. Vraag 5 is beschrijvend, vraag 6 verklarend.
 
5 Heeft de intensiteit waarmee personen zoeken naar een huwelijkspartner alvorens ze besluiten om te
trouwen een invloed op het echtscheidingsrisico?
 
6 Zo ja, kan deze relatie worden verklaard door heterogamie? 
Gegevens
Er worden in dit onderzoek twee databronnen gebruikt. De eerste databron betreft de registraties
aanwezig bij het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) welke ik ter plekke heb geanalyseerd.
Deze informatie was geleverd door elke Nederlandse gemeente en bevat elk huwelijk en elke
echtscheiding die in deze gemeenten werden geregistreerd tussen 1974 en 1994. Door de
gemeenten werd achtergrondinformatie van het echtpaar ingevuld op een formulier dat door het
CBS werd verwerkt. Van vóór deze periode zijn geen elektronische dataregels beschikbaar. Sinds
1994 worden de gegevens niet meer op deze manier verzameld, maar wordt informatie verkregen
over personen uit de Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie (GBA) van iedere gemeente. Die informatie
is niet toegankelijk voor externe analyses over de tijd. Dat de gegevens omtrent huwelijken en
echtscheidingen tussen 1974 en 1994, die de hele populatie dekken, wel door mij konden worden
gekoppeld en geanalyseerd was een unieke kans. Voor een dergelijk doel en op de wijze zoals in
deze studie waren deze data nog nooit eerder gebruikt. Door de kleine één miljoen huwelijken
gesloten tussen 1974 en 1984 te analyseren, konden ze allemaal minimaal tien jaar worden
gevolgd.
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Het gebruik van deze gegevens heeft twee voordelen. Omdat de informatie van officiële
registraties stamt, lijdt zij niet aan een mogelijke onbetrouwbaarheid ten gevolge van
retrospectieve vragen. Bovendien is informatie voorhanden van de werkelijke populatie in plaats
van uit een steekproef, waardoor we niet afhankelijk zijn van statistische significantie. Ook is het
mogelijk om relatief kleine groepen te bestuderen. Het gebruik van deze gegevens heeft ook
nadelen. Het aantal kenmerken waarvoor heterogamie kan worden bestudeerd is beperkt.
Echtgenoten kunnen worden vergeleken wat betreft hun leeftijd, godsdienst, nationaliteit en hun
voorgaande burgerlijke staat, maar andere sociale kenmerken op basis waarvan huwelijkspartners
elkaar mogelijkerwijs uitkiezen, zoals opleidingsniveau en sociale herkomst, blijven buiten beeld.
Vanwege de beperkingen van de registratiegegevens, is ook gebruik gemaakt van
surveygegevens. Tevoren was onvoldoende surveymateriaal beschikbaar voor de vergelijking van
wel en niet gescheidenen voor een onderzoek zoals het onderhavige. Het SIN98 survey werd
speciaal voor dit en verscheidene andere onderzoeken ontworpen en bevat voldoende gegevens
over beide echtgenoten in bijna 2400 zowel intacte als verbroken relaties. Het survey bevatte
onder andere vragen over de levensloop van de respondenten, hun huidige of beëindigde huwelijk
en hun arbeidsloopbanen. Voor de onderhavige studie zijn vragen toegevoegd over sociale
kenmerken van beide echtgenoten, hun verkering, onenigheden tussen de echtgenoten en de
acceptatie van de relatie door de sociale omgeving. Beide gegevensbronnen, registraties en survey,
vullen elkaar aan.
Bevindingen: toetsing van hypothesen
Heterogamie-effecten op de echtscheidingskans
In hoofdstuk 2 en 4 werden hypothesen gepresenteerd omtrent de effecten van heterogamie op
het echtscheidingsrisico ter beantwoording van de eerste onderzoeksvraag. De meest basale en
algemene hypothese is de heterogamiehypothese die voorspelt dat heterogame paren een hogere
echtscheidingskans hebben dan homogame paren. Een verdere specificatie werd gemaakt door
rekening te houden met het feit dat bepaalde combinaties in de samenleving minder worden
geaccepteerd dan andere wanneer het gaat om man-vrouw verhoudingen. De asymmetrie- of
hypergamiehypothese voorspelt dat de kans op echtscheiding in een gemengd huwelijk groter is
wanneer de vrouw ouder of hoger opgeleid is of een hogere sociale status heeft dan haar man. Van
de traditionele arbeidsverdeling wordt verwacht dat zij het huwelijk stabiliseert. Vandaar dat de
specialisatiehypothese de heterogamiehypothese afzwakt en een reductie of zelfs omkering voorspelt
van het effect van heterogamie naar (economische) sociale status op de kans op echtscheiding.
Andere kenmerken gerelateerd aan een traditionele rolverdeling zijn een wat oudere man met een
hoger opleidingsniveau vergeleken met zijn vrouw. Desalniettemin wordt niet verwacht dat het
heterogamie-effect van leeftijd en opleidingsniveau klein zal zijn ten gevolge van specialisatie,
omdat deze kenmerken ook te maken hebben met cultuur, smaak en voorkeuren.
Met de registratiegegevens van het CBS konden (in hoofdstuk 2) de hypothesen
multivariaat worden getoetst voor leeftijd, kerkelijke gezindte, nationaliteit en de burgerlijke
staat vóór het huwelijk. Met de SIN98-surveygegevens gebeurde dit (in hoofstuk 4) voor
heterogamie naar leeftijd, opleidingsniveau, sociale status, kerkelijke gezindte, etniciteit en
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sociale herkomst. Met de surveygegevens waren meer gesofisticeerde levensloopanalyses
mogelijk. Duidelijke heterogamie-effecten werden gevonden in de registratiegegevens voor
leeftijd, kerkelijke gezindte en nationaliteit. De grootste effecten die werden gevonden met de
surveygegevens waren voor leeftijd, opleidingsniveau, kerkelijke gezindte en economische
herkomst.
Volgens de registratiegegevens zijn meer paren na tien jaar huwelijk gescheiden
naarmate hun leeftijdsverschillen groter zijn. In 42 procent van de onderscheiden heterogame
leeftijdscombinaties werd dit effect gevonden, gecontroleerd voor het hoofdeffect van de
huwelijksleeftijd, welk aangeeft dat naarmate een bruid of bruidegom jonger is op de
huwelijksdag, de echtscheidingskans groter is.
De belangrijkste heterogamie-effecten naar godsdienst die in hoofdstuk 2 werden
gevonden zijn voor de grootste christelijke denominaties: gemengde katholiek/protestantse paren
hebben grotere echtscheidingsrisico’s. Van alle geanalyseerde combinatiemogelijkheden
vertoonde 51 procent het heterogamie-effect. Ook deze effecten zijn gecontroleerd voor het
hoofdeffect van kerkelijk gezindte, waaruit blijkt dat onder de homogame paren de onkerkelijken
de grootste en de gereformeerden de kleinste echtscheidingskans hebben. 
Soortgelijke effecten werden voor etniciteit gevonden. In hoofstuk 2 gebeurde dit aan de
hand van de nationaliteit. Omdat alleen in Nederland geregistreerde huwelijken en
echtscheidingen konden worden geanalyseerd, moeten de resultaten op dit vlak met
terughoudendheid worden geïnterpreteerd. Toch zijn er extreem hoge echtscheidingskansen
binnen tien jaar voor gemengde paren in vergelijking met de respectievelijke homogame paren in
de categorieën van man en vrouw. Van de 13 gemengde combinaties die konden worden
onderzocht vertoonden 11 (85 procent) een meestal zeer groot heterogamie-effect.
Door relatief kleine aantallen gemengde huwelijken is de behoorlijke invloed van
gemengd huwen op de echtscheidingskans zoals gevonden op het microniveau beduidend kleiner
op het macroniveau. Toch leert een gesimuleerde vergelijking van een denkbeeldige volledig open
samenleving met een volledig gesloten samenleving dat heterogamie met betrekking tot leeftijd
en nationaliteit toch enige macro-implicaties heeft voor de gemiddelde echtscheidingskans.
Het genoemde effect van leeftijdsheterogamie op de echtscheidingskans kon ook worden
vastgesteld met de surveygegevens. De kansverhouding om te scheiden (versus niet te scheiden)
neemt met 4 procent toe voor elk jaar dat het leeftijdsverschil groter is. Dat betekent dat een paar
met een leeftijdsverschil van 17 tot 18 jaar een dubbel zo grote kansverhouding heeft als een even
oud paar.
Kerkelijke verschillen resulteren volgens de surveygegevens in een grotere
echtscheidingskans voor gemengde huwelijken tussen een onkerkelijke en een katholiek, een
katholiek en een protestant en enkele niet nader gespecificeerde gemengde combinaties in
vergelijking met homogame paren in de categorie van zowel man als vrouw. De kansverhouding
van een onkerkelijk/katholiek paar ligt 24 procent boven die van homogame onkerkelijke paren en
zelfs 111 procent boven die van homogame katholieke paren. Katholiek/protestantse paren
hebben een kansverhouding 59 procent boven die van homogame katholieken en 89 procent
boven die van homogame protestanten.
Een ander toegeschreven kenmerk, alleen beschikbaar in de surveygegevens, dat een
invloed heeft op de echtscheidingskans is economische herkomst: naarmate de verschillen in
economische status van de vaders van man en vrouw groter zijn, neemt ook de kansverhouding
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om te scheiden toe met 15 procent per eenheid van de schaal die in onze gegevens een bereik
heeft van tussen de -1.40 en 2.43.
Aldus zijn duidelijke effecten gevonden in zowel registratiegegevens als survey die de
heterogamiehypothese bevestigen. De bevindingen bevestigen ook patronen in overeenstemming
met de asymmetriehypothese. De leeftijdscategorieën die in de registratiegegevens een
heterogamie-effect laten zien zijn grotendeels combinaties waarin de vrouw ouder is dan de man.
In de surveygegevens ontbreekt het bewijs voor een asymmetrie-effect van leeftijdsheterogamie,
maar is de invloed van opleidingsheterogamie volledig asymmetrisch van aard: de kansverhouding
voor echtscheiding stijgt alleen als de vrouw een hogere opleiding heeft dan de man en wel met
17 (in een uitgebreid model) tot 21 procent (niet gecontroleerd voor andere vormen van
heterogamie). Een asymmetrie-effect voor economische status werd gevonden in een model dat
niet voor andere vormen van heterogamie controleert, maar werd verklaard in een multivariaat
model.
Verder werd de specialisatiehypothese bevestigd door de afwezigheid van de effecten van
absolute verschillen tussen partners betreffende zowel de economische als de culturele dimensie
van sociale status en betreffende het opleidingsniveau. Het heterogamie-effect op echtscheiding
wordt hier gecompenseerd door de voordelen die taakspecialisatie met zich meebrengt.
Als er een of meer kinderen jonger dan 13 jaar in het huishouden wonen dan wordt de
echtscheidingskans lager. Heterogamie-effecten op de echtscheidingskans worden echter niet
verklaard door het hebben van kinderen. Evenzeer wordt het moment van de geboorte van het
eerste kind niet beïnvloed door de mate van heterogamie.
Verklaring
Hiermee is de eerste onderzoeksvraag beantwoord met analyses uit hoofdstuk 2 en 4. Met behulp
van analyses op de surveygegevens kon in hoofdstuk 4 ook een antwoord worden gegeven op de
tweede onderzoeksvraag naar de verklaring van de relatie tussen heterogamie en echtscheiding.
Daartoe werden eerst hypothesen afgeleid van de voordelen die homogamie aan het huwelijk
biedt. De theorie benadrukt dat heterogamie tot een grotere kans op echtscheiding leidt omdat
echtgenoten gemiddeld genomen minder goed met elkaar zouden kunnen opschieten vanwege
verschillende voorkeuren en verwachtingen. De verklarende conflicthypothese met betrekking tot
echtscheiding voorspelt daarom dat verschillen van mening tussen man en vrouw de
heterogamie-effecten op de echtscheidingskans kunnen verklaren. Vervolgens werd erop gewezen
dat de sociale omgeving een gemengd huwelijk door de bank genomen in mindere mate
accepteert. Dit leidt tot minder steun voor het huwelijk en een neiging tot het steunen van een
echtscheiding wanneer het huwelijk zich in moeilijke tijden bevindt. De verklarende steunhypothese
met betrekking tot echtscheiding houdt in dat afkeuring door de sociale omgeving het effect van
heterogamie op echtscheiding verklaart.
Vervolgens werden de hypothesen meer specifiek gemaakt door te verwijzen naar het
onderscheid tussen enerzijds kenmerken die door overerving aan mensen worden toegeschreven,
namelijk kenmerken van de ouders, de sociale omgeving, en anderzijds kenmerken die bereikt
worden door eigen verdiensten van de mensen zelf. De ascriptie-verklaringshypothese voorspelt dat
de effecten van heterogamie naar godsdienst, etniciteit en sociale herkomst op de
echtscheidingskans vooral verklaard kunnen worden door sociale afkeuring van het huwelijk. De
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verwerving-verklaringshypothese voorspelt dat de effecten van heterogamie betreffende het
opleidingsniveau en eigen sociale status vooral verklaard kunnen worden door meningsverschillen
tussen de partners. Asymmetrie-effecten worden verwacht gelijkelijk verklaard te worden door
zowel gebrek aan steun van de sociale omgeving als meningsverschillen tussen de echtgenoten.
De analyses in hoofdstuk 4 lieten inderdaad zien dat gemengd huwen een invloed heeft
op de meningsverschillen van partners betreffende bijvoorbeeld smaak, voorkeuren, gedrag, de
relatie, en op de afkeuring van het huwelijk door de sociale omgeving en dat deze op hun beurt
een invloed hebben op de echtscheidingskans. Verder werd de invloed van bepaalde vormen van
heterogamie op echtscheiding kleiner nadat rekening gehouden werd met de meningsverschillen
tussen partners en het afkeuren van het huwelijk door de sociale omgeving, zoals ouders,
vrienden, buren en vertegenwoordigers van de kerk.
In welke gevallen kunnen we spreken van een oorzakelijke verklaring? Het effect dat
leeftijdsverschillen, ongeacht hun richting, leiden tot een grotere kans op echtscheiding werd voor
een derde verklaard. Deze verklaring leek voor het grootste deel tot stand te komen door een
gebrek aan steun door ouders, vrienden, buren en vertegenwoordigers van de kerk. Het
asymmetrie-effect van een hogere echtscheidingskans voor paren waarvan de vrouw een hoger
opleidingsniveau heeft dan haar man wordt volledig verklaard door meningsverschillen tussen
partners en steun door de sociale omgeving. Zoals kon worden verwacht van een kenmerk door
iemand zelf verworven, spelen meningsverschillen de grootste rol in deze effectreductie, maar
zoals voorspeld voor asymmetrie-effecten is het aandeel van een gebrek aan steun uit de sociale
omgeving bijna even belangrijk.
Echtelijke meningsverschillen en afkeuring door de omgeving verklaren meer dan een
derde van de invloed van onkerkelijk/katholiek en katholiek/protestant gemengde huwelijken op
de kansverhouding van echtscheiding. Voor kerkelijk gemengde huwelijken tussen kleinere
kerkelijke groeperingen is deze verklaringskracht iets meer dan een vijfde. Alleen de verklaring
door de sociale omgeving is statistisch gezien causaal en interveniërend: kerkelijke heterogamie
beïnvloedt steun, steun beïnvloedt de echtscheidingskans. Dit ondersteunt de ascriptie-
verklaringshypothese. Dit geldt niet voor de invloed van verschillen in economische ouderlijke
herkomst, welke causaal alleen voor een klein deel verklaard wordt door meningsverschillen
tussen de echtgenoten.
Veranderingen over de tijd
Om de derde onderzoeksvraag naar veranderingen over historische tijd te kunnen beantwoorden
werden hypothesen afgeleid van de veranderingen die zich in de laatste decennia hebben
voltrokken in de samenleving. Ik wees daarbij op de trend naar individualisering en secularisering
die gepaard gaat met veranderingen in normen en waarden. Dit betekent dat, naast de toename
van de echtscheidingfrequentie, een toenemende liberalisering van normen en waarden leidt tot
een grotere acceptatie van gemengde huwelijken en daarmee tot een afnemende invloed van
heterogamie op de kans op echtscheiding.
Een tweede soort verandering betreft die naar een samenleving waarin sociale posities
verkregen worden op basis van eigen verdiensten en niet meer zozeer op basis van geërfde,
toegeschreven kenmerken. Dit gegeven is eerder gebruikt voor de voorspelling dat een kenmerk
zoals opleidingsniveau relatief belangrijker wordt als criterium in het partnerselectieproces dan
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bijvoorbeeld kerkelijke gezindte of sociale herkomst. In deze studie gebruiken we de trend naar
meritocratisering voor voorspellingen aangaande de invloed van heterogamie op de
echtscheidingskans. Het ascriptiegedeelte van de trendhypothese voorspelt dat de toegeschreven
kenmerken religie, etniciteit en sociale herkomst een door de tijd afnemende invloed hebben op
echtscheiding. Tegelijkertijd voorspelt het verwervingsgedeelte van de trendhypothese een door de
tijd toenemende invloed van de verworven kenmerken opleidingsniveau en sociale status van de
partners.
In hoofdstuk 3 en 5 werden de veranderingen over de historische tijd onderzocht op
respectievelijk de registratie- en de surveygegevens. De absolute niveaus van heterogamie over de
tijd werden beschreven. Bij leeftijd en sociale herkomst was geen sprake van een duidelijk
patroon; bij opleidingsniveau en economische sociale status was een duidelijke daling van
heterogamie zichtbaar tussen midden jaren ’60 en de jaren ’80; kerkelijke en etnische heterogamie
nemen sinds het midden van de jaren ’80 duidelijk toe.
Veranderingen in de invloed van heterogamie op de kans op echtscheiding werden
echter niet of nauwelijks gevonden. Slechts enkele specifieke groepen vertonen een trend in
overeenstemming met het ascriptiedeel van de trendhypothese. Dit betreft een minimale afname
tussen de perioden 1974-1979 en 1980-1984 van het echtscheiding bevorderende effect van
katholiek/gereformeerde en Nederlands hervormd/gereformeerde paren uitsluitend gevonden in
de registratiegegevens voor de eerste vijf jaar van het huwelijk. Met de surveygegevens wordt
geen afnemende trend gevonden behalve, maar niet echt overtuigend, voor de groep
onkerkelijk/katholiek gemengde huwelijken wanneer de periode voor en na 1970 wordt
vergeleken. Etnisch gemengde huwelijken lijken zelfs een toenemende trend te vertonen, maar
hierbij konden de juiste vergelijkingen niet worden gemaakt vanwege geringe groepsgroottes.
Veranderingen gedurende het huwelijk
Ook werd in deze studie gekeken naar veranderingen gedurende het huwelijk ter beantwoording
van onderzoeksvraag 4. De hypothese van groeiende acceptatie tussen partners voorspelt een
afname van het heterogamie-effect op echtscheiding over de duur van het huwelijk, terwijl de
hypothese van geaccumuleerde irritatie tussen partners over hun verschillen een toename van het
heterogamie-effect voorspelt. Een combinatiehypothese voorspelt een omgekeerde-U-verband: een
aanvankelijke stijging gevolgd door een daling van het effect. De hypothese van groeiende acceptatie
werd vervolgens uitgesplitst. Hierbij werd voorspeld dat de afname over de duur van het huwelijk
bij het effect van de ascriptiekenmerken, kerkelijke gezindte, etniciteit en sociale herkomst, en bij
de asymmetrie-effecten beperkt zou zijn, en dat de afname voor de verwervingskenmerken,
opleidingsniveau, eigen sociale status en ook voor leeftijd meer geprononceerd zou zijn. Verder
werd in de groeihypothese voorspeld dat huwelijkspartners die zich aan elkaar aanpassen door qua
sociale kenmerken naar elkaar toe te groeien gedurende het huwelijk kleinere scheidingsrisico’s
hebben, terwijl partners die van elkaar vervreemd raken in de zin van een toenemende sociale
heterogamie grotere scheidingsrisico’s hebben.
Ook deze veranderingen werden onderzocht in hoofdstuk 3 en hoofdstuk 5 op basis van
respectievelijk de registratie- en de surveygegevens. Hierbij werd eerst een beschrijving gegeven
van de veranderingen in absoluut niveau van de mate van heterogamie gedurende het huwelijk.
Alleen in de surveydata waren verschillende meetmomenten van heterogamie voorhanden voor
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sociale status en kerkelijke gezindte. Wat leeftijd betreft konden veranderingen over het huwelijk
bekeken worden in de vorm van het natuurlijk verloop van de leeftijdsratio. De verschillen in
sociale status nemen in de eerste 25 jaar van het huwelijk toe, religieuze verschillen nemen
gedurende het huwelijk af. Deze veranderingen zijn deels aanpassing, deels een gevolg van de
onderzochte heterogamie-effecten.
Met betrekking tot de veranderingen in invloed op echtscheiding werd alleen een lichte
en inconsistente afname gevonden voor enkele categorieën van heterogamie naar nationaliteit.
Verder werden in beide hoofdstukken geen lineaire trends aangetroffen. Een vergelijking van de
periode voor en na de geboorte van het eerste kind laat een afnemend asymmetrie-effect zien van
het hebben van hogere sociaal-economische status van de vrouw in vergelijking met haar man: dit
positieve effect is uitsluitend vóór de geboorte van het eerste kind zichtbaar. Verder neemt het
positieve heterogamie-effect voor een onkerkelijk/katholiek gemengd huwelijk af na de geboorte
van het eerste kind. Concluderend kan gesteld worden dat de invloed van heterogamie op de kans
op echtscheiding maar weinig verandert gedurende de duur van het huwelijk.
Wat het naar elkaar toe en van elkaar af groeien betreft, maken veranderingen in de
mate van heterogamie tijdens het huwelijk naar economische en culturele status niet uit voor de
echtscheidingskans. Veranderingen in godsdienstheterogamie zijn wel van belang, maar alleen als
de partners van elkaar af groeien: indien godsdienstverschillen tijdens het huwelijk ontstaan, dan
wordt de echtscheidingskans groter.
Partnerselectieproces
De laatste twee onderzoeksvragen die werden onderzocht betreffen het partnerselectieproces.
Leidt een overhaaste keuze of een keuze onder druk tot een grotere scheidingskans en wordt dit
verklaard door een grotere mate van sociale heterogamie? Vier indicatoren voor de intensiteit of
kwaliteit van het zoekgedrag werden gebruikt in hoofdstuk 6: de huwelijksleeftijd, de
verkeringsduur, een voorhuwelijkse zwangerschap leidend tot een min of meer gedwongen
huwelijk (moetje) en voorhuwelijkse samenwoning. De hypothese betreffende de zoekkwaliteit
voorspelt een lagere scheidingskans naarmate men langer en intensiever naar een partner heeft
gezocht.
De surveydata laten zien dat de invloed van de kwaliteit van het zoekgedrag op het
echtscheidingsrisico behoorlijk sterk is. Huwelijken houden het langer uit indien ze tot stand
komen op een meer volwassen leeftijd en na een wat langere periode van verkering dan op een
immature leeftijd met iemand die men eigenlijk nog nauwelijks kent. De kansverhouding voor
echtscheiding neemt met 3 tot 4 procent af voor elk jaar dat de jongste echtgenoot ouder was bij
huwelijkssluiting. Voor elk extra jaar verkering is deze afname 5 tot 9 procent, afhankelijk van het
aantal controlevariabelen. Het effect van de huwelijksleeftijd neemt af over de tijd, hetgeen erop
duidt dat men steeds meer trouwt of gaat samenwonen op een leeftijd dat men daar rijp voor is.
Verder uitstel geeft dan geen extra bescherming voor de huwelijksstabiliteit.
Een voorhuwelijkse zwangerschap lijkt aanvankelijk ook de echtscheidingskans te
verhogen, maar dit wordt verklaard door de controlevariabelen, met name socialisatie en
ervaringen in het verleden met betrekking tot echtscheiding. Zogenaamde ‘moetjes’ hebben
daarom eerder te maken met sociale druk dan met de kwaliteit van het zoekgedrag.
Als we voorhuwelijks samenwonen zien als een testhuwelijk, zou het te beschouwen zijn
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als een uitbreiding van het zoeken naar een partner. Als men eerst met elkaar heeft
samengewoond is de kansverhouding voor echtscheiding echter 20 (gecontroleerd) tot 56
(ongecontroleerd) procent hoger. Ongehuwd samenwonen heeft daarom veeleer te maken met een
minder onderschrijven van traditionele normen en waarden met betrekking tot het huwelijk en
het gezin en niet slechts met een testhuwelijk.
Wanneer heterogamie in het model wordt opgenomen dan neemt alleen de invloed van
de verkeringsduur op de echtscheidingskans licht af. De invloed van de intensiteit van het
zoekgedrag op de kans op echtscheiding wordt nauwelijks verklaard door sociale heterogamie. Te
verwachten valt dat prematuriteit en heterogamie met betrekking tot persoonlijkheidskenmerken
een belangrijkere rol spelen in die invloed.
Discussie
Na het schetsen van een zo compleet mogelijk beeld van de relatie tussen heterogamie en
echtscheiding is een van de discussiepunten dat een grote invloed van heterogamie op de
echtscheidingskans niet noodzakelijkerwijs veel bijdraagt aan het macro echtscheidingscijfer.
Maar als gemengde huwelijken meer voorkomen, dan wordt die macrobijdrage van heterogamie
groter onder de voorwaarde dat de invloed van heterogamie op echtscheiding gelijk blijft. Dit
heeft voor het onderzoek als consequentie dat een survey onder momenteel gehuwden een steeds
selectievere steekproef oplevert van relatief homogame paren.
Eerder onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat bij de partnerkeuze het opleidingsniveau van een
aanstaande partner belangrijker is geworden ten opzichte van bijvoorbeeld godsdienst. Dit is
conform de verwachting van een meritocratische samenleving waarin eigen kenmerken
belangrijker worden dan geërfde kenmerken. Het onderhavige onderzoek laat echter zien dat
naast heterogamie naar verworven, ook die naar toegeschreven, van de ouders geërfde kenmerken
nog steeds een duidelijke echtscheiding bevorderende invloed heeft.
Het relatief toenemen van heterogamie naar toegeschreven kenmerken ten opzichte van
heterogamie naar verworven kenmerken en het feit dat hun effecten op echtscheiding niet veel
lijken te veranderen over de tijd, brengen de verwachting naar voren dat heterogamie naar
toegeschreven kenmerken een relatief belangrijkere rol kan gaan spelen in de echtscheidingskans
dan die naar verworven kenmerken. Dit lijkt op een soort ‘correctie’ die de groeiende openheid
van de samenleving weer vermindert. In de relatie tussen partnerselectie, heterogamie en
echtscheiding is daarom waarschijnlijk niet zozeer de openheid van de samenleving aan het
veranderen, maar de houding ten aanzien van het huwelijk: het huwelijk is geen doel op zich
meer, maar een middel om gelukkig te worden en zich te kunnen ontplooien. Brengt een huwelijk
niet op wat men ervan verwacht, dan besluit men tegenwoordig eerder om het huwelijk te
beëindigen.
Het is de moeite waard om trendeffecten van heterogamie op de echtscheidingskans te
repliceren omdat ze moeilijk zijn vast te stellen. Verder zouden meer meetmomenten van meer
vormen van heterogamie gedurende het huwelijk een nuttige uitbreiding van toekomstig
onderzoek kunnen zijn om de juiste causale volgorde van gebeurtenissen vast te stellen. Ter
verklaring zouden behalve meningsverschillen ook verschillen in verwachtingen rondom de
verdeling van taken en leefstijlkenmerken meegenomen kunnen worden. Aan de verklaring door
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afkeuring vanuit de sociale omgeving zouden ook andere, meer uitgesproken of juist subtiele
vormen onderscheiden kunnen worden, zoals aandacht of ingrijpen van de ouders tijdens het
huwelijk. Een andere mogelijke uitbreiding betreft de introductie van psychologische oorzaken in
de sfeer van botsende persoonlijkheidskenmerken.
Homogamie zou ervoor zorgen dat echtgenoten overeenkomstige voorkeuren en
leefstijlen hebben. De vraag is of sociaal heterogame paren die toch trouwen dat doen omdat hun
meningen en gedrag overeenkomen ondanks hun sociale verschillen. Paren die wel besluiten te
gaan samenwonen of trouwen zouden vergeleken kunnen worden met paren die besluiten dat
niet te doen en voordien hun relatie beëindigen. Een dergelijk onderzoek naar het
partnerselectieproces kan een nieuw licht werpen op de huidige bevindingen dat soort over het
algemeen soort zoekt en tegenpolen elkaar toch vaak afstoten.
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